

**Our Catholic heritage in Texas, 1519-1936; prepared under the auspices of the Knights of Columbus of Texas, Paul J. Foik, editor.**

Texas Knights of Columbus Historical Commission.  
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
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OUR CATHOLIC HERITAGE IN TEXAS  
1519 - 1936







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# OUR CATHOLIC HERITAGE IN TEXAS

IN SEVEN VOLUMES

1519-1936

PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF  
THE KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS OF TEXAS

PAUL J. FOIK, C. S. C., PH. D., *Editor*  
*Chairman*

TEXAS KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS HISTORICAL COMMISSION  
St. Edward's University  
Austin











*Knights of Columbus State Council. Historical Commission*

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1519-1936

PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF  
THE KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS OF TEXAS  
PAUL J. FOIK, C. S. C., PH. D., *Editor*

## THE MISSION ERA:

# THE PASSING OF THE MISSIONS

1762-1782

*by*

CARLOS E. CASTAÑEDA, PH. D.

  
VOLUME IV

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## P R E F A C E

The increasing wealth of unused sources has made the period covered in the present volume shorter than originally planned. While many of the incidents and events described and portrayed have previously been treated in part or in whole, nevertheless, they are here presented with many additional details gleaned from new sources now available. The withdrawal of the missionaries of the College of Queretaro from the Texas field has received heretofore only passing mention. It is treated fully here for the first time. The same is true with regard to the first attempt at secularization of Mission Valero, a significant episode ignored until now. An earnest effort has been made to present the complete picture of social, economic, and political conditions and to portray realistically the personal considerations and human emotions that often determine the course of history.

The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the Knights of Columbus, under whose auspices the study was carried out; to Rev. Dr. Paul J. Foik, C. S. C., of St. Edward's University, Austin, for his valuable guidance and constant encouragement; to Dr. Charles W. Hackett, Dr. Eugene Barker, Miss Winnie Allen, Miss Maurine T. Wilson, and Mr. E. W. Winkler of the University of Texas for useful suggestions, friendly advice, and continued coöperation in checking materials and sources, and to Elisa, his wife, for uncomplaining endurance in checking details.

C. E. CASTAÑEDA,  
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# THE PASSING OF THE MISSIONS



## CHAPTER I

### THE PROVINCE OF TEXAS IN 1762

On the eve of the Louisiana cession to Spain, the Province of Texas had aroused the concern of the officials in Mexico. Largely through the persistent efforts of the tireless missionaries an extension of the actual domain of Spain had been attempted since 1740 but with doubtful results. The continued menace of French enterprise, constantly carried forward into the Indian territory occupied by the unsubdued Apaches and Comanches, and the relentless advance of the English frontier towards the Mississippi had determined the Spanish officials on more than one occasion to support the zealous efforts of the missionaries in extending their endeavors to the unconquered tribes. As a result, the general situation had been improved in spite of apparent failures. San Antonio, the center of Spanish power, had continued to develop slowly. La Bahía had now two missions, and the garrison of the presidio had been increased by ten men. Conditions at Los Adaes had been improved and the illicit trade with the neighboring French post of Natchitoches had grown in spite of stringent regulations and repeated investigations. A fruitless attempt had been made to occupy the lower Trinity by authorizing the establishment of a mission for the Orcoquisacs and a garrison of thirty men. Several missions and a presidio had been established at La Junta de los Rios, present Presidio. The El Paso region had been given liberal support and the missions in the vicinity of present El Paso were active and making progress. The San Xavier River enterprise had proved a dismal failure and led to a futile attempt to bring the fierce Apaches under Spanish influence, which in turn had come to a tragic end through the aroused enmity of the northern tribes. The most formidable attempt of Spanish arms, under Colonel Ortiz Parrilla, to chastise these Indians had resulted in the most shameful defeat at the hands of the natives in the annals of frontier warfare. But the continued efforts of the officials in Mexico and the undaunted missionaries in Texas in the face of apparently insurmountable obstacles had forced the extension of the missionary field to the upper Nueces River, where new missions were temporarily founded for the faithless Apaches. This experiment, however, only helped to maintain the hostility of the already embittered northern tribes.

The details of some of these activities and incidents have been given in

[1]

the previous volume of this history. Before taking up the interrupted thread of our narrative, it will be well to survey conditions in Texas in 1762. With this as a background the new policies of the viceregal government and the activities of the zealous missionaries during the closing quarter of the eighteenth century will be better understood.

The mission system had been founded under numerous handicaps and at the cost of great sacrifices in the early part of the century. It had heroically stood the trials and tribulations of the early years in an untrodden and unconquered wilderness and in the face of unmerited opposition of unsympathetic and selfish officials. In the years that followed, it had grown and developed inspired by human sacrifice and the blood of innocent martyrs, who toiled with undying faith to plant deep the roots of civilization and bring the comforts of religion to the untutored hordes that roamed the vast wilderness. But like other frontier institutions, the missions were to continue until their work was done. Not till then were they to pass on even as the frontier itself. It is this last phase that will form the major portion of the present volume. It would be misleading, as Bolton, the great pioneer historian of Spanish Texas, has so aptly said "to leave the impression that all the Texas missions in this period had the same disastrous career as those on the San Xavier, the Trinity, the San Sabá and the Nueces Rivers."<sup>1</sup> Fortunately the industrious and painstaking friars have left us a detailed and illuminating report of the progress, both spiritual and temporal, made by the missions up to the year 1762.

An impartial examination of the record of material and spiritual progress attained by the missions offers a striking contrast to the wretched and precarious existence of the civil settlers in Texas. But the success of the missions had not been at the expense of the civil settlements. It was the result of the intelligent and disinterested direction of the missionaries, the paternal care, the burning zeal, and the unselfish labors of that remarkable group of men who took the uncivilized denizen of the wilds, and in order to bring to him the comforts of religion, initiated him into the industrious habits of civilized men, leading the neophytes gently but firmly in their daily tasks and inclining them by slow degrees to sustained and persistent effort. This was, truly, a labor of love and genuine civilization. The realization that the civil settlement of Texas and the establishment of Spain's claim to this vast province were due to the efforts of the missionaries more than to Spanish arms, dawned with

<sup>1</sup>Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 95.

irresistible force upon the student of the mission era. It was, in fact, the missions that supplied food to the settlements in their want; it was the mission Indians that saved San Antonio on more than one occasion. It was the missions that offered greater protection against the attacks of hostile tribes than the poorly built and run down presidios in Texas. Lastly, it must be recognized that the officials themselves admitted the fact that only the influence of the missionaries kept the numerous Indian nations, who far outnumbered the Spanish soldiers and settlers, from destroying the Spanish outposts in Texas and driving the Spaniards out.

It has been asserted, without any foundation and with but little thought, that the missions in Texas were a grand failure. Unfortunately the assertion has been repeated by Catholics and non-Catholics alike to the point where it has become an admitted and undisputed fact. But this conclusion is unfounded and merely the result of a deduction from a false premise. It has been deduced that since the missions disappeared and only their silent and romantic ruins stand today before the gazing crowds, they failed. But the fundamental fact is ignored, that the mission in the Spanish system was a transitory frontier institution designed as a stage in the progress of the extending frontier, like the military posts themselves, which moved on to new frontiers or were abandoned when the settlements became self-supporting and the need for protection had ceased. Just as the stagecoach, the covered wagon, the trading post, and the thundering herds of the buffalo have passed away, so did the missions of the Spanish frontier give way to a new age for which they had labored so faithfully. Each served its purpose in the development of the frontier, each made possible in its own way a new era.

The missions, however, like the zealous austere pilgrims of the Atlantic coast, carried into the wilderness the elements of a new civilization, but with greater love and sympathy for the native, whom they tried to convert and civilize and in whom the missionary recognized another fellow-being. By no standards can it be said that the Texas missions failed. Temporally and spiritually they succeeded admirably, as the records plainly show. They accomplished their task well and unselfishly held high the torch of civilization. The repeated accusations by unscrupulous officials and envious neighbors, that they prospered at their expense, is the begrudging admission of their uncontested success. It is the despairing cry of those who fail. Had the missions failed, had they had no material goods, had the Indians lived under their protection and care as wretchedly as the

impoverished and indolent soldiers and settlers, there would have been no outcry against them.

*Mission San Antonio de Valero.* By 1762, this mission had become a prosperous Indian community under the watchful care and paternal guidance of the devoted missionaries of the College of La Santa Cruz of Querétaro. Located about two gunshots distance from the San Antonio River, on its eastern bank, stood the monastery or friary, which was the heart of the mission. This was a building fifty *varas* square, with its upper and lower cloisters flanked with ample archways. There were cells for the missionaries, a refectory, a kitchen, and offices. All these rooms were decorously furnished with all the things necessary for the administration of the mission and to supply the needs of the neophytes. The cells of the *Padres*, the offices, and all the other rooms were decorated with good taste and breathed a spirit that reflected the fervent faith of the founders. Back of the monastery was a large hall, where there were four looms. Here cotton and woolen cloth and blankets of various kinds were woven to supply all the needs of the mission. Adjoining the looms were two rooms in which the wool, the cotton, the combs, cards, spools, and other spinning accessories used by the Indians in the daily tasks were kept. Both the wool and cotton used were raised by the mission.

The church, begun in 1738, had been completed before this date (1762) with its tower and sacristy, but the structure was poorly built and caved in soon after its completion. With characteristic industry and determination a new church was now being built out of stone and mortar, much more solidly and much better designed. A word should be said here about the childish tradition, sentimentally repeated by credulous folklorists and uncritical historians, that the mortar used was mixed with the milk of asses or goats. No reference to any such practice has been found in the available records. In the meantime a hall, thirty-five *varas* long, built to serve as a granary, was being used for religious services. An altar with its platform had been erected at one end of the long room. Over it, in a niche, a carved image of Saint Anthony, one *vara* high, had been placed. There were also an image of Christ crucified, one and a third *varas* long, a carved image of Our Lady of Sorrows, and a similar one of Saint John. The last two were artistically clothed. Above a second altar was an image of Our Lady of Sorrows, one *vara* high, with its *andas*, and two lovely dresses. This image was taken out every week by the Indians in a procession which they held in connection with their

devotion to the rosary. It had a pallium of Persian silk. Above a third altar, which was set up in the choir, there was a beautiful image of the Nazarene and several pictures. Along the sides of the choir were built-in benches for greater comfort. There were also two benches, two confessionals, a fountain for holy water, a baptismal font made of copper with its cover, a set of altar bells, candlesticks and four large bells.

The sacristy was a well furnished room with drawers and closets in which the ornaments were kept. There were three chalices with their patens, four cruets, a mounted crucifix, a censer, and three anointers, all of silver. For the celebration of the Holy Sacrifice and other liturgical functions there were fourteen complete sets of vestments, some of Persian silk and some of damask, besides four copes. There were also twenty surplices and fifteen sets of altar cloths. The mission had three missals, two rituals, and all the things necessary for the adequate celebration of the various religious festivals.

The pueblo proper consisted of seven tiers of houses made of stone arranged about a square. Through the center of this ran a waterway shaded by willows and various fruit trees which were cultivated for the benefit of the Indians. As a precaution against a siege, a good well had been dug to provide the inmates with water. The entire mission and pueblo were surrounded by a wall with a fortified gate, over which there was a turret, where three cannons were mounted. On either side were loopholes for its defence. Each house was provided with doors and windows and each one had high beds and chests with drawers. Each family had its *metate* (grindstone), its *comal* (flat iron to cook corn bread), its pots and pans, and all the necessary utensils. These things were regularly supplied to the neophytes from the common warehouse.

For the cultivation of their crops, which were chiefly corn, beans, chile, cotton, and some vegetables, the mission had forty yokes of oxen fully equipped, thirty plows and the necessary plowshares and harrows; twelve carts to transport supplies, stone, and timber; fifty axes, forty hoes, twenty-two bars, and twenty-five scythes. For carpentry they had all the necessary instruments and tools, such as planes, saws, vices, hammers, files, *formones* (chisels), and braces. They also had a well-equipped blacksmith shop to repair their tools, sharpen their instruments, and shoe their stock.

In the granary, which was a large stone building, the supplies were kept. Here there was room to store as many as eighteen hundred bushels

of corn and several hundred bushels of beans, which were the annual harvest raised by the mission Indians.

The mission also had a ranch with a rock house twenty-five *varas* long and an arcade. The building had three rooms, where the families, who took care of the stock, lived. There were in the ranch one hundred and fifteen saddle horses, eleven hundred and fifteen head of cattle, twenty-three hundred sheep and goats, two hundred mares, fifteen donkeys, and eighteen mules. The ranch had its stone chapel, eleven *varas* long, with a stone cross two *varas* high on its altar, which was also adorned with several carved images and some paintings. In the chapel two sets of vestments were kept for the celebration of Mass.

Such was the physical plant of Mission San Antonio de Valero forty-four years after its establishment. During this time, while gaining in temporal goods, it had baptized fifteen hundred and seventy-two Indians. Of these twelve hundred and forty-seven had received Christian burial and four hundred and fifty-four had been married by the church. In 1762 there were seventy-six families living at the mission, who together with the orphans and widowers, made a total of two hundred and seventy-five persons. They were of the Xaramé, Payaya, Zana, Lipan, Coco, Top, and Karankawa nations. Of these, thirty-two were gentiles who were being instructed to receive the Sacrament of Baptism. The mission was administered at this time by Fray Mariano Francisco de los Dolores, Fray José López, and Brother Juan de los Angeles.<sup>2</sup>

*Mission Purísima Concepción.* This mission, which was originally founded in East Texas in 1716, was moved to San Antonio in 1730. It was located about one league (two and one-half miles) south of Valero. Its church, which had now been completed, was thirty-two *varas* long and eight *varas* wide, built of stone and with a dome. It had two towers with bells. Above the main altar there was a fresco of the *Cinco Señores*. Its tabernacle was gilded, and over the main altar, in an oval-shaped

<sup>2</sup>Fray Mariano Francisco de los Dolores and companions to Fray Francisco Xavier Ortiz, March 6, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 28, ff. 162-183. This important and detailed report was made by order of Fray Manuel de Nájera, Commissary General of Missions in New Spain, given on October 16, 1761, and transmitted to the San Antonio missionaries on October 28 of the same year by Fray Ortiz. The contents were summarily given by Bolton in his *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 96-101, but the details concerning each mission have never been cited. They constitute an invaluable source for a graphic picture of the missions in San Antonio in 1762 that should be made available. In the present description liberal use of the report has been made.



niche, was an elegantly sculptured image in honor of Our Lady of Sorrows and Our Lady of Pilar. The church was furnished with two confessionals, several benches and a pulpit. Beneath the two towers there were two small chapels: one dedicated to Saint Michael, with a very pleasing altar, and the other used as a baptistry. Here there was a baptismal font of copper with its cover, three anointers, and a silver shell.

The sacristy was a room with an arched ceiling twelve *varas* square and was fitted with closets and drawers, where three chalices with their patens were kept, together with a ciborium, cruets, a tray, and a censer, all made of silver. There were also several missals, twelve complete sets of vestments made of Persian silk and ten of damask, three copes, a good supply of altar cloths and various ornaments for the celebration of the different feasts of the Church.

The friary had the necessary cells for the missionaries and other rooms for offices and storage. It was one-story high with a pleasing archway along the side. All the rooms and cells were decorated with good taste. Adjoining the living quarters of the missionaries was a large hall, where the looms of the mission were installed. It also had two storerooms. Here woolen and cotton cloth of various kinds were woven for the use of the mission inmates. Blankets, too, were made here. In the adjoining storerooms the wool and cotton used were also stored together with the combs, cards, spinning wheels and other equipment. The granary was in a separate building, where sixteen hundred bushels of corn and one hundred bushels of beans were kept.

For the cultivation of the fields the mission had forty-five yokes of oxen and the necessary number of plows, plowshares, hoes, and other tools. Its blacksmith shop was fully equipped with its anvil, bellows, hammers, tongs, and sledge hammers. The mission was also well provided with all the tools necessary for carpentry and cabinet making, which were used by the Indians in keeping their houses and the entire mission property in repair and in making the furniture required for their needs.

The Indian pueblo proper was arranged in two tiers of stone houses on either side of the church and monastery, all enclosed within a rectangular wall for its protection. Each Indian family was provided with the necessary pots and pans, its grindstone for corn, and a flat iron for cooking their *tortillas* (corn cakes) over the coals. The cultivated fields were fenced and irrigated by a ditch that led the water from the river, where a stone dam had been built. The mission owned a ranch, where it had several houses for the caretakers who looked after the two hundred mares, one

hundred and twenty horses, six hundred and ten head of cattle, and twenty-two hundred sheep and goats.

According to the records of the mission it had baptized seven hundred and ninety-two persons since its establishment, of whom five hundred and fifty-eight had been given Christian burial. At this time there were fifty-eight families living in the mission, who together with the orphans and widowers, made a total of two hundred and seven persons of both sexes and all ages. They were chiefly members of the Pajalat, Tacame, and Sanipao nations. In charge of the mission were Fray Guadalupe de Prado, and Fray Pedro de Parras.<sup>3</sup>

*Mission San Juan Capistrano.* This mission was located a little less than three leagues (seven or eight miles) from San Antonio de Valero, almost due east, and had not made as much progress as the others because the land allotted to it was not sufficient for its cattle and horses and the raising of the required crops. No separate church had as yet been built, religious services being held in a large room twenty-five *varas* long in the monastery. Adjoining this room was a smaller one used as the sacristy. The room used as a chapel had three altars: one of the Nazarene, one of San Juan Capistrano in the center, with a beautiful gilded tabernacle, and one of Our Lady of the Rosary. Each one of the three had an unusually well carved image of their respective saint. Furthermore, each altar was graced by a number of good oil paintings. In the sacristy there was a baptismal font with its silver shell, two anointers, twenty-two candlesticks, two censers, six small silver bells, a copper crucifix mounted on a staff, two chalices with their patens, and a ciborium, all of silver, three missals and three manuals for the administration of the sacraments. For the celebration of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass it had twenty-one vestments of silk and damask, two copes, twelve surplices, fifteen pair of altar cloths, and many other ornaments needed for the observance of the various religious feasts and rites. All these things were kept in the sacristy in closets and drawers. There was also a beautiful statue of Our Lady of Sorrows with its costly tunic and a silver crown and sword.

The monastery or friary had several cells and two rooms for offices or storage, besides the two that served for the chapel and sacristy already described. Each one was furnished with taste and devotion. The gallery that ran along the side was flanked by a graceful arcade. As in the other

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, 167-169.

three missions already described, there was a separate hall where woolen and cotton cloth and blankets of various kinds were woven in three looms for the use of the mission Indians. All the cotton and wool employed for this purpose were produced by the mission. Its weaving and spinning room was well equipped with everything needed for the work.

Being much more exposed to the frequent attacks and raids of the enemy, the mission had not made as much progress as the others. The neophytes still lived in adobe huts thatched with grass or hay, but these were neatly kept. Plans had already been made, however, to replace them with more durable structures of rock and lime, for which purpose the mission had twelve carts ready to transport the necessary materials. Each family was provided with pots and pans, grindstones, and other household utensils. To repel the not uncommon attacks of the Apaches the mission had several swivel guns and twenty arquebuses with the corresponding ammunition.

In the granary, which was a large and well constructed building of stone and mortar, the mission had room to store as many as two thousand bushels of corn and beans for the maintenance of the Indians. For the cultivation of the fields it had a supply of plows, hoes, plowshares, harrows, and other farm implements. It also had a good supply of carpenter and blacksmith tools, as well as trowels and other instruments for masonry. The chief crops cultivated by the neophytes of this mission were corn, beans, chile, various vegetables, and cotton.

The mission owned about one thousand head of cattle and thirty-five hundred sheep and goats. To care for these it had one hundred saddle horses and four hundred mares which were pastured in eleven droves.

According to the records of the mission the good *Padres* had baptized eight hundred and forty-seven persons, young and old, and they had given Christian burial to six hundred and forty-five. At this time there were living in the mission fifty-one families with a total of two hundred and three persons of both sexes and all ages. The chief nations represented were the Orejón, the Sayopín, the Pamaque, and the Piguique. The missionaries in the mission were Fray Benito Varela and Fray Manuel Rolán.<sup>4</sup>

*Mission San Francisco de la Espada.* This was in some respects the most exposed of the San Antonio missions founded by the College of Querétaro. It was located about a quarter of a league (less than a mile) south from San Juan Capistrano, but over three leagues from San Antonio

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<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 169-171.

de Valero and the Presidio of San Antonio de Béjar. The foundations for a church had been laid several years before, but the building had not been completed because of the scarcity of adequate materials. A new quarry, however, had been recently discovered nearby and work had been resumed with the intention of finishing the church as soon as possible. It must be kept in mind that the Indians worked slowly and irregularly at their various tasks in a mission. They were not used to sustained effort and their aversion to systematic labor had to be overcome with patience. In the meantime a large room in the friary had been fitted out as a chapel. Here two altars were built. One was dedicated to Saint Francis, whose carved image was placed over the carefully carved and gilded tabernacle. This was further decorated with other beautifully carved and painted images tastefully arranged. The other altar was that of Our Lady of the Rosary. In the chapel there were two confessionals and several benches. In the sacristy in closets and drawers were kept the ornaments, vestments, candlesticks, and censers. It had four anointers, three silver chalices with their patens, an ostensorium, two pairs of cruets, with their respective trays, a ciborium, a procession crucifix, altar bells, and two silver crowns. It had two missals and five manuals for the administration of the sacraments.

In the friary proper, which had two stories, there were four cells on the second story and three on the ground floor. Here also were the looms and the spinning wheels in a special room. There were three looms and all the necessary accessories. On this floor were also the offices and the kitchen. The friary had its arcade and was adequately supplied with all the things needed by the missionaries and the Indians.

The granary, like the monastery, was built of stone and mortar and was a large and spacious building. Here were stored over two thousand bushels of corn, one hundred and two of beans, and a good supply of chile, salt, cotton, and wool for the use of the neophytes. To cultivate the fields it had thirty-seven yokes of oxen, forty harrows, the necessary plows, fifty-eight hoes, forty-six axes, ten scythes, and sixteen bars. There were also the necessary tools for carpentry, masonry, and blacksmithing. For defense against the enemy the mission had two swivel guns and sixteen firearms with a corresponding supply of ammunition.

The mission owned a ranch where its cattle and stock were kept. This had a good stone house where the ranch hands lived comfortably, supplied with all they needed. There were twelve hundred and sixty-two head of

cattle, four thousand sheep and goats, one hundred and forty-five saddle horses, eleven droves of mares, and nine donkeys in the ranch.

The mission pueblo consisted of three tiers of stone and mortar houses ranged around three sides of a rectangle. Here lived the Indians of the mission, each family being supplied with the necessary furniture, pots and pans, and other utensils. At this time there were fifty-two families, numbering two hundred and seven persons of both sexes and all ages. But since the founding of this mission eight hundred and fifteen had been duly baptized and five hundred and thirteen had received Christian burial. The nations represented by the neophytes were the Pacao, the Borado, and the Mesquite. Fray José Ignacio María Alegre and Fray Tomás Arcayos were in charge of the mission at this time.<sup>5</sup>

*Mission San José.* This mission, founded by the saintly Margil, was under the care of the College of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe of Zacatecas. Although it was established two years after Mission Valero (present Alamo), it was just as flourishing and perhaps more beautiful. Before the end of the century it was to be acclaimed the finest mission in all New Spain. As early as 1758, when Governor Jacinto Barrios y Jáuregui made his first inspection, San José had already attained an enviable stage of development and was recognized as the best organized and best defended of the five missions in San Antonio. At that time it had two hundred and eighty Indians of both sexes and all ages. Of these one hundred and thirteen were capable of bearing arms. Besides the old men, there were seventy-six women and ninety-two boys and girls. Since its establishment nine hundred and sixty-four had been baptized and four hundred and sixty-six had been given Christian burial. One hundred and forty-five had been married *in facie ecclesiae*.

A good stone and mortar church had been built, with its tower, its transept, and a single nave with vaulted roof. This was not, however, the present building, whose corner stone was not laid until 1768, but a more simple one. It was, nevertheless, ample enough to accommodate two thousand persons, according to the report of the not-too-friendly governor. In the tower it had a good chime of bells and in the sacristy it had a fine supply of ornaments and vestments of excellent material and exquisite workmanship. The church had many beautifully carved statues at the main altar and in two chapels at either end of the transept.

Next to the church stood the friary, well built of stone and mortar, with

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<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 171-173.

ample room and graceful archways. On the ground floor were the offices, kitchen, refectory, and several cells, while on the second story only one cell had been built at this time. This commanded an unusually good view of the surrounding country.

There were four other buildings of stone and mortar. The soldiers' quarters, designed for the mission guards, were opposite the church. Then there were a carpenter shop, a granary, and a spinning and weaving room. Each of these was adequately supplied with the tools and equipment necessary for the work done by the Indians. There was also a place where sugar cane was made into brown sugar and molasses. The whole area was surrounded by a well constructed wall in the shape of a square. Arranged along the wall, which formed the back, were eighty-four stone houses where the neophytes lived. The houses had flat roofs and loopholes from which to fire upon the enemy when attacked. Each house had a bedroom and a kitchen, and each family was supplied with a cooking flat iron, a grindstone for corn, a water jar, a bed, a chest of drawers, and a clothes closet. For the convenience of the Indians there were several baking-ovens built at intervals, and, wonder of wonders, there was a swimming pool (*alberca*) for the neophytes. The water was brought from the river by means of a gravity canal that flowed along the houses, hence into the pool and out into the adjoining fields. Near the building that served as the military quarters there was another swimming pool for the soldiers. Everything was so well arranged that the governor frankly admits it caused one to marvel to find a mission so well planned and constructed with such meager means as the *Padres* had.

But the degree of civilization attained by the Indians of this mission causes even greater wonder and is the best proof of the success of the missionaries in converting the natives from wild heathens to civilized Christians. The governor explains that the Indians selected their own governor, *cabildo* (governing council), *alcaldes* (judges), *fiscales* (overseers), and captains, managing all their civil and military affairs under the good-natured and sympathetic supervision of the missionaries, who acted as counselors and umpires in the novel game of self-government so ably played by the neophytes. Those who failed to attend prayer or to perform their assigned task were tried and punished by their own officials. That the system had succeeded is evident, says the governor, because the mission had no jail or detention room, nor any chains or stocks. All the Indians seemed to be happy and contented. They were

well dressed, had an ample supply of food, and each performed his assigned task willingly.

In the granary there were twenty-five hundred bushels of corn and beans. They had thirty yokes of oxen and all the necessary implements and tools for the cultivation of the fields. These were all irrigated. It is of interest to note that sugar cane was being cultivated and that here was the first place in Texas where it was made into sugar by the Indians. The mission owned fifteen hundred head of cattle, all branded, after having lost in recent years over two thousand killed or stolen by the Apaches. It had thirty-two hundred sheep, eighty mares, and almost a hundred saddle horses. Six bulls were killed weekly at the mission for consumption by the neophytes, who when sick were fed chicken broth and lamb chops. The heart and soul of the mission was Father Fray Ildefonso José Marmolejo, to whom much of the progress was due.<sup>6</sup>

Unfortunately the report made in 1762 in response to the order of the Commissary General of Missions is rather meager and too general to compare the progress of San José with the missions of the College of Querétaro already described.<sup>7</sup> But by 1768, the inspector of missions for the College of Zacatecas, Fray José de Solís, was so impressed with the progress made that he exclaims, "This mission is in such a flourishing condition, both spiritually and materially, and so beautiful that I cannot find words or figures of speech with which to express its beauty." Behind a square wall, six hundred and sixty feet on each side, rose the monastery and buildings of the mission, guarded by two turrets placed on diagonal corners of the square to protect the gates and two adjacent wings respectively. The former church had been pulled down to construct a new and better one, whose corner stone was laid this year. This is the building that is standing to this day, a peerless example of mission architecture at its best, proclaimed the finest in New Spain ten years later in the pristine beauty of its inauguration.

An arched hall that led from the former church to the friary had been walled in order to use it as a church. This was large enough for the purpose. Here there were several chalices, a ciborium, and a monstrance of wrought silver, besides many vestments of excellent material and fine workmanship. It had its silver oil stocks, silver sprinkler, and a holy

<sup>6</sup>Informe del Gobernador Barrios y Jáuregui sobre la Misión de San José. May 23, 1758. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 12, pp. 59-61.

<sup>7</sup>For the description made in 1762 by Fray Simón Hierro, Guardian of the College of Zacatecas, which the writer has been unable to find, see Bolton, *op. cit.*, 99-100.

water pot. There was a baptismal font of copper with its silver shell. The friary had been enlarged by the addition of cells on the second story.

The granary, too, had been enlarged by adding two more naves. In the workshops there was now, in addition to the carpenter shop, the blacksmith shop, and the forge, a tailor shop, where the Indians made their clothes with the cotton and woolen cloth woven in the mission. There were also a lime and brick kiln. The extensive fields under cultivation covered more than a league, all being fenced and irrigated by a large canal through which so much water flowed that it resembled a small river in which fishing was actually done by the natives. Corn, beans, lentils, vegetables, chile, melons, potatoes, and sugar cane were raised. Besides these, the Indians had an orchard in which they cultivated peaches which weighed as much as a pound apiece. Supplies were furnished by the prosperous mission not only to the Presidio of San Antonio but to those of La Bahía, Orcoquisac, and Los Adaes.

Ten or twelve leagues away the mission had a ranch called Atascosito. Here it had ten droves of mares, four droves of asses, fifteen hundred head of cattle, and five thousand sheep. In the ranch, as well as in the mission proper, the Indians did all the work and looked after everything. They wove the cloth, made the dresses, planted and harvested the crops, cared for the stock, managed the carpenter shop, the forge, and the quarry, burned the brick and lime in the kilns, and ran the small sugar mill, first in Texas, that made all the *piloncillo* (brown sugar) consumed by the mission. No Spanish overseers were needed any longer for the various tasks performed, all being done now by the neophytes, who had become accustomed to continued labor and industry.

There were living in the mission three hundred and fifty Indians, young and old, men and women. Since its foundation one thousand and fifty-four baptisms had been performed and recorded, three hundred and fifty-nine had received Christian burial, and two hundred and eighty-seven couples had been married by the church. The natives represented were the Pampopa, Mesquite, Pastia, Canama, Tacame, Cana, Aguasalla and Xaraname. The neophytes lived in stone houses along the walls that surrounded the mission and each family had all the things necessary for the convenient administration of a well regulated household.<sup>8</sup>

Let Father Solís describe the appearance and manners of the neophytes on his visit. "All the men and women," he says, "are very polite, they

<sup>8</sup>Fray José de Solís, *Diario y derrotero*, *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 27.



are well instructed in the truths of Christianity, and all know the catechism and the mysteries of our holy faith. With the exception of such as were already old when they came to the mission, and who are still uninstructed and ignorant, all of these Indians speak Spanish, have been baptized, and know their prayers. Most of them play some musical instrument, the guitar, the violin, or the harp. All have good voices and on Saturdays, the 19th of each month, and on the feasts of Our Lady, the Blessed Virgin, they recite the rosary outdoors and a choir of four voices, soprano, alto, tenor, and bass, with musical accompaniments, sings so beautifully that it is a delight to hear them. The procession moves along within the walls and is protected on either side by a double file of warriors. Outside the wall are posted sentinels on horseback to watch against attack by unfriendly tribes. Both the men and women sing and dance just as the Spaniards, and they do so, perhaps, even more beautifully and more gracefully. They dress with decency, being provided with two suits or dresses, one for week days and another for feast days. The men are not bad-looking, and the women, except an occasional, coarse-featured one, are graceful and handsome. The able-bodied men attend to the manual labor, the old men make arrows for the warriors, the grown-up girls weave cloth, card wool, and sew, the old women catch fish for the *Padres*, and the younger boys and girls go to school and recite their prayers.”<sup>9</sup>

Before describing the conditions of the Presidio of San Antonio de Béjar and the Villa de San Fernando it may be well to summarize briefly the progress of the missions. All but one of the five missions had stone or rock houses for the neophytes and all had stone and mortar friaries, granaries, and protective walls, being supplied with adequate means of defense and arms sufficient to equip the neophytes to repel the enemy. Some of them even had swivel guns to safeguard the main gates. In their granaries the five missions had a grand total of nine thousand nine hundred bushels of corn and over seven hundred bushels of beans, besides chile, salt, potatoes, cotton, and other supplies in varying amounts. On the farms they cultivated and raised all the products enumerated besides lentils, vegetables, melons, sugar cane, and peaches. In their ranches they had a total of five thousand four hundred and eighty-seven head of cattle, seventeen thousand sheep and goats, over six hundred saddle horses, almost one thousand breeding mares, over one hundred donkeys, and almost as many mules. The wool produced by the sheep was woven

<sup>9</sup>P. P. Forrestal, *The Solís Diary of 1767*, in *Preliminary Studies*, Texas Catholic Historical Society publications, Vol. 1, p. 6, pp. 20-21.

into cloth, as well as the cotton, in sixteen looms, and in one instance they had a regular tailor shop.

Spiritually the five missions had baptized five thousand one hundred and fifteen natives. They had given Christian burial to three thousand three hundred and twenty-two, and they had married seven hundred and forty-one couples. There were living in the missions at this time twelve hundred and forty-two Indians, representing twenty-three different nations or tribes: The Xaraname, Payaya, Zana, Lipan, Coco, Top, Karankawa, Pajalata, Tacame, Xarame, Sanipao, Pacao, Borrado, Mesquite, Orejón, Sayopín, Pamaque, Piguique, Pampopa, Pastía, Canana, Cana, and Aguasalla. Many of these tribes lived over a hundred miles away and had to be brought from their native haunts to the missions and induced to stay there. These figures and facts bear eloquent testimony to the success which attended the labors of the zealous and unassuming friars, who worked incessantly for the welfare of their beloved but wayward children of the wilds.

*Presidio San Antonio de Béjar and Villa de San Fernando.* When the Bishop of Guadalajara visited Texas at the close of 1759 he was greatly disappointed with the conditions he found prevalent throughout the entire province. He was particularly impressed with the inadequacy of its defence and the wretched conditions of the civil settlements. In a letter to the viceroy he declares that there were, in fact, no presidios in Texas properly speaking, and that the few settlements were truly diminutive and totally defenseless. "There is not even a poor bulwark or breastwork," he exclaims, "behind which to entrench a cannon. The four or six swivel guns of the Presidio of San Antonio de Béjar are lying on the ground without a carriage." The Villa de San Fernando was not much better. The whole settlement consisted of about sixty families, so poverty-stricken and wretched that they subsisted only by the grace of God. In the opinion of the bishop two hundred Indians armed with guns could put the entire settlement to flight.

Such conditions could not be allowed to continue, the good bishop remonstrated, because the site of this struggling settlement was the most important in the entire province and the best suited for the development of a large town. The most urgent need, it seemed to him, was to build a respectable fort that could furnish the settlers the security and safety required for the development of a prosperous community. The garrison of five men, all that were left in the presidio after the assignment of

three guards to each one of the five missions, was totally inadequate, especially since the presidio was a fort only in name. First of all the presidio should be rebuilt out of strong timber at least, for at present it was a group of miserable huts roofed with grass, exposed to being set on fire by a lighted arrow. It had neither a wall nor a stockade. The settlers were justified in feeling uneasy with the persistent rumors of a contemplated attack by northern tribes.

The bishop explained that he had obtained information of the danger that threatened San Antonio not from its commander or the settlers but while sojourning in La Bahía and other places and while talking with the older and more experienced pioneers of other sections. The truth was that the country from Monclova and San Juan Bautista in Coahuila to San Antonio was practically uninhabited and infested by hostile bands of Indians. In his opinion the Apaches constituted a serious menace, and under the circumstances, since they could not be effectively resisted by force, it would be wise to tolerate them and to court their friendship. He sagely pointed out that if this nation was alienated under the existing conditions it might cause the loss of the entire province to France or England.<sup>10</sup>

The discouraging picture so vividly painted by the bishop in his sincere anxiety for the safety of the forlorn outpost is corroborated by the optimistic Fray Mariano, whose faith in the Apaches appears to have been shaken by the recent tragedy of San Sabá. In a letter to the viceroy he expresses the fears entertained both by the settlers and the missionaries early in 1760. It seems that in January of this year a group of Tonkawas had come to San Antonio to solicit peace. These Indians had warned the Spaniards that the Taovayas, Quitseys, and Tawakonis were planning a combined attack "when the trees bud again," aided by a large force of Comanches. The friar reminded the viceroy that these northern tribes no longer fought with bows and arrows but used firearms which were furnished them by the French.

San Antonio could muster eighty men at the best, including soldiers and settlers. This force could not repel an attack such as was expected. Many of the men were incapacitated for vigorous service and some lived in ranches twenty-five leagues away, so that little dependence could be placed on them in case of a sudden or unexpected attack. Although it

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<sup>10</sup>Bishop of Guadalajara to the Viceroy, December 26, 1759. In *Testimonio de los autos fijos a consulta del Coronel Diego Ortiz Parrilla. A. G. I., Audiencia de México, 92-6-22* (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1762), pp. 197-200.

was true that the missions had a respectable number of armed Indians for their protection, they could give little or no help to the presidio and settlers in case of an emergency because of the distance that separated them and the fact that they were needed to defend the different missions.

Like the bishop, he pointed out that the Presidio of San Antonio de Béjar offered no protection to the settlers. It did not have a single stone building. There was no stockade, no wall, no trench, no dirt redoubt, no protecting ditch, in a word no defences whatsoever. The cannon were useless and lay on the ground by the door of the captain's house. The town itself was ill-planned for defense, the houses having been built at random, without order, and of inflammable materials, with but few exceptions. The need of a well built fort, with a strong wall around it, within which the settlers could congregate in case of a general attack was most urgent. In the present condition it could not withstand a concerted native attack and much less check foreign invasion. If something was not done to remedy the situation soon, San Antonio would "become the door that will usher a host of evils to the entire realm and cause the ultimate loss of the country to His Majesty's dominion."<sup>11</sup>

By 1762 conditions had not been improved, rather they had become worse as the result of the vacillating policy which circumstances had forced upon the settlers and the missionaries alike in regard to the Apaches. In a statement to Governor Martos y Navarrete, Fray Mariano declared that the greatest evil that had befallen the five missions on the San Antonio and the Villa de San Fernando were the outrages they had to endure from the Apaches under a feigned peace that had become a farce. These Indians killed, stole, and destroyed the property of the Spaniards and the missions with impunity. The herds of cattle had been decimated and were threatened with complete annihilation. The crops were wantonly trampled and destroyed. Thus the resources of the struggling settlement were gradually being reduced and consumed. The tolerance of the Spaniards in the face of such outrages had lost to them the respect of the Apaches and had incurred the enmity of the northern tribes. The immediate effect upon San Antonio had been to confine the settlers to an ever decreasing area in the vicinity of their homes, making it dangerous to cultivate the fields and to establish or maintain ranches beyond the city limits.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup>Fray Mariano de los Dolores to the Viceroy, January 16, 1760. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 95, pp. 76-80.

<sup>12</sup>Fray Mariano de los Dolores to Governor Martos y Navarrete, August 6, 1762.

The deplorable conditions, made worse by the perfidy of the Apache Indians, are frankly admitted by the *Cabildo* (city council) itself. On September 1, 1762, it presented a formal petition to Governor Martos y Navarrete reaffirming the catalogue of grievances and misfortunes the settlement of San Antonio had suffered at the hands of the hostile tribes and placed the responsibility on the inadequate garrison and the general lack of proper protection. The emboldened Apaches, under the guise of a peace which they knew the Spaniards would not dare break, carried their insolence to the extreme of flatly refusing to return branded horses stolen from the afflicted settlers, impudently laughing in their faces at their impotence. Luís Antonio Menchaca, Andrés Ramón, Francisco Delgado, and Vicente Álvarez Travieso, old settlers and experienced pioneers, urged in their representation the restoration of the garrison to its original forty-four men as the initial and most essential step in the improvement of the settlement.<sup>13</sup>

But the most graphic and vivid picture of the existing conditions and the general appearance of the Presidio of San Antonio de Béjar and the Villa de San Fernando was drawn by its new commander, Luís Antonio Menchaca. Upon the resignation of the old and intrepid Captain Toribio de Urrutia, disabled after more than thirty years of faithful service as a frontier officer of His Majesty, Menchaca was appointed to this important post. The terms of the appointment themselves are interesting. He was to receive three hundred *pesos*, half of the salary of the aged Urrutia, who was to remain on the rolls of the presidio and to receive the other half of his salary until his death, being relieved of all active duty but asked to help the new commander with the wisdom of his long experience. When Menchaca took over the command, he made a long and detailed report on the condition of the presidio and the villa in May, 1763.

The garrison, including the captain, consisted of twenty-two men. These were well provided with guns, rawhide shields (an antique defense now against arrows), swords, powder horns, powder, lead balls, horses, and chaps (*cueras*). Although the men were well equipped and disciplined, such a small force was totally inadequate for the defense of this important outpost, particularly in view of the deplorable condition of the presidio. This place was entirely open to attack and devoid of even the vestige

In Testimonio de los autos de la visita. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22. 1763, pp. 55-60.

<sup>13</sup>Representation of the *Cabildo*, September 1, 1762, in Testimonio de los autos de la visita . . . *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22, pp. 60-66.

of a defense on all four points of the compass. There was not a breastwork or bastion to give the small force the least advantage over the attacking or besieging party. The artillery consisted of four old swivel guns. One of these could not be fired, the remaining three had no sights, and although they had been recently mounted on ill-shaped and insecure carriages, there was no ammunition with which to serve them, since not a single cannon ball had been found in the presidio.

Of the supply of extra arms sent by the viceroy shortly after the destruction of San Sabá to be distributed to the settlers for defense in case of an emergency, there were only eighteen guns, twelve swords, and thirty-four lances in the guardroom of the presidio. The remainder had foolishly been issued to the settlers by Governor Martos y Navarrete without making the required arrangement for their return. The result was that many of the settlers being unscrupulous, had exchanged the new guns and equipment for useless ones and they were now as poorly armed to aid the garrison as before. In the guardroom he had found also one hundred and six pounds of powder and three hundred and five pounds of lead.

Turning next to the Villa de San Fernando, Menchaca declares, there were about one hundred men, including the very aged, the sick, the infirm, the vagrants, and those who resided within a radius of from twenty to twenty-five leagues (about sixty miles). Consequently not more than twenty-five at the most could be mustered to help the garrison in case of an emergency. But since the effective number of soldiers for the defense of the Villa was only five, besides the sergeant and the captain, it meant that counting all the civilian reinforcement, the presidio would have a maximum of thirty men to repel the enemy. The other fifteen soldiers were assigned to the missions and could not be counted upon for the defense of the settlement.

In the list of the settlers that accompanies the report there is much information about the old pioneers. Vicente Álvarez Travieso, member of the city council, lived most of the time in his ranch called Las Mulas, located some twenty leagues from San Antonio. Andrés Hernández, another old-timer, lived in his ranch on Cibolo Creek, as did also Juan José Flores and Miguel Guerra. At Las Mulas, as a neighbor of Álvarez Travieso, lived Martín Lorenzo, not one of the original Canary Islanders, but a later arrival. Poor José Curbelo, one of the founders, was now blind and paralytic. Manuel de Nis, another of the founders, was now so old that he had to be carried to church every day to hear Mass. Old Juan José

Rodríguez had suffered a stroke and Alberto López was very old and stone-deaf. Francisco de Estrada, too, was very old, but Juan Cortinas was still older, and so was Gerónimo Flores. Andrés Ramón, a member of the *Cabildo* and a relative of the Ramóns of Coahuila, was suffering from an incurable disease that made him practically an invalid. Pedro Flores was also an invalid. Old Isidro de la Garza had broken his leg and was unable to do anything. Thus we get a glimpse of the settlers thirty-one years after the establishment of the Villa of San Fernando.

But let us return to the presidio. Menchaca pointed out the multiple duties which the five men of the garrison were supposed to perform and it does seem absurd to have expected so much of them. In addition to all the routine duties of a post they were expected to guard the horses, furnish escort for the governor, the missionaries, or any other official coming to or going from San Antonio to any other place; take messages even to distant Mexico, and convoy trains of supplies. With justified indignation Menchaca declares it was preposterous to expect any five individuals to do all these things and to defend this important outpost of Spain's dominion against all enemies. No other presidio along the entire frontier was called upon to protect five missions and a civil settlement. Los Adaes, Orcoquisac, La Bahía, San Sabá, San Juan Bautista on the Rio Grande, and Santa Rosa in Coahuila, all had more men than San Antonio de Béjar to garrison them, yet not one of them had to furnish guards to five missions and to defend a settlement. Furthermore no other presidio was so exposed nor so frequently attacked by hostile Indians. But its troubles, always great, had been increased tenfold since the destruction of San Sabá. Unable to rely upon the perfidious Apaches, who preyed constantly upon the slender resources of this frontier outpost and settlement, it was seriously threatened now with complete destruction by the northern tribes whose enmity had been embittered to no purpose by the friendly policy towards the Apaches.

Menchaca, like the settlers themselves and the missionaries, was truly apprehensive. He recounted how in 1762 Governor Martos y Navarrete had unwisely entertained in San Antonio a host of over three hundred and fifty northern Indians, who entered the settlement as friends but fully armed. Although they came in peace, it was a great risk which jeopardized the safety of the presidio and settlement, whose weakness was revealed to every northern warrior. Furthermore, during their stay in San Antonio, the visitors had committed many abuses against the civilians as well as the mission Indians, which had been endured because of the inability to offer resistance. But he was determined that, if the northern tribes returned

and desired to visit the villa and the presidio, he would not allow them to enter within either. Their entrance, now that they knew the full impotence of the Spaniards, might prove a stratagem to repeat the tragic massacre of San Sabá.

The five missions had reënforced their outer walls and strengthened the defense of the various entrances in anticipation of an attack. Nothing had been done at the presidio nor could anything be done under the present conditions. He had neither the men required nor the means with which to do it. He frankly confessed he feared the consequences of a serious attack and was warning the authorities, as was his duty, in order that, if misfortune overtook the presidio and villa, he might not be held responsible for negligence in making the danger known. He strongly urged and pleaded for the restoration of the full garrison of forty-four men as the first step in placing San Antonio on a sound footing for defense.<sup>14</sup>

Mention should be made that in spite of the serious troubles endured by the heroic band of Spanish settlers, they had succeeded in completing the Church of San Fernando with the aid of funds from the royal treasury. Early in 1757, one of the missionaries declared that the parish church had been completed and he described it as "perfect and harmonious in every detail." The cost of the edifice was seven thousand *pesos*. Some idea of the salaries paid to workmen may be gained from the details concerning the cost of the building. The ordinary masons or bricklayers, who mixed the mortar and put the stone in place were paid at the rate of from twelve to eighteen *pesos* a month with board. The helpers to the masons received only fifty cents a day and were not given board. The master masons, who directed the work, were paid at the rate of two *pesos* a day and board.<sup>15</sup>

*La Bahía del Espíritu Santo.* Almost ten years after the removal of the Presidio of Nuestra Señora de Loreto to its new location on the San Antonio River we have a description of Mission Nuestra Señora de la Bahía del Espíritu Santo given by Father Fray Francisco Xavier de Salazar to the new Governor of Texas, Don Jacinto de Barrios y Jáuregui. In 1758 there were living in the mission forty-nine Indian warriors

<sup>14</sup>Luis Antonio Menchaca to the Viceroy, May 11, 1763. In *Testimonio de los autos formados a representación de Don Toribio de Urrutia . . . A. G. I., Audiencia de México, 92-6-22* (Dunn Transcripts, 1748-1763, pt. 2), pp. 191-204.

<sup>15</sup>The details given here are found in a long report in which various persons testified as to what it would cost to build a church at San Sabá, using the expenses incurred in building San Fernando church as a basis. See *Testimonio de las diligencias practicadas por el Coronel Don Diego Ortiz Parrilla . . . A. G. I., Audiencia de México, 92-6-22* (Dunn Transcripts, 1748-1763, pt. 2), pp. 60-100.



capable of bearing arms, fifty women, and seventy-nine boys and girls, making a total of one hundred and seventy-eight natives. Up to this time baptism had been administered to four hundred and ninety-nine Indians according to the mission records.

With characteristic industry the friars of the College of Zacatecas had succeeded in building a respectable church of stone and mortar and a friary ample enough for their needs, with the customary offices, refectory, kitchen, and cells. The mission Indians were still living in *jacales* (huts) thatched with grass or hay. The mission was well provided with the tools and implements necessary for the cultivation of the fields, but these were not yet irrigated. Father Salazar declared, however, that he had the tools and the means to begin the digging of the contemplated irrigation ditch that would obviate the risks and the eventualities of dry farming to which they had been subjected up to the present time. The Indians in the mission were, nevertheless, well fed and provided with all the things needed.

As a result of the formal establishment of the new Mission of Nuestra Señora del Rosario in 1758, which was under the care of Father Fray Juan de Dios María Camberos of the same College, interest in the development of a civil settlement, similar to that founded in San Antonio, had been aroused. Father Salazar states with much optimism and enthusiasm that fifty families were expected to come from New Spain. Unfortunately the plans for the settlement of these families, one of the ardent schemes of the enterprising colonizer of Colonia del Nuevo Santander, Don José de Escandón, never materialized due to the opposition encountered with some of the officials in México who objected to the additional expense.<sup>16</sup> Father Salazar explained that the Mission of Nuestra Señora del Espíritu Santo had been much more successful in its new location in raising cattle and sheep. By 1758 it owned thirty-two hundred and twenty head of cattle and sixteen hundred sheep. To care for its stock it had about one hundred and twenty saddle horses.<sup>17</sup>

By 1762, when Governor Martos y Navarrete visited La Bahía in his tour of inspection, considerable progress had been made in the construction of a formal presidio. In his report to the viceroy he says that the Presidio of Nuestra Señora de Loreto had been laid out on a square seventy-six *varas* on each side. The northern stockade had been completed and on this side were also the guardhouse, the presidio chapel, and several houses.

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<sup>16</sup>For a more detailed discussion of the plans for the establishment of a civil settlement at La Bahía see Volume III of this work, Chapter IV.

<sup>17</sup>Report of Fray Francisco Xavier de Salazar to the Governor, May 28, 1758. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 12, pp. 62-64.

On the opposite side there were also several houses already built, which almost completed that wing. The house of the captain, the only one constructed of stone and mortar, occupied about one-third of the west side. Opposite to the captain's residence on the east side were the garrison's headquarters, which occupied about one-third of that wing. Here, too emplacements for two pieces of artillery had been built. All the buildings, with the exception of the captain's house, were built of timber and plastered with clay mixed with hay or moss to give the plaster greater consistency. The purpose in plastering the buildings was to protect them against being set on fire by the enemy. This precaution was also taken with regard to the roofs. Thus it may be seen that this presidio was in much better condition than San Antonio de Béjar at this time.<sup>18</sup>

But we gain a much more accurate picture of both the presidio and the missions at La Bahía from a long letter written by Captain Manuel Ramírez de la Piscina to the viceroy shortly after the governor's inspection. From some stray remarks in this interesting document it seems the captain was not particularly pleased with the long stay of Governor Martos y Navarrete in La Bahía. In describing the location of the presidio he declares it was on the south bank of the San Antonio River, on the top of a small hill that dominated the spacious plains and the surrounding woods. The spot was, in fact, not very far from the coast. The presidio, which had consisted of a group of frame buildings thatched with grass, had been rebuilt since the arrival of Captain Ramírez de la Piscina. But it had been impossible to construct the buildings out of stone and mortar because of the scarcity of these materials and of expert workmen. He had, therefore, hit upon the idea of plastering the buildings, both inside and out, with mud mixed with hay or moss, as the governor had described in his report.

The church of the presidio was a good, roomy structure stoutly built with solid beams and well plastered. The same was true of the barracks and the guardhouse. He explained that he had erected at his own expense a good residence for himself made of stone and mortar, which could serve as protection for the few settlers in case of an emergency. In order to construct this solid building he had been obliged to bring master masons from New Spain to do the work.

The armament of the presidio consisted of six eight pounders which were brought several years before by water from Veracruz. Of these

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<sup>18</sup>Visita of Governor Martos y Navarrete, March 13-May 20, 1762. In Testimonio de los autos de la visita en el Real Presidio de la Bahía del Espíritu Santo . . . A. G. I., *Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22, 1763, pp. 8-9.

four were mounted on gun carriages, while the other two were being mounted at this time by a French carpenter who had been brought to the presidio for that purpose. There were also two swivel guns properly mounted. Four others intended for this presidio were still in Saltillo waiting to be transported. He had not been able to find a mule train that would undertake to bring them because each piece weighed eighteen *arrobas* (about three hundred and fifty pounds).

The garrison consisted of fifty-one men, including the captain, and it was kept up to full strength, all vacancies being promptly filled. This number was, however, far from being sufficient for the varied duties the soldiers had to perform. To prove his statement the captain explained that ten men were detailed regularly to guard the horses, which were pastured up and down the river for a distance of about twelve leagues. In the summer these soldiers were relieved twice a month, but only once a month in the winter. Three men were posted in Mission Espíritu Santo and four in the more recently established Mission of Rosario. They not only protected the *Padres* and mission Indians and inspired proper respect, but they helped them to instruct the neophytes in their daily tasks. In the presidio ten men were kept constantly occupied on day and night guard duty. Seven more were used to escort supply trains required to bring corn and other goods from San Antonio and the Río Grande. This duty was necessary because the two local missions did not raise sufficient food to meet the needs of the presidio. Without irrigation they were able to raise only the food consumed by the neophytes. The only thing that was abundant was meat, because cattle raising had been much more successful than farming. Consequently, after deducting these men from the regular garrison, there were left only fourteen men for all other miscellaneous duties such as escorting of convoys to East Texas, accompanying the missionaries in their quest for new converts or runaways, furnishing guards to officials, the bishop, and other dignitaries, and carrying dispatches.

Unfortunately all efforts to induce settlement in the vicinity had been in vain. Only a few settlers had come in recent years. The reason was the uncertainty of the crops which entirely depended upon the weather. Furthermore there was little or no trade to stimulate the establishment of business. Most of the settlers in the vicinity of the presidio and the two missions were superannuated soldiers, who chose to remain near the fort in order to be close to their sons, who frequently took their places in the garrison and who helped to support them. Occasionally the relatives

of the soldiers moved in from Coahuila or Nuevo Reyno de León, but in general there were very few civilians at La Bahía at this time.

Returning to the garrison, Captain Ramírez de la Piscina declared that all the men had uniforms. These appear to have consisted mainly in the wearing of blue coats with which they were all supplied. Every man had his gun, sword, shield, chaps, and breastplate. The soldiers of this presidio were regularly instructed in military drills and they had target practice. The captain then gives an interesting account of the way in which frontier outposts fought the Indians. The method of warfare with the natives was different from that employed in regular warfare in other countries. Seldom if ever were the men of a presidio called upon to engage in a regular battle. Nor did they often undertake a formal campaign against the natives without the expressed consent from the viceroy. Usually they limited themselves to protective measures against surprise by raiding parties. If hostile Indians succeeded in a raid, the soldiers pursued them in order to recapture the stolen animals or goods. If the malefactors were overtaken and captured, they were brought back to the presidio and either made to work for a period of time or whipped. After they were duly punished and kept in the presidio under guard for a time, they were given presents and allowed to return to the woods or to join one of the missions.<sup>19</sup>

Mission Nuestra Señora del Espíritu Santo was opposite the presidio on the north bank of the river. Its monastery and church were well built, the Indians had as yet only *jacales* (temporary huts) but these were neat and comfortable, and the whole mission was surrounded by a substantial stockade. The neophytes had all been baptized, were well instructed in the fundamentals of our holy faith, and appeared to be happy and contented. The two nations represented in this mission were the Xaraname and the Tamique. Many of them had not only been baptized, but had been married by the church.

Mission Nuestra Señora del Rosario, which had finally been established four years before in 1754, was located one and one-half leagues (about four miles) to the west of the presidio. The Indians congregated were the Coxanes (Cujanes), Guapites, and Karankawas. In the four years of its existence the mission had baptized one hundred and thirty-seven natives, but there were many under instruction who would soon be administered this sacrament. All the neophytes attended the *doctrina* regularly and were relatively industrious and diligent in the performance of their

<sup>19</sup>Manuel Ramírez de la Piscina to the Viceroy, May 2, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 95, pp. 122-131.

tasks. The principal buildings of the mission had been erected and it, too, had its stockade. The nations congregated in this mission had formerly given a great deal of trouble to the presidio and the other mission, committing frequent depredations on the property and cattle herds. But the missionaries of the College of Zacatecas had finally won the friendship of these Indians, after humoring them for years. Captain Ramírez de la Piscina stated with some pride that he had contributed personally to their ultimate reduction. With his own funds he had bought over two hundred head of cattle, and much corn, tobacco, knives, sugar, and trinkets of various kinds at different times to be distributed among these Indians as gifts by the missionaries to win their good will and attract them to mission life. The new mission was making rapid progress.

The captain closed his interesting and illuminating letter to the viceroy with a plea for the strengthening of this post, which, because of its location near the coast and the incontestable evidence of English prowlers, deserved to receive the attention of the viceroy. It is of interest to note that the concern of the officials was no longer the French but the English. In the opinion of the experienced frontier captain, who had served His Majesty in Texas for fifteen years, the presidio should be rebuilt of stone and mortar. Since these materials were not found in the vicinity, they would have to be brought from outside, just as the master masons and stonecutters needed to do the work. Once the presidio was properly rebuilt, the artillery should be properly mounted and defenses constructed that would be effective against a foreign foe in case of an invasion. He estimated that it would cost about twelve thousand *pesos* to rebuild the presidio along the lines he had suggested and place it in a respectable state of defense against all enemies.<sup>20</sup>

The fear of English attack at this time was not entirely imaginary. Recently an English ship loaded with merchandise, evidently intended for trade with the natives, had been shipwrecked on the coast not far from the Presidio of Nuestra Señora de Loreto. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the French and Indian War was in progress at this time and that the Spaniards were the allies of France. The viceroy had written to the captain at La Bahía to keep a close lookout for an English surprise along the coast and to be prepared to withstand and repel any attack upon the fort. The letter of the viceroy arrived just a few days after the captain had sent his report. Because of this fact, we have many additional details about conditions at La Bahía.

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<sup>20</sup>Ramírez de la Piscina to the Viceroy, May 2, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 95, pp. 122-131.

On May 21, 1762, in answer to the letter of the viceroy asking for additional information about the English shipwreck and recommending extreme caution and preparedness against a surprise, Captain Ramírez de la Piscina again assured the viceroy that the garrison of La Bahía was kept at full strength and that the men were well supplied with arms. He frankly admitted, however, that in case of an English attack the garrison was insufficient to defend the fort. The carriages of the cannon were not in the best condition and there were no artillerymen in the fort to man them. The pieces were never used against the Indians and were fired only on occasions, such as when the bishop visited the presidio, or when the governor came. It would be well, therefore, to send a few skilled artillerymen to instruct the soldiers of the garrison in the use of the cannon. These men could later train those of Los Adaes and Orcoquisac (San Agustín de Ahumada), who were equally ignorant in the use of artillery. Such training would be most important in case of war with the English.

In order to keep a close watch on the movement of English vessels on the coast, he explained he would ask the coöperation of the Cujane, Guapite, and Karankawa Indians of the Mission of Rosario. These Indians were generally allowed to go to the seashore and spend the months of June, July, and August on the bay, fishing and swimming. They knew that the English were the enemies of the Spaniards and could be depended upon to report their presence or activity.

Confidentially Captain Ramírez de la Piscina informed the viceroy that little or no aid could be expected at La Bahía from the other presidios of Texas in case of an attack by foreigners. San Antonio had such a small garrison that it could not possibly send any reinforcements, and the Presidio of San Agustín de Ahumada at Orcoquisac was a mere ranch of the governor, where a handful of soldiers were kept who resembled cowboys more than soldiers, their chief duty being to take care of the governor's cattle. They had no arms to speak of, a scanty food supply, and only a few horses. As to Los Adaes, it could not be expected to send any of its men to the rescue of La Bahía in case of an English attack, because it would have to guard against the same thing. Furthermore, in his opinion, Los Adaes was even more exposed to danger from a foreign invasion than La Bahía. Since the English were at war with the French, should they take New Orleans, the captain wisely pointed out, they could easily ascend the river to Natchitoches and from there surprise Los Adaes. But he reassured the viceroy that with such men as he had and with such

means as he could command, he would defend La Bahía and die before surrendering.

It seemed to him, however, that in order to prepare for a contingency such as was feared, certain measures should be adopted. In the first place it was highly advisable that the governor, who was in San Antonio, should repair as soon as possible to Los Adaes, from where he could watch the movements of the enemy much better. If he spent six months in San Antonio as he did at La Bahía, Los Adaes was exposed to serious danger in his absence. The garrison at La Bahía should be increased if possible, and its cannon placed in good order with a group of trained artillerymen to man them. Provision should be made to supply this post with the essential grain and food. Up to now it had been dependent upon such food as could be spared by the missions in San Antonio. This source, however, was inadequate, because when the crops were not abundant, the missions were unable to meet the demands of La Bahía.<sup>21</sup>

Just at this time when an attack by the English was expected, the Apaches, under the guise of friendship, were destroying the scant resources of this outpost on the Gulf coast and threatening the two missions with annihilation. Fray Pedro Ramírez, who succeeded Fray Salazar, appealed to the captain for aid against the intolerable abuses of these insolent and taunting Indians. Since the destruction of the San Sabá Mission, the Apaches, ever fearful of their mortal enemies the Comanches, had begun to roam regularly to the south of San Antonio and they appear to have spent several months each year near the coast in the vicinity of the missions of La Bahía. Why they chose this spot, it is easy to see. Here they could prey with impunity upon the mission herds and the horses of the presidio, confident that the Spaniards would not dare break the peace and would not exact stern reprisals. Father Ramírez declared that just recently bands of these Indians had twice entered the Mission of Nuestra Señora del Espíritu Santo, had openly insulted the missionaries and taken things from the neophytes. This flaunting of the *Padres'* authority had a tendency to demoralize the mission Indians, make them lose respect for the missionaries and disregard the benefits of mission life. In plain view of the mission they had killed thirty cows on one occasion and twenty-five on another to take only choice cuts. These abuses caused the neophytes to wonder what advantages there were in staying in the mission and in being rationed, when they could go out and do what the Apaches did without fear of being punished.

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<sup>21</sup>Manuel Ramírez de la Piscina to the Viceroy, May 21, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 95, pp. 118-121.

Father Ramírez went on to explain that the same was true in San Antonio, where the Apaches had become an abominable pest to the Mission of San José, whose prosperous herds had been reduced from about four thousand head to about fifteen hundred. He pointed out that the wanton destruction of the herds and the perpetration of misdeeds with impunity would not only destroy the means of livelihood of the missions and the civil settlers, but would cause the neophytes to abandon the missions and ruin the work of conversion. Captain Ramírez de la Piscina testified to the truth of the statements of the good friar and ordered that the petition be sent on to the viceroy.<sup>22</sup>

In spite of Apache hostilities and the many handicaps suffered by the missionaries at La Bahía, the two missions continued to prosper. By 1768, when they were visited by Father Fray José de Solís, Mission Rosario had made considerable progress in the fourteen years since its establishment. The mission buildings and the living quarters of the missionaries, as well as those of the Indians and the soldiers, were all good and solid structures, made of timber and well plastered with clay. The church was finished by now. It consisted of a very good frame building, white-washed and beautifully decorated. The inside had been plastered with clay and the roof had strong beams which were covered with shingles. It was well provided with the necessary sacred vessels and other ornaments used in the celebration of the various festivals. It had its pulpit, confessional, and three altars tastily decorated with pictures and carved images. In the sacristy there was a good supply of vestments, a baptismal font with silver shell, a number of candlesticks and a censer. Everything was kept nicely in order. The entire mission was surrounded by a very good stockade which afforded ample protection against attack.

Temporarily the mission had made much progress. The fields were well cultivated, but they were not irrigated, because it had been impossible to secure water from the river. The mission possessed about five thousand head of cattle, two hundred milk cows, seven hundred sheep, thirty mules, forty tame horses, and two droves of asses. It had twelve sets of harness, the necessary saddles, and all the tools and implements needed for the cultivation of the fields and the work in the shops.

Father Fray José Escobar was in charge of the work. Fray Solís describes him as being affectionate, charitable, gentle, tractable, and generous. The Indians appeared to be fond of him. With kindness and firmness he made the neophytes learn their prayers, attend the *doctrina*,

<sup>22</sup>Declaration of Fray Pedro Ramírez, June 5, 1762 . . . Testimonio de los autos de la visita. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22. 1763. Pp. 50-55.



and work at the various tasks assigned to them. Under his paternal care they were provided with food and clothing and instructed in our holy faith and in the ways and habits of civilized man. Every day at sunset the mission Indians gathered at the call of the bell. Young and old, they all recited their prayers before the church and were instructed in the catechism. Fray Escobar explained to them the mysteries of our holy religion and urged them to observe the commandments of our Lord and of our holy mother, the Church. On Saturdays they all recited the rosary out in the open and sang the *Alabado*. On Sundays and feast days the neophytes recited their prayers and the lessons learned in the *doctrina* before Mass. After the Holy Sacrifice the missionary explained the Christian doctrine and such things as they should know and understand.

The nations represented were the Cujane, Guapite, Karankawa, and Copane. Recently most of the members of the last named nation had deserted the mission. Father Solís explains that the natural indolence of the natives and their aversion to all regulations were the chief causes for their dissatisfaction with mission life. They preferred to suffer hunger, nakedness, and the inclemencies of the weather in order to enjoy absolute freedom and indulge in complete apathy and sloth rather than to work and to receive the benefits of religion and the security of the missions. They were particularly fond of their native dances called *mitotes*. These were very expressive, the dominant note being sometimes joy and then again sorrow. Often they danced for three days and nights at a time. The women ordinarily did not take part in the dances. This practice was not permitted in the missions. Since the establishment of Mission Rosario, two hundred Indians had been baptized, one hundred ten had been buried by the Church, and thirty-four had received the Sacrament of Marriage.

Mission Nuestra Señora del Espíritu Santo was in much better condition, being older than that of Rosario. It was just across the river from the presidio. There was no bridge over the stream, and all communication between the two was by means of a canoe. The church of Espíritu Santo, although better built, was smaller than that of Rosario. It was well provided with vestments, sacred vessels, and all things pertaining to divine cult. The Blessed Sacrament was kept in an inside oratory with the permission of the Bishop of Guadalajara, who granted this privilege during his visit in 1758. At the door of the oratory a small lamp was kept burning with nut oil. This practice had also been approved by the Bishop. There were ample quarters for the religious and the

soldiers. The Indians lived in small but clean huts neatly arranged along the stockade.

The fields of this mission, like those of Rosario, were not irrigated. During dry years little or no corn was raised. When the weather was favorable, however, the Indians raised cotton, melons, potatoes, corn, and beans. In an orchard cultivated by the neophytes excellent peaches and figs were harvested in large quantities. The mission owned several plows, plowshares, hoes, bars, and other implements necessary for farming. On its ranch it had fifteen hundred sheep and goats, almost as many head of cattle, about one hundred and ten horses, some seventy mules, four droves of asses, one herd of mares, and two hundred yoke of oxen.

There were about three hundred Indians of both sexes and all ages living in the mission at this time. Sixty-five of them were capable of bearing arms, thirty of whom were armed with guns, while the rest had bows, arrows and spears. They came principally from the Xaraname, Tamique, Piquiane, and Manos de Perro. Since they had been longer under the administration of the mission, these Indians were much more civilized than those of Rosario. Father Solís observes that they no longer ate horse flesh, but confined themselves to beef, venison, buffalo meat, bear, turkeys, ducks, quail, geese, and partridges. To wean them from their pagan *mitotes*, the missionaries had introduced Spanish dances. Many of the Indians had learned to play the guitar and the violin and they used these instruments, in addition to the drum, for the new dances. Some of these were new and required special costumes, with which the natives were supplied. Since its establishment this mission had baptized six hundred twenty-three Indians and had given Christian burial to two hundred seventy-eight.<sup>23</sup>

*Mission Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de los Nacogdoches.* When visited by Father Solís, this mission showed undeniable signs of decay. Located on a small plain, surrounded by shady trees, with a permanent creek that flowed through the grounds, the buildings looked neat and clean, but there was an air of forlornness about the place. The adobe church, with its shingle roof, formed the center of the now almost deserted mission. Nearby stood a similar building, the home of the lonely *Padre*. There were two or three other houses, a granary, and the temporary quarters of the mission guards. The whole was surrounded by a stockade. In the grounds a small orchard had been planted, where excellent peaches

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<sup>23</sup>P. P. Forrestal, *The Solís Diary of 1767. Preliminary Studies of the Texas Catholic Historical Society*, Volume I, No. 6, pp. 10-17.

and persimmons grew. Not an Indian lived within the mission, however, the only human beings besides the *Padre* being the two soldiers and their families and a few half-breed servants. The fields in the vicinity were poorly cultivated, and the few stalks of corn that grew were almost crowded out by the tall weeds.

But in the church were still kept the necessary vestments, several chalices, and the other sacred vessels necessary for religious services, thanks to the devotion of the untiring missionary, who in the solitude of the nearly abandoned mission still prayed and hoped. Although no neophytes remained within the old stockade, the natives were not far distant. On feast days and on Sundays, or when the spirit moved them, the wayward children of the forest came to the mission. Sickness and the fear of imminent death compelled them at times to solicit the aid and comfort of the holy man of God, who waited patiently for such opportunities to exercise his ministry and always had a kind word for his wayward children.

Within a radius of ten to fifteen leagues lived the Nacogdoches, the Cadodachos, the Asinais, and the Nasonis. These Indians had never really been reduced to mission life. The ease with which they could supply themselves with firearms from the French had made them more or less independent from the beginning. They were not only skilled in the use of the rifle, but were excellent horsemen. They harbored no special grievance against the Spaniards. They were friendly in their own way.

The old mission had known affluence and even at this date it still had some property left. It counted among its worldly goods eighty sheep, thirty oxen, fifty cows, several bulls, some donkeys, twenty-five saddle horses, twenty mules, two droves of mares, and a stock of plows, plowshares, hoes, and other farming implements.<sup>24</sup>

For forty-three years Father Fray José de Calahorra y Sáenz had lived here and labored to bring the Indians into the fold. Few men had come to know the natives of this area better than this devoted missionary. When the loyalty of the Tejas was questioned by officials, after the unfortunate destruction of San Sabá, Father Calahorra stoutly defended them, contending that the Tejas had been the friends of the Spaniards since the earliest days. He maintained that when the Spaniards befriended the Apaches in San Antonio they had naturally alienated the friendship of the Tejas and the other northern tribes. The Tejas and the Tawakonis were the mortal enemies of the Apaches but not of the Spaniards. It is

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<sup>24</sup>P. P. Forrestal, *The Solís Diary of 1767. Preliminary Studies of the Texas Catholic Historical Society*, Volume I, No. 6, pp. 35-37; La Fora, *Relacion*, f. 70.

of interest to note that the experienced old missionary explained to the authorities that the source of the trouble since the destruction of San Sabá was the failure of the Spaniards to establish civil settlements, as well as missions, at regular intervals from one end of the province to the other.<sup>25</sup>

*Presidio de San Agustín de Ahumada and Mission Nuestra Señora de la Luz.* Almost due south of Nacogdoches on the east bank of the Trinity River, one league from its mouth, and barely a quarter of a league from its stream stood the Presidio de San Agustín de Ahumada, also called "de las Amarillas," but better known as the Orcoquisac Presidio. Here a guard of thirty men had been first placed by Governor Jacinto de Barrios y Jáuregui in the spring of 1755. At the recommendation of a *Junta de Real Hacienda*, the viceroy had authorized the establishment of a presidio, a civil settlement, and a mission on February 12, 1756. The history of this outpost had been stormy and tragic. In 1766, when the Marqués de Rubí visited the place, little or no progress had been made. The presidio at this time consisted of a few frame buildings on a low hill, the only spot not completely flooded by the waters of the Trinity the greater part of the year. Rubí explains that across the mouth of the Trinity there was a large sand bar which caused the flood waters of the river to backwash and inundate the entire area from the mouth to the presidio. This made the land impassable. In order to reach the sea by land it was necessary to make a detour of ten leagues. The entire coast from the Trinity to the Mississippi was equally impassable during the greater part of the year.

The reason for choosing so undesirable a place was, it seems, the ill-advised desire to occupy the spot where a group of French traders had been discovered. This was not only unhealthy, but extremely damp and most difficult of access. If intended to protect the coast it was practically useless, observes the Marqués, being impossible to reach it by land the major part of the year. The garrison of thirty-one men, including the captain, were poorly clothed, poorly fed, and poorly equipped. Because of the difficulty of securing supplies as a result of the bad roads and the high water, the men were often forced to live on roots, nuts, and wild fruits.

The mission, which was located near the presidio, had met with little success. The Orcoquisac Indians (Arkokisas) had been more or less

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<sup>25</sup>Fray José de Calahorra y Sáenz to the Governor, May 8, 1764. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 12, pp. 156-161.

indifferent, and the lack of food forced them to abandon this mission frequently to search for food in the woods or in the bay and river, where they caught fish with harpoons. So unhealthy was the climate and so scarce the food that the missionaries had always experienced great suffering both from sickness and actual want at this post. Shortly after its establishment, the mission claimed its first victim, Father Fray Bruno Chavira, who died a martyr to his zeal. In a letter to the commissary general, the guardian of the College of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de Zacatecas described the circumstances. Father Chavira, although aged, was still a very active, zealous, and enthusiastic missionary. "He was a worthy religious," the guardian explains, "whose virtues were commended highly by Governor Barrios y Jáuregui." Soon after his arrival with a young companion the two fell sick. The older man urged his young companion to go to Los Adaes for treatment. Left alone the venerable *Padre* grew worse. Overwork, lack of food, cold and dampness, the lack of shelter—for there were no buildings yet—proved too great a hardship for the aged missionary. Feeling his end approaching, he sent a messenger to Nacogdoches for a friar to come and administer to him the last sacraments. But the streams were high and the messenger could not reach his goal. Alone, in a rudely constructed hut made of brush, without the consolation of a brother missionary, Father Chavira delivered his soul unto his Maker, a true martyr of charity, early in 1757.<sup>26</sup>

*Mission Nuestra Señora de los Dolores de los Ais.* About seventeen leagues (approximately forty-five miles) due east from Nacogdoches, was the old Mission of Nuestra Señora de los Dolores, founded in 1716. According to the Marqués de Rubí this was located on a small hill, five leagues from the Atoyaque River in 1768, when he saw it. Nearby ran a permanent creek.<sup>27</sup> But the banks of this stream were too high to permit irrigation. With characteristic industry, however, the *Padres* had planted a garden and a small orchard along the creek, which were watered by hand. Here they raised cabbage, lettuce, beans, lentils, garlic, and onions. In the fields nearby, a moderate amount of corn was harvested

<sup>26</sup>The details summarized here are taken from various sources, chiefly from La Fora, *Relación*, ff. 73-74; Fray José María de Guadalupe Alcivia to the Commissary General, September 18, 1757, in *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 28, pp. 190-192; and Testimonio de los autos fechos a consulta de Don Jacinto de Barrios y Jáuregui, *A. G. I., Guadalupe*, 103-6-23 (Dunn Transcripts, 1756). The history of the founding of the presidio is given in full in a subsequent chapter of this book. The location was not far from the present city of Liberty.

<sup>27</sup>La Fora, *Relación*, f. 71.

in good years by the missionaries, the mission guards, and their families, for there were no Indians living in the mission. The natives came on feast days and Sundays, and they occasionally helped with the planting.

In the mission, whose church, priest's house, and granary were made of timber and roofed with shingles, lived two *Padres* and a lay brother in addition to two soldiers and their families. They made up the permanent residents at this time. Recently, sporadic interest was suddenly aroused by the discovery of gold in the vicinity. It seems that a mine was actually started not far from somnolent Mission Dolores. Some ore was extracted, but it proved to be of very inferior quality. The interest in the operation was naturally short-lived.<sup>28</sup>

Although there were no Indians living in the mission the Ais nation occupied the surrounding country and attended religious services with some regularity. The frequency with which they committed petty thefts on the depleted stock of the mission on such occasions indicates that their visits were the result of material rather than spiritual interest. Their lax morals were the constant despair of the missionaries. But in spite of frequent losses the mission still had a few saddle horses, fifteen or twenty mules, ten or twelve cows, a few bulls, and eight or ten yoke of oxen. The *Padres* experienced considerable difficulty, however, in saving what little stock remained. The Indians often ate the oxen during the winter and made it almost impossible to plant the crops in the spring. Not infrequently they stole the remaining horses and mules to trade them to the French for paint, beads, clothes, powder, bullets, guns, tobacco, and wine. Father Solís was thoroughly disgusted with the worthless character of the Ais, whom he declared were the worst Indians in the entire province, being drunkards, thieves, and indolent dullards. They were fond of dancing and addicted to all vices. The generally optimistic *Padres* were obliged to admit the hopelessness of their true conversion. In view of the circumstances, the missionaries stationed in this lonely spot deserved much praise, Father Solís thought, for having the fortitude necessary to stay among such ungrateful people, waiting patiently for a repentant soul to come in search of the cleansing waters of baptism and the comforts of religion.<sup>29</sup>

Was this mission a failure? Can it be cited as incontestable proof of the futility of the work attempted by Franciscans in East Texas? On the face of the circumstances just described this conclusion seems inevitable. But on the other hand the Marqués de Rubí bears testimony to the fact that the

<sup>28</sup>*The Solís Diary of 1767 in op. cit.*, pp. 33-34; La Fora, *Relación*, f. 71.

<sup>29</sup>*The Solís Diary in op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

Ais Indians spoke Spanish almost without exception; that they were very wise (ladinos); that they had learned to use modern implements, raised good crops independently, and were skilled (too much so) in the use of firearms.<sup>30</sup> Evidently then, the Indians in the vicinity had been civilized to a greater degree than had been suspected, but unfortunately, they had adopted only the worst features of the new civilization. This was due, perhaps, to the proximity of the French, which had prevented their reduction at any time to the strict discipline of missionary life.

*Presidio de los Adaes.* This presidio, the most distant outpost of Spanish power, was far from being a dependable defense of the vast Province of Texas. When Governor Martos y Navarrete visited it in 1760, the fort, hexagonal in shape, was altogether a flimsy wooden structure with a half-rotten stockade, defended by only two cannon which, because of their condition, were a greater menace to the garrison than to the enemy. Two years before, the courageous wife of Governor Barrios y Jáuregui subdued her Spanish pride sufficiently to confess candidly to the viceroy that the conditions of the presidio and the tattered clothes of the garrison filled her with shame. She declared that it was a question of pride in the face of the French fort of Natchitoches to improve conditions. Her husband had donated two silver candlesticks to the presidial church in order that the altar might look better when French visitors attended services.<sup>31</sup>

Although, according to his wife, Governor Barrios y Jáuregui had rebuilt the stockade in 1758, two years later it had again become practically worthless, having rotted in that short time as a result of frequent rains. The presidio had six cannon at one time, but two were loaned to Colonel Ortiz Parrilla and two had been sent to the new Presidio of San Agustín de Ahumada, near the mouth of the Trinity. Because of its hexagonal shape, not less than six cannon were needed in order to place two at least on each of the three alternate angles to protect the adjoining flanks. Governor Martos y Navarrete urgently requested that this matter be given attention. He found also that the supply of powder for the garrison of sixty men was rather uncautiously kept on a high platform built on four poles, without any other protection. Although the

<sup>30</sup>La For, *Relación*, f. 71.

<sup>31</sup>Manuela de Alcázar to the Viceroy, September 8, 1758, *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 91, part 1, pp. 123-126; Martos y Navarrete to the Viceroy in Testimonios de los autos formados sre. la residencia tomada por Don Angel de Martos y Navarrete . . . *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 88-6-10. (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1762), pp. 258-260.

powder was high enough from the ground to prevent its getting damp, it was exposed to the danger of being ignited by lighted arrows thrown by the enemy. The new governor declared that he planned to rebuild the entire fort, replacing the wooden structures with buildings of stone and mortar. This was entirely practical. Good building stone could be found within a quarter of a league and lime could be obtained by going about one league. It was his firm intention to build a subterranean deposit for the powder and ammunition. All this would mean considerable work for the garrison and would require the importation of some laborers; but when the work was completed, it would relieve the garrison from constantly repairing the stockade and the timber buildings which rotted so quickly because of the dampness.<sup>32</sup>

*Fear of English attack.* Rumors of the progress of the French and Indian War had filled officials both in Louisiana and Texas with fears of the English. Early in 1761, the viceroy had issued instructions to officers in Texas to regulate the use of powder and safeguard the stock of this important item in the presidios. The viceroy warned commanders against the danger of English attack and asked that a close watch be kept against surprise by intruders. That his fears were not unfounded is evident. From a letter of Governor Martos y Navarrete written at this time, we learn that he postponed his inspection of La Bahía for fear of an English encounter. The French commander at Natchitoches, seriously menaced in the fall of 1761 by an Indian rebellion, warned Governor Martos y Navarrete of the peril. Fortunately the French officer succeeded in preventing the revolt induced by English traders. By December, the danger of English attack had passed and the Texas governor informed the viceroy that the season was too far advanced now for the English to invade Louisiana and threaten the interests of Spain.<sup>33</sup>

*Mission San Miguel de los Adaes.* A short distance from the presidio stood the mission on a small hill, opposite the narrow valley that separated them. Founded by the enthusiastic and zealous Father Margil in 1716, it was the most advanced Spanish mission on the frontier, less than six leagues from the French fort of Natchitoches. The old church, the friary,

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<sup>32</sup>Testimonios de los autos formados, *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 88-6-10 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1762), pp. 258-260; Fiscal to the Viceroy, September 3, 1761, *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara* (Dunn Transcripts, 1761-1766), pp. 116-117.

<sup>33</sup>Martos y Navarrete to the Viceroy, May 26, 1761; same to same, December 4, 1761, in *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 91, part 1, pp. 150-153.



the granary, and the other buildings—all of timber with shingle roofs—had never been replaced with more permanent structures of stone and mortar, as had been done in San Antonio. In 1767, when Father Solís saw this mission, the buildings plainly showed the need of repair. But with practically no neophytes, the *Padres* could do little more than keep up the place. In spite of the lack of help, the church and grounds were neat and clean. Large pines and oak trees cast their kindly shade on the mission. In the church were found the necessary vestments, sacred vessels, and chalices of silver for religious services, besides some candlesticks and other ornaments for special occasions.

The devoted Zacatecan missionaries lived soberly, with only the bare necessities of life. Practically no crops were raised any more on the old mission lands, and its ranch "El Baño," located about half a league away, had only a few cows and some worn-out horses and mules which the Indians disdained taking. Corn no longer constituted the chief article of food. The settlers, as well as the natives, had come to depend more and more on wheat imported surreptitiously from Natchitoches. The hay needed to feed the straggling remains of the mission herd had to be brought from ten to twelve leagues away. The Indians had grown more and more independent and insolent. Only when sick or in time of famine in the winter, did they come to the *Padres* for aid and comfort. True, they were not hostile, nor did they harbor any animosity against the missionaries, but they had grown indifferent. With admirable Christian patience and charity, the friars labored incessantly to attract them and to induce them to become practical Catholics, for almost all the Indians in the neighborhood were baptized and most of them were buried by the church. The *Padres* never lost hope. They stood ever ready to aid and comfort the wayward and seemingly ungrateful wards of the old mission. They tended with the same solicitude the sixty soldiers of the presidio, their families, and the few settlers who had come to live in this remote post.<sup>34</sup>

*Presidio de San Luis de las Amarillas (San Sabá).* This presidio, near the present city of Menard, was originally founded on the San Gabriel River to protect the projected Apache missions of San Xavier, which ended in dismal failure after the tragic death of Father Gzábal. The garrison had been moved in 1758 to the San Sabá and increased from fifty to one hundred men, but even with this added strength, it had been unable to do more than to witness at a safe distance the burning

<sup>34</sup>*Solís Diary of 1767* in *op. cit.*, pp. 31-33; La Forá, *Relación*, ff. 71-72.

of the new Apache mission and the martyrdoms of Fathers Alonso Giraldo de Terreros and Santiesteban. By a strange coincidence, the original commander, Captain Felipe de Rábago y Terán, who was seriously implicated in the untimely death of Father Ganzábal at San Xavier, was restored to the command of San Sabá by order of the viceroy on June 7, 1760.<sup>35</sup> The new commander took possession on October 19, 1760. After the formal ceremony, he entered into an agreement with Colonel Ortiz Parrilla to permit him to continue to administer the presidio until January 1, 1761, at which time the garrison would be turned over to Felipe Rábago y Terán fully equipped.

When he finally took over the command, the condition of the presidio and garrison was far from favorable. Among the one hundred men of the garrison were included eighteen who had come from Coahuila to participate in the campaign recently waged against the northern Indians by Ortiz Parrilla. Furthermore, there were several boys who were entirely too young for military service, three tailors, and one sacristan in the ranks. There were also several superannuated soldiers and disabled veterans of frontier warfare, who although they had rendered efficient service in days gone by, they had outlived their usefulness and were entitled to honorable retirement. All in all, the effective number of men capable of military service was far below its reputed strength. They were all poorly clothed, had almost no horses, and their equipment was totally inadequate.

In order to replenish the horses of the presidio, almost completely stolen by the Indians, Rábago y Terán requested six hundred remounts from Colonel José de Escandón. Unable to get more than three hundred and seventy from Escandón, he had two hundred and sixty sent from Coahuila. With these and seventy-four brought by himself, the presidio had almost enough horses to meet all emergencies.<sup>36</sup> It should be kept in mind that presidial regulations required each man to have from six to eight horses as remounts. Supplies, arms, and ammunition were also secured with all diligence and the garrison was soon placed in condition to perform its duties more effectively.

Rábago then turned his attention to the presidio. The old wooden buildings were quickly replaced by a *casa fuerte* (strong or blockhouse)

<sup>35</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, November 1, 1761, in *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 20-28. For the details of the early history of this presidio see Volume III of this history.

<sup>36</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, November 6, 1761, *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 20-28.

built of stone and mortar for the protection of the garrison and settlers. This fort was constructed a short distance from the river, on a small bluff, which dominated the countryside. With justifiable pride, Rábago y Terán declared the new fort looked "like a castle, with its turrets and redoubts." Expert masons had been brought for this work, who, aided by the soldiers, completed it by the end of 1761. In his report, the new commander explained that he intended to have all the houses built of stone and that the soldiers would do this in their spare time. He would soon have the strongest and best defended post in the entire frontier, he assured the viceroy. The stockade had been repaired, and would be replaced by a stone wall soon.<sup>37</sup>

While busily engaged in reënforsing the presidio and placing its garrison on a better footing, Captain Rábago y Terán, who appears to have experienced a great change of heart, displayed the most convincing zeal for the conversion of the natives and their reduction to mission life. Shortly after his arrival he sent word to the Apache chiefs to come to see him. He also dispatched exploring parties to examine the surrounding country and the neighboring streams between San Juan Bautista on the Río Grande and San Sabá and between San Sabá and the Northwest for suitable sites for missions. At the same time he wrote to Father Fray Diego Jiménez, president of the missions on the Río Grande, inviting him to come to the presidio to help plan the reëstablishment of missions for the Apaches.<sup>38</sup>

Since the destruction of San Sabá, the Apaches had been afraid of congregating at the site. They justly felt that the presidio offered no security against attack by the Comanches and the northern tribes. But with the improvements made by Rábago y Terán since his return, confidence was restored to some extent, and they expressed a willingness to listen to new proposals for reduction to mission life. It became evident, however, that the site at San Sabá was considered too exposed. They suggested that new establishments be founded on the Chanas (Llano) River or on the upper Nueces, in the Valle de San José (near present Barksdale, Camp Wood and Montell).

*Mission San Lorenzo de la Santa Cruz.* This mission, founded early in 1762 as a result of the activities of Captain Rábago y Terán and

<sup>37</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, November 6, 1761, *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 29-30; also letter of July 12, 1761, in *ibid.*, pp. 12-15.

<sup>38</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, August 18, 1761, in *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 17-18.

Fray Diego Jiménez, was located on a flat hill near a spring, on the east side of the Nueces River in the Valle de San José, generally called "El Cañón."<sup>39</sup> This valley was about fifty leagues, some one hundred and forty miles, north of San Juan Bautista on the Río Grande, and some forty leagues south of San Sabá, or nearly halfway between these two points. In the vicinity there were good arable lands and many springs. Furthermore, the Apaches chose the spot because it was much more secluded than San Sabá and offered greater facilities for defense. Before the end of 1762 there were four hundred Apaches and Lipanes, young and old, living in the mission, and the enthusiastic friars had hopes of gathering here and in the neighboring mission as many as three thousand natives.<sup>40</sup>

On the eve of the French cession of Louisiana, this new mission in west Texas had just been started. The necessary buildings, such as the church, the friary, the granary, and the huts for the neophytes were as yet only temporary structures. Although the missionaries were very hopeful of the future, this depended largely on the formal approval by the viceroy of the new enterprise to assure it the indispensable royal aid. The mission had been founded provisionally and without official authorization.

*Mission Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria del Cañón.* Practically at the same time that San Lorenzo de la Santa Cruz was founded, another Apache chief called El Turnio (Cross-Eyed) requested that a similar establishment be founded for his people on another spring located four leagues south of the first, on the west side of the river, in the Valle de San José. This was the beginning of the new mission of Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria. By the close of 1762 it, too, had over four hundred Indians, young and old, most of the essential buildings had been erected, and the fields necessary for the planting of corn and beans had been cleared and planted.<sup>41</sup>

When a report was made on December 7, 1764, two years later, of the progress of the two missions at "El Cañón," it was stated that each one still had over four hundred neophytes, mostly Lipanes. The enthusiastic missionaries Fray Diego Jiménez, Fray Manuel Antonio Cuevas, and Fray Joaquín Baños, who had served the two missions since their

<sup>39</sup>The details of its founding will be given in subsequent chapters.

<sup>40</sup>Report of Fray Diego Jiménez, Fray Joaquín Baños, and Fray Diego Martín García, February 7, 1762, in *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 29, pt. 1, pp. 113-115.

<sup>41</sup>*Autos* of Rábago y Terán, February 7, 1762; Fray Diego Jiménez to Rábago y Terán, October 8, 1762, in *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 201-203, 150-156.

establishment, were still filled with the highest hopes. They believed that three more missions could be established in this region for the Lipan Apaches, whose total number they estimated to be about four thousand. The failure of the officials in Mexico to approve the new missions had been a great handicap and the *Padres* had often been reduced to the direst need. But privations, hardships, and suffering had neither dampened their enthusiasm nor weakened their faith in the ultimate reduction of the faithless and treacherous Apaches, of whom it has been said they had no friends among men or beasts because of their cruelty.<sup>42</sup>

*Summary of progress to 1763.* The rapid survey of conditions just given shows clearly the incredible progress made in the spread of missionary endeavors and the actual occupation of widely separated and distant areas in the vast Province of Texas on the eve of the French cession of Louisiana. There were at this time five formal presidios: San Antonio de Béjar, Nuestra Señora de Loreto de la Bahía, San Agustín de Ahumada de los Orcoquisacs, Nuestra Señora de Pilár de los Adaes, and San Luis de las Amarillas de San Sabá. In addition to these presidios there was a detachment of twenty soldiers kept at El Cañón or Valle de San José, to protect the two Apache missions there. More remarkable still was the increase in the number of missions actually in operation at this time. In San Antonio there were four Querétaran Missions and one Zacatecan mission, which after years of trials and tribulations had attained a truly flourishing state. To such an extent had the pioneer days passed that Fray Bartholomé García had been able to compile in Mission Espada the first and only *Manual* of the most commonly used dialect of Texas, to be employed by the missionaries in the administration of the sacraments. This alone is indicative of the calm, security, and leisure attained as a result of the advance made by the missions in this area. Scholarly works cannot be produced in the attendant hardships of a pioneer community.

Southeast from San Antonio, at the mouth of the San Antonio River, in La Bahía, present Goliad, there were now two missions that had at last succeeded in bringing into their fold the untractable tribes of the coast area, among them the fierce Karankawa. East of La Bahía, on the mouth of the Trinity, a new mission, aptly called Nuestra Señora de la Luz, shed its pristine light amidst the encircling gloom of the hitherto untrodden land of the Orcoquisacs and the Bidais. North of Nuestra Señora de la Luz, on the site of present Nacogdoches, still stood the old Mission of

<sup>42</sup>Relación de las misiones de la Presidencia del Río Grande del Norte . . . A. G. M., *Historia*, Vol. 29, pt. 1, pp. 180-185.

Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, and to the east and northeast still persisted the missions of Dolores and San Miguel. In north central Texas frantic efforts were being made to revive the charred remains of Mission San Sabá, from whose cinders rose the two new missions recently founded on the upper Nueces: San Lorenzo de la Santa Cruz and Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria in El Cañón.

There were in all thirteen missions in operation in Texas in 1763, where in 1716 there had been only six, and in 1722 only nine. This does not take into account the four or five missions founded on the Texas side at La Junta de los Ríos, present Presidio, which were still in operation, nor the much more active missions in the El Paso area: Isleta, Senecú, San Lorenzo, and Socorro, nor the *visitas* along the lower Río Grande from Laredo to present Rio Grande City. If these regions are included in the present survey, as they should, it can justly be said that in the area comprising the present State of Texas there were in 1763 seven formal presidios, one military outpost, twenty-one missions, and four *visitas*. It is interesting to note that at this time there were no missions as yet in California and that the number in later years exceeded those in Texas at this time by only two. It should also be kept in mind that in addition to the civil settlement in San Antonio, there were many stray settlers at La Bahía, Los Adaes, and San Sabá, as well as in numerous ranches scattered from Laredo to Los Adaes.

It cost the king of Spain over one hundred thousand *pesos* a year to support the presidios and missions in this province. Not one cent did he receive in return. Fear of French aggression and foreign intruders may account in part for the maintenance of this vast and costly enterprise, but it is nevertheless a tribute to the burning zeal of the missionaries, their perseverance, and their boundless faith in the conversion of the natives that they induced the officials to make such an investment. Without the determination of the missionaries to spread the faith, the French and English would have carried their activities to the Río Grande and New Mexico unimpeded and undiscovered, and thousands of natives would have never known the comforts of religion nor would they have experienced the sublime charity of the devoted missionaries, the redeeming grace of Christianity.

The extent of missionary activity in Texas has never been realized. Historians are just becoming aware of how widely and how deeply the foundations of Christianity were laid by the devoted friars. The archaeologist, the anthropologist, and the serious investigator into the origins

of the numerous tribes that roamed the vast expanse of present Texas are beginning to realize how valuable and how thorough is the information gathered by the patient soldiers of Christ concerning the customs and habits, the religion and habitat of the aboriginal races now completely departed from the land.

## CHAPTER II

### OCCUPATION OF THE TRINITY RIVER, 1746-1772

Although Don Pedro de Rivera claims to have had this region explored in 1727 by Francisco Alvarez Barreyro, who with a detachment of twenty soldiers is said to have examined the coast from the Guadalupe to the Neches, Spanish officials knew little or nothing about it.<sup>1</sup> Governor Prudencio Orobio y Basterra frankly admitted to Fray Benito Fernández de Santa Anna, as late as 1740, that nothing was known concerning the coast area from the Guadalupe to the Sabinas.<sup>2</sup> The following year, this official, on hearing that French traders were active along the coast, urged the establishment of a presidio near the mouth of the Trinity River but his efforts proved fruitless.

When, however, his kinsman, Captain Joaquín Orobio y Basterra of La Bahía reported in 1745 that insistent rumors had reached him concerning the presence of French intruders in the Trinity region, the viceroy became suddenly apprehensive and immediately ordered an investigation to determine if the French had actually established a settlement, what were the number and character of the Indians in the vicinity, and to request any Frenchmen found already settled to leave at once.<sup>3</sup>

*Exploration of the Coast by Orobio y Basterra.* Upon receipt of the orders, Orobio y Basterra, with a group of men, set out in October to make a preliminary reconnaissance. La Bahía was at this time still on the Guadalupe. Descending the banks of this stream in order to follow

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<sup>1</sup>Rivera, *Diario y derrotero*, 63-64. Only vague, indefinite and very inaccurate accounts of this episode were available in the older works until Dr. Bolton first published his study, "Spanish Activities on the Lower Trinity River, 1746-1771," in the *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XVI, 339-377, revised and reprinted later in his *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 324-374. In 1909 Miss Elise D. Brown, using materials gathered by Dr. Bolton, presented a study, "History of the Spanish Settlements at Orcoquisac, 1746-1772," as a Master's thesis to the University of Texas. Since that time some additional material has become available, particularly in the copies of the *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, obtained by the University of Texas Library from the writer. The account here presented is based on the excellent study of Dr. Bolton and on the new sources now available. A portion of this account fell chronologically within the scope of the preceding volume, but the author chose to present the incident as a unit here.

<sup>2</sup>Orobio y Basterra to Fray Benito Santa Anna, July 8, 1740, cited by Bolton, *Texas*, p. 63, note 18.

<sup>3</sup>The Viceroy to Captain Orobio y Basterra, July 18, 1745, in *Béjar Archives*.



the coast, he was soon forced to abandon his plan because of high water. He now conceived the idea of constructing a number of large canoes and undertaking the expedition by water. Lieutenant Miguel Olivares, who was commissioned to investigate the matter and report, soon informed him that the river was obstructed and that boats capable of sailing along the Gulf coast could not be built. He was forced, therefore, to change his plans and arrange to go overland to the crossing on the Trinity, some one hundred miles above its mouth, in order to follow the stream from there to the coast. But before starting, he had to secure reinforcements from San Antonio and San Juan Bautista in order not to leave La Bahía unprotected.

On December 20, he finally set out with a company of twenty-one men. Making his way to the Trinity crossing, he arrived there on January 9, 1746. Here he made diligent inquiry among the Indians, but failed to obtain satisfactory information. He decided therefore to go to San Pedro de los Nabadaches, near the Neches River. There the rumors about the presence of the French on the coast were confirmed, but he was told that the only way to reach the mouth of the Trinity was to go on to Nacogdoches, where he could take the Bidai Trail, a path cut by these Indians in going to and from their country. He was impressed with the abundant signs of French influence in San Pedro de los Nabadaches, but he was told that the French firearms, clothing, and trinkets did not come from the coast but from Natchitoches.

When he arrived in Nacogdoches a few days later, he learned from Father Fray José Calahorra y Sáenz, the veteran missionary of Guadalupe, that fifteen shipwrecked Frenchmen had recently passed by on their way from the coast to Natchitoches. Struck by the coincidence, Orobio decided to go to Los Adaes and consult with Governor García Larios. By February 4, he was back in Nacogdoches, where he secured an Indian guide to take him over the Bidai Trail. Having completed his arrangements, he left Nacogdoches on February 7, and arrived on March 6 at a place which he called Santa Rosa de Viterbo, where he found a settlement of Bidai Indians near the Trinity.

The presence of Spaniards, Orobio remarks, aroused great interest, being the first time they had been seen in this region. After a few days rest and a long interview with the chief of these Indians he again set out, accompanied by a Bidai guide, crossed the Trinity River, and went thirty leagues west-southwest from Santa Rosa de Viterbo to a place which he called San Rafael, and which appears to have been on

Spring Creek, west of the San Jacinto River.<sup>4</sup> Here he found two Orcoquisac villages. The Orcoquisacs were even more surprised than the Bidais to see *Yegsa*, as they called the Spaniards in their territory.

*News of French activities.* Both the Bidais and the Orcoquisacs explained that the French visited them frequently. For six years traders, who lived in a place they called Pachina, near the Mississippi, had been coming by land. Others came by water and ascended the Neches, Trinity and Brazos Rivers. No permanent settlement had been made, but last summer a party, who had come by sea, had chosen a site and told the Orcoquisacs to notify the Bidais, the Deadoses, and the Tejas to bring their bearskins, buckskins, and buffalo hides to this place to trade. The site chosen appears to have been on the San Jacinto, some distance from its mouth. The Indians explained it was on a stream between the Trinity and the Brazos which was a tributary of neither. The Orcoquisacs told Orobio that some Frenchmen had been recently lost among the Cujanes, who lived to the southwest. From this he concluded that the party that had passed through Nacogdoches had perhaps been out to rescue them.

*Exploration of the San Jacinto.* Curious to see the site chosen for the proposed settlement, Orobio went towards the coast some fifteen leagues and was shown the place where the French said they would establish themselves. This was on a stream which Orobio named Aránzazu and which was in all probability the San Jacinto. There was no sign of habitation and in the opinion of Orobio no permanent settlement could be established on this spot for lack of lands, timber, and stone. Satisfied there was no French settlement, nor any immediate probability of one, he set out in a northwestern direction until he came upon the *Camino Real* between Nacogdoches and La Bahía. He then followed the road back to his presidio, where he arrived on April 6, and made a complete report to Governor García Larios on June 25, 1746.<sup>5</sup>

*The Orcoquisacs (Arkokisas).* Before the visit of Orobio practically nothing was known about the Orcoquisac Indians. During the next ten years much was learned concerning them by occasional explorers and

<sup>4</sup>To here his diary found in *Diligencias practicadas por Dn. Joaquín de Orobio Capn. de la Bahía Sobre establecimiento de Franceses in Béjar Archives* has been followed. For the identification of localities we are indebted to Bolton, *Texas*, p. 330. Use has also been made of Miss Brown's thesis, "History of the Spanish Settlements."

<sup>5</sup>*Diligencias practicadas por Dn. Joaquín de Orobio Capn. de La Bahía sobre establecimiento de Franceses, Béjar Archives.*

adventurous traders who penetrated the coast region. The center or headquarters of the tribe seems to have been located on a western branch of the San Jacinto River called at this time Arroyo de Santa Rosa de Alcázar. This stream has been identified on good authority as Spring Creek.<sup>6</sup> A short distance below the junction of the San Jacinto and Santa Rosa, about a gunshot from the banks of the latter, was another village ruled by Chief Canos. This chief was a close friend of the French, whom the Indians generally designated as Canos; hence the name. Some twenty miles above was the village of Chief El Gordo (Fatty). A fourth village was located ten or fifteen miles above the mouth of the Trinity on its east bank, while a fifth, ruled over by the same chief, Calzones Colorados (Red Breeches), was at or near the mouth of the same river and on the same side.<sup>7</sup> This nation occupied and claimed as their country the coast region from as far west as the Brazos to halfway between the Trinity and the Neches, for a distance of from fifteen to twenty miles inland from the coast. The nation was bordered on the north by the Bidais and the Deadoses. On the west were the Cocos and to the west and southwest the Karankawas and the Cujanes. The Orcoquisacs seem to have been on friendly terms with the neighboring tribes with the exception of the Karankawa. Racially they seem to have been closely related to the Attacapa, with whom they intermarried freely.<sup>8</sup> The number of this tribe has been estimated between ten and fifteen hundred souls. Orobio in his report in 1748 places the number of families as slightly over three hundred.

*Exploration of the Trinity River, 1748.* On January 29 of this year, the viceroy issued detailed instructions to Captain Orobio y Basterra to explore the coast between the Guadalupe River and the Trinity and to ascertain the facilities offered for settlement as well as the number and character of the Orcoquisacs. The order was prompted by a report of Orobio that a group of Indians from this tribe had come to La Bahía to request that missions be founded in their country. The order was received

<sup>6</sup>Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, p. 333.

<sup>7</sup>Bolton, *op. cit.*, p. 333, declares that the location of the fifth village is not clear. But the report of Orobio to the Viceroy made on July 22, 1748, clearly indicates that there was a village at or very near the mouth of the Trinity. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 19, pp. 95-100.

<sup>8</sup>Hodge, *The Arkokisa* (Orcoquisac) in *Handbook of the American Indian*; Castañeda, *Morfi's History of Texas*, pt. 1, p. 80; *The Missions at Work* (Vol. III of *Our Catholic Heritage*, Chapters I and VI); Bolton, *Texas*, pp. 332-335.

on March 30, but due to unavoidable delays, Orobio was unable to start until May 15.

Starting out from La Bahía on this date, he followed a northwestern course and crossed the Colorado River fourteen leagues (some thirty-five miles) below the *Camino Real* to Los Adaes. Here he was delayed two or three days on account of high water. Continuing his march in the same direction, he next crossed the Brazos and proceeded in a more easterly direction to the Trinity across level and open country. He reported that the land between the last two rivers was rich and black, with many creeks bordered by good timber. He remarked that this region was well suited for agriculture and cattle raising. From the Brazos to the Trinity he estimated the distance to be about forty leagues (some ninety miles). He states that he kept his course about fifteen leagues from the coast and that he encountered a few lagoons along the way. Before reaching the Trinity, twelve leagues north of what he called San Fernando Bay, he crossed a large creek which he named Nombre de Dios. A short distance beyond he came to San Antonio de Padua, and not far from this stream he crossed Santa Bárbara Creek, arriving at the Trinity on June 10. The point was about fifteen leagues from its mouth, but he could neither cross the river, which was high, nor continue to its mouth because of the lagoons that intercepted his march.

Camping on the river, he was agreeably surprised to see several Orcoquisac Indians come across the river in canoes to greet him. He immediately dispatched the visitors with a message to the chief of the village at the mouth of the river, who came the next day with four large canoes and many Indians. After the exchange of the usual courtesies, the chief insisted on taking Orobio in his own canoe to his village, while his companions took charge of the transportation of the other soldiers, their horses, and their supplies. Orobio was truly amazed at the enthusiastic reception accorded him and his companions. Although the Indians wished him to stay in the village, he courteously but firmly refused the invitation and pitched his camp a short distance from the *ranchería*. He then distributed presents of food, tobacco, and trinkets of various kinds which he had brought for the purpose.

One June 12 and 13, he inspected the *ranchería* and explored the mouth of the river. He found that the Indians cultivated small patches of land and raised good corn and other vegetables. At the mouth of the river, he discovered a large sand bar and he noted that it caused the water to be level with the banks for a distance of one and one-half leagues. To

the east there were two long lagoons that joined each other and into which the river flowed to reach the sea.

Three chiefs with many warriors, one from Arroyo Nombre de Dios, who had visited the presidio the year before, one from the Neches River, and one from the Sabine, came on June 15 to pay their respects to the captain. They declared they were friends of the Spaniards, and that they had come at the invitation of the head chief, who lived near the Bay of San Fernando. Asked through an interpreter the number of people in their nation, they replied that there were two hundred and ninety-two families, without counting seventeen who had gone to San Xavier.

Orobio now decided to explore the country to the east of the Trinity. The Indians offered to guide him, and he followed the trail that led from the Trinity to the Sabine and into the French settlements, according to his escorts, for a distance of three leagues. The first two leagues were along open and level country, but after this distance he encountered thick groves of pine trees and heavy underbrush. His guides told him the rest of the way was of the same type until one day's march east of the Sabine. From there he would find wide plains similar to those he had seen between the Trinity and the Brazos. Orobio notes that the land was swampy and unfit for settlement. Satisfied with what the Indians had told him, he turned back to camp.

On June 16, Orobio undertook to explore San Fernando Bay with three soldiers and the chief of the village who offered to act as guide. Three-quarters of a league from the village they came to Santa Rosa Creek, a stream that ran into the bay. The water was found to be too deep to permit crossing it on horseback. Fortunately the chief had foreseen the difficulty, and ordered a canoe to meet them. Leaving the horses, they boarded the canoe and proceeded down the stream to the bay where some soundings were taken. With a practiced eye Orobio noted that a part of the timber had been recently cut along the far edge of the bay. He inquired from the chief if his French visitors had done this. The Indian replied that it had not been the French, but a party of white men who had come in several large boats and sent a small launch ashore to cut wood and get water. They had anchored in the bay for several days, but had not traded with the natives. From the description of the visitors Orobio concluded they had been English and not French. When asked how long ago it was, the chief replied it had been in the fall.

From its mouth, which was about one league wide, the bay extended inland for a distance of about five leagues to the base of the hill near

the village where Orobio had set up his camp. At its widest point, the bay was about two and one-half leagues, but it narrowed to one league toward the hill. During the next two or three days Orobio attempted to reach the point where the English had cut the wood but without success.

On June 22, he examined carefully the mouth of the Trinity where it entered the bay. He found that it was one hundred and six *varas* wide (about three hundred feet) and that from the east bank to the middle the depth increased gradually to two fathoms. But the main channel ran close to its west bank, where a depth of five fathoms was discovered. Opposite the mouth there were sand banks and the water appeared to be shallow.

After inspecting the neighboring streams, which he called San Antonio de Padua and Nombre de Dios, both of which were found to be large creeks and apparently permanent, he took leave of his friends on June 25 and started his return march to the Guadalupe. He followed the most direct route, and finding no high waters, he arrived in La Bahía on July 4, from where he made his report to the viceroy.<sup>9</sup>

*Trade with the Bidais and the Orcoquisacs.* Although the recommendations of Orobio y Basterra for the establishment of missions among these Indians were disregarded at this time because of the San Xavier enterprise, when Governor Barrios y Jáuregui arrived in Los Adaes in 1751 he seems to have realized the possibilities of a friendly trade with them. An investigation held in 1760, after his departure, disclosed how he had established a practical monopoly in which there are some indications that the missionaries of East Texas shared. The trade was carried on by his personal agents, Marcos Ruiz, Domingo del Río, Juan Antonio Maldonado, and Jacinto León. The business appears to have been well organized. Governor Barrios y Jáuregui obtained the goods in Natchitoches, in open violation of the strictest orders of the viceroy, and sent them in pack-trains escorted by a small guard of soldiers to the country of the Bidais and the Orcoquisacs. The goods consisted of French knives, scissors, beads, cloth, tobacco, combs, and even firearms, in spite of the serious offense which it was to supply arms and ammunition to the natives. In exchange there were obtained corn, horses, buckskins and buffalo hides. The corn and horses were sold by the governor to the garrison at Los Adaes, while the skins and hides were either traded at Natchitoches for

<sup>9</sup>Orobio y Basterra to the Viceroy, July 22, 1748, *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 19, pp. 95-100. This report has not been used before by historians. It is for this reason that it has been cited here in detail.

new supplies or sent to Saltillo. This trade, in violation of every Spanish regulation, seems to have been as lucrative as it was illegal.

But while Governor Barrios appears to have had a practical monopoly, French traders seem to have continued their activities and frequently visited these Indians. It was charged in the investigation that the participation of the French traders was with the collusion of Barrios. This idea apparently was widely held, for even Morfi in his *Historia*, referring to the arrest of Blancpain and his companions in 1754, says: "After having served Barrios in his illicit trade, this official, fearful of being discovered by his successor during the *residencia*, sacrificed them by denouncing the unfortunate men. They protested in vain that they had entered the province with the consent of the governor, whose orders they always obeyed. . . ."<sup>10</sup> Morfi exaggerated the facts in this instance, for no such claim was made by the prisoners.

*Arrest of Blancpain and companions, October 10, 1754.* Whatever the relations of the French traders with the governor, the fact remains that the prisoners did not implicate him in their declarations. But the whole story of this incident that led to the establishment of a presidio and a mission on the Trinity has only been summarized heretofore.<sup>11</sup> It seems that on September 20, 1754, Barrios held a secret investigation at Los Adaes. He declared he had reliably been informed that four Frenchmen and two Spaniards had settled near the mouth of the Trinity River, where they had built houses (*jacales*) and were selling guns and ammunition to the natives. This was a violation of the regulations of the viceroy and a transgression of Spanish territory. The claim to the Trinity had been established by the visit of Joaquín Orobio y Basterra, of La Bahía, the first to explore its mouth, and the Bidai and Orcoquisac Indians had long been the friends of the Spaniards. Proof of this was the aid given to Father Fray Mariano de Anda of San Xavier in recovering runaway Mayeyes, Yojuanes, and Yerbipiames who had taken refuge among them.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup>Castañeda, *Morfi's History of Texas*, pt. 2, p. 373 (Quivira Society Publications, Vol. VI). For details of the investigation concerning illicit trade see Bolton, *Texas*, 35-40.

<sup>11</sup>Bolton's account is brief, as is Miss Brown's. With full details now available, a fuller account is given here. Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 66, 337-338; Brown, "Spanish Settlements at Orcoquisac," 21-24 (University of Texas, Master's Thesis, 1909).

<sup>12</sup>*Auto* of Governor Jacinto de Barrios y Jáuregui, September 20, 1754, in Testimonio de los autos fecho a consulta de D. Jacinto de Barrios y Jáuregui Govor. de la

He consequently ordered Lieutenant Marcos Ruiz to proceed with all dispatch, compatible with caution, to the Trinity River, taking with him twenty-five soldiers. On the way, he was to visit and invite the Bidai Chief Tomás and his people to join him. To propitiate his good will he was to give him presents and offer him all the booty taken from the French intruders. He was to do the same thing with the Orcoquisac Indians. The French were to be captured and sent to Governor Pedro de Rábago y Terán in Coahuila with instructions to be forwarded to Mexico for examination. Whatever property was found should be confiscated and distributed to the Indian allies to encourage them in their friendship for the Spaniards and their hatred for the intruders. Ruiz was furthermore to explore the country carefully, to destroy the houses and boats of the French, and to take soundings in the river and bay.

The party set out on its mission with the greatest secrecy to prevent any warning from reaching the intruders. Not until the little band reached the *ranchería* of Chief Tomás did the men themselves know the purpose of the expedition. The Bidais gladly joined the Spaniards, who then went to the Orcoquisacs. These Indians naturally joined them also. Together they quietly surrounded the house where the Frenchmen lived, which was about two leagues above the mouth of the Trinity River, on its east bank, and on October 10, 1754, captured Joseph Blancpain (often called in the documents Lampen), Elias George, his brother-in-law, and Antonio Dessars, together with two negro slaves. A large supply of merchandise was found and taken from the cabin, which, according to the report made by Ruiz, was all distributed among the Indians. Many boxes and barrels filled with various things were wantonly destroyed and their contents scattered, for which reason only a partial list of the goods taken could be made. Such was the story of Ruiz and his companions, who after distributing the booty and exploring the surrounding country started back on October 14. When the soldiers were about to set fire to the log cabin, just before leaving, the Indian Chief Mateo, of the Orcoquisacs, resolutely opposed the measure and said he wanted to use the timber. The Spaniards started to destroy several canoes found in the river, but they had barely sunk the first, when their Indian allies begged that the others be given to them. The request was naturally granted.

On the second day of the return march, the party was unexpectedly

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Provincia de tejas en que dá quenta haver aprehendido vnos franceses qe. se hallaban establecidos en el Río de la Trinidad. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara, 103-6-23* (Dunn Transcripts, 1756), pp. 1-7.



surrounded by a group of Attacapa Indians who demanded the release of the prisoners. Ruiz instructed his men to shoot the prisoners if the natives attacked. Blancpain then asked to be allowed to talk to the newcomers. He spoke to them in their own tongue and apparently persuaded them to desist from their demand, because the Attacapas then took leave in a friendly way and allowed the Spaniards to continue in peace.

Ruiz divided his men and proceeded with the prisoners to San Xavier, sending back to Los Adaes about half of the soldiers to take his report to the governor. Upon their arrival on October 22, Barrios y Jáuregui examined publicly Cristóbal de Córdoba, José de Arias, Ignacio Hernández, and José del Río, who reported the details of the capture. They also revealed that when questioned, Blancpain had said he was expecting fifty families who were to come from New Orleans to found a permanent settlement and who were to be accompanied by a chaplain to establish a mission for the Indians.<sup>13</sup>

An indication of the goods required for this trade is gained from the list sent by Ruiz. Far from being complete, for many more things were in fact taken and kept by the soldiers with the consent of the governor, perhaps, it nevertheless gives a good idea of the extent of Blancpain's operations. Among the items listed were seventeen guns, four barrels of powder, four of bullets, twelve dozen knives, one case of mirrors, one case of glasses, four bolts of cotton cloth, one bushel of beads, one large bundle of vermillion, nineteen blankets, two hundred hats, twenty-two hatchets, three bolts of red flannel, twenty-four hoes, ten spades, seven shirts, two thousand flints, eight pistols, thirteen hundred powderhorns, and one barrel of butcher knives.<sup>14</sup> These were reported as all that had been seized, but when months later Blancpain made his official declaration in Mexico, he alleged that the inventory made by Ruiz was false, that ten times as many goods were taken from him, many of which were not listed, and that these were not distributed among the Indians, as was claimed by his captors, but were kept by the soldiers, who gave the natives only a few insignificant trinkets. The actual value of his goods he estimated at six thousand *pesos* and he gave a truly remarkable list from memory. Furthermore he declared that he had twenty-three hundred deerskins at the time of his capture which were taken by the soldiers.

<sup>13</sup>Report of Marcos Ruiz and declarations of soldiers. In Testimonio de los auttos fecho . . . A. G. I., *Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-23 (Dunn Transcripts, 1756), pp. 4-21.

<sup>14</sup>Ynventario. Memoria de los vienes que havia en la casa de Lampen (Blancpain). A. G. I., *Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-23 (Dunn Transcripts, 1756), pp. 7-8.

His brother-in-law, Elias George, added that Diego Ramón, one of the soldiers, had sent two mule loads of stolen goods to his brother on the Río Grande.<sup>15</sup>

*Attempt to occupy the Trinity at once.* But let us return to Los Adaes. On October 23, 1754, Governor Barrios convoked a *Junta de Guerra* to decide on a course of action. After hearing the opinion of the officers it was agreed that to prevent the possible settlement by the French a detachment of ten soldiers and ten citizens should be sent at once, pending the ultimate action of the viceroy. The citizens could be assigned twenty-four *pesos* a month and given such arms as could be spared from the stock in the presidio. In the meantime a report was to be made to the viceroy and a request for twelve men sent to the commanders of San Antonio and La Bahía. Lieutenants José González and Antonio Losoya were accordingly commissioned to enlist the citizens. But by November 4 only three men had been found and the matter was dropped awaiting the decision of the viceroy.<sup>16</sup>

Before reporting the matter to the viceroy, however, Governor Barrios thought it wise to present some evidence of the favorable disposition of the natives towards the establishment of missions. Father Francisco Vallejo, President of the missions in East Texas, was requested to state what he knew concerning the matter. He quickly replied on November 19, 1754, that he had often heard Father Calahorra say that the Orcoquisac Indians had repeatedly come to Nacogdoches to solicit missions and had expressed a deep desire that Spaniards and missionaries should live in their lands. It had been the intention of Father Calahorra to visit these Indians this year for which purpose he, Vallejo, had given him permission, but illness had prevented his expedition.<sup>17</sup>

Satisfied with the evidence gathered, Governor Barrios formally ordered ten men from Los Adaes to go to the mouth of the Trinity as soon as eighteen others came to join them for that purpose from San Antonio, San Xavier, and La Bahía. On November 30, he made a detailed report to the viceroy and transmitted copies of all the evidence he had gathered.

<sup>15</sup>Summary of declarations in *Respuesta fiscal*, in *ibid.*, pp. 46-65; see also *Declaraciones de los reos franceses*, given in full in *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 6, pp. 181-190.

<sup>16</sup>*Autos of the Junta de Guerra*, October 23-November 4, 1754, in *Testimonio de los auttos fecho . . . A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-23 (Dunn Transcripts, 1756), pp. 20-27.

<sup>17</sup>Fray Francisco Vallejo to Governor Barrios, November 19, 1754. In *ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

In his report he urged the importance of the formal establishment of a garrison of thirty men at the site where the French traders had been captured, the founding of a civil settlement with settlers from Los Adaes, and the erection of a mission for the Orcoquisacs. The civil settlement would obviate in a few years the need of a garrison. The messenger who carried the dispatches made good time, for on January 11, 1755, the viceroy referred the matter to the *Auditor*.<sup>18</sup>

*Effect of incident on viceregal authorities.* The news of Blancpain's arrest aroused Spanish officials in Mexico to action. Ever since 1739, the Spanish frontier from Texas to New Mexico and beyond had been violated by daring French traders. The persistence of the intruders was beginning to chafe viceregal officials. In 1739, the Mallet brothers with a party of eight or nine men made their way first to Taos by way of the Platte River, and hence to Santa Fé. They had succeeded in breaking through the Comanche country and the vigilance of the Spanish frontier. After a residence of six or seven months in comfortable captivity, most of the members of the party were allowed to return. Four descended the Canadian and the Arkansas rivers to New Orleans, while the others made their way to Canada. They carried back the impression that the people of New Mexico were willing to trade and that the Comanches were not an insurmountable obstacle.

Encouraged by this initial success, Governor Bienville sent a party under Fabre de la Bruyere to open trade with Santa Fé by way of the Arkansas River. Although the little band did not reach its destination, French authorities established a post on the Missouri at the Kansas village shortly afterwards, and French traders soon entered into a treaty in 1746 or 1747 with the Comanches and the Jumanos, which made the Arkansas trail to New Mexico safe. The effect was immediate. From 1748 to 1750 forty-five Frenchmen were reported among the Comanches near Taos, among them Fabre, Satren, and Raballo. In 1751, four others arrived in New Mexico from New Orleans by way of the Missouri. Finally in 1752 Chapuis and Feuilli from Fort Chartres came to Santa Fé and brazenly proposed to open a regular trade route between Illinois and New Mexico.

What was the Spanish reaction to these activities? At first they looked upon the visitors benevolently and permitted the Mallet party to return unimpeded. When Fabre, Satren, and Raballo appeared, the Spaniards

<sup>18</sup>*Auto* of November 20, 1754; Barrios y Jáuregui to the Viceroy, November 30, 1754, in *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-23 (Dunn's Transcripts, 1756), pp. 32-38.

became a bit resentful and retained the intruders in Santa Fé as artisans. But when still others continued to come, officials became apprehensive and sent the uninvited guests as prisoners to Mexico with a report that the French-Comanche alliance was dangerous. Feuilli and Chapuis were then sent to Spain for trial in 1754. They were preceded by those who came in 1751.<sup>19</sup> When these incidents are coupled to the recent investigation concerning the boundary between Louisiana and Texas, conducted by Governor Barrios, and the discovery of Blancpain and his companions in the Orcoquisac country, it is not strange that the viceroy and his advisors should have viewed the situation with some alarm.

Relative promptness was revealed by the *Auditor*, Don Domingo Valcarcel, who made his report to the viceroy on February 11, 1755. After briefly summarizing the evidence presented by Governor Barrios, he emphasized the serious menace of the proposed settlement on the Trinity of fifty French families, who, accompanied by a chaplain, were to be sent by Lacreau from New Orleans. The suggestions of the governor to forestall such a grave contingency should be put into effect without delay. The incidents of 1752 and 1754 in New Mexico clearly pointed out the determination of the French to penetrate the dominion of Spain in America, and the alliance recently made with the Comanches and the Jumanos made the approach by way of the Pecos feasible. They could not be permitted to gain a foothold also on the coast region. A Spanish settlement should promptly be established on the Trinity. With reference to the governor's proposal that settlers for this purpose might be recruited in Los Adaes, Valcarcel was of the opinion that it would be best to enlist families from outside of Texas rather than weaken Los Adaes, which itself was a frontier outpost with Natchitoches dangerously near it. He heartily endorsed the immediate establishment of a presidio, a mission, and a civil settlement, and recommended that the *Fiscal* be asked to make an early report. But the mission should not become a source of misunderstanding and friction between officials. It might be advisable, he thought, to place the new establishment in the care of Jesuit missionaries.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup>Autos fhos. sre. Averiguar que rumbo han traído tres franceses que llegaron al pueblo de Taos . . . *A. G. M., Provincias Internas*, Vol. 37, and Testimonio de los autos fechos a consulta del govor. del Nuevo México sobre haber llegado dos franceses . . . , *A. G. M., Provincias Internas*, Vol. 34. See also Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, pp. 66-68.

<sup>20</sup>Dictamen del Auditor, February 11, 1755. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-23 (Dunn Transcripts, 1756), pp. 39-46. Copy also in *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 6, pp. 19-25.

*Governor Barrios' second investigation, 1755.* In the meantime the governor, fearful lest the projected French settlement might be established, and curious as to what was happening in the Trinity region, ordered Domingo del Río, one of his trusted lieutenants, on April 29, 1755, to visit again the site, where Blancpain was arrested and report on the attitude of the Indians. Del Río set out shortly afterwards with a good supply of gifts and presents. By June 4, he was back in Los Adaes. He reported that soon after the arrest of Blancpain a boat containing men had come, who having learned of the fate of the French traders had not stopped in the Trinity but had explored the coast as far as the Brazos, from where they had turned back to New Orleans. This group had not been the only visitors. After the boat disappeared, four Frenchmen on horseback had entered the country of the Orcoquisacs, bringing merchandise to trade, but the Indians refused to have anything to do with them, with the exception of those at the *ranchería* of Chief Canos. The statement made by Del Río was substantiated by seven other witnesses who swore to its truth. But Governor Barrios did not inform the viceroy until September 6 of the new intrusions and of the recent overtures made by Governor Kerlerec of New Orleans for permission to purchase cattle in Texas, and a reciprocal arrangement for the return of deserters.<sup>21</sup>

The proposals assume an added significance in view of the project Governor Kerlerec had presented to French authorities in 1753 to open trade with the interior provinces. In his *memoire* to the king he pointed out that although Spain was most jealous in her commercial policy, nevertheless the weakness of the frontier outposts made her exclusiveness ineffective. Furthermore the rich mines of Nuevo León and Coahuila could be occupied without difficulty. The main obstacle seemed to be not the Spanish outposts but the Apaches, whose hatred of the eastern and northern Indians extended to the French. The first step was to negotiate a peace between the Apaches and their eastern neighbors. This would prepare the ground for the occupation of the Apache country, which at present was not controlled either by Spain or France. Then if a rupture should occur between the two crowns, the French would be in position to advance and take possession of the Spanish interior provinces already indicated.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup>Comisión que le dió a Domingo del Río para que pasase a la averiguación . . . April 29, 1755; Declaraciones de testigos; Barrios y Jáuregui to the Viceroy, September 6, 1755. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-23 (Dunn Transcripts, 1756), pp. 113-134.

<sup>22</sup>"Project de Paix et D'Alliance avec les Conneils," in *Journal de la Société des Americanistes de Paris*, Nouvelle Série, III, 67-76.

*Declarations of Blancpain and companions.* Upon the arrival of the prisoners in Mexico, viceregal officials had obtained sworn declarations from the three Frenchmen. The chief of these, Joseph Blancpain, admitted he was a royal interpreter and knew eight Indian languages. His home was among the Humas, some twenty miles above New Orleans, and he had a trading establishment in Natchitoches. He had set out from New Orleans with several companions and a supply of merchandise to trade among the Attacapas. These Indians had been friends of the French for thirty-two years. It was a numerous nation that lived along the coast from the Trinity to the Mississippi. Before leaving, he had obtained a patent from Governor Kerlerec to trade and he had received instructions to win the friendship of any new tribes he might encounter, inviting their chiefs to visit the governor in New Orleans.

He explained that he set out from New Orleans, where he had obtained the merchandise and a negro slave from Monsieur Lacreau. He had then proceeded to his home twenty leagues up the river. From there he had gone to Plaquemin, about ten leagues distant, made his way to Lake Chetimatha, where the Attacapas lived, crossed in canoes, and then traveled thirty leagues to another lake, also in the Attacapa country, from where he marched twenty-five leagues more to Attacapa Bay. This bay had two arms, one running west, and the other east. The place where he was taken prisoner was about a league north of the bay on the east bank of the Trinity. The distance from New Orleans was fifty-five leagues. At the time of his capture he had been among the Indians for several months and had traded merchandise for skins to the value of three or four hundred *pesos*. He explained that he and his companions could have easily escaped, because the natives had warned them of the approach of the Spaniards six days before.

When asked about the proposed settlement of fifty French families from New Orleans who were to come with a chaplain, he stoutly denied any such plan and asserted that the only interest of the French was to trade with the natives. He took occasion to state that the report of the goods taken from him was far short of the actual amount, saying that the value of the merchandise was six thousand *pesos*, and that Ruiz and his soldiers had stolen the rest, giving to the Indians only a few worthless trinkets. He added that when the Attacapas attempted to rescue him and his companions, he had merely explained to them that he was going to see the "Capitán Grande" (Big Chief), the designation by which the natives usually referred to the governor.

The statements made by Blancpain were corroborated by the separate

declarations of Elias George and Antonio Dessars. Monsieur George explained that at the time of the capture they had twenty-three hundred deerskins, which were taken by the soldiers and distributed among themselves. He accused Diego Ramón, one of the soldiers, of having sent two mule loads of goods to his brother.<sup>23</sup>

*Action of authorities.* Not until August 27 did the *Fiscal* make his report. He reviewed all the facts of the case, analysed the declarations of the prisoners and the recommendations of the governor and the *Auditor*, and concluded that the matter was urgent. In his opinion the temporary occupation of the Trinity ordered by the governor should be approved. As to the missions contemplated, that official should consult with the Indians, the President of the missions of East Texas, and persons of experience as to the location best suited for the purpose, and report at which time the matter could be formally approved. Wisely he ignored the suggestion that Jesuits be sent to Texas and expressed the hope that in time several missions might be founded for the Orcoquisacs. He did not think that a civil settlement was necessary at this time. The governor could be instructed to enlist volunteer settlers and offer them lands and the honors of first settlers as inducements, but the royal treasury should not be burdened with additional expenses for this purpose.

Taking notice of the claim of Blancpain as to the incomplete report of Ruiz and Governor Barrios concerning the goods taken from him, the *Fiscal* suggested that this matter should be investigated. This was essential in order to make a correct report to His Majesty. If part of the merchandise had been distributed among the soldiers, this should be recovered by the governor and kept safely by him subject to the orders of the viceroy.<sup>24</sup>

When the matter was again referred to the *Auditor*, this official replied immediately by urging the need for prompt and determined action. In his opinion the failure of the French to win completely the friendship of the Comanches had induced them to seek an easier route along the coast. He pointed out that it was the policy of French officials to employ

<sup>23</sup>Declaraciones de José Blancpain, Elias George y Antonio Dessars, February 19-21, 1755, *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 6, pp. 181-189; Doctor Andreu al Virrey, August 27, 1755; List of goods declared by Blancpain as taken from him, October 22, 1755; Razón de la Ruta, October 25, 1755, in *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-23 (Dunn Transcripts, 1756), pp. 83-90.

<sup>24</sup>Respuesta fiscal, August 27, 1755, *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-23 (Dunn Transcripts, 1756), pp. 46-65. Copy also in *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 6.

interpreters of native languages as pathfinders. One of the leaders who reached the Pecos and New Mexico in 1752 was an interpreter, the same as in the case of Blancpain. Should the French succeed in establishing a post on the Trinity, they would sever communication between San Antonio and the missions on the Neches, Nacogdoches, and Los Adaes. Measures to occupy the Trinity must be taken at once.

He expressed surprise at the opposition of the *Fiscal* to a civil settlement at royal expense. Valcarcel, an experienced officer and follower of the farsighted Marqués de Altamira, strongly pointed out that the founding of a civil settlement would obviate the need of a regular garrison in a few years, citing many instances to prove his contention. The military force assigned to the new post should be temporary and the time of service specifically limited to six years. The settling of fifty families at royal expense would prove a great saving in a few years by eliminating the need of maintaining a permanent presidio. He recommended that the governor be immediately instructed to explore the country and to select an appropriate site for a mission, a temporary presidio, and a settlement. The three French prisoners and the two negroes should be sent to Spain for trial.<sup>25</sup>

*Death of Blancpain and fate of companions.* The viceroy approved the recommendations of Valcarcel in regard to the disposition of the prisoners, who were notified shortly thereafter of their early embarkation for Spain. Joseph Blancpain had been ill for some time and now pleaded that the trip would endanger his very life. On January 5, 1756, the viceroy ordered Doctors Antonio Martínez, Nicolás Torres, and Domingo Russi to examine the prisoner and make a report. The doctors reported that the unsanitary conditions of confinement and a poor diet had aggravated a hereditary ailment which the prisoner had suffered for ten years. He was in no condition to travel and needed a long treatment that could not be administered in the prison. Before much could be done, however, the unfortunate Frenchman became worse and died on February 6. Two court doctors made the autopsy and testified as to the causes of his death.<sup>26</sup>

On March 14, 1756, Elias George and Antonio Dessars, together with

<sup>25</sup>Dictamen del Auditor, October 11, 1755, in *ibid.*, pp. 65-82.

<sup>26</sup>Esripto de Blancpain, October 25, 1755; Respuesta Fiscal, October 29, Decreto del Virrey, January 5, 1756; Medical report, same date, in *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-23 (Dunn Transcripts, 1756), pp. 83-92; Certificación de los medicos sobre la muerte del reo francés Blancpain, *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 6, pp. 189-190.



the two negroes, were sent to Cádiz on board "La América" and a detailed report of their arrest, declarations, and the measures adopted to prevent the occupation of the Trinity by the French sent to the king. Upon arrival in Cádiz the prisoners were placed in a dungeon while the Council of the Indies determined their fate. When in October of that year the Council took up the case it recommended that although the prisoners had incurred the death penalty this be commuted to life imprisonment. As a result of this case the king issued an order that in the future if any more Frenchmen were found within the Spanish dominions in New Spain without a permit, they should be sent to Acapulco from where they were to be shipped to South America to be kept on the Island of Juan Fernández or the Presidio of Valdivia.<sup>27</sup>

*Approval of plan for presidio, mission, and civil settlement.* But let us return to the perplexed officials in Mexico. The report of Governor Barrios of September 6, 1755, concerning new evidence of French activity and the proposals for trade of Governor Kerlerrec reached the viceroy towards the close of December. This naturally required a new consultation. Valcarcel reiterated his recommendations on January 8, 1756, and urged that the matter be considered by a *Junta de Guerra y Hacienda*. Just at this juncture a change of viceroys occurred. When the Marqués de las Amarillas finally took office he promptly ordered a *Junta* for February 4 to decide on a course of action.

The Marqués de Aranda, who succeeded Doctor Andreu as *Fiscal*, presented on January 27 the basic considerations to be submitted to the *Junta*. He called attention to the fact that although it had been taken for granted that the Trinity had been temporarily occupied since August 27, 1755, by twenty-eight men sent by the Governor of Texas from Los Adaes, San Xavier, San Antonio, and La Bahía, this measure had not been carried out because of the unavailability of the required men.<sup>28</sup> It was highly important, therefore, that the necessary men for this new post, be they twelve or twenty, be recruited specially for the purpose

<sup>27</sup>Expediente sobre la aprehensión . . . de tres franceses y dos negros . . . *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-23 (Dunn Transcripts, 1751-1756), pp. 181-206; Despacho de los autos fijos. sre. la condusión de los franceses y negros. in *ibid.*, pp. 207-238; Testimonio de los autos fechos sobre haver fallado . . . el francés nombrado Blancpain, in *ibid.*, 286-292. Much additional data found in these documents. See also Bolton, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-339.

<sup>28</sup>Marqués de Aranda to the Viceroy, January 27, 1756, *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-23 (Dunn Transcripts, 1756), pp. 143-157. This definitely shows that the deduction that the Trinity was occupied on or about August 25, 1755, is unfounded. Bolton, *op. cit.*, 242, note 4.

without delay. But the new soldiers should be enlisted for a period not to exceed five or six years, after which time these men and their families would remain at the new post as settlers. It would be well to select the recruits with care to make certain of their character, their ability to get along with the natives, and their steadfastness of purpose. They should be informed that lands and water will be assigned them at the end of their period of military service. The cordial relations between France and Spain and the friendly attitude of the Indians made a permanent garrison unnecessary.

He next took up in detail the importance of selecting a suitable site for the new establishment with the greatest care. The governor should be ordered to make a thorough exploration of the Trinity mouth area, accompanied by the missionaries from East Texas and other persons of experience, and choose with them the best site for the purpose. The place selected should not only have good arable land, be capable of irrigation, and have timber and pastures, but it should be strategically located to check French incursions and protect the Indians against illicit traders.

The question of the sale of cattle to the French in Louisiana had been raised by the Governor in his recent communication. On this point the *Fiscal* was of the opinion that there was no harm in allowing the Spanish settlers in Texas to sell their surplus cattle to the French, provided only the surplus, over and above all the needs of the Spanish province, was thus sold. But this trade should be strictly for cash. This arrangement would be fair in view of the scarcity of meat in Louisiana and the fact that in the past the French had supplied the Spaniards with grain and other commodities when these were needed.<sup>29</sup>

The questions and considerations raised by the *Fiscal* were submitted to the *Junta* on February 4, together with all the documentary evidence accumulated on the subject. The viceroy presided in person, but even his august presence did not bring about an unanimity of opinion. As a matter of fact most of the questions were left undecided and only the general policy as to the principles governing the action to be taken was approved, leaving the details and concrete decisions to the discretion of the viceroy.

On February 12, 1756, the Marqués de las Amarillas drew up a decree, giving detailed instructions for the immediate occupation of the lower Trinity River. He ordered that the site, where the French had been arrested on the Trinity, be occupied by a detachment of thirty men under the command of a lieutenant. At the same time, a mission was to be erected

<sup>29</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 143-157.

on or near the spot where the garrison was established, this to be placed under the care of two missionaries from the Apostolic College of Our Lady of Guadalupe of Zacatecas, in whose territory lay the Trinity River. The missionaries were to begin at once to congregate the Orcoquisacs and the Bidais under the protection and with the coöperation of the thirty men assigned to the new post in order to begin to instruct them in the catechism. For this purpose the governor was instructed to request the Guardian in Zacatecas to send two missionaries at the earliest opportunity, informing him that each one was to receive four hundred *pesos* a year from the royal treasury. They would likewise be provided with the necessary ornaments, sacred vessels, and all other things customarily supplied for such purpose.

Since a civil settlement was approved, the viceroy requested the governor to inform him of the proper amount of money that should be allowed each of the fifty families for expenses. In arriving at the estimate, the governor was asked to keep in mind that they were to settle near the mouth of the river and that the families enlisted should be as large as possible. The settlers were to be in addition to the thirty soldiers and the lieutenant authorized for the new post, who were to be recruited at once and ordered to occupy the site indicated without delay. Their salary was to be the same as that of the garrison at Los Adaes, to whose commander they were to be subordinated. But it was to be understood that their enlistment was for only six years.

The proposal of the Governor of Louisiana for the mutual return of deserters could not be granted. The king had issued strict orders on July 26, 1752, covering this point. It would be well for Barrios to inform Governor Kerlerec of the resolution adopted by the *Junta*, sending him a copy of the royal order prohibiting any such arrangement. With regard to the sale of cattle to the French in Louisiana for a reasonable price a concession was made. This trade should be limited, however, to the most indispensable need of the French in order to avoid overpopulation of the neighboring province.<sup>30</sup>

*Establishment of Presidio San Agustín de Ahumada, May 27, 1756.* The decree with supplementary instructions was sent immediately to the Governor of Texas for its execution. Barrios had dispatched Marcos Ruiz to Mexico with his report of September 6, 1755, who appears to have

<sup>30</sup>Junta de Guerra y Real Hacienda, February 4, 1756; Decreto del Virey, February 12, 1756, in *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-23 (Dunn Transcripts, 1756), pp. 157-162. See also the Viceroy to Governor Barrios, February 12, 1756, *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 37-42.

spoken with many of the officials concerning the situation in Texas. He evidently made a good impression on the viceroy, or he profitably used his time to advance his personal affairs, because on February 29, 1756, just a week after formal approval was given to the project for a new presidio, that official appointed Ruiz lieutenant commander of the proposed establishment and commissioned him to enlist thirty men for its garrison on his way back to Texas. Instructions were likewise issued at the same time to the officers of the provinces and towns, through which he was to pass, to place no hindrance in the way of the new commander, but to render him whatever aid he might need.<sup>31</sup>

Making his way back to Texas leisurely, Ruiz arrived in Los Adaes on May 12. His recruiting efforts had not been entirely successful, revealing that it was not easy to secure volunteers who were willing to go out to a frontier outpost. When he reported to Governor Barrios he had only fifteen men. He presented his credentials and asked for the coöperation of his former commander. The governor had already received the decree of February 12, and the more detailed instructions of the viceroy, which were delivered to him on April 28, and had made preparations for the immediate occupation of the lower Trinity River. He gave Ruiz sixteen more men, one hundred fifty-one horses, the required guns, swords, saddles, and other military equipment, and all the supplies he could spare. On May 16 Ruiz left Los Adaes and on May 27 he formally took possession of the new post, which was established on the very spot where Blancpain and his companions had been captured on October 10, 1754. This was east of the Trinity, on a low hill near a lagoon, about two leagues (five miles) from the head of the bay. Although Bolton places it near the north line of Chambers County, it was really in Liberty County at or near present Moss Bluff. The presidio was named San Agustín de Ahumada in honor of the viceroy, and immediate steps were taken to put it in condition.

By July 12, 1756, temporary structures had been put up for the garrison. Two cannon had been borrowed from Los Adaes with the corresponding powder and lead to be ready for any surprise attack. The soldiers had brought the necessary carpenter's tools, plows, harrows, and other farm implements, axes to cut down the trees, several yoke of oxen, and one hundred fifty-one cattle. While some cut down logs others planted, so that the presidio had already eighteen bushels of corn planted in the

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<sup>31</sup>Decreto del Virey que se envíe despacho de teniente a Ruiz que lleve tropas para la fundación de la misión de la Trinidad, February 29, 1756. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 6, pp. 112-113.

recently cleared fields, which was beginning to sprout. In reporting the progress made, Governor Barrios hopefully pointed out that if nothing unfavorable happened and the rains were normal, enough corn would be raised to supply the needs of the civil settlers when they came. To help train the recruits in their new duties, he had sent fourteen experienced soldiers from Los Adaes in addition to the regular garrison. This, no doubt, accounts for the rapid progress made.<sup>32</sup>

Although both the governor and the viceroy had written to the College of Zacatecas requesting missionaries to establish a mission for the Orcoquisacs and Bidais in connection with the new presidio, the *Padres* had not arrived. But there is little doubt that the natives were friendly and that, attracted by the novelty and the unavoidable bustle contingent upon the establishment of an outpost in the wilderness, they helped Ruiz and his men with the planting. In the meantime Governor Barrios had been getting a supply of goods used by the Indians, such as beads, trinkets, paint, and certain kinds of cloth to have them ready as an inducement for the natives to come to the new mission.

*Attitude of the French.* These goods, like most of the supplies, had to be secured in Natchitoches. Prior to the arrest of Blancpain and the decision to take possession of the lower Trinity River, the French had been very friendly, but since they learned of the new presidio and mission among the Orcoquisacs and Bidais they had become sullen. The governor experienced difficulty in purchasing the Indian gifts and was forced to pay excessive prices for them. The French explained that the high prices charged were due to the war with the English, but Barrios suspected it was an indirect means of making the trade of the Spaniards with the Indians unprofitable.

As soon as it was learned that a new presidio, mission and civil settlement had been authorized, the commander of Natchitoches publicly announced that anyone selling corn or other supplies to the Spaniards would be severely punished and his property would be confiscated. The reason alleged was a scarcity of corn, but Governor Barrios declares that the French had an abundance of this grain. The only way to secure corn now was to send the soldiers privately to Natchitoches to buy small

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<sup>32</sup>Informe del Gobernador de las ordenes llevadas a cabo para completar la dotación del nuevo presidio de San Agustín, July 12, 1756. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 80-83. Neither Bolton nor Miss Brown had access to this and many other documents now available which have enabled the present writer to give the full details of this incident. The Béxar and Nacogdoches Archives on which they relied are meager.

amounts secretly. The price had gone up to four and five *pesos* a bushel and even at this price many preferred not to sell than to run the risk of being caught. A certain Henri had contracted to deliver eighty bushels. Elated at his good fortune, it seems the Frenchman indiscreetly boasted of his profitable deal. The commander at Natchitoches quickly seized and confiscated all his corn.

Governor Barrios informed the viceroy that as soon as the orders of February 12, 1756, arrived in Los Adaes, a messenger had been sent from Natchitoches to New Orleans. A second one was dispatched when Ruiz came. No apprehensible result had been noticed, however, either at Natchitoches or in the vicinity of the new post on the Trinity.

The situation had been further complicated by the corresponding shortage of cattle to supply the French. The chief sources for this trade were the missions at Los Ais and Nacogdoches. The establishment of the new presidio had forced him to secure two hundred thirty-five head from them, and he would need three hundred fifty more, when the settlers came, to feed them during the first year. This demand would use all that the missions had, leaving them barely enough for their own needs. Consequently no cattle could be sold at this time to the French, in spite of the recent instructions that permitted a limited trade. The French attributed the shortage, however, to design and ill will.<sup>33</sup>

*Plans for the civil settlement.* Mystifying indeed is the great interest displayed by Governor Barrios in the founding of a settlement at Orcoquisac, as the location of Presidio San Agustín de Ahumada was generally designated, and the thoroughness with which he worked out the minutest details and succeeded in not only getting the plan approved but in having over thirty thousand *pesos* set aside for its establishment. Then he cooled suddenly in his ardor and eventually caused the defeat of his own plan. Was it that he expected to derive great material profits from the scheme and found he could not carry it through in the short period of time left of his administration? On August 21, 1756, he was appointed to the government of the Province of Coahuila by royal order, and Don Angel Martos y Navarrete was named to succeed him. It was not until October, 1757, that Barrios learned of his transfer, which he justly considered a demotion. On the 16th of that month he asked the viceroy to excuse him for his failure to carry out all the orders given him, recounted his services, and, after enumerating what remained to be accomplished, he begged to be allowed time to complete the settlement on the Trinity. The viceroy

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<sup>33</sup>Informe del Gobernador . . . in *ibid.*, Vol. 7, pp. 80-83.

acceded to his request and obtained royal approval for Barrios to remain in Texas until 1759, Martos y Navarrete serving as Governor of Coahuila in the meantime.<sup>34</sup> His loss of interest in the civil settlement coincides in point of time exactly with his notification in October, 1757. It is also of interest to note that he used his friend, Bernardo de Miranda, as an excuse for failure and blamed him for the erroneous report as to the suitability of the site selected for the civil settlement.<sup>35</sup>

Be that as it may, let us trace briefly the development of the plan for the civil settlement, which Governor Barrios had suggested should be called San Luis de Ronda. The *Junta* of February 4, 1756, had approved the founding of a civil settlement at royal expense in connection with the presidio and mission on the lower Trinity and fixed the number of families at fifty, leaving the details to the viceroy. This official requested Barrios on February 12 to report on the cost of such a plan and the way in which the families could be secured. On receipt of the order in April, the governor dispatched instructions to Bernardo de Miranda, his trusted lieutenant and friend, who was then in San Antonio, to find out the amount of money the Canary Islanders had been allowed and the details of their settlement, which might serve as a precedent. He appears to have consulted on the matter with others and to have made a careful study before writing to the viceroy on July 22, 1756.

In his letter he declared there were several difficulties to be taken into account. First, there was a technicality. The *Laws of the Indies* in Title VII, Book IV, Law 18, provided that no one with a house and lot in America could be allowed to move to new frontier outposts in order to avoid the danger of depopulation of old settlements. This provision would have to be waived before the desired families could be enlisted. Second, it was not easy to find large families who were willing to move to an exposed frontier. There were several in San Antonio who were disposed to try their luck, even from among the pioneer Canary Islanders, if the legal provision could be suspended. But he doubted that fifty families could be found for the proposed settlement in the entire frontier of northern New Spain.

In his opinion, therefore, it would be well to recruit twenty-five Spanish

<sup>34</sup>Informe del gobernador de Texas sobre diligencias practicadas durante su gobierno y las que le han faltado cumplir, October 16, 1757. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 19-20; Bolton, *Texas*, 347. Martos y Navarrete took possession of the government of Texas on February 6, 1759.

<sup>35</sup>Opinión del gobernador sobre no ser apropiado el paraje de Santa Rosa del Alcázar . . . October 20, 1757, *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, 10-12.

families and twenty-five or thirty Tlaxcalteca Indian families to make the required total for the new settlement on the Trinity. The loyalty, industry, and high stage of civilization of these Indians were well known. They would furthermore serve as an inducement and example to the uncivilized natives in the district to be occupied. The Tlaxcaltecas in Saltillo, Boca de Leones, and Coahuila (Monclova) had been constantly increasing in number. Consequently, the desired quota could be recruited from among them.<sup>36</sup> Thus it was Barrios who suggested, in this instance, the use of the brave and loyal Tlaxcalteca Indians to advance the Spanish frontier. These Indians had been placed successfully in every northern outpost and a small band was in fact sent in 1757 to form the nucleus of the San Sabá Mission.

As to expenses he thought that the Canary Island experiment should serve as a norm, that each family should be allowed transportation, a daily stipend for food while en route, the minimum equipment to start life anew, and provisions and supplies for one year. He sent a tentative list of what would be required for the viceroy's consideration.<sup>37</sup>

*Mission Nuestra Señora de la Luz del Orcoquisac.* The Indians of the various *rancherías* of the Orcoquisacs and of the Bidais had come to the presidio ever since its formal establishment in May, 1756, and Ruiz and his men had, according to instructions, exerted themselves in winning their friendship and humoring them with gifts until the missionaries arrived. But in October they were still waiting for the *Padres* to establish the new mission formally. Father Fray Anastasio de Jesús Romero of Mission Dolores had paid the presidio a visit in August and held the first services on the feast day of Saint Augustine, the patron of the establishment. It was Fray Romero that began the formal erection of the new mission. As usual, the Indians were enthusiastic with the novelty of the establishment and the abundant and generous gifts of the Spaniards. The first mission was as yet only a project and already, true to form, each one of the *rancherías* began to request a separate mission.

The governor was giving his attention to the plans for the mission also. It seems that as early as July, 1756, he had consulted Father Fray Francisco Vallejo, President of the Zacatecan missions in east Texas, concerning the ambitions of the various native villages. Chief Tomás of the Bidais wanted a separate mission for his people in their own

<sup>36</sup>Consulta del Gobernador sobre establecimiento de presidios y misiones en Texas, July 22, 1756. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 83-90.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, Vol. 7, pp. 83-90.



lands. Chief Mateo, who lived on the San Jacinto, likewise declared he wanted a mission in his own country and convinced Governor Barrios that the Orcoquisacs were divided into two bands that were hostile. In view of the circumstances, Fray Vallejo suggested that it might be best to establish a mission near the presidio for Chief Calzones Colorados, one in the *ranchería* of Chief Mateo, and one for Chief Tomás, assigning each one a guard of five soldiers, ten of which could be drawn from the fifty families allotted to the civil settlement.

The governor was a bit puzzled, but by November, after a personal visit to the Orcoquisac, he was convinced that one mission would be ample. He declared that the Orcoquisacs had in fact four *rancherías* (five); two of Calzones Colorados and one each of Canos, El Gordo, and Mateo. The first three had agreed to congregate in one mission and he felt confident that Mateo could be induced to join them despite the distance to the site selected. He was not very favorable to the Bidais, who, he declares, "are undependable, live too far away, and really do not need a special mission."

Although he had written to the Guardian of the College of Zacatecas urging him to send two missionaries to start work among the natives, the post was still without spiritual ministrations at the close of November, 1756. At that time there were about ninety persons in the presidio, two Spanish families, and two Karankawas. Ten more were being awaited, besides the numerous Orcoquisacs who came and went, looking for the formal establishment of the mission.<sup>38</sup>

In this connection the governor made an interesting proposal intended to save time. He called the attention of the viceroy to the fact that the San Xavier missions had been moved to the San Marcos, where they were being cared for by Fathers Fray López and Fray Aparicio. Since these missions had only a few neophytes and were about to be suppressed, he suggested that their sacred vessels, ornaments, bells and other equipment be assigned to the new presidio of San Agustín de Ahumada, the mission, and the Pueblo of San Luis de Ronda soon to be founded.<sup>39</sup>

*Arrival of the missionaries.* Shortly after Barrios wrote to the viceroy that the missionaries had not put in an appearance, that official seems

<sup>38</sup>Informe del gobernador sobre conveniencia de establecer población . . . November 20, 1756: Consulta misiones, July 22, 1756. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 157-164, 83-90.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, Vol. 7, pp. 83-90. For details of the missions on San Marcos River see Castañeda, *The Missions at Work* (Volume III of *Our Catholic Heritage*).

to have taken up the matter with the Commissary General of the Franciscans in Mexico, who in turn wrote the Guardian of the College of Zacatecas. The *Discretorio* of the college reported to the viceroy on May 28, 1757, that immediately upon receipt of the order of February 12, two missionaries, Fray Bruno Chavira and Fray Marcos Satarain, were dispatched with a letter to the governor. Just when they set out or when they arrived at the Trinity is not clear, but the evidence available seems to indicate they left Zacatecas towards the close of October, 1756, and that they arrived late in November or early in December, for on November 5, 1757, the viceroy ordered that they be paid for one year's service.<sup>40</sup> Upon their arrival in Nacogdoches, Fray Chavira wrote a letter to the governor, notifying him that they were going on to Presidio de San Agustín and asking him for instructions. Fray Chavira later wrote to the college that the governor had ordered him to do nothing towards the establishment of a formal mission, because he was awaiting the decision of the viceroy concerning the permanent site. He reported at this time that the Indians were friendly and appeared firm in their determination to enter the mission. Through the interpreter, Domingo del Rio, they expressed their appreciation for the gifts received. But the food available was limited. Some cattle were being expected and corn was brought with much difficulty from the Presidio of Los Adaes.

The college reported to the viceroy that a few days after the missionaries left, the necessary ornaments, sacred vessels, and other equipment had been sent for the new mission. The conductor of these goods had since returned and it was learned from him that the governor was not satisfied with the location of the presidio, which was too near the sea, very unhealthy, and extremely damp. Fray José María de Guadalupe y Alcivia, the Guardian, took occasion to remonstrate that the stipend assigned to the missionaries of Nuestra Señora de la Luz was low, since the soldiers were being paid four hundred twenty-five *pesos* a year, while the friars had been allowed only four hundred. In his opinion the two missionaries should each be given fifty *pesos* more. The mission at Orcoquisac was two hundred leagues from La Bahía, one hundred from Los Adaes and fifty from Nacogdoches, which made the transportation of supplies and the cost of living higher at this post than in any other in Texas. He reminded the viceroy that the college had outfitted and sent a train of supplies, but had not received as yet any

<sup>40</sup>Informe de los Padres del Colegio de Zacatecas . . . May 28, 1757, *A. S. F. G.*, Vol. 6, pp. 112-116; Decreto del Virey, November 5, 1757, *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 91, pt. 1, p. 16.

money from the royal treasury for this expense nor for the stipends of the missionaries.<sup>41</sup>

*Early hardships of Mission Nuestra Señora de la Luz.* By the time the missionaries arrived, Governor Barrios was already contemplating the removal of the presidio to a new site. This explains his negative instructions to the zealous old missionary Fray Chavira, towards whom he seems to have developed a dislike from the beginning. In a letter to the viceroy he declared that Fray Chavira was too old and his companion too young to work successfully in the new mission. He blamed them for not having brought sufficient provisions for immediate establishment. Barrios seems to have been on very good terms, however, with Father Vallejo of Mission San Miguel. As President of the Zacatecan missionaries in East Texas, he requested Fray Vallejo to remove Fray Chavira and Fray Satarain, but before action could be taken Providence intervened and the zealous old missionary, who had abandoned the ease and comfort of his college to preach the Gospel to the natives in Texas, died a martyr of zeal and charity, alone and unaided, on June 27, 1757. Fray Satarain was also obliged to abandon the mission temporarily on account of illness. Thus the two were removed by the will of God.<sup>42</sup>

Before his death the industrious Fray Chavira drew a map of the new mission which was sent to Jacinto Martínez de Aguirre, syndic of the Order. Unfortunately Aguirre, who lived in Mexico City and who had been requested to turn the map over to the viceroy with a report of the prevailing conditions, died also, and this interesting document was lost. When the Guardian of the College learned of the unfortunate death of Fray Chavira, he was seriously troubled because no missionary in Zacatecas volunteered to take his place, discouraged by the unhealthiness of the location of the new mission and the hardships of the post. He declares that he hesitated to order anyone to go who was not willing to do so. In the last report of Fray Chavira he had described how they often had to live on roots, herbs, and wild fruit. If the conditions were as bad as reported, the guardian thought it might be wise to move the mission to a better location. Strange as it may seem, however, the Indians them-

<sup>41</sup>Informe de los Padres del Colegio de Zacatecas . . . May 28, 1757, *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 6, pp. 112-116. The viceroy ordered 1,088 pesos paid for supplies on November 5, 1757. Decreto del Virey, November 5, 1757, in *op. cit.*, 16.

<sup>42</sup>Governor Barrios y Jáuregui to the Viceroy, June 12, 1757, *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 64-79; Fray Guadalupe y Alcivia to the Viceroy, September 18, 1757, *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 28, ff. 190-192. See also page 35 for details of his death.

selves objected to the abandonment of the place and this naturally complicated the situation.<sup>43</sup>

Although still suffering from dysentery, Fray Marcos Satarain returned to his post at Orcoquisac shortly after the death of Fray Chavira. But the poor water of the mission soon aggravated his ailment and forced him to stay in bed. Sometime in August, 1757, Governor Barrios requested Father Fray José Francisco Caro of Mission Dolores to go to Nuestra Señora de la Luz to aid Fray Marcos and to report conditions there. Little progress had been made. Temporary structures had been erected for the missionaries and for religious services but no formality had been given to the mission. Father Caro reported in October that Fray Marcos had turned over to him a supply of palmetto which had been cut and brought to roof the buildings of the missions, three bundles of tobacco, five dozen knives, some cheap cloth, six hats, and ten blue cotton shawls. These were all the goods he had to win the good will of the natives. There was practically no food, and no crops had been planted in the spring because of the illness of the *Padres*, the lack of the necessary tools, and the crude and temporary nature of the establishment. He expressed surprise that Fray Chavira had not placed the Indians under the formal regime of mission life. But he did not know that this seeming negligence had been the result of the instructions of the governor to do nothing until the question of the permanent location was determined. Fray Marcos Satarain was too sick to be of much service and left soon after Fray Caro arrived.<sup>44</sup>

The new missionary devoted himself to his duties with zeal, expecting to be relieved by other workers shortly, but as months dragged on and winter came, the hardships of the new post proved too much. He appealed to Father Vallejo as president to permit him to return to Mission Dolores because he could stand it no longer. Father Vallejo wrote the governor on February 27, 1758, that it was impossible to continue to maintain a missionary at Orcoquisac. He painted a truly pathetic picture. Fray Caro had implored relief. The mosquitoes, flies, ants, and other insects were unbearable. The lack of adequate food and the poor water made dysentery an unavoidable ailment, which proved fatal in many instances. Not only had Fray Chavira died but also the new missionary. Fray

<sup>43</sup>Guadalupe y Alcivia to the Commissary General, September 18, 1757. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 28, ff. 190-192.

<sup>44</sup>Despacho del Gobernador Barrios a Fray José Francisco Caro e informe de este, October 3, 1757. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 7-10. He must have arrived in August, 1757, because he said in October he had been there two months.

Francisco de San Miguel, sent to take the place of Fray Marcos Satarain, who was forced to leave Fray Caro alone. Julian Flores, one of the guards, fell a victim to the ravages of disease. The soldiers of the presidio were all sick and weakened by the prevailing illness. When the south wind blew it drove the polluted and brackish water of the lagoon up the river and made it undrinkable.

Father Vallejo pleaded with the governor that Fray José Francisco Caro be either allowed to return to Mission Dolores, his former post, or to move the mission, which by this time had been formally established, to a site called Atascoso, a few miles up the river. Here two beautiful springs were located about a league from the Trinity, which furnished excellent water for drinking. There were good farm lands, plenty of timber and firewood, and extensive pastures. If the presidio could not be moved without permission from the viceroy, Father Vallejo asked that Fray Caro be allowed to go on to El Atascoso (sometimes called Atascosito) with the five guards of the mission to wait for the decision of the officials in Mexico. To remain at Orcoquisac would imperil the life of the missionary. Fray Caro should be given relief either by permitting his return to Dolores or by authorizing him to occupy El Atascoso.<sup>45</sup>

This was not the sole complaint concerning the unhealthy character of the site on the Trinity nor was it the only proposal to move to a new location. But by some miracle of faith, Mission Nuestra Señora de la Luz was maintained in the same place and continued to progress, slowly but surely, in spite of hardships, privations, epidemics, and provoking insects. It is refreshing to find a missionary actually favorable in his judgment about the future of the apparently doomed enterprise a year and a half later. This brave soul was truly an optimist. It had been proposed with great insistence that the presidio and mission be moved first to one place and then to another, but in 1759 a determined effort was made by religious and civil officials to move the new establishments to a location called Los Horconcitos. The slowness and deliberation with which the viceregal machinery moved was exasperating at times, but in this instance it was a blessing in disguise. The viceroy requested an official report from the missionary of Nuestra Señora de la Luz before taking final action.

Fray José Abad de Jesús María complied with the request in November, 1759. Philosophically the good friar replied that the mission was much

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<sup>45</sup>Carta del Presidente de las misiones al Gobernador que se restituya a Fray Caro a la Misión de Nrs. Sra. de los Dolores por ser intolerable el paraje de Nra. Sra. de la Luz, February 7, 1758. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 21-24.

as it had always been, but in fact, making progress in spite of contradictory reports. In the last two years repeated search had been made by different officials for a better site and each one had claimed jubilantly that he had found the best and only one in the area. Just recently Governor Martos y Navarrete had discovered one at Los Horconcitos, which to judge from his report was admirable and beggared description. But appearances had proved deceiving so often upon a closer investigation, that the experienced friar wisely observed that it would be better to allow the presidio and mission to remain where they were. The objections, so loudly denounced, were not so bad as described and many of them had disappeared in the meantime.

Taking each one in turn, he proved his contention with surprisingly good logic. True, he said, there had been many ants and mosquitoes, and flies, and other insects, but these were always found in new settlements and they had been no worse here than anywhere else. They were not half so bad now, he declared, and as the place became permanently settled, they would cease to be a pest. Much had been said about the marshy character of the land. It was true the lowlands were flooded periodically, but there were others which were not and on these the principal buildings of the mission had been built, while officials talked and argued the advisability of moving. The truth of the matter, he assured the viceroy, was that there was no other place any better, as investigation of each one of the proposed sites had plainly revealed.

How the *Padres* had chosen the location on which to build the houses he explains in these words: "The two missionaries having explored and examined the land with the greatest care and exactitude, did not find any place more suitable or nearer to the presidio than a hill, a little less than a quarter of a league to the east, on the same side of the river and near the lagoon. This site . . . because of its elevation commands a view of the presidio and the surrounding country to the west and south, to where the river turns." He pointed out that to the east, for a distance of a league or more, the country sloped gently downward, but that although it was not as high as that on which the mission stood, it was nevertheless capable of cultivation. Here he thought enough corn and other food could be raised to feed a large settlement. Nearer to the low hill or prominence on which the mission was built, there were other fields that were cultivated by the neophytes. The mission was made of hewed timbers and plastered with clay mixed with hay. It had a graceful arcade with four arches. Proud of his mission, Fray Abad declared that it was the strongest and most pleasing structure to be found in this region



among either the Spanish or French settlements. The work on the building had been recently suspended because of the ever-present uncertainty as to the permanence of the post, but with the aid of the soldiers everything could be finished in a very short time. What was needed most of all, he asserted, was assurance of stability. If His Excellency would but order it, the work could be promptly finished.

The natives liked this location. It was in the heart of their own country. Furthermore the proximity of the bay or lagoon was a constant source of food in times of need. The Indians caught fish, wrestled with the alligators, which they skillfully rolled on land and killed, and they could always obtain an abundant supply of oysters here. They would seriously resent moving to any other place. The abandonment of El Orcoquisac, as the site was called, would perhaps spell failure.

There were enough arable lands, he assured the viceroy, and good crops could be raised. The trouble had been negligence. The presidio had never had a reputable commander. The lieutenant in charge did not inspire respect. The men observed no discipline. They spent their time trading and gambling with the Indians. The real cause for the scarcity of food was that the corn brought as seed was traded by the soldiers for deer-skins. The certainty that misdeeds and violation of regulations would not be punished encouraged excesses.

He concluded by saying that the most serious objection to the present site was the inability to irrigate and the poor supply of water. There was no irrigation at Los Adaes nor at La Bahía, he pointed out, yet good crops were raised almost every year. It was true that the river water was brackish and undrinkable during certain seasons, but excellent and abundant water was obtainable by digging wells. The underground water was not deep and was of excellent quality. The mission had a good well and the presidio could have one also. Enough water could be secured from this source to supply all the needs of a large settlement. There were excellent pasture lands, fine timber, and abundant wood within easy reach. The present site was preferable to any in the whole district. Progress had been made. This was the best proof of its suitability. What was needed was to abandon the idea of moving in order to settle down to the development of the present establishment.<sup>46</sup> Thus Fray Abad pointed out the real advantages and the fictitious objections to the site at Orcoquisac. Time has proved how clearly he saw the true nature of the Trinity

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<sup>46</sup>Carta del padre misionero de Nra. Sra. de la Luz informando los inconvenientes del traslado de la misión a los Horconcitos, November 27, 1759, *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 53-60.

River bottom, destined to become the site of the largest city in the state and one of the richest agricultural areas in Texas.

*Moving frenzy and beginning of difficulties at San Agustín.* Let us return to Governor Barrios and the Presidio of San Agustín. When the governor made his report in July, 1756, he was enthusiastic concerning the enterprise and gave no hint that the location of the new presidio was unsuited for settlement. On the contrary, he requested six cannon and a competent sum of money for the construction of permanent fortifications, a decent church, and other buildings, as had been done in the case of San Antonio and San Xavier. He inquired what price he should charge the garrison for corn and other supplies, pointing out that it took twenty days to transport them from San Antonio and ten or twelve from Los Adaes. Everything seemed to indicate the permanence of the new presidio. Three months later he made the first proposal to move from Orcoquisac. This was followed by a bewildering series of proposals and counter proposals that makes one's head swim and which must have been exasperating to the officials.

In November, 1756, he explained how in August he had gone personally to the Orcoquisac, accompanied by Fray Anastacio de Jesús Romero, with the intention of making a reconnaissance to select a site for the proposed civil settlement. Unfortunately, he had been forced to abandon the exploration because of the urgent need of his presence in Los Adaes. He had commissioned, therefore, Bernardo de Miranda, Marcos Ruiz, and the friar to make the investigation. The three had examined the banks of the Trinity River upstream for thirty leagues without finding a suitable site. They discovered that the tide came up the river for twenty-two leagues. All along the river the land was subject to floods for a distance of three leagues. The only good site found was at Los Ojos de Santa Rosa del Alcázar, where Chief Gordo's *ranchería* was located, some eighteen or twenty leagues from the sea. This was about ten leagues, some twenty miles, west of the San Jacinto where two springs joined this river. The two creeks have been identified as Mill Creek and Spring Creek.<sup>47</sup> The site was pleasant and offered facilities for a successful settlement. The *ranchería* of Chief Canos was only ten leagues away and that of Calzones Colorados six. In view of the unsanitary conditions of the site where the presidio was at present and the marshy character of the land, the governor urged its immediate removal to Santa Rosa del Alcázar where the civil settlement could be founded. The survey

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<sup>47</sup>The identification was made by Dr. Bolton. See Bolton, *Texas*, 350.



had cost three hundred *pesos*. This amount, he requested, should be paid by the royal treasury.<sup>48</sup>

*Details for the civil settlement.* Bernardo de Miranda was sent to Mexico with the report. He lost no time on the way, for he was in Mexico City the early part of December. Viceregal officials were puzzled with the new turn of affairs. They were confronted with the problem of working out the details for the settlement of fifty families, whose ultimate destination was being questioned before they set out. They had authorized the founding of one mission, and already a request for three had been made.

On December 11, the *Auditor* took up the various questions. Evidently, the quality and number of supplies recommended and the allowance of two and a half *pesos* a day to each family was excessive. The governor's suggestions that the settlers be supplied with silklined hats, fancy stirrups and bridles, silk shirts, Spanish shawls, and kid shoes seemed ill-advised. According to the estimate presented, it would cost over forty-five thousand *pesos*. The *Auditor* recommended that the officers of the treasury report the expenses incurred in the settlement of the Canary Islanders in San Antonio, and that the whole matter be referred to a *Junta* for approval. The use of Tlaxcaltecan families was not objectionable, provided that those enlisted for the new settlement volunteered to go without compulsion.

In regard to increasing the number of missions, this suggestion should wait until the country was better explored. The proposal that the ornaments and sacred vessels of the extinct San Xavier missions be used for the San Agustín presidio and mission could not be accepted, because Don Pedro Romero de Terreros had already agreed to purchase them for the new missions on the San Sabá.<sup>49</sup>

To these recommendations the *Fiscal* agreed on January 11, 1757. But by this time other questions had arisen, such as, who was to bear the expense of digging irrigation ditches for the new settlement? Was this to be at Orcoquisac, where the presidio and mission were now, or at Santa Rosa del Alcázar? On these two points the *Fiscal* was of the opinion that in regard to the first the new settlers should be furnished tools for the digging of the proposed ditches, but that the treasury should not be burdened with additional expense. As to the second, if the present

<sup>48</sup>Informe del gobernador sobre conveniencia de establecer población en los ojos de agua del Alcázar, November 20, 1756, *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 157-164.

<sup>49</sup>Paracer del Auditor, December 11, 1756. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 95-117.

site was untenable, the governor should be instructed to move the presidio and the mission to Santa Rosa del Alcázar with the consent and coöperation of the missionaries. But he should first make certain that the new site was as good as represented. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the primary purpose of the enterprise was to check the French. Therefore, if the presidio was moved, the garrison should be in duty bound to make periodic visits to the old site to avert any possibility of new French incursions. Contrary to previous opinions, the missionaries should attempt to reconcile the various factions of the Orcoquisacs and the Bidais.<sup>50</sup>

The viceroy approved the recommendations on January 19, and authorized the governor to transfer the presidio and mission to Santa Rosa del Alcázar. At the same time he requested the officials of the treasury to report on the cost of the settlement of the Canary Islanders in San Antonio, and ordered a *Junta* for March 3, 1757, to consider all questions.<sup>51</sup>

*Recommendations of the Junta, March 3, 1757.* As usual, when the *Junta* met, it reviewed the entire history of the new presidio and the various proposals and recommendations. In view of the circumstances, it gave its formal approval to the removal of the new establishment to Santa Rosa del Alcázar. In regard to the civil establishment, it decided that only twenty-five Spanish families be recruited instead of fifty, but it provided that none should be taken from San Antonio. The remaining twenty-five could be Tlaxcalteca Indians. It authorized giving each family aid for one year, to allow them three *reales* a day for subsistence while *en route*, and to furnish them through the governor, the necessary arms, as well as certain goods and equipment. It recommended the purchase of three hundred and fifty yards of woolen cloth for overcoats, fifty axes, fifty hoes, fifty harrows, fifty *machetes* (cutlasses), fifty *metates* (grindstones), fifty clay pots, one hundred and fifty *comales* (flat cooking irons), enough woolen cloth to make one skirt for each woman, fifty half silk shawls, fifty pairs of Brussels hose, fifty pairs of shoes, ten iron bars, one for each five families. These were to be acquired by the royal treasury. The Governor of Texas should be ordered to buy one hundred horses, one hundred and fifty mares, fifty stallions, one hundred and fifty cows,

<sup>50</sup>Dictamen del Fiscal recomendando se traslade el presidio que se intentó en el desemboque del Río de la Trinidad y que se hagan reconocimientos semanales a los puntos cercanos, January 11, 1757. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 177-179.

<sup>51</sup>Aprobación del Virey, January 19, 1757, *ibid.*, pp. 179-180; El Virey to Governor Barrios y Jáuregui, *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 26-27.

fifty bulls, two hundred sheep, fifty rams, and fifty yoke of oxen. Each family was to be given three mares, three cows, four sheep, one stallion, one bull, and one ram, and one yoke of oxen. The families were furthermore to be transported to the new settlement at royal expense.

As to the number of missions, the *Junta* decided one was sufficient. This should be assigned from three to five soldiers to protect and aid the missionaries. The *Padres* should be instructed to keep the Orcoquisacs and the Bidais separate and strangely enough, to foster hostility between them, a curious reversal of policy. This strange recommendation was the result of Governor Barrios' report that the natives were so numerous that if they ever made peace among themselves and joined forces, they could drive out the Spaniards from their lands.

The matter of the price to be charged for corn by the governor was carefully considered. The *Junta* decided that no fixed price could be determined, but that the governor should be instructed that he could sell corn to the new settlement at a price equal to its actual cost plus the cost of transportation, with nothing added for profit.

The request for six cannon was considered just. These should be purchased by the royal treasury and sent to the presidio without delay. The two borrowed from Los Adaes should be returned. Likewise, the royal treasury should bear the expense of a modest church to be built under the directions of the commander and the missionaries.

The estimated cost for the construction of the irrigation ditches set at twenty-two hundred *pesos* was too high. In the opinion of the *Junta*, the ditches should be dug by the settlers as a community project. The royal treasury should furnish the necessary tools. The amount to be spent for this purpose was to be left to the discretion of the viceroy.<sup>52</sup>

*Viceregal action.* On March 18, 1757, the viceroy incorporated the recommendations of the *Junta* in a formal decree, which he dispatched to Governor Barrios with a personal letter on March 26. Bernardo de Miranda was still in Mexico City. Anxious to learn more about the country of the Trinity, the viceroy ordered him to make a detailed report of the area from Los Adaes to Orcoquisac. The contradictory proposals and changing whims of the governor had made the viceroy suspicious.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>52</sup>Recomendación de la Junta de guerra sobre el establecimiento y mutación del presidio. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 123-142.

<sup>53</sup>Decreto del Virey sobre pacificación y conversión de los Indios del Río de la Trinidad. March 18, 1757. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 142-148; the Viceroy to Governor Barrios y Jáuregui. March 26, 1757. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol.

*Miranda's description of the lower Trinity.* The report which Miranda made on April 26 clearly shows his thorough knowledge of the country he had explored, and the map which he drew remains one of the most accurate of that region.<sup>54</sup> He explained that he could not give a description of the entire country from Los Adaes to the Trinity and east to the Mississippi, because the French had not permitted its exploration. Although the most direct route from Los Adaes to Orcoquisac was by way of Monsieur Masse's cabin, he had been obliged to go to Los Ais and hence to Nacogdoches, fifty leagues to the southwest, and fifty more leagues south to reach the lower Trinity. This was a roundabout way. The Presidio of San Agustín was practically at the mouth of the river on its north bank.

Since the viceroy wanted to know more about Santa Rosa del Alcázar, Miranda declared this place was in the heart of the country of the Orcoquisacs. From the springs of Santa Rosa, the San Jacinto River was almost ten leagues due east, and from this river to the site where the Presidio de San Agustín had been erected, there were six more leagues in the same direction. The Neches was sixteen leagues to the northeast from the presidio. It was in this region along the river that the Attacapas lived. They traded freely with the French, who supplied them with guns, powder, lead, clothes, beads, knives, and various trinkets in exchange for buffalo, deer, and bear skins, and stolen horses. East of the Neches River were two other streams, the Angelina and the Atoyac, which joined before entering the Gulf. From the Neches to where the two streams joined there were twenty-two leagues. It was on the south bank of these two streams that Monsieur Masse had his house. Beyond, at a distance of twenty-two leagues, was the Sabinas River, and forty leagues farther to the northeast was the Mississippi. Between the Sabinas and the Mississippi, not far from the coast, Monsieur Tablon had established himself. He owned many slaves and had a large farm and cattle ranch. He had heard that Tablon had settled there before 1748. Although Miranda had never been to New Orleans, he declared this city was on the north bank of the Mississippi, close to its mouth, protected by long walls made of logs to withstand frequent floods.<sup>55</sup>

Satisfied with the information given him, the viceroy ordered the

91, pt. 1, pp. 86-87; the Viceroy to Bernardo de Miranda. April 15, 1757, *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 91, pt. 1, p. 23.

<sup>54</sup>Published in Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, opposite p. 350.

<sup>55</sup>Informe de Bernardo de Miranda. April 26, 1757. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 29-34.

treasury on April 30, 1757, to pay thirty thousand *pesos* to the agents of the Governor of Texas for the purchase of the cattle, supplies and equipment recommended by the *Junta* for the civil settlers. At the same time he informed the governor of his action and told him that the necessary guns, swords, and ammunition would likewise be furnished for the Spanish and Tlaxcalteca Indian families, who were to defend themselves against Indians and foreign aggressors.<sup>56</sup>

It seems that Miranda was the bearer of the viceroy's communication. At any rate in October of the same year, he again undertook an exploration of the mouth of the Trinity River at the request of the governor. On October 5, 1757, he reported that the river flowed to the south; that it was from five to ten *varas* deep near the presidio and deeper two leagues below; that the bay was broad and roomy but shallow, only one *vara* deep four leagues from the mouth of the river. He had attempted to explore the bay in a canoe, first to the east and then to the west, but strong winds had prevented the accomplishment of his object. He recommended that the Presidio de San Agustín be moved to Los Ojos de Santa Rosa del Alcázar.<sup>57</sup>

*The governor changes his mind and the civil settlement is suspended.* Almost a year before, Governor Barrios had been of the same opinion and had himself urged the removal to Santa Rosa. His request had been granted by the *Junta* and ordered carried out by the viceroy, who had furthermore made available the necessary funds. But for some unexplainable reason, Barrios changed his mind and on October 20, 1757, declared Santa Rosa unfit for the civil settlement or the establishment of the presidio and mission. In order to save his face, he now turned on his good friend, Miranda, and unscrupulously blamed him for having misrepresented the facts concerning Santa Rosa. He declared that he had set out to explore this site himself a year before, but circumstances had obliged him to commission Miranda to carry out the enterprise and that on his recommendation he had indorsed the removal. But upon receipt of the orders for the transfer on August 15, he had gone personally to Santa Rosa and had found that although the site was most pleasing to the eye, the appearances were deceiving because irrigation was impractical.

He deeply deplored the misrepresentation which had caused so many

<sup>56</sup>The Viceroy to Governor Barrios. April 30, 1757. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 20-21; Dictamen del Fiscal que se den a los Tlaxcaltecas las mismas armas. April 29, 1757. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 153-155.

<sup>57</sup>Reconocimiento del Río de la Trinidad por Bernardo de Miranda, October 5, 1757. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 3-6.

arrangments to have been made in vain. In a tone of righteous indignation at the deception practiced by Miranda, he explained that he now had at San Agustín seven hundred head of cattle, forty-five yoke of oxen, fifty-eight mares, two hundred horses, and six stallions ready for the removal of the presidio and the establishment of the civil settlement. Furthermore, he had ordered twenty thousand *pesos* of goods and supplies from Mexico, besides twenty-five hundred purchased in Saltillo. The stock, the garrison, and the mission could not stay at San Agustín nor could they be moved to Santa Rosa, which was equally unfit. Under the circumstances many of the expenses incurred might prove a total loss before a proper site was found. These grieved him. In an outburst of feigned generosity, he assured the viceroy that since the blame was partly his, he would take over all the goods and supplies and stock accumulated and pay for them himself rather than permit the royal treasury to suffer a loss. He could use the supplies for the various garrisons in Texas. It seems probable that the governor's real interest was to take over the supplies purchased, which he could not have secured on his personal credit, sell them at a profit, and pay for them in due time.

Naturally, he had a new site to propose. This was known as El Atascoso or Atascocito, and was located some six leagues up the river on its north or east bank. There were good lands, ample pastures, and good drinking water. Although irrigation was not possible, the drinking water was a great inducement, since the lack of it was responsible for most of the difficulties at Orcoquisac.<sup>58</sup>

*Exploration of El Atascoso.* Governor Barrios dispatched a special courier to Mexico with his new proposal, and shortly afterwards, he set out to explore the new site. Evidently, he had not seen it before. On April 5, 1758, he went to Nacogdoches where he was joined by Fray José Francisco Caro, Marcos Ruiz, Domingo del Río, Cristóbal de Cordoba, Gregorio Cordobes, and Bartolo de Sierra. The little party arrived at El Atascoso on April 13, and immediately began a formal examination of the surrounding country. The site chosen as the most likely for the presidio and mission was on the east bank of the Trinity, about a league from the river and some six leagues from El Orcoquisac. A small spring furnished good water to drink. The lands were sandy but fertile and there were good pastures, plenty of timber and firewood within easy reach. The governor frankly admitted, however, that a civil

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<sup>58</sup>Opinión del Governador Barrios sobre no ser apropiado el paraje de Santa Rosa del Alcázar, October 20, 1757. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 10-12.

settlement could not be founded here any more than on the San Jacinto because of the lack of facilities for irrigation.

But he was so well pleased with the advantages over the site now occupied by the presidio and mission that without awaiting formal authorization from the viceroy, he issued instructions to the commander and the *Padres* at Orcoquisac for them to move to El Atascoso as soon as the crops were gathered in the fall. He explained to the viceroy that these instructions were subject to his final approval and that he had taken this measure because of the unhealthy character of El Orcoquisac.<sup>59</sup>

Fearful, as usual, of incurring blame, Barrios carefully pointed out that it was at the insistence of Fray Vallejo and the other missionaries that he had decided to order the removal. The pathetic picture painted by Fray Vallejo and Fray Caro has been described already.<sup>60</sup> Both friars were intimate friends of the governor and there is ground to believe that they colored their reports perhaps at his request. It is amusing to note the use which the governor made of their complaints.

He had not entirely abandoned the idea of a civil settlement. While admitting that El Atascoso could not support such an establishment, he now suggested that a site for that purpose might be found on the San Jacinto. He doubted the possibility of finding any place that could be irrigated, but irrigation was not essential. The San Jacinto was in the heart of the Orcoquisac country, and a settlement there would have very definite advantages.

In closing his report and recommendations, he asked to be allowed to remain in Texas until the close of 1759 in order to finish the various measures taken with regard to the proposed settlement.<sup>61</sup>

*Abandonment of the civil settlement idea.* When the report of October 20, 1757, was referred to the *Fiscal* on December 17, this official began to view the entire enterprise with serious misgivings. After carefully considering the antecedents, he advised the viceroy on February 3, 1758, that in view of the circumstances, it was best to suspend all action with regard to the new settlement.

There still remained the question of the disposition of the presidio and mission, now established at Orcoquisac, however, which it was pro-

<sup>59</sup>Reconocimiento de El Atascoso por el gobernador. April 5-13, 1758. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 26-29; Informe del gobernador de Texas sobre haber dado orden de trasladar el Presidio de San Agustín al Atascocito. May 2, 1758, *ibid.*, pp. 32-36.

<sup>60</sup>See pages 75-76.

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid.*, Vol. 7, pp. 32-36.

posed to move to El Atascoso. The *Fiscal* wisely observed that the only justification for the existence of the new presidio was the protection which it was to afford against French incursions. It was not a question, therefore, of finding a site that was comfortable but of maintaining the new garrison authorized in a strategic position with regard to French aggressions. The governor should be thanked for his concern in regard to the expenses incurred by the treasury, but he should be instructed to make a careful exploration of El Atascoso and its strategic advantages with regard to French attack before moving the Presidio de San Agustín.<sup>62</sup>

The viceroy ordered Barrios on March 3 to make the new investigation recommended and repeated his orders on March 13. We have already seen how Barrios had undertaken the exploration without awaiting the orders of the viceroy. When his report of May 2, 1758, reached the authorities, it seems to have convinced them of the futility of the enterprise, because the request for a longer stay in Texas was denied and Governor Angel de Martos y Navarrete was ordered to go to Los Adaes to take charge of his post and conduct the *residencia* of Governor Barrios.

*Los Horconcitos and Los Pielagos.* The new governor took charge of his office on February 6, 1759, and immediately busied himself with the *residencia* of Barrios. Just as soon as time permitted, he undertook to find a site for the new Presidio of San Agustín. He went at this task methodically. In October, he visited Santa Rosa personally and concluded it was not suited for permanent settlement. Accompanied by Domingo del Río and Fray Abad de Jesús María, he went to El Atascoso on November 4, and likewise decided it was unsuited for the purpose. He now set out to find a new site. Three and a half leagues above El Orcoquisac he found a place called Los Horconcitos (little forks), and one league to the north, he found another one called Los Pielagos. The latter was on a creek. Both offered facilities for the establishment of the presidio and mission, as well as a civil settlement.<sup>63</sup>

Fray Abad de Jesús María was convinced that El Orcoquisac was the best place and he so stated his opinion in a long report made to the viceroy on November 27, 1759.<sup>64</sup> But Governor Martos y Navarrete strongly urged the new site in his letters to the viceroy of December 6,

<sup>62</sup>Dictamen del Fiscal que se suspenda la población de Santa Rosa. February 3, 1758. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 7, pp. 12-15.

<sup>63</sup>Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, pp. 354-355.

<sup>64</sup>For his reasons in opposing the removal to Los Horconcitos see p. 86.



1759, and May 30, 1760. He reënforced his view by requesting Father Vallejo to declare whether the removal from the present site was necessary. Father Vallejo, on the strength of a letter of Father Romero of Los Ais, who had been in San Agustín, strongly supported the proposal of the governor.<sup>65</sup> By this time, however, he had given up the idea of reviving the civil settlement project. On December 16, 1759, he had asked to be relieved of all responsibility in regard to that phase of the Orcoquisac enterprise.

*Order for removal to Horconcitos disregarded.* On March 15, 1760, the viceroy, on his own authority, instructed Governor Martos to move the presidio and mission to Los Horconcitos as requested. By the time the order reached the governor he had again changed his mind and made new excuses for his failure to comply. When the Orcoquisac question was again taken up by the *Junta de Guerra* on December 9, 1762, the council unanimously recommended that the presidio and mission should be moved to Los Horconcitos and the viceroy issued the corresponding orders on December 17. Martos y Navarrete set out to put in effect the removal late in the spring of 1763. It seems, however, that shortly after his arrival in Orcoquisac, he took ill and was obliged to return to Los Adaes without accomplishing his mission.<sup>66</sup>

*Appointment of the new commander.* While in Orcoquisac, it seems he incurred the ill will of Lieutenant Domingo del Río, who secretly made a bitter complaint to the viceroy on April 29, 1763, that the garrison was often left without corn, flour, and even clothing. This neglect extended also to the supply of ammunition. In his opinion, it was highly advisable that the garrison of the Presidio de San Agustín should be placed under the independent command of a captain.<sup>67</sup> It will be remembered that Father Abad de Jesús María had also pointed out the need of a responsible officer at Orcoquisac. This added to the continued disregard of orders

<sup>65</sup>Governor Martos to the Viceroy, December 6, 1759, same to same, May 30, 1760. *Béjar Archives*.

<sup>66</sup>Testimonio de lo determinado en Junta de Guerra y hacienda celebrada sobre la traslación del presidio de San Agustín . . . December 9, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 91; Martos y Navarrete to the Viceroy, November 14, 1763, in *ibid.*, Vol. 91, pt. 1, p. 180.

<sup>67</sup>Martos y Navarrete to the Viceroy, May 17, 1776, *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-27 (Dunn Transcripts, 1767), pp. 59-68; Navarrete complained at this time that Del Río had made false accusations on April 29, 1763, because he (Navarrete) had reprimanded him for permitting the soldiers to gamble. Bolton, *Texas*, pp. 367-368.

by Martos y Navarrete seems to have induced the viceroy to appoint a new commander for the post. Ever since the fall of 1759, a certain Rafael Martínez Pacheco had been importuning the viceroy for an appointment to a post in Texas. In recounting his former services, he declared he had been commissioned by Colonel Diego Ortiz Parrilla to remove the Presidio of San Xavier from the San Marcos to the San Sabá; that he had later been employed to recruit families to settle at San Sabá; and that he had served as conductor of supplies and horses for the Presidio de San Antonio de Béjar. On November 23, 1763, the viceroy appointed Rafael Martínez Pacheco Captain of the new Presidio de San Agustín de Ahumada.<sup>68</sup>

*Constructive work of Martínez Pacheco.* The new commander arrived at Orcoquisac on May 13, 1764, and immediately embarked on a program of reform and activity which would have borne much fruit had not adverse circumstances checked it at its inception. With him came Fathers Fray Luis Salvino and Fray Bernardino Aristorena to infuse new life in the Mission of Nuestra Señora de la Luz. The day after his arrival, Captain Martínez Pacheco called the Orcoquisac Indians in the vicinity and urged them to enter the mission. The meeting was attended by one hundred and fifty Indians to whom Del Río, the interpreter, explained the duties of mission life and told them they must obey the king, his officers, and the missionaries; destroy their idols, attend prayers, work in the fields, live in the mission, and help the Spaniards defend the post against the French and hostile nations. He explained that if they did these things they would be given clothing, rations four times a week, and all things necessary for the cultivation of the fields. The peace pipe was smoked, the Indians performed their native dances, gifts were distributed and there was much feasting and rejoicing. Next day the Indians, true to their promise, brought their idols and the ornaments used in their pagan orgies and delivered them to the astounded missionaries. The Orcoquisacs had formally accepted Christianity.

The efforts of Captain Martínez Pacheco and the missionaries were not confined to the *ranchería* of Chief Calzones Colorados. Chief Canos came at the request of the captain on May 31, accompanied by a group of natives, mainly Attacapa Indians. They marched into camp flying a French flag. The peace pipe ceremony was repeated. Chief Canos agreed

<sup>68</sup>Order of the Viceroy, November 23, 1763, Papeles pertenecientes al orcoquiza, cited by Bolton, *Texas*, p. 368, note 14; Decreto del Virey sobre asignación de sueldos a los soldados por Rafael Martínez Pacheco, undated; Escrito de Rafael Martínez Pacheco sobre diligencias practicadas para poblar el Presidio de San Luís de las Amarillas, undated, *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 6, pp. 45-147.

to surrender his French flag and renounce his heathen idols to enter mission life, if one was founded for his people separate from that of Calzones Colorados. A few days later, on June 6, Chief Tomás, of the Bidais, came with forty-eight of his followers, and after the usual ceremonies, agreed to enter a mission with his people if it was established in his own country. He explained that his people had already tried going to a mission outside of their lands (the San Xavier) and preferred one in their own country now.

Captain Martínez Pacheco could only promise the various chiefs to transmit their proposals to the viceroy for approval. He did, however, distribute gifts among the visitors, and he gave his undivided support to Mission Nuestra Señora de la Luz to enable it to carry on its work. According to his figures he spent over a thousand *pesos* in clothing alone, and he supplied the Orcoquisacs with two beeves and ten bushels of corn a week. While awaiting for the decision of the viceroy, to whom he reported everything on June 14, he agreed to supply the *ranchería* of Chief Canos with one beef and five bushels of corn a week.<sup>69</sup>

*Burning of the Presidio de San Agustín de Ahumada.* It is only natural that Martos y Navarrete should have felt jealous towards the new commander who had relieved him of the supervision of the presidio at Orcoquisac. He was incensed because Martínez Pacheco did not go to Los Adaes first to pay his respects to him as governor. Worse still, the new captain had not even informed him of his arrival until seven days later. The order to remove the presidio to Los Horconcitos, which sickness had prevented the governor from carrying out, had not been revoked. Taking this as an excuse, he went to Orcoquisac in June, 1764, accompanied by Father Calahorra, determined to put into effect the removal to Los Horconcitos. Martínez Pacheco was not pleased with the idea of the governor's interference in the conduct of affairs of his presidio. But he knew better than to oppose the action of the governor directly. Martos y Navarrete was surprised to find that neither the Indians nor the missionaries would agree to go to Los Horconcitos. In vain he tried to cajole them by threats and promises.<sup>70</sup> After a month's stay, the governor had to return to Los Adaes without accomplishing his purpose. He reported the matter to the viceroy, who repeated the

<sup>69</sup>*Papeles pertenecientes al Orcoquisac*, cited in Bolton, *Texas*, pp. 365-366.

<sup>70</sup>Later investigations disclosed that Martínez Pacheco had in fact bribed Chief Calzones Colorados and his followers to oppose the removal. Declaration of Calzones Colorados before Marcos Ruíz, January 2, 1765. *Lamar Papers*, No. 25.

orders for the removal of the presidio and mission to Los Horconcitos on August 12, 1764. But these were never carried out because the breach between Martínez Pacheco and Martos y Navarrete assumed such proportions that everything else was forgotten in the ensuing feud.

The month's visit of the governor at Orcoquisac did little towards restoring harmony. Although Martos later claimed that the garrison was on the verge of mutiny when he arrived in June, 1764, and that only his presence had prevented an open break, it seems more likely, in view of the circumstances, that the governor did everything in his power to foment whatever discontent already existed. Claiming that Martínez Pacheco was quick-tempered, cruel, arrogant and avaricious, the soldiers of San Agustín began to desert and seek refuge in Natchitoches shortly after the governor's departure. By August 28,<sup>71</sup> only five remained at Orcoquisac, Lieutenant Domingo del Río being one of them. On this date, the deserters addressed a petition to Governor Martos y Navarrete, through the French commander Périère, recounting their grievances, imploring permission to return and surrender, and asking for justice against Captain Martínez Pacheco.

With suspicious alacrity the governor granted the request of the deserters, who came to Los Adaes immediately thereafter. A formal investigation of their complaints was instituted, in which depositions were taken and all agreed on the charges against their former commander. Martos y Navarrete, without giving the accused an opportunity to answer the charges presented by deserters, considered the evidence sufficient and passed judgment on the Captain of San Agustín by formally deposing him on September 12, appointing Marcos Ruiz of Los Adaes to succeed him and pardoning the deserters, whom he sent under Ruiz to take charge of affairs at Orcoquisac. The newly appointed commander was instructed to serve notice on Martínez Pacheco that he had been suspended from office, place him under arrest, and send him out of the province until the matter was officially decided by the viceroy.

Marcos Ruiz and his band of pardoned deserters departed at once to carry out the instructions received. They arrived in Orcoquisac on October 7, about noon. The Presidio de San Agustín was practically deserted. Only four soldiers were on duty. Lieutenant Del Río had gone across the river in search of some cattle, and Captain Martínez Pacheco was taking his *siesta* (after dinner nap). Ruiz marched his men to the

<sup>71</sup>Bolton says August 18, but Martos y Navarrete gives the date as the 28th in his letter to the King of May 17, 1776. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-27 (Dunn Transcripts, 1767), pp. 59-68; Bolton, *op. cit.*, 368.

plaza, and halting in front of Pacheco's quarters, called for him to surrender his sword. The captain, awakened by the martial noise of his would-be captors, of whose approach he seems to have had some knowledge, sprang to his feet, and musket in hand defied the little band. Undaunted, Ruiz read the governor's orders. Martínez Pacheco replied indignantly that he had no other superiors than the viceroy and the king, that he would not give himself up alive, that they should return to Los Adaes. He then raised his musket and fired wildly into the crowd. One of the men rushed at him and grabbed his gun. A free-for-all attack followed. After a few minutes the scuffle was over, the Captain had recovered the musket and his servants had come to his rescue. Impressed by the determination of the commander, Ruiz thought it best to retire to a safe distance to decide upon the next move. He took a position behind the mission and waited there for the return of Del Río. A messenger was sent after him.

In a short while he came. Informed of the orders of the governor, Del Río agreed to place himself under the command of Ruiz and to try to induce Pacheco to surrender. In the meantime the Captain had barricaded himself in the presidio with two cannon loaded and ready to fire. The Spaniards realized that before proceeding with their unpleasant task it was essential to secure the support of the Indians. Del Río found that they had been given arms by the commander. He explained the situation to Chief Calzones Colorados. The experienced old chief wisely shook his head and declared he wanted three days in which to try to induce Captain Martínez Pacheco to submit peacefully, that if after that time he persisted in resisting, he would be ready to do whatever Ruiz ordered.

In the presidio the Captain watched day and night with lighted torch by the two cannon, a stack of loaded muskets by his side. His half-sick brother Leandro guarded one window, while Ambrosio Brioso and Andrés Zambrano watched the other. In vain did the invaders try to communicate with the besieged. Del Río and Chief Calzones Colorados attempted daily during the next three days to speak or convey a message to Captain Martínez Pacheco without success. Juan Váldez was sent by Ruiz with a letter, informing the commander that unless he surrendered the fort would be set on fire, but the letter was returned unopened. Fray Luis Salvino, desirous of avoiding bloodshed, attempted to convince the obstinate Pacheco, but was equally unsuccessful. The fair Rosa Guerra, one of the young maidens of the settlement, added her pleadings but to no avail.

The three days of grace passed. Chief Calzones Colorados and his

followers were ready to obey orders. Ruiz called a council of war. It was decided to make one more peaceful attempt and if it failed, to set the presidio on fire. It was now October 10. A new letter was sent with a flag of truce, but Martínez Pacheco arrogantly refused even to open it. The besiegers hesitated. The day passed without a formal attack. But on the morning of the 11th Ruiz and his men, aided by Indian allies, advanced determined to take the captain prisoner, dead or alive. Once more they asked him to surrender. A cannon shot was the defiant reply. Rushing from all sides, the soldiers set fire to the captain's quarters. Pacheco and his men fired upon the attackers. Joaquín del Río fell dead, two soldiers were wounded, and the rest retreated to the presidial chapel and the nearby store to protect themselves from the flying bullets. Desperately Brioso fired upon the besiegers as he attempted to smother the flames with a wet blanket. Andrés Zambrano, another of the defenders, was wounded. The flames mounted higher. Ruiz and his men watched from their safe position for Pacheco to flee from the burning ruins. Soon the brave little band was forced to give up. Leandro, the brother of the commander, was carried from the enveloping fire by the defenders. All the men were accounted for, except Martínez Pacheco and the courageous Ambrosio Brioso. The besiegers had watched closely, but they had not seen them leave. The soldiers now busied themselves in putting out the fire. Only the captain's quarters and a few empty barracks adjoining it had been burned. Ruiz was certain Pacheco and Brioso had perished in the flames. But they searched for the charred remains in vain. Turning to the survivors, who had surrendered, he inquired what had become of them. The prisoners explained that the commander and his loyal friend Brioso had escaped through a secret door in the chimney.<sup>72</sup> A thorough search was immediately instituted by the baffled Ruiz, but no trace of the fugitives was found. Not until the 13th was news of their whereabouts learned in Orcoquisac from two teamsters who arrived on that day from San Antonio, where they had gone to secure corn. They reported that they saw the two fugitives at Caramanchel the night before, about twelve leagues (some thirty miles) away. The two were on foot and carried their guns on their shoulders. They were going on to La Bahía.

Brioso and Pacheco were given refuge by Captain Ramírez de la Piscina

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<sup>72</sup>Governor Martos y Navarrete to the King, May 17, 1776, *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-6-27 (Dunn Transcripts, 1767), pp. 59-68; Testimonio de autos fhos. por el Thente. D Marcos Ruiz contra el Capitan D. Raphael Martínez Pacheco, *Béxar Archives*; Brown, *History of the Spanish Settlement at Orcoquisac*, Master's thesis, 1909, University of Texas.



in La Bahía, where they remained in hiding a day and two nights. Ramírez de la Piscina loaned them a horse and they went on to Mission San José, where Martínez Pacheco was kindly received by Father Camberos. Captain Menchaca, upon receipt of a proclamation issued by Ruiz, was obliged to arrest him, but he remained a prisoner a very short while, for in December, Menchaca set him at liberty. He continued to live in San José for several months, and went to San Antonio frequently without being molested. Governor Martos was indignant at the laxity of Menchaca and later reported that he had not only failed to keep Martínez Pacheco in prison but had gone with him to a bullfight in San Antonio. On another occasion Martínez Pacheco had attended a mask ball disguised in woman's apparel without being molested in the least.<sup>73</sup>

*Ruiz in command.* After the escape of Martínez Pacheco, things at Orcoquisac settled down once more and Lieutenant Marcos Ruiz took charge of the charred remains of the presidio. The scandalized Indians were again gathered in Mission Nuestra Señora de la Luz with the aid of the devoted Fray Luis Salvino. Ruiz made several reports to the viceroy concerning the misdeeds of the escaped commander and instituted an investigation of conditions in his efforts to reduce the Indians to mission life. The investigation disclosed that Chief Calzones Colorados had been bribed by Martínez Pacheco to oppose the removal of the presidio and the mission to Los Horconcitos during the preceding summer, when Governor Martos y Navarrete had attempted to carry out the orders of the viceroy. Domingo del Río, the former lieutenant, was implicated by the evidence. The result was that officials in Mexico now appointed Afan de Rivera as commander of the unfortunate post. Upon his arrival, Rivera suspended Del Río.<sup>74</sup>

*Responsibility for the burning of the presidio.* Such was the state of affairs in the summer of 1765 when Don Hugo Oconor, inspector general of the Spanish frontier, arrived in San Antonio. According to Governor Martos y Navarrete, he came accompanied by Felix Pacheco, a cousin of Rafael, the former captain, and consequently, he was inclined to overlook the responsibility of Martínez in the scandalous affair at the Presidio of

<sup>73</sup>Governor Martos to the King, May 17, 1775, in *op. cit.*, pp. 59-69.

<sup>74</sup>Presidio de San Agustín. Testimonio de diligencias comenzadas en S. Agustín de Ahumada y continuadas en este preso. de Los Adaes por el gobernador de estas provincias de Texas contra el Capitán Dn. Rafael Martínez Pacheco. Año 1765; Testimonio de la declaración que hicieron los principales Indios de la nación Orcoquisac ante Dn. Marcos Ruíz, 1765, in *Béxar Archives*, University of Texas.

San Agustín. Both the governor and the former commander of San Agustín presented their cases to Oconor, who in November ordered the arrest of Lieutenant Marcos Ruiz and charged him with burning a royal presidio. Fearful of arrest Manuel de Soto, a man of some prominence and a friend of the governor, fled to Natchitoches, where he lived for several years as a refugee. The investigation now disclosed clearly the responsibility of Governor Martos y Navarrete in the deplorable incident that caused Martínez Pacheco to flee from the burning presidio of San Agustín. In 1767 formal charges against the governor were brought. His trial for this offense lasted for fourteen years and resulted in the imposition of a heavy fine.<sup>75</sup>

*A tropical storm devastates San Agustín, 1766.* To the irreparable havoc wrought by the storm of human passions that almost annihilated the unfortunate post at the mouth of the Trinity was added the material destruction of a terrific storm that desolated the barren coast. On September 4, 1766, a typical Texas storm shook the half-abandoned presidio and mission and almost blew it out of existence. Hardly a building was left standing, and all the property and supplies were severely damaged. An appeal was hurriedly made to San Antonio de Béjar, and a report of the pitiable condition of the garrison and the missionary was sent to the viceroy. Afan de Rivera explained to the viceroy that a similar storm had desolated this place in 1762, and he begged permission to move to higher ground. The necessary aid was given, and the viceroy informed Rivera that ever since December 9, 1762, the removal of the presidio and mission had been authorized. Subsequent events had prevented the order from being carried out. Rivera now moved the garrison to a low hill about a quarter of a league from its original location. It is to be noted that this was the only removal of the presidio since its founding.<sup>76</sup>

*Visit of Marqués de Rubí, 1767.* The presidio de San Agustín had not fully recovered from the disastrous effects of the storm, when it was visited in 1767 by the Marqués de Rubí, one of the most distinguished and capable Spanish officials to inspect the frontier. With him came the able and meticulous engineer Don Nicolás de la Fora, who kept a careful diary of the inspection and made maps and drawings of the places visited. It is in this document that we have the last pen picture in which the

<sup>75</sup>Martos y Navarrete to the King, May 17, 1776, *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalupe*, 103-6-27 (Dunn Transcripts, 1767), pp. 59-68; Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, p. 372.

<sup>76</sup>*A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 2, pp. 72-81.



doom of the Presidio de San Agustín and the Mission de Nuestra Señora de la Luz is written. The report of Rubí was to extinguish the flickering light of this distant outpost of Spanish culture and Christian faith founded at the mouth of the Trinity.

"This presidio is in the country of the Orcoquisac nation," says La For. "The distance to the gulf coast due east is one league or five leagues due south. The Trinity River, which empties into the gulf, passes a quarter of a league west of the presidio. The river is very wide and deep, and the water forms pools because of its low banks and a sand dune which blocks its mouth and checks its course. Because of this natural dam, the whole country is full of lagoons. This makes it difficult to explore the coast. The lagoons are chiefly to the east and make it necessary to take a detour of ten leagues in order to reach the sea, a feat which is accomplished with great difficulty and the loss of many horses. It is said that the nature of the whole coast to La Balise, in Louisiana, near the mouth of the Mississippi, is the same, which makes it impassable.

"The garrison of the presidio consists of a company of cavalry of thirty-one men, including a captain, a lieutenant, and a sergeant. Its annual allowance amounts to thirteen thousand two hundred forty-five pesos, in addition to the stipend for two religious of St. Francis who minister to the soldiers and the Mission of Nuestra Señora de la Luz." The diarist then affirms that little or nothing was accomplished here by either the presidio or the mission. "I, therefore, consider this presidio useless," says La For, speaking for the Marqués de Rubí, "for it does not serve to support the missions, useless because of the slight inclination of the natives to embrace our sacred religion, a fact well demonstrated since the year 1758, when the first and only mission [in this region] was founded. It has not accomplished in all this time the formal reduction of a single Indian." The Marqués de Rubí then explained that the presidio could serve no purpose of defense in a country which was uninhabitable and whose very nature made it proof against foreign attempts at colonization. The country was marshy, full of lagoons, unhealthy, and inaccessible. "Here," he exclaims, "because of an ill-advised decision, the unfortunate garrison with a few stragglers and the missionaries are forced to subsist the greater part of the year on a wild root called *camote* (sweet potato), on persimmons, nuts, cherries, wild chestnuts, smaller than those of Spain, and other equally wild foods."<sup>77</sup> Rubí strongly urged that both the presidio and the mission on the Trinity should be immediately

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<sup>77</sup>La For, Nicolás, *Relación del viaje*.

suppressed, particularly since the cession of Louisiana to Spain there was now no need for the maintenance of frontier defenses in Texas.

During the inspection, Rubí found several abuses which he ordered corrected. Chief among these was the excessive price of some of the commodities furnished to the garrison. He instructed the acting captain, Melchor Afan de Rivera, to credit the accounts of the soldiers with two *pesos* for each silk handkerchief charged at five *pesos* and that in the future this was to be the standard price. Similar credit was to be given for silk ribbon sold for two *pesos a vara*, whose price should be one and a quarter *pesos*; leather cases for guns, which were being sold for ten *pesos*, should be charged at six; and black and colored ribbons which sold for seventy-five cents should be charged at fifty cents. The company was eighty-three horses short of its one hundred thirty-two. But twice the number would not be sufficient to keep the garrison supplied adequately with mounts, because of the nature of the service they were called to perform in making frequent trips to Los Adaes, La Bahía, and San Antonio. The guns were of different makes and calibers, some Spanish and some Catalanian. Of the eight cannon four were useless and two were badly in need of repair. The garrison lacked cartridge belts, but their saddles were in fairly good condition. Such were the conditions found by Rubí during his inspection.<sup>78</sup>

*Martínez Pacheco returns to San Agustín.* Upon being absolved of guilt in the burning of the presidio, Captain Martínez Pacheco returned to his post, where he arrived on September 28, 1769. He immediately took an active and enthusiastic interest in repairing the presidio and in the reduction of the Indians to mission life. The two missionaries, Fathers Fray Anselmo García and Fray Ignacio Maria Lava testified to the lively interest displayed. He called the Orcoquisacs and the Attacapas and distributed numerous gifts to them, supplying as many provisions as he could spare to the missionaries. He also furnished them tools and implements to work the fields. Because of the prevalence of various ailments he brought a physician at his own expense to treat the soldiers and Indians alike. Aware of the effect of a good example, he attended personally the evening services held in the mission and led the soldiers in prayer. "So solicitous has the captain been for the welfare of the settlers, the soldiers, and the Indians," says Fray Ignacio, "that he

<sup>78</sup>Copia de la cartta que comprehende las resoluciones tomadas en la revistta de ynspcción . . . 1767, *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Transcripts, 1767), pp. 341-356.

has literally taken his food from his mouth that the sick may not want."

In a certified statement of the supplies and provisions furnished to the missionaries from September 1769 to September 1770, the principal goods are listed. These include ninety-six cows, sixty pounds of salt, twenty-seven *fanegas* (fifty-four bushels) of corn, and more than thirty bundles of tobacco. He also furnished numerous suits of clothes, cloth, shoes, hats, stockings, skirts, shawls, and even neckties. The total spent in presents and supplies to restore the mission to a flourishing state was four thousand six hundred twenty *pesos*. All this he furnished at his own expense.

His genuine efforts bore a belated fruit. In a statement certified by Fray José del Rosario Coto and Fray Ignacio María Lava, we find that Fray Luis Salvino baptized one Cujane Indian, ten adult Orcoquisacs, five children of the same nation, and one Coco; Fray Martínez, one Orcoquisac; and Fray Ignacio María Lava, nine adult Orcoquisacs, and two children of the same nation. Only one funeral, performed on November 24, 1770, by Fray Ignacio, is recorded. This was a Christian Coco Indian who was buried in the mission church on November 24.<sup>79</sup>

*Acadian and English shipwrecks.* Shortly after the return of Martínez Pacheco to San Agustín, he received instructions from Governor Hugo Oconor, then in San Antonio, to proceed at once to La Bahía to take charge of a group of Acadian, English, and German families who had been shipwrecked on the Texas coast. He was to conduct the survivors by way of San Agustín to the French post of Natchitoches to whose commander he was instructed to deliver them.

The ship that was wrecked some forty leagues from La Bahía seems to have been named *Bretaña de Maryland*. It is not clear whether it set sail from England or Maryland, but at the time of the accident it was on its way to New Orleans with a mixed group of families, who were to settle in Louisiana. The vessel appears to have reached the vicinity of the mouth of the Mississippi about the last day of September, 1769. Before it could enter the river, however, it was overtaken by a storm that swept it off its course and carried it somewhere near the mouth of the San Antonio River, where it was wrecked on the shallow waters of

<sup>79</sup>The facts summarized above concerning the activity of Martínez Pacheco after his return are found in a long document, *El virrey de Nueva España da cuenta con testimonio del mérito y servicios de Dn. Rafael Martínez Pacheco . . . 1772. A. G. I., Guadalajara*, 104-6-16 (Dunn Transcripts, 1765-1776), pp. 120-145.

the low-lying coast. One hundred twenty-five families reached the shore and were discovered by soldiers from Presidio de Nuestra Señora de Loreto de La Bahía del Espíritu Santo and taken to Captain Tovar.

It was here that Captain Martínez Pacheco took charge of them on October 3, 1769. He not only escorted them to San Agustín, furnishing them the necessary supplies, but he hired at his own expense three Spanish *arrieros* (muleteers) and secured the horses and mules for the transportation of the families and their belongings. After his arrival in San Agustín, he allowed them to rest for a few days and then sent them to Natchitoches under a special escort, commanded by Francisco Pacheco de La Portilla, where the grateful survivors arrived safely on October 26. Both the French and English families signed a sworn statement expressing their gratitude for the kind solicitude displayed by Martínez Pacheco for their welfare. The French statement was signed by Honorato Fralien and Jacobo Rousseau, the only two who could write and Esteban Ribot, Antonio Bellad, Benito Oliviet, Andres Recor, Luis Ladet, Pedro Prumeru, Jean Tescune, Francisco Pasque, Francisco Bauntin, Nicolás Beau Soleil, and Votuer who, unable to write, made their sign. The English statement was signed by Philip Ford, Juan Siel, Francisco Lownder, Leonardo Mattingly, Carlos Stuart, Joseph Hamilton, Neal Therengan, Joseph Mattingly, and George Albercombi.<sup>80</sup>

*Abandonment of Presidio de San Agustín.* Little is known concerning the last days of this unfortunate presidio and the Mission of Nuestra Señora de la Luz. In the summer of 1770, the Baron de Ripperdá was forced to call upon Captain Martínez Pacheco for help, who gallantly responded and sent a part of his small garrison to aid the governor, now seriously threatened by the Apaches. In February, 1771, conditions in San Antonio demanded further help. The remainder of the small garrison at San Agustín, with the exception of three soldiers left to guard the mission, set out to heed the call of distress. The Indians were reluctant to see the good Father Fray Ignacio María Lava and the three soldiers leave their country. For a while the little band of Spaniards patiently awaited the return of their companions. But after a few weeks, the three soldiers and the two missionaries, Fray Lava and Fray Coto took the road to San Antonio de Béjar. The lingering light of Nuestra Señora de la Luz was extinguished, and the mission and presidio of the Orcoquisacs passed out of existence even before their formal abolition was decreed by the new regulations of the frontier presidios of New Spain promulgated in 1772.

<sup>80</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 142-145.

## CHAPTER III

### AFTERMATH OF THE SAN SABÁ MASSACRE

Were one inclined to reflect on the consequences of a man's misconduct, Captain Felipe Rábago y Terán might be held responsible for a series of misfortunes that brought down upon the Spaniards the relentless enmity of the northern tribes, which resulted in the destruction of the Mission of San Sabá, and occasioned the death of ten men, two missionaries among them. The failure of the San Xavier missions, as a consequence of his ill-advised conduct, caused the officials in Mexico to accede eventually to the removal of the original presidio to the San Sabá River and the increase of its garrison to one hundred men in order to afford greater protection to the persecuted Apaches. These Indians had requested and begged, impelled by fear and dire necessity, the establishment of missions for their people in their country. To befriend them proved a serious error, which resulted almost in the loss of Spanish power in Texas. Within a year after the establishment of the first mission and the new Presidio de San Luis de las Amarillas on the San Sabá River, before the faithless Apaches had fulfilled their promise and entered the mission, the northern tribes swept down upon the two establishments, surprised the mission, killed its defenders, martyred two missionaries, and burned and pillaged the whole place. Panic seized the entire Spanish frontier. The daring of the Indians of the north was unparalleled in the annals of Spanish Texas. In fact in the annals of Spanish colonization subdued Indians had revolted, but never had a Spanish fort and mission been attacked by a force of natives bent upon revenge and conquest. Hurried appeals for help went unheeded. Every commander along the frontier felt that his post might be the next objective of the daring hordes, who emboldened by their initial success might continue their sanguinary exploits.<sup>1</sup>

*Proposed removal to the San Marcos or the Guadalupe Rivers.* The first impulse of those at San Sabá, seeing that no aid came and still dreading a new attack, was to abandon the place. In fact not a few of the soldiers deserted leaving their families behind. The commander was truly perplexed. With about four hundred men, women, and children

<sup>1</sup>For details of the massacre at San Sabá and the frantic efforts to secure aid, see C. E. Castañeda, *The Missions at Work (Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, Volume III, Chapter VIII)*.

on his hands and provisions for only a week, since the entire herd of cattle had been driven away by the Indians, he was almost desperate. On April 5, 1758, just three weeks after the massacre, Father Fray Francisco Aparicio formally requested the abandonment of the site and the withdrawal to either the San Marcos or the Guadalupe. In his statement he declared that he had been sent to the missions established on the San Xavier in 1752, where he had stayed until 1755, when the unbearable conditions of the locality forced him to retire to the San Marcos. Speaking from experience, he expressed serious doubts that the Apaches would ever congregate at San Sabá after the recent occurrence. He recounted that while at San Xavier he had made frequent trips to the country of the Mayeyes, Hierbipiames, Yojuanes, Tonkawas, Bidais, Orcoquisacs, and Cocos. During his visits to these tribes he had also met some Tawakonis, Quitseys, and Comanches. Some of these had even visited him in the missions. They had always declared, however, that they hated the Apaches and would kill them all some day. While on the San Marcos, when the establishment of missions for the Apaches was being discussed, he was told by the Indians that the Yojuanes, Tonkawas, Bidais, Orcoquisacs, Tawakonis, Quitseys, and Tejas had said they were no longer the friends of the Spaniards because they had befriended their enemies, the Apaches. He learned at that time that all these nations were planning a combined attack on the Apaches and that they had declared that they would destroy the Spaniards also, if they helped their enemies. As he looked back now, the good friar reflected that the fate of the San Sabá mission had been foretold by him.

At the time of the attack he was at the Guadalupe River, taking care of the remnants of the San Xavier missions established there. Upon receipt of news of the massacre, Fray Mariano in San Antonio had immediately ordered him to retire to that place for safety. He had obeyed the order. Shortly after his return to San Antonio, however, he had been sent to San Sabá to look after the Apaches that might come. Knowing these Indians well, he did not expect a single one would agree to stay at San Sabá. Since the massacre they had taken a deep distrust to the site, feeling that their mortal enemies had found the road to it and would very likely return. They had, therefore, retired southward to the Medina, the San Antonio, the San Marcos and the Guadalupe. To remain at San Sabá was useless. He suggested that the presidio be moved to either of the two last named streams to encourage the fleeing Apaches to congregate there. There was another particular advantage in moving to the locality proposed. It would give the four hundred or more apostate Indians from

the missions of San Xavier an opportunity to return to mission life. After the suppression of the missions many of the Indians, who had been baptized and were being instructed, had relapsed to savagery.<sup>2</sup> The officers and soldiers of the presidio presented a similar petition on the same day.

*Parrilla's proposals.* Three days later, on April 8, 1758, Colonel Diego Ortiz Parrilla wrote three different communications to the viceroy reporting conditions at San Luis de las Amarillas, discussing the problems that faced him, and making proposals for their solution. In the first of these he explained at great length that he could in no way be held responsible for neglect in the tragic deaths of Father Fray Giraldo and Fray Santiesteban nor in the destruction of the new mission. But the tragedy made a deep impression on the garrison, and the men and their families were anxious to abandon the place. Some of the soldiers had deserted. But if all were to go, he assured the viceroy, he was determined to hold the site single-handed rather than abandon the post without permission.

Turning to the character of the Indians that attacked San Sabá, he shrewdly pointed out that they were very different from those of New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, and Nuevo Santander. In these provinces the natives used bows and arrows chiefly, they were either apostates or savages that had attained a very low grade in civilization, and they had relatively meager natural resources for their subsistence. The northern Indians, however, appeared to be much more numerous, they operated in larger bands, had had relations and trade with the French for many years, knew how to use firearms, had a supply of these and munitions, had horses of excellent quality and in sufficient numbers, planted corn and vegetables, and had an abundant supply of meat in the countless buffalo that roamed the plains. Furthermore, as a result of their long contact with Europeans, they had learned modern methods of warfare and they were more aggressive and determined fighters than any of the natives living in the interior of New Spain. These differences made them a more formidable enemy, who must be met with better trained men, more efficient firearms, and better fortifications.

In view of the character of the enemy that threatened the presidio, the proposals of the soldiers and officers, as well as of Fray Aparicio, were worthy of being considered. The present site was unquestionably

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<sup>2</sup>Certificación de Fray Francisco Aparicio. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 42-45.

too exposed to the attacks of the northern Indians. The Apaches had always feared them and now, in view of the fact that the Spanish garrison had offered them little practical protection, they were not likely to congregate at San Sabá. Furthermore, he reminded the viceroy that the river afforded facilities for the maintenance of only two missions, and if it was desired to reduce all the Apaches to mission life it would require more than two. It was true that since the massacre the Apaches had fled southward and many of them had taken refuge on the San Marcos and the Guadalupe Rivers. He believed the proposal to move the presidio to either of these two streams in order to reduce the Apaches to mission life was sound, but he would await the viceroy's decision in the matter.<sup>3</sup>

*Formal campaign proposed.* Whether the presidio was moved or not, Parrilla was of the opinion that it would be well to plan a formal campaign into the country of the northern Indians to chastise them for the outrages committed on the mission. If something was not done to make them feel the might of Spanish power, they would lose all respect for Spaniards and would be encouraged to undertake similar surprises with impunity. The one hundred men of the Presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas could not be expected to make the campaign single-handed. Such a campaign would require many more than one hundred men. It should be kept in mind, he pointed out, that Governor Juan Antonio Bustillo y Ceballos had undertaken a campaign against the Apaches in 1732 with one hundred fifty men and had suffered a defeat, and that Don Pedro de Rábago y Terán in 1747 had taken two hundred men, meeting with success in the capture of a village only because the natives had been reduced to impotence by a severe epidemic. The northern tribes were more formidable adversaries, were better armed, and more skilled than those against whom the two cited expeditions were directed. Consequently, if a campaign against those who desecrated the mission on the San Sabá was to be undertaken, it would require more men than either of the two previous expeditions. He proposed that if the idea met with approval, the viceroy should order a *Junta* to be held in San Antonio to discuss and plan the campaign, the number of men needed, the approximate cost, the time of setting out, and the character of the enemy. He modestly offered to lead the expedition, recalling his successful experience in fighting natives in Sonora.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Consulta del Coronel Diego Ortiz Parrilla to the Viceroy, April 8, 1758. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 46-57.

<sup>4</sup>Diego Ortiz Parrilla to the Viceroy, April 8, 1758. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 46-57. For details concerning Bustillo



*Proposal to move to Los Almagres or the Llano River.* After writing the first communication, Parrilla presented an alternate proposal for the removal of the Presidio de San Luis de las Amarillas either to Los Almagres or Chanas (Llano River). He explained that mindful of the best interests of the king he had sent out exploring parties during the year to determine if there were mineral deposits in the vicinity. The precious metals, he declared, had always been a great incentive to colonization. A group of his men had visited Los Almagres (perhaps the same site discovered by Miranda) and had obtained some samples of ore which were sent to Santa Rosa in Coahuila for assay. The assay had shown the ore rich in silver and lead. Another mineral deposit had been found near the headwaters of the Llano River, samples of which were likewise assayed and found to be rich. According to the diaries kept, Los Almagres was thirty-six leagues from San Sabá and forty-one from San Antonio. The deposits found on Llano River were nineteen leagues from San Sabá, forty-one from San Antonio, and eighteen from Los Almagres. Although neither site had sufficient water for irrigation, there was enough to supply the needs of a large settlement at either one. There were good lands, pastures, timber, firewood, and rock. Regularly authenticated reports could be secured, but time did not permit. He, therefore, sent Joseph de Guzmán to make a personal report. Guzmán was an experienced miner and frontiersman, who had explored the sites and had in fact been wounded by the Indians while on the expedition.

Parrilla proposed that after hearing Guzmán, the presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas could be moved, with its garrison of one hundred men, to either of the two sites or to some point halfway between them, from which protection could be afforded to settlers at either place. If mining centers were developed in the two sites suggested, the country would rapidly be settled and the increased population would soon obviate the necessity of a garrison. The settlement of this area would afford the best protection against the northern Indians and would be the best incentive for the Apaches to enter mission life.

If it was decided, however, that it was advisable to found missions for the Apaches on the San Marcos or the Guadalupe, the two purposes could be accomplished by removing the presidio with one hundred men to a convenient point near Los Almagres and the Llano River, and by placing a detachment of forty additional men, dependent upon the

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y Ceballos's expedition see C. E. Casteñeda, *The Missions at Work (Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, Volume III, pp. 39-44)*. For expedition of Rábago y Terán see *ibid.*, pp. 214-220.

presidio, on the San Marcos or the Guadalupe. The additional forty men were necessary to the proposed location of the presidio. As in the case of the campaign, Parrilla suggested that the matter should be carefully studied by a *Junta* in San Antonio, who should be asked to report on the advisability of such a plan and the way and means for carrying it out.<sup>5</sup>

*Request for permission to move temporarily to the San Marcos or the Guadalupe.* It is difficult to tell just what Parrilla really wanted to do. Hardly had he finished his two former proposals, when he formally requested permission to move the presidio provisionally to either the San Marcos or the Guadalupe, to await there the final disposition of the viceroy. Both streams offered excellent facilities for missions. He reminded the viceroy that he had examined the San Marcos early in 1757, to determine whether a mission should be continued there or at the Guadalupe. He had further opportunity to acquaint himself with the San Marcos when he camped on it for more than a month prior to his departure for San Sabá. The Apaches were more amenable now to a proposal to congregate in missions than ever before. On either of the two streams several missions could be founded not only for the Apaches, but for the former neophytes of the three San Xavier missions.

There was one question, however: Would Don Pedro Romero de Terreros agree to continue to bear the expenses of the new missions, if they were moved to the San Marcos or the Guadalupe? Parrilla argued that although Fray Giraldo had once ruled that his cousin would not support other missions than those founded for Apaches to the north of San Antonio, the fact that the Apaches had moved to these streams would maintain Terreros' obligation in force. At any rate the matter would have to be taken up with him.<sup>6</sup>

*Viceregal action on the proposals of Parrilla.* Upon receipt of the proposals, they were referred to the new *Fiscal* Don Luis de Mosquera, Marqués de Aranda. As meticulous and as logical as his distinguished predecessor, the Marqués de Altamira, he prepared a remarkably clear and able report. After reviewing the history of both the San Xavier and the San Sabá missions to the destruction of the latter, he declared that the three communications of Parrilla could be reduced to four propositions. First, was a campaign desirable to punish the Indians who had attacked

<sup>5</sup>Diego Ortiz Parrilla to the Viceroy, April 8, 1758. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 60-65.

<sup>6</sup>Ortiz Parrilla to the Viceroy, April 8, 1758. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 66-71.

San Sabá and to seek them in their own country? Secondly, should the site on the San Sabá be abandoned and the Presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas with its garrison of one hundred men be moved to the San Marcos or the Guadalupe to permit the Apaches and the scattered apostates of the San Xavier missions to congregate there? Thirdly, should the removal be to the San Marcos-Guadalupe area or to the vicinity of Los Almagres and the Llano River, with an increase of forty men in the latter case? Fourthly, can Terreros be held responsible for the maintenance of the missions, if transferred to the San Marcos-Guadalupe area?

The Laws of the Indies, Title 4, Book III, expressly prohibited the waging of war against natives to reduce them to Christianity. But if Indians were guilty of revolt, or committed depredations, and waged open war against the Spaniards, the latter had the right to chastise and punish them by undertaking a formal campaign within three months. However, if the damage inflicted by natives was serious, Spaniards might take reprisals at a later date than three months. There was little doubt in the mind of the *Fiscal* that the murder of two missionaries and the complete destruction of a royal mission were sufficient cause to justify a formal campaign. But the time was not appropriate, nor were men and the needed supplies and arms available. Furthermore such an undertaking would require considerable expense. The question should be discussed by a special *Junta de Guerra y Hacienda*, and if decided upon, the leader of the expedition should be enjoined not to attack any Indian nation other than those who were known to have taken part in the sacrilegious murders of San Sabá.

He was not opposed to the removal of the presidio to the San Marcos or the Guadalupe, if this would result in the congregation of the Apaches. The two rivers had been examined, the sites were known and had been temporarily occupied. The chief purpose and the main reason for the establishment of the presidio at San Sabá had been the reduction of the Apaches to mission life. This was its only justification for existence. The proposal should be given serious consideration.

He was a bit suspicious, however, of the reputed mineral deposits discovered at Los Almagres and the Llano River. The evidence presented was unconvincing and insufficient to authorize the removal of the presidio to an unknown site and the increase of its garrison by forty men.

The question raised concerning the obligation incurred by Don Pedro Romero de Terreros in his agreement to bear the expense of missions established for the conversion of the Apaches presented no difficulty.

As long as the missions were primarily for the reduction of the Apaches, the obligation of Don Pedro would remain in force.

He concluded by recommending that no formal campaign be undertaken at this time; that the Los Almagres-Llano proposals be rejected, that permission to move the presidio provisionally to the San Marcos might be granted, subject to a more careful survey and the opinion of the missionaries as to its suitability for missions; that if this experiment should prove a failure, the presidio should then be abolished; that if the removal to the San Marcos was made the garrison should be cut to fifty men, giving as a reason, the proximity to San Antonio; but that the reduction of the garrison to fifty, if moved to the San Marcos, should not be taken to imply the restoration of the twenty-two men to San Antonio.<sup>7</sup>

When the matter was referred to the *Auditor*, Domingo Valcarcel, he concurred in all the recommendations of the *Fiscal*. He suggested that the whole matter should be taken up in a special *Junta*.<sup>8</sup>

*Campaign authorized.* Usually the recommendations of the two trusted counselors of the viceroy were adopted by the *Junta*. But in this instance, after a heated argument, the opinions of the *Fiscal* and the *Auditor* were reversed. To abandon the site of San Sabá by removing the presidio to any other site would be an admission of fear. Spanish honor demanded its maintenance at all costs. Furthermore, no evidence had been presented that the Apaches had expressed a desire to congregate somewhere else, nor that they had an aversion to San Sabá. The reports submitted expressed the opinion of the commander, the officers, the soldiers, and the missionaries, but not of the Apaches. The maintenance of the presidio on its present site was essential not only to vindicate Spanish prestige, but to insure the peace and safety of Coahuila and Nuevo Santander. To avoid a recurrence of the massacre, the missionaries should be ordered to live in the presidio for greater safety, and Parrilla should be instructed to hold his post at all costs.

Unanimously the *Junta* now voted in favor of authorizing a campaign to punish the daring boldness of the northern tribes that had committed the sacrilegious murders of San Sabá. It was recommended that Parrilla should be instructed to call a special *Junta* in San Antonio as soon as possible, which should be attended by the governors of Coahuila and

<sup>7</sup>Dictamen Fiscal del Marqués de Aranda, May 29, 1758. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 92-129.

<sup>8</sup>Dictamen del Auditor, Domingo Valcarcel, June 12, 1758. *A. G. I., Audiencia. México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 129-139.

Texas, Parrilla, and other frontier officers of experience. The *Junta* was to discuss the character and number of the Indian tribes to be attacked, plan a systematic campaign, determine the number of troops needed and the best time for setting out. They should present an estimate of the supplies, arms, and munitions needed and a statement of the approximate total cost of the campaign. Out of regard for the fact that the presidio offended had been San Luis de las Amarillas, Parrilla should be placed in command of the projected expedition. To assure the assistance of the various officials summoned to the *Junta*, the viceroy should instruct them that failure to attend would be sufficient cause for suspension from office. It was highly advisable that the *Junta* meet at the earliest date possible and submit the plans for viceregal approval without delay.<sup>9</sup> The viceroy, who was in sympathy with the recommendations of the *Junta*, approved them on June 27, and the corresponding orders were issued on the following day from San Angel to Parrilla, the Governors of Coahuila and Texas, and José de Eca y Músquiz.<sup>10</sup>

*Instructions to Parrilla.* On July 5, 1758, the viceroy sent Parrilla a list of instructions for his guidance. In the first place he was to determine, with the aid of the missionaries, the attitude of the Apache Indians with regard to the establishment of missions for their people in the San Sabá area. He was to find out specifically what their opinion was concerning the present site and whether these Indians would rather be congregated either on the San Marcos or the Guadalupe, or in some other place more acceptable to them. He was to carry out the proposed investigation as soon as possible and to make the corresponding report, in order that the viceregal authorities might be able to decide whether the Presidio de San Luis de las Amarillas was to be maintained at San Sabá or moved to a more favorable locality.

In order that proper safety might be insured, all vacancies occasioned by the recent attack of the Indians and by subsequent desertions should be filled and the garrison brought to its full strength.

At the same time Parrilla was to call a *Junta* in San Antonio of the Governors of Coahuila and Texas and the commanders of the neighboring presidios. The date should be fixed at such a time as to permit the arrival of the different officials. The deliberations of the *Junta* regarding the proposed campaign should not be prolonged, and a decision should be

<sup>9</sup>Junta de Guerra y Hacienda, June 15-27, 1758. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 139-146.

<sup>10</sup>Decreto del Virrey, June 27, 1758. *Ibid.*, 146-147.

reached as soon as possible in order that the members might return to their posts without loss of time.

The *Junta* was enjoined to determine as far as was possible the nations to be attacked, their character, and the arms which they were in the habit of using. It was to estimate the distance to the country of the enemy, to suggest the best time in which to undertake the campaign, to calculate the number of Spanish troops and Indian allies that would be required, and the amount of munitions, arms, supplies, and horses that would be needed.

As soon as the *Junta* had completed its deliberations, Parrilla was to make a full and detailed report on the plans and needs of the proposed campaign, particularly of the estimated costs. With this information, viceregal officials would be able to authorize the campaign at an early date.<sup>11</sup>

*Attitude of the Apaches towards San Sabá.* The instructions of the viceroy reached Parrilla early in August. The diligent commander replied on the 11th of this month acknowledging receipt and explaining that he would carry them out without delay. He had at this time already requested the Governors of Texas and Coahuila and the commanders of the neighboring presidios to meet with him in San Antonio on October 4.

He could not report the attitude of the Apaches now, because ever since the destruction of the mission in March no Indians had been living at San Sabá. Small bands came from time to time to the presidio while on their way to or from buffalo hunts and raiding expeditions. They lingered for only a few days and departed, fearful lest the Comanches should surprise them. There were good reasons for their fears, Parrilla assured the viceroy. Only a few weeks before, a group of Apaches were ambushed by a considerable force of northern Indians, who lay in wait for them a short distance from the presidio. More than fifty were killed and only a few managed to escape. Ever since the attack bands of northern Indians had been seen boldly prowling in the vicinity, and on more than one occasion had come within sight of the presidio to taunt the discouraged garrison.

Under the circumstances, the commander expressed some fear that in the meantime he might not be able to hold his post without additional men until the campaign was undertaken. He took occasion, therefore, to

<sup>11</sup>Instrucciones, July 5, 1758. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 148-152.

make a formal request for thirty soldiers to be added to the garrison of the Presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas.<sup>12</sup>

Not until October 17 did Parrilla have an opportunity to obtain an official statement from the Apaches concerning their attitude towards San Sabá. On this date, while in San Antonio awaiting the arrival of the officers summoned to the special *Junta*, Chief Tacú, meaning in the Apache language Shorty, paid a visit to the commander. Parrilla called Fathers Fray José López, Fray Francisco Aparicio, and Fray Mariano de los Dolores, and in their presence questioned the chief through an interpreter. Tacú declared that the Apaches were ready to congregate as soon as the campaign, which they were undertaking against their enemies, freed them of the danger of future attacks. In the meantime, his people had chosen to have no fixed habitat in order to avoid a surprise by the enemy. It was for this reason, the chief assured Parrilla, that his people had not come to stay at San Sabá. When told that the Spaniards were also planning a campaign to punish the northern tribes, Chief Tacú evinced great joy and gladly offered to take part with all his people as allies.<sup>13</sup>

Shortly after the declaration of Chief Tacú, Fray Mariano de los Dolores testified concerning the character and faithlessness of the Apaches. The experienced and aged missionary, who had once defended the Apaches so stoutly, had now become completely disillusioned. He declared that no faith could be placed in their promises. Under the guise of friendship they had almost ruined the entire frontier by exacting gifts, demanding good treatment, and shamelessly stealing whatever and whenever they wanted. They now constituted the most serious menace to Spanish interests in Texas. They had come and gone freely into every settlement, mission, and presidio during the last ten years. The result was that they knew the resources and the strength of every post and could lead a surprise attack that might prove fatal.

It was his opinion and that of every missionary in San Antonio, that after the formal campaign was brought to a close, the Apaches should be made to fulfill their promises. There should be no more temporizing. A formal request, that they be reduced to mission life, should be made to their chiefs and a time limit set for their reduction. If they did not comply with the request within the time stipulated, they should be considered enemies of the Spaniards and treated as such.

<sup>12</sup>Diego Ortiz arrilla to the Viceroy, August 11, 1758. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 164-168.

<sup>13</sup>Declaration of Chief Tacú, October 17, 1758. In *ibid.*, pp. 201-213.

Wisely, these men of God observed that if by any chance the Apaches should make peace with the Comanches and the northern tribes, the combined forces of this savage enemy, supplied with arms and ammunition by the unscrupulous French traders, would completely annihilate the Spanish settlers and drive out every soldier in the province. The hostile natives far outnumbered the Spanish forces and the mission Indians in Texas. The more widespread use of firearms by the natives placed the entire province at their mercy.

Thoroughly in sympathy with the proposed campaign against the northern tribes, the missionaries suggested at this time that it would be necessary to leave a competent force in all the presidios and missions to protect them from surprise attacks by roving bands while the campaign was in progress. They openly hinted that the Apaches themselves, aware of the weakened condition of the settlement, might take advantage of the circumstances to commit grave and serious depredations. The statement was signed by Fathers Fray Mariano Francisco de los Dolores, Fray Francisco Aparico, Fray Acisclos Valverde, Fray José Ignacio María Alegre, Fray José López, Fray Pedro Parras, Fray Bartolomé García, and Fray José Guadalupe Alcivia, and represented the opinion of all the missionaries in San Antonio at this time.<sup>14</sup>

*French activity among the northern Indians.* The fears of the *Padres* were not entirely unfounded. The French cannot escape the responsibility of supplying the natives with firearms. In fact, there are indications that if some of them did not actually take part in the sacrilegious murders at San Sabá, they did obtain some of the spoils from the sacked missions. The commander at Natchitoches, César Le Blanc, wrote to the Governor of Texas on August 19, 1758, to inform him that on the day before the sergeant from the Presidio of Saint Louis de Kerlerec had brought Messrs. Saint Quentin and Cronier as prisoners. These two traders had gone to the Tawakoni villages on the Cadodachos River (the Red) and there had engaged in trade with the natives. They brought back a number of articles that belonged to the recently destroyed Mission of San Sabá, which they claimed they had obtained at great risk. Le Blanc informed the governor that he was ready to return these objects, but that he would expect the Spaniards to make some sort of recompense to the traders for their pains in obtaining them.

Fortunately, the careful commander of Natchitoches sent a copy of

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<sup>14</sup>A. G. I., *Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 217-224.



the official declaration of Saint Quentin to the Governor of Texas. This Frenchman declared that over a year ago he had set out from the French post on the Arkansas for Natchitoches with a modest supply of merchandise to trade. On the way he had visited the village of the Tawakoni. He explained that there was no other way to go from Arkansas to Natchitoches. On September 23, 1757, he received a letter from Governor Kerlerec, while in Natchitoches, with instructions to deliver it to the commander at the post on the Arkansas. But he had been unable to leave Natchitoches on his return trip until February 4, 1758, at which time M. Le Blanc gave him a passport.

From this point the chronology of the movements of Saint Quentin is not given. He emphatically states that on his return trip he was not engaged in trading. But he goes on to say that when he arrived in the *pueblo* of the Tawakonis, he found the Indians celebrating a victory in a wild orgy of dancing. As soon as they saw him, he declares, they seized all his goods—strange, if he was not on a trading expedition,—and gave him in exchange some partly soiled and partly burned pieces of silk goods, some gold and silver braid, a chalice, two silver cases for stocks of sacred oils, two patens and three plates of some metal which he did not know. He also received three silver forks.

He added that he had been told by the Tawakonis that the Taovayas had many articles of solid silver in their village a short distance up the river. The Indians explained that the Taovayas had accompanied them and, being very numerous, had obtained the major part of the spoils.

He declared, furthermore, that he had learned of the recent destruction of San Sabá from the Indians. He actually saw in the village a number of scalps around which they were dancing, and he noticed an Indian wearing a part of the habit of one of the murdered missionaries. He said that these things had made him fear for his life and had forced him to accept what they had given him. But the goods they had taken from him were worth more than what he received.<sup>15</sup>

That the Indians had a good espionage service is shown by the fact that Saint Quentin declared that the Tawakonis were aware of the proposed campaign against the northern tribes. They had dispatched scouts to keep them apprised of the movements of the Spaniards and to warn them of their approach. Furthermore, they told the French trader that they were expecting a band of Taovayas and Nasonis to join them in August to make a new raid upon the Spaniards in the fall. Chief Cuello

<sup>15</sup>César Le Blanc to the Governor of Texas, August 10, 1758. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 265-269.


Gordo (Thick Neck) said that in the attack on San Sabá, the northern tribes had not started the fighting. He blamed the Spanish guards on the stockade for firing the first shots.<sup>16</sup>

*French disclaim responsibility for Indian hostility.* In an official communication to the Governor of Texas a few days later, Le Blanc emphatically denied the charge that the French were to blame for the attack on San Sabá or for inciting the northern tribes to harass the Spanish frontier posts. Such accusations and suspicions were unfounded and constituted a rank calumny. In support of the good will and coöperation which the French had always evinced, he recalled the Blancpain incident. His refusal to incite the Bidais and Attacapas to attack the small Spanish party that had arrested him had prevented the shedding of Spanish blood. He explained that a few days after the arrest of Blancpain, a group of Indians had come to him and offered to drive the Spaniards from East Texas, but he had dissuaded them from their purpose by telling them that the French and Spaniards were friends.

It was the Spaniards, he declared, who refused to coöperate with the French. He had returned the articles obtained by Saint Quentin at the risk of his life, yet the Spaniards had refused to make any recompense to the Frenchman for the goods he had lost in obtaining the sacred objects. This was not the only instance of lack of coöperation. He cited the case of a soldier named Bontin, a French deserter who had taken refuge at Los Adaes a short time before, carrying with him a number of stolen objects. When the governor was requested to return the deserter and the stolen property to Natchitoches, he had refused to do so. But now the Spaniards were demanding the return of the leaders in the attack on San Sabá. Governor Kerlerec had written him to use his influence with the friendly tribes of the north to obtain this object and he was trying to comply with the request, but it was not in his power to carry out the orders he had received.

*César Le Blanc warns the Spaniards.* He concluded his communication by stating that the Iscanis, Taovayas, Tonkawas, and Comanches were negotiating a treaty and making arrangements to attack the Spaniards, who should beware, for these Indians greatly outnumbered them. Furthermore, he had recently learned that the Asinais had visited the Tawakonis in their village and made a hostile harangue against the Spaniards. It was known that the Tawakonis had been helped by the Nasonis in their

<sup>16</sup>*ibid.*, 268-269.



PRESIDIO SAN LUIS DE LAS AMARILLAS OR SAN SABÁ, GENERAL VIEW AND MAIN GATE. RECONSTRUCTED ON ORIGINAL SITE NEAR MENARD. COURTESY OF MENARD CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.



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attack on San Sabá. It would be well to keep a close watch on the tribes in the vicinity of Los Adaes. Indians, he declared, were like snakes that crouch treacherously in the grass and bite the unsuspecting traveler. They were not brave in open battle, but they constituted a formidable enemy in ambush.<sup>17</sup>

The governor naturally transmitted the correspondence he had received from Le Blanc to Parrilla at San Antonio. By the time it was received, the *Junta* was about to convene. This information greatly increased the fears of the assembled commanders and convinced them of the complicity of the French in the hostility of the northern tribes.

*Activities of the cleric Santiago Disdier.* Years before, when the question of the establishment of a presidio at Orcoquisac was at its height, Governor Barrios y Jáuregui had written a long report to the viceroy concerning this picturesque character, typical of the French adventurer that perturbed the trusting and good-natured Spanish officials along the frontier. In July, 1756, Disdier had appeared in Los Adaes, in the robes of a French cleric, claiming he had lost his way. He solicited the protection of the viceroy and was welcomed for a time by the governor. Little by little the story of his stormy and eventful career leaked out. He had not been lost but had come expressly to Los Adaes as the secret agent of Monsieur Masse, who had a plantation near the mouth of the Sabine. He had lived for several years in New Orleans and in Natchitoches but the insistence of his numerous creditors had forced him to take refuge with M. Masse. He seems, however, to have been unable to get along with anybody for any length of time and he soon fell out with his latest protector.

Before coming to Louisiana he had been a prebendary in France, Carthusian chaplain of a regiment, and a parish priest in Guarico. He had entered the Jesuit order, but after a short time, he had abandoned his studies and had gone to New Orleans where he opened a collegiate seminary. The success of the school was short-lived. The parents soon withdrew their children from the new academy, because of the quick and irrational temper of the schoolmaster.

He had proposed to the predecessor of Governor Kerlerec to open a new communication between Natchitoches and Santa Fé. It seems that he spent several months in this daring enterprise and perhaps traveled a good part of the way to the coveted Spanish emporium. At any rate,

<sup>17</sup>César Le Blanc to the Governor of Texas, August 16, 1758. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 257-265.

he claimed that he had gone to Santa Fé and returned in seven months. But on his return the former governor had been replaced by Kerlerec, who developed a deep dislike for the enterprising cleric and refused to pay him for the expenses he had incurred in the alleged exploration. It was this incident, the failure of his school, and the insistence of his creditors that had driven him once more to the wilds to take refuge with M. Masse and hence to throw himself upon the mercy of the viceroy of New Spain by presenting himself to the governor at Los Adaes. For two months he was actually engaged by Barrios y Jáuregui as tutor to his children.

While at Los Adaes, he appears to have made occasional visits to Natchitoches. Ever ready for new adventures, he soon tired of the monotonous life of the frontier outpost and solicited a permit from Governor Barrios y Jáuregui to go to Zacatecas. He said he wanted to visit the College of Our Lady of Guadalupe and join the Franciscan order. The governor was too busy at this time with the Orcoquisac affair to give much attention to the importunities of the restless and enterprising Frenchman, whose sincerity he had begun to doubt. While the governor was away, Disdier appealed to the missionaries in Los Adaes for a letter to the Guardian of the College. The good friars, more credulous than the governor, gladly gave it to him. When the governor returned from Orcoquisac, Disdier was gone. But before he set out for the interior of Mexico, he wrote a letter to De Mézières, explaining to him that it was his intention to penetrate the country to Mexico City and eventually to go back to France to report his experiences in New Spain.

The governor now warned the viceroy and advised that he inform the commanders along the frontier to be on the lookout for the adventurous Frenchman and to arrest him on sight. Barrios y Jáuregui characterized him as quick of wit, pleasant in conversation, a man of much ready knowledge and of versatile attainments. He declared that he was cunning in the extreme and very fond of novelty and change.<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately, nothing more was ever heard of the restless French cleric, and his ultimate end will, perhaps, never be known.

*Deliberations of the Junta of San Antonio, January 3-30, 1759.* But let us return to Parrilla and the *Junta* called to consider the plans and needs of the proposed campaign to punish the northern tribes that had desecrated the Mission of San Sabá. Although called by Parrilla for

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<sup>18</sup>Governor Barrios y Jáuregui to the Viceroy, June 16, 1757. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 80-83.

October 4, various circumstances, chiefly the weather and the impassability of the roads, prevented the various officers summoned from reaching San Antonio until the end of the year. When the *Junta* finally met on January 3, 1759, Jacinto Barrios y Jáuregui presided, because of his rank as Governor of the Province of Texas. Among those present were Angel Martos y Navarrete, Governor of Coahuila; Colonel Diego Ortiz Parrilla, commander of the Presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas; Captain Manuel Rodríguez of the Presidio of San Juan Bautista del Río Grande; Captain Manuel Ramírez de la Piscina, of the Presidio of Nuestra Señora de Loreto of La Bahía; Lieutenant José de Eca y Músqiz, of San Luis de las Amarillas; and Joseph de Castillo y Terán, of the Presidio of Monclova. The first question to be considered was the number of troops that would be required for a formal campaign against the northern tribes. After much discussion it was agreed that a total of not less than five hundred men was necessary to insure the success of the enterprise. This number was to include presidial soldiers, volunteer militiamen, Tlaxcalteca Indians, and mission Indians.

In the opinion of the *Junta* the campaign should be directed against the Tawakonis, Tonkawas, Wichitas, Taovayas, and Iscanis who, it had been reasonably established, were responsible for the attack which resulted in the destruction of the Mission of San Sabá, the death of two missionaries, and the loss of several Spanish lives. The Comanches had also taken part in the sacrilegious attack, but their country was far distant and unknown. These Indians were said to be very numerous and their fixed habitat was a matter of conjecture. Under the circumstances it would be unwise to attempt at this time to carry the campaign into their country. If their known allies in Texas were duly chastised, this would serve as an example that should restrain them in the future.

It was decided that the best time for the undertaking of the proposed punitive expedition would be in June. Although at this time of the year most of the rivers in Texas were at flood stage, the expedition could be provided with portable bridges or other suitable means to enable them to cross the streams. The chief advantage of setting out at this time was that the fields were then covered with good grass. This would obviate the necessity of carrying forage for the horses and stock.

In discussing the nature and character of the enemy to be attacked, the *Junta* explained that these nations had congregated recently in the upper Sabine River. On this stream they had regular villages, similar to those of the Neches and Nasonis in the vicinity of Nacogdoches. They planted corn and vegetables, raised horses, and lived in their pueblos

most of the year, except during the hunting season, when they followed the herds of buffalo over the plains. They had no other allies to the north of their villages than the numerous and roaming Comanches who lived far away.

Next the *Junta* took up the question of whether the Apaches should be invited to take part in the proposed campaign. In order to justify their conclusions on this subject, the *Junta* made an interesting report on the nature and character of these Indians. They explained that there were several nations to whom this general appellation was applied, who were distinct in themselves and lived in different areas. There were the Julimes, the Mescaleros, the Natages, the Jatacosas, the Jumanos, and the Lipans. Only the last group named were in fact the friends of the Spaniards. Although these nations occasionally united to fight a common enemy, they were in reality separate and distinct groups with their own tribal organization, living in widely separated areas. In November, 1758, most of them had joined in a general campaign against the Comanches, their common and inveterate enemies, but their combined effort had been unsuccessful.

It was necessary to keep in mind, therefore, that while the punitive expedition being planned marched in pursuit of the northern tribes, the other Apache groups, who were not friendly to the Spaniards, might attack the Spanish settlements and missions not only in Texas but in the neighboring provinces, aware that their defence had been weakened. It was highly important to make provision to reënforce the garrisons in Coahuila and Texas with volunteers from among the settlers in order to afford them proper protection while the campaign was in progress.

The *Junta* took occasion to urge in the strongest terms the restoration of the garrison of San Antonio to its former strength of forty-four men. The Presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas also needed to be increased by forty soldiers, while the garrison at La Bahía and Los Adaes deserved to be equally strengthened to safeguard the integrity of the frontier. Governor Martos y Navarrete of Coahuila presented at this time a special plan for the reorganization of the entire line of presidios in Coahuila and urged the importance of increasing their garrisons to check the growing boldness of the Indians of the north. There can be little doubt that local influence was in part responsible for the strong plea in favor of the garrison of San Antonio, while the interests of the various commanders assembled, who always profited in proportion to the size of the garrisons of their respective posts, induced the request for more troops. Nevertheless, the alarming reports brought by Governor Barrios y Jáuregui concerning



the activity of the French and the designs of the northern tribes, against whose treachery and cunning Le Blanc had warned, were legitimate reasons for the earnest request to reorganize and strengthen the entire frontier of Texas and the adjoining provinces. But it was not to be until after the inspection of the Marqués de Rubí.

Although Chief Tacú had gladly and spontaneously offered to join the expedition, the *Junta* was of the opinion that the Lipan Apaches should not be encouraged, much less invited formally to accompany the Spaniards in the proposed expedition. To ask them to join the Spanish forces would be tantamount to placing them on a footing of equality in a fight against their mortal enemies. This would increase their pride, making them feel that the Spaniards had to depend on them to fight the northern tribes. There was one other consideration. If asked to accompany the Spaniards, they would very likely flock to the campaign in such numbers that they would constitute a real problem in feeding the throng and in maintaining discipline. It would be best to hire about twenty-five Apaches to serve as guides and scouts, since they were well acquainted with the country to the north, and to allow no others to go.

The *Junta* proceeded to outline the general policy that should be henceforth observed in regard to the Lipan Apaches. As the missionaries had pointed out, these Indians had been soliciting missions for eight years, yet when given an opportunity to join a mission, they always had some excuse to put off formal reduction. Little wonder that the *Padres* had come to despair of their conversion. It would be well to wait until the end of the proposed campaign. Immediately thereafter, notice should be served upon them and a limit set for their formal reduction to mission life. If they failed to comply this time they should be treated as enemies and made to feel the weight of Spanish might. It was high time to put a stop to their insolence and their treachery practiced under the guise of friendship.<sup>19</sup>

*Troops and equipment requested.* The *Junta* estimated that a total of six hundred twelve men would be required for the campaign. Not since the days of the Aguayo expedition to drive the French out of Texas had plans been made on such a scale. Of this number five hundred were to be used in the campaign against the enemy and one hundred twelve to garrison the outposts left behind to prevent a possible surprise by the treacherous Apaches. A detailed list of the men to be contributed by the

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<sup>19</sup>Junta de San Antonio, January 3-30, 1759. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 273-293; *Arriévita, Crónica*, 280-281.

different towns and frontier establishments was prepared. It was suggested that San Sabá furnish five officers, forty-five soldiers, and fifty Indians; San Antonio, ten soldiers and fifty mission Indians; La Bahía, one officer, nineteen soldiers, and fifty Indians; San Francisco de Monclova one officer, eleven soldiers, twenty-five militiamen, ten Tlaxcaltecas, and five mission Indians; Santa Rosa in Coahuila, twenty-five soldiers, and ten militiamen; San Juan Bautista del Río Grande, twelve soldiers, six militiamen, twenty Indians; Peyotes mission, five Indians; San Francisco de Vizarron, five Indians; San Barnardino de la Candela, forty-nine soldiers, forty-one militiamen, ten Tlaxcalteca Indians, and thirty-five mission Indians; San Fernando de Austria two soldiers and two militiamen; San Pedro de Gígedo ten Tlaxcalteca Indians; the Haciendas del Alamo, Cantatores, Cienegas, and Sardinias four militiamen each; Nuevo Reyno de León, one hundred men; Colonia del Nuevo Santander, twenty-five men; Saltillo twenty-five men; Nueva Vizcaya fifty men; San Luis and Charcas, eighty-two men. A list of the supplies needed and of the amounts to be paid to the soldiers, the militiamen, and the Indian auxiliaries, was likewise prepared, based on a four months' campaign. The total cost as estimated was approximately fifty-nine thousand *pesos*.<sup>20</sup>

*Fear of renewal of Indian attack.* While the *Junta* was deliberating on the ways and means for the proposed campaign, disquieting rumors of a new attack by the northern Indians on San Sabá and San Antonio were rife. On January 12, 1759, a messenger arrived from East Texas, sent by Father Fray José de Calahorra y Sáenz, who wrote to the governor to inform him of what he had just learned while visiting among the Indians in the vicinity of Los Adaes and Nacogdoches. Called to minister to the natives who were sorely afflicted by a raging epidemic of measles and smallpox, he learned that the Indians were planning to make a new and more determined effort to destroy San Sabá and San Antonio early in the spring. The Tawakonis, Tonkawas, and Wichitas were to be joined by the Tejas in the proposed attack. Encouraged by the success of the previous year, the natives hoped to drive every Spaniard out of Texas. The good *Padre* had been told by loyal Indians on their deathbed to abandon his mission before the spring because it was planned to kill all the Spaniards and the friars when the victorious raiders returned from San Antonio. But Father Calahorra assured the governor in his letter

<sup>20</sup>Testimonio de los auttos formados sobre la cuenta de cargo, datta, qe. da el Coronel Don Diego Ortiz Parrilla . . . *A. G. I., Audiencia de México, 92-6-22* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 5.

that he would not abandon his post regardless of the consequences. Fully aware of the danger, however, he closed his report by saying "we may die here like sheep."<sup>21</sup>

Almost at the same time there came a messenger from Lieutenant Juan Cortinas, who had been left in command of San Sabá by Colonel Ortiz Parrilla. He sent word to his superior that friendly Indians who had visited the presidio had told him to beware, because the northern tribes would soon sweep down to finish razing the fort to the ground. He added that marauding bands had been seen in the vicinity and he urgently pleaded that reinforcements be sent.

The fears of Father Calahorra and Lieutenant Cortinas were confirmed by the warning sent by César Le Blanc from Natchitoches to Father Fray Joseph Abad in charge of Mission Dolores. The French commander advised the good missionary to take refuge in the Presidio of Los Adaes because an attack was being planned by hostile Indians. Fray Abad forwarded the warning to Fathers Tello and Vallejo, who sent the information on to San Antonio.<sup>22</sup>

Governor Jacinto Barrios y Jáuregui, who was presiding over the *Junta* in San Antonio, presented the information he had received concerning the immediate danger that threatened San Antonio and San Sabá. The plans for the proposed campaign were temporarily dropped. In view of the circumstances the *Junta* penned an urgent request to Governor Juan Manuel Muños de Villavicencio of Nuevo Reyno de León for one hundred men to be sent to San Antonio without delay. The *Junta* declared that the aid solicited was indispensable to prevent the complete destruction of San Antonio and San Sabá. Copies of the letters of Father Calahorra, Le Blanc, and Cortinas were sent with the request, which was signed by Governor Barrios, Colonel Parrilla, Governor Martos y Navarrete, Captains Manuel Rodríguez and Manuel Ramírez de La Piscina, and Eca y Múquiz.

The call for aid was sent immediately by special messenger. The Governor of Nuevo León replied on January 27, 1759, stating that he had given instructions on that day to Sergeant Major Antonio de Urresti to raise the hundred men requested in Monterrey and proceed to San Antonio without delay. But when Urresti received the order from the

<sup>21</sup>A. G. I., *Audiencia de México*, 1763 (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 271-272.

<sup>22</sup>A. G. I., *Audiencia de México*, 1763 (Cunningham Transcripts), pt. 2, pp. 271-273. At this time Chief Chico was surprised by a band of Comanches on the Florido while hunting buffalo. Arricivita, *op. cit.*, pp. 378-379.

governor he was informed by the Cabildo of Monterrey that the citizens had been called upon to render aid so frequently to the struggling settlers of Coahuila and Nuevo Santander that they were unable to furnish one hundred men at this time.<sup>23</sup>

*Second attack on San Sabá.* The *Junta* completed its deliberations on January 30, 1759, and made their report to the viceroy. Colonel Parrilla immediately returned to San Sabá to prepare for the impending attack. All of February the garrison busied itself reënforcing the defences of the presidio. The lack of forage caused the commander to send the horses and cattle of the presidio to range some distance below the fort. From time to time a wandering band of Indians would stop to trade for a few days. When invited to stay permanently and to enter mission life, they invariably made excuses and moved on. As in the previous year, there was an ominous calm and a cloud of apprehension seemed to hang suspended over the garrison.

Shortly after sunrise on March 30, 1759, a soldier arrived in the presidio hatless and out of breath. He had ridden hard from the presidial ranch to call for aid. Early that morning a large horde of hostile Indians, all armed with firearms and well mounted, had surprised the guard at the ranch. In vain did the sergeant and nineteen soldiers attempt to repel the attack. When the hurried reënforcements, rushed to relieve them, arrived at the ranch, they found only the desecrated remains of their companions, who had bravely given up their lives in the performance of their duty. Scattered over the ground lay the naked forms savagely cut to pieces. In the distance, against the surrounding hills, the rear guard of the enemy was discernible, retiring in good order and driving before them all the horses, cattle and mules of the presidio. The small rescue party for a moment considered rushing the enemy in an effort to recover the stolen horses and cattle and of avenging their unfortunate companions, but it was realized that the enemy far outnumbered the little band and that to attack them would only imperil the lives of the party with no hope of success.

The condition of the presidio after the surprise attack of the Indians on the ranch was truly discouraging. The cattle taken by the Indians represented the bulk of the food supply. The garrison had only twenty horses left. This meant they would have to confine their activities to

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<sup>23</sup>Governor Barrios to Governor Muñoz, January 15, 1759; Governor Muñoz to Urresti, January 27, 1759; Urresti to Governor Muñoz, January 29. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México* (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 177-181.

the presidio. At this very time a train of sixty mules was on the road, loaded with supplies for the soldiers and their families. The commander had received information that the train had left San Antonio before the attack. The northern Indians, who had just taken the cattle and horses from the presidio ranch, might likewise surprise the supply train before it reached its destination. Such a contingency would be fatal to the garrison and the inmates of San Sabá. Parrilla sent an urgent request to Governor Martos y Navarrete that if the troops from Nuevo León had arrived in San Antonio a strong detachment should be sent to overtake the train of supplies and to escort it safely to the presidio. That same day he wrote also to the viceroy, deploring the plight in which he found himself as a result of the surprise attack of the northern Indians. He pointed out that the attack had been executed by the same Indians almost a year to the day from the time of the destruction of the Mission of San Sabá. He explained to the viceroy that the train of mules with supplies had set out from San Antonio six days before and was not far from its goal now. The enemy Indians were only five leagues away and were leisurely celebrating a huge funeral wail to honor their dead. Scouts had reported that there were many tribes, all well armed. Parrilla lamented his inability because of the lack of horses to attack the marauders in order to recover all or part of the stolen property and to scatter them.<sup>24</sup>

Governor Martos y Navarrete, who was still in San Antonio awaiting the decision of the viceroy in regard to the proposed campaign against the northern tribes, took occasion to write a long letter to the viceroy in which the precarious condition of the entire province is eloquently revealed. He explained that he was powerless to give any aid whatsoever to the besieged garrison of San Sabá. Of the personal guard that had accompanied him to San Antonio from Los Adaes, he had been obliged to furnish an escort to Governor Jacinto Barrios y Jáuregui when he departed for Coahuila. These soldiers had just returned but their horses were completely exhausted. From the few men remaining he had just recently detailed five to escort a train of thirty-six mules sent to Orcoquisac with a supply of corn for that post. The grain had been urgently requested since December. He had furthermore detailed ten men to secure two hundred horses which he intended to take back to Los Adaes on his return. At the present time he had a guard of only ten men at his disposal in addition to the reduced and ineffective garrison of San Antonio.

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<sup>24</sup>Col. Ortiz Parrilla to Governor Martos y Navarrete, March 30, 1759; Ortiz Parrilla to the Viceroy, same date. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 4, pp. 14-19.

In view of the circumstances he had pleaded with the missionaries to allow two soldiers and four Indians from each of the five missions to go to Parrilla's aid, taking as many horses for the garrison as could be spared. While admitting the deplorable plight of San Sabá, the missionaries wisely observed that San Antonio should not be left entirely unprotected. The Indians who had attacked San Sabá might attempt to surprise San Antonio as they had boldly declared was their intention.

Governor Martos y Navarrete concluded with a note of warning. The failure of the Spaniards to afford adequate protection to the Lipan Apaches at San Sabá might cause these Indians to make peace with the Comanches. Such an alliance would result in the inevitable loss of the entire province of Texas to the natives. It was imperative that the hostile tribes from the north be driven from San Sabá and followed into their own territory to restore the prestige of Spanish arms. Their success the previous year and the failure of the Spaniards to inflict exemplary punishment upon the transgressors had emboldened the natives to repeat the attack.

After the destruction of the Mission of San Sabá, a special supply of arms and ammunition was sent from Mexico in April, 1758. But these goods did not arrive in San Antonio, the governor declared, until January, 1759. For some unexplainable reason the train that brought the arms did not bring any powder or lead. The result was a shortage at this time of ammunition. Even the missions, where care was generally taken to keep a reserve supply on hand, were out of powder at this time. The need of horses for the soldiers was as urgent as that of powder. Without mounts the garrison was powerless to take the offensive against the Indians and was severely handicapped in repelling attacks.

The governor pleaded for the increase of the garrison of San Antonio. The twenty-two men, fifteen of whom were employed constantly as mission guards, were woefully inadequate to protect this important post or render aid to the other presidios in Texas. He also expressed deep concern over the safety of the annual train of supplies for the Zacatecan missions which had passed on its way east in the fall. Generally the train returned in December, but it was now April and nothing had been heard of it.<sup>25</sup>

*Approval of the proposed campaign.* Although the report and recommendations of the *Junta* held in San Antonio had been sent to the viceroy at the close of January, it seems they did not reach Mexico City until

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<sup>25</sup>Governor Martos y Navarrete to the Viceroy, April 3, 1759. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 4, pp. 10-14.

March 18, 1759. The viceroy immediately referred them to the *Fiscal* and the *Auditor*. The first of these officials reported favorably on March 23, and the second recommended the approval of the plan submitted by the *Junta* on March 25. While agreeing in general with the plan outlined, the two advisers raised questions as to how the undertaking could be financed. But they both were emphatic on the necessity of doing something to curb the growing pride and boldness of the savage Indians of the north. The viceroy himself was hesitant to authorize so vast and expensive an expedition. He was fully convinced, however, of the imperative need of chastising severely the impudence of the northern tribes in order to restore the prestige of Spanish arms. To confirm his own conviction he decided to consult the dean of the *Audiencia*, the experienced and capable *Oidor* Don Francisco Antonio de Echavarri to whom he now submitted all the documents. The learned and judicious *Oidor* was in complete accord with the recommendations of the trusted advisers of the viceroy and wholeheartedly urged, on March 30, 1759, the immediate adoption of measures that would humble the pride of the emboldened natives. His recommendation would have been much stronger had he known that on that very day the same daring tribes of the north had committed fresh depredations on San Sabá in far-away Texas.

Satisfied with the opinions rendered to him, the viceroy formally authorized the officers of the treasury on March 31, to pay eight thousand *pesos* to Diego Giraud and forty-three thousand three hundred forty-two *pesos* to José González Calderón, agents of the governors of Coahuila and Texas respectively. At the same time he issued instructions that orders be dispatched at once to the different governors, commanders, and officers who were to contribute with quotas of men and supplies for the proposed campaign. The formal decree authorizing the expedition and naming Colonel Diego Ortiz Parrilla, its leader, was issued on April 1, 1759, at Cuatitlan, a suburb of Mexico City.<sup>26</sup> Whatever misgivings the viceroy may have had in authorizing the expedition were removed shortly after, when the decree of the king of March 29 of the same year arrived, approving in principle the proposed campaign, which had been recommended by the *Junta de Guerra y Hacienda* as early as June 27, 1758. The king recommended that the campaign be carried out with the greatest caution and care in order not to run the risk, should the undertaking fail,

<sup>26</sup>Dictamen del Fiscal y auditor y del oidor decano, March 23, 25, 30, 1759; Decreto del Virrey, April 1, 1759. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 2, pp. 276-293, 302-318.

"of increasing the audacity of the savages, since it was not well to acquaint or familiarize them with the art of war."<sup>27</sup>

*Preparations for the campaign.* It took the secretary of the viceroy four days to issue all the orders and instructions to the different officers and commanders who were to coöperate in the raising of troops and the supplies necessary for the campaign. Not until May 11, 1759, however, did Colonel Parrilla receive notice of the decision reached by the viceroy. At that time he was still being threatened by the hostile bands of Indians that had remained in the vicinity of San Sabá, waiting for an opportunity to surprise the garrison. Try as he would, he was unable to set out for San Antonio, as ordered, to take charge of the organization of the expedition, until the end of the month.

It had been the intention of Parrilla to start the campaign in June. Upon his arrival in San Antonio he found that not a single man had come. As late as July 15, 1759, he wrote the viceroy that he was making every effort to complete the arrangements for the campaign, but that he had little hope of being able to set out before August 1. Even at that time several of the contingents had not arrived. This enforced delay jeopardized the success of the expedition. He explained that the Indians that attacked San Sabá on March 30 had remained in sight of the presidio for three days and had then retired leisurely to the Brazos. The lack of horses had prevented him from pursuing them. Since then he had learned that the friendly natives that came and went to San Sabá and San Antonio had informed the northern tribes of the proposed campaign and the preparations that were being made to punish them. Aware of their perfidy and the just resentment of the Spaniards, the northern tribes had retired to their country and it was said they were making preparations to resist the attack. Parrilla had learned these facts from eight Bidais and two Orcoquisacs. He deplored the impossibility of keeping the preparations for the expedition as secret as was desired with so many Indians frequenting the Spanish outposts.<sup>28</sup>

The first men to arrive were those from Nuevo Santander. But by the middle of August a formidable array had been gathered in the peaceful city of San Antonio which now bustled with martial activity. There were

<sup>27</sup>Castañeda, *Morfi's History of Texas*, Vol. 2, pp. 388-389. Morfi wisely remarks that the recommendation would have been fine, if the Indians had not been already more experienced and skilled in the methods of modern warfare than the Spanish soldiers themselves.

<sup>28</sup>Colonel Ortiz Parrilla to the Viceroy, July 15, 1759. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 4, pp. 221-223.



twenty-five men from Nuevo Santander, fifty from San Luis Potosí, thirty-two from Charcas, one hundred from Nuevo León, and fifty from Coahuila, in addition to the contingents from the various presidios of Texas. The Indian auxiliaries consisted of forty-three from Coahuila, ten from Mission Concepción furnished by Fray Francisco Aparicio, ten from Mission San Juan furnished by Fray José Ignacio María Alegre, two from San Francisco de la Espada Mission furnished by Fray Acisclos Valverde, ten from San José Mission furnished by Fray Pedro Ramírez, and eighteen from San Antonio de Valero Mission furnished by Fray Mariano de los Dolores, besides one hundred thirty Apaches. The troops from Nuevo Santander were commanded by Captain Ildefonso de la Garza of Camargo, those from San Luis Potosí by Captain Juan Angel de Oyarzán, those from Charcas by Captain Francisco Espinosa de los Monteros, and those from Nuevo León by José Elías de la Garza Falcón. Two religious accompanied the troops, Fray Tomás Arcayos of the College of Querétaro, who went as chaplain, and Fray Santiago Peláez, of the Order of San Juan de Dios, who went as surgeon.

By dint of great exertions over fifteen hundred horses and several hundred mules had been secured as mounts and beasts of burden for the transportation of the equipment and supplies. Most of the meat for the expedition consisted of dry beef. The driving of cattle had been deemed unadvisable in view of the need of traveling as rapidly as possible in order to surprise the enemy. A good supply of corn, flour, and beans had also been gathered.

When Parrilla reviewed his troops in San Antonio before starting for San Sabá, he had about three hundred sixty presidial soldiers and volunteers, one hundred seventy-six Indian allies, over fifteen hundred horses, several hundred mules, and an adequate supply of dry beef, flour, corn, and beans.<sup>29</sup>

*Parrilla's march against the northern tribes.* Instead of setting out directly from San Antonio, Parrilla led his men first to San Sabá to the Presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas, near present Menard. The start from San Antonio was about the middle of August. After reorganizing his forces, Parrilla seems to have resolutely plunged into the almost

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<sup>29</sup>Testimonio de los auttos formados sobre la cuenta Cargo, Datta, qe dio el Coronel Don Diego Ortiz Parrilla de lo gastado en la Campana . . . 1763. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Cunningham Transcripts), pt. 5, p. 763. For brief accounts of Parrilla's campaign see Castañeda, *Morfi's History of Texas*, Vol. 2, pp. 288-391; Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 88-91; Hackett, *Pichardo's Treatise of the Limits of Louisiana and Texas*, Vol. 2, pp. 233-238.

unknown area, due north and east from present Menard, going at first almost due north and crossing the Concho River in the vicinity of present Paint Rock. Continuing in the same general direction he must have crossed the Colorado slightly below present Ballinger. From here he seems to have inclined more to the east. Although the expedition advanced cautiously to surprise the enemy it could find no signs of Indian life. Repeatedly they came upon tracks of fleeing natives and they passed several villages which had been recently abandoned. Aware of the projected expedition, it seemed as if the Indians had fled northward for safety. The men began to grow weary and to grumble that there was little use of going farther. The enemy had run away and would take good care not to show its face. With pardonable pride Parrilla exclaims: "Anyone less experienced than myself would have given up the chase, but I persevered, disregarding the opinion of the other officers, who, like those whose heart is not in their business, were easily discouraged."<sup>30</sup>

The expedition kept doggedly on, inspired by the determination of the commander. It must have crossed the clear fork of the Brazos near present Fort Griffin. Either beyond this point, or just after the expedition crossed the main stream of the Brazos, in the vicinity of Ebert or New Castle, on October 2, the Spaniards came upon a Tonkawa village where a large number of Indians had congregated while fleeing. The natives seemed to have been unaware of the approach of the expedition. Taken by surprise, they attempted resistance for an hour to allow their women and children to escape. When the Spaniards attacked them in full force they broke and fled. In the encounter fifty-five enemy Indians were killed and one hundred and forty-nine men, women, and children were captured, besides a great many horses and mules. Imagine the surprise of Parrilla when, as he says, he found that "some of the animals recovered had my own brand and had but recently been stolen from San Sabá." The Spaniards suffered no loss in the successful engagement.

The prisoners taken, upon being examined, confessed that they had taken part in the destruction of Mission San Sabá the previous year. Their declarations were fully confirmed when one of the Indians captured showed them a piece of the habit of one of the martyred missionaries, which he carried as a trophy.

At the time of the surprise of the Tonkawa village, the expedition had gone approximately one hundred fifty leagues from Presidio San

<sup>30</sup>Consulta del Coronel Ortiz Parrilla, November 18, 1759. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Mexico*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1761), pp. 228-240.

Luis de las Amarillas, present Menard. The brilliant victory, just obtained without the loss of a single life to the expedition, would have fully justified the return to San Sabá. Perhaps such a course might have been the wisest. Parrilla himself weighed the advisability of abandoning the campaign. Father Morfi, who is bitter against Parrilla and questions his motives in continuing the campaign, says: "Had he been satisfied with this victory and returned home, the campaign would have ended gloriously, the enemy would have been duly chastised, and a healthy fear of similar punishments would have resulted. The arms of the king would have covered themselves with victory, our ranks would have suffered no losses, and the royal treasury would have suffered much less expense."<sup>31</sup>

Whatever motives may be imputed to Parrilla for continuing the campaign, we have his own statement concerning his reason for going farther into the enemy's territory. In his report to the king, he emphatically declared that he chose to go on in search of other places of refuge of the fleeing natives impelled primarily by the desire to explore the land and to inflict a more decisive defeat upon an enemy who had grown in daring and arrogance as a result of the Spaniards' ill-advised generosity.<sup>32</sup>

*A stinging defeat.* Encouraged by the success over the Tonkawa village, the expedition moved on with sanguine hopes of new victories. A few days later, on October 6, Parrilla reached the vicinity of present Spanish Fort, some twelve miles northeast of Ringgold,<sup>33</sup> where the Taovayas had a large *rancheria*. Here, it seems, the natives had gathered from far and near to make a firm stand against their pursuers. Shortly before noon the scouts reported the proximity of the enemy's village. The vanguard advanced to a thicket of timber beyond which the village was located near the river. As they approached the timber, sixty or seventy warriors advanced from the brush and charged the Spaniards. After a short but lively skirmish the Indians broke and fled through the timber. The Spaniards rushed after them. As they came out of the brush on the opposite side they found themselves in a clear and open field that faced not a typical Indian village but a real fortress with a well-built stockade. Hundreds of Indians swarmed upon the stockade armed with rifles. Their

<sup>31</sup>Castañeda, *Morfi's History of Texas*, Vol. 2, p. 390.

<sup>32</sup>Consulta del Coronel Ortiz Parrilla, November 18, 1759. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1761), pp. 228-240.


<sup>33</sup>According to Parrilla's account the Taovaya pueblo was on the river, at the point where a small stream joins the main stream, making a fork. This description fits the vicinity of Spanish Fort, which probably owes its name to the old fortified Indian village. Cf. Bolton, *Texas*, 90.

withering fire checked the onrush of the Spanish cavalry, who wheeled about and quickly gained the refuge of the timber again, leaving three men in the field. They now realized that the retreat of the small band of Indians had been a well-planned ruse.

When the main body of the expedition came up, Parrilla ordered a careful reconnaissance to be made of the enemy's position and their strength. From the vantage point of the protecting timber belt, it was noted with growing astonishment that the Indian village consisted of a large number of cylindrical huts, much higher than the ordinary ones, thatched with straw. The whole *ranchería* was completely surrounded by a stout and well built stockade, which was further defended by a deep moat several yards wide and more than a yard deep, filled with water diverted from the river which flowed behind the village.

"All the Spaniards," declared the witnesses, "plainly saw a large French flag flying within the fort." In addition to their native fifes the Indians had a number of French drums with which they kept up a lively music during the battle. Evidently the residents of the village were not in doubt as to the outcome of the conflict, nor very much disturbed about their safety, for the Spaniards noticed quantities of white linen spread out to dry within the village, while the women and children fought for advantageous seats on top of the houses, from where they could watch the progress of the fight. To the left of the village, extending along the river, there were well cultivated fields where corn, beans, pumpkins, and watermelons were growing. These fields were all fenced and had irrigation ditches. To the right wound the narrow road that led to a side entrance of the fort, not far from the river. This road was also defended by skillfully constructed stockades. Back of the village could be seen the large corrals where the horses and beasts were kept. Farther in the distance were numerous tepees of the Comanche allies, distinguishable by their shape. The observers variously estimated the enemy to be from two to six thousand, but Parrilla, who seems to have been a truthful man, says only that there can be no doubt that they outnumbered the Spaniards considerably. From the prisoners captured a few days before, it was learned that the enemy included Taovayas, Comanches, Tawakonis, Wichitas, and other northern tribes, all having gathered here to check the advance of the Spaniards into their lands.

Parrilla proceeded to organize his entire force and prepared for a combined assault of the enemy's position. The center was formed by seasoned Spanish troops, the right flank was protected by Tlaxcalteca Indians, and the left by the mission Indians and the Apache allies. This



TYPICAL TAOVAYA OR WICHITA INDIAN VILLAGE. REPRODUCED FROM RANDOLPH B. MARCY. *EXPLORATION OF THE RED RIVER OF LOUISIANA IN THE YEAR OF 1832*. THE VILLAGE AT SPANISH FORT WAS SIMILAR.



proved a poor arrangement, because the Indians soon gave way and left the flanks of the main body completely exposed to the impetuous rushes of the infuriated northern tribes. It was almost one o'clock when two small cannon were placed in position and the general assault was ordered. The Indians met the attack with incredible valor and coolness, displaying much skill in repelling it. Swift bands of natives, mounted on excellent horses and armed with rifles charged the advancing column, the men on the stockade kept up a lively fire, while groups of warriors fell vigorously upon the flanks. The Indian braves were followed by footmen who handed them loaded rifles as they were needed. When the horsemen retreated, the footmen closed their ranks and held the ground until a new mounted charge was made.

The Indians were directed and led by an imposing chief in a spotless white uniform mounted on a superb horse. He seemed to be everywhere, encouraging the warriors by his coolness, dexterity, and horsemanship. His figure was easily distinguishable, yet he seemed to have a charmed life, coming out unscathed from the thickest of the fight. He was dressed in spotless white doeskin and over his head he wore a small hat made of the same material, with a crest of horsehair colored a bright red. His horse was dark red with a flowing black mane and tail. Both the rider and the steed seemed inspired by a daring spirit that led them recklessly into the midst of the battle.

Never before had Spanish troops encountered such a stout resistance or such well planned tactics. Confronted by a deadly fire of an enemy who used rifles just as skillfully as themselves, the Spaniards wavered and their allies broke and fled, leaving the flanks exposed. In the ensuing confusion the militia or volunteers began to lose heart and to flee. All efforts of the officers to restrain them proved fruitless. The two cannons were fired eleven times but with little effect. One of them exploded and seriously injured Captain Francisco Espinosa de los Monteros in the leg. When a large group of natives sallied forth along the protected road on the right and began to advance with the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the Spaniards, the attackers became apprehensive and abandoned the assault, leaving the broken cannon and its now silent companion in the open field, while they took refuge in the narrow strip of timber. Fortunately darkness spread its protecting mantle and saved the remainder of the Spanish troops from complete annihilation. During the night the discouraged and amazed Spanish troops saw the bright camp fires in the village of the Taovayas, where the savages danced in triumph. They noticed how the watch on the stockade was not relaxed and how new bands kept

arriving to reënforce them. A council of officers was held that night. It was decided to abandon the camp and start the homeward march early in the morning.

Many were the deeds of daring and of valor performed that day and numerous were the wounds received by the officers. Colonel Parrilla had his horse killed under him. Undaunted, he captured a fleeing steed and returned to the charge. Twice his cuirass was shot and one bullet pierced his left arm before he retired dejected from the field. Captain Manuel Rodríguez, from Presidio of San Juan Bautista, near present Eagle Pass, had a bullet hole in his coat, but fortunately escaped without personal harm. Captain Elías de la Garza Falcón was shot nine times, but the bullets went through his clothes without wounding him. Captain Angel de Oyarzán, from San Luis Potosí, who led the center in the charge, had his horse shot from under him, but escaped bodily harm. Lieutenant Ildefonso de la Garza also had his horse shot. Lieutenant Agustín de Luna was not so fortunate. A bullet struck him in the breast, but did not kill him. Lieutenant Santiago Moneo seems to have been the most fortunate, considering his narrow escapes. One bullet knocked the leather shield from his hand, another left him hatless, a third hit the large pommel of his saddle, and a fourth whizzed through the lapel of his coat. The Spaniards lost fifty-two men, two cannon, and numerous horses. The Indians, it was estimated, had lost about one hundred men. Fortunately for Parrilla, they did not press their advantage on the following day, but permitted the Spaniards to retire in peace.<sup>34</sup>

*The return to San Luis de las Amarillas on the San Sabá.* In the council held the night of October 6, the officers urged the abandonment of the campaign. They remonstrated that the troops were completely discouraged by the determined resistance of the natives and their effective use of firearms. The result was that many had deserted during the battle and that many more were even then running away. The Apache allies, fearful of what might happen to them if they fell into the hands of their enraged enemies, had fled in a body. A new attack might result in the loss of the one hundred forty-nine prisoners taken on October 2. Furthermore there were many men wounded in the camp. A second defeat by the natives would endanger their lives. Another reason why the expedition should start home as soon as possible was the approach of winter. Bad weather would make the retreat extremely difficult. The

<sup>34</sup>Testimonio, October 7, 1759. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1761), pp. 208-228.



volunteers and militiamen had completely lost their morale. They were chiefly tailors, shoemakers, shepherds, cigarette makers and miners, who lacked spirit and discipline.<sup>35</sup>

The request of the officers was seconded by Fray Tomás Arcayos, the chaplain of the expedition, and by Fray Santiago Peláez, the surgeon and doctor of the troops. Both urged Parrilla to abandon the campaign and return to San Sabá.

Parrilla had little or no choice in the matter. The officers and men were discouraged and had made up their minds to return to San Sabá. He himself was wounded in the left arm. Consequently he granted the request of the officers. On October 7, a Mass of Thanksgiving was offered to Nuestra Señora del Rosario for their deliverance, before the discouraged band started the homeward march. They kept for a while close to the timber belt along the river, both to protect themselves and to allow stragglers and deserters, who might have taken refuge in the woods, to join the main body. After the first day, seeing that the Indians had not pursued them, the Spaniards quickened their pace. Their Apache allies were waiting for them at a safe distance. Led by them they seem to have made their way back to San Sabá by a more direct route and at much greater speed than on the way out. By October 25, the expedition had arrived in the Presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas on the San Sabá.

*Results of the campaign.* Upon their return the Spaniards had little to show for their pains. Nearly five hundred men, Spaniards and Indians, had painfully marched almost two hundred leagues northeast of San Sabá to the banks of Red River only to meet with defeat, regardless of the lame explanations for the reverse suffered at the village of the Taovayas. Almost sixty thousand *pesos* had been uselessly spent, and over one thousand horses and mules lost. The only trophy brought back was a miserable group of wretched Indians captured at one village of the Tawakonis. One hundred forty-nine men, women, and children of whom the Apaches had taken ninety-seven and the Spaniards fifty-two. The Apache allies were the only ones who profited. They traded their prisoners to the Spaniards for merchandise. Parrilla explained that those who bought them as house-servants had solemnly sworn to feed and clothe them and to give them instruction in the faith. The Spanish soldiers were not so fortunate with their prisoners. Of the fifty-two

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<sup>35</sup>Petición de los capitanes y oficiales . . . que se levante el Real esta noche del paraxe en que se halla. October 6, 1759. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1761), pp. 203-207.

brought back, twenty-five died shortly after they arrived in San Antonio as the result of a violent epidemic of smallpox and dysentery which broke out among them. This was occasioned no doubt by ill-treatment and poor food. The survivors, however, were sold into practical slavery, the same as those brought by the Apaches.<sup>36</sup> Such practice was strictly against all the laws of the Indies and the repeated admonitions of the viceroy and his advisers.

Thus the campaign failed to chastise the Indians of the north or to impress them with the might of Spanish power, the Apaches still felt no security in the protection offered them by Spanish arms, and the King's treasury paid almost sixty thousand *pesos* to reduce to slavery a wretched group of unfortunate natives. It was a costly enterprise, authorized by the viceroy as a supreme effort to subdue the ever-threatening northern hordes and to strengthen the frontier of Spanish power by a series of telling blows. It proved a miserable failure through lack of leadership, poor coöperation, and inadequate equipment. No missionaries accompanied the expedition. It was not undertaken to plant new centers of civilization. The two friars who went with Parrilla ministered not to the spiritual and physical needs of the untutored natives, but to the spiritual welfare of the soldiers and the bodily comfort of the sick and wounded.

*Council held at San Sabá.* Immediately upon their arrival, Colonel Parrilla requested the officers to hold a council and determine whether a new campaign should be undertaken at once against the Mayeyes, Tonkawas, Yojuanes, and Hierbipiames, who although not grouped with the northern tribes were known to be enemies. The *Junta* was to decide the best time for such an undertaking; the force that should be kept at Presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas; and the time when the soldiers recruited for the campaign just concluded should be allowed to return to their respective homes.

Manuel Rodríguez, Francisco Espinosa de los Monteros, Joseph Elías de la Garza Falcón, Juan Angel de Oyarzán, Vicente de Alderete, Joseph Clemente de la Garza, Santiago Moneo Carzedo, Ildefonso de la Garza, Domingo Castela, Joseph Alvada, Tomás de Ojueda, Ignacio Enriquez de Luna, and Agustín Antonio de Luna, all officers of the expedition, met on October 27. They declared that the time was inappropriate for a new campaign against any Indians. Winter had set in and the cold

<sup>36</sup>Testimonio de los autos formados sobre la cuenta de Cargo, Datta, qe. da el Coronel Don Diego Ortiz Parrilla de los gastado en la Campana . . . A. G. I., *Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 5.

was too severe to enable the troops to surprise the enemy. The expedition had returned to San Sabá just two days before, after a hard march of over four hundred leagues in the course of a little more than two months. The horses were in bad condition and no new remounts could be obtained at this time. The men, too, were worn out with the long marches; the defeat suffered at the village of the Taovayas had destroyed their morale; many of them were volunteers who lacked discipline and upon whom no dependence could be placed. The number of seasoned troops available was inadequate for a new campaign.

The officers were of the opinion that the Indians against whom it was intended to march now had, in all probability, taken refuge with their friends, the tribes of the north, or had fled to the country of the Comanches. Such a campaign at this time would likely prove a fruitless chase.

In their opinion it would be best to allow the men to remain in San Luis de las Amarillas until December 1. This would give them a month to rest and await any possible reprisals on the part of the northern tribes. The horses and mules too, would be given a much needed rest. On December 1, all additional troops should be allowed to start for home, going by way of San Antonio. All the remaining cattle, supplies, and surplus horses should also be sent to that post. If these were transported at one time, the retiring soldiers could escort them to protect them from any marauding bands. The regular garrison of one hundred men assigned to the Presidio of San Luis was sufficient for its safety. Colonel Ortiz Parrilla should accompany the troops as far as San Antonio, leaving Captain Manuel Rodríguez in command at San Sabá until his return.<sup>37</sup>

*Temporary increase of San Antonio's garrison.* The disappointed commander did not wait at San Sabá until December as suggested by the council of his officers. Early in November he appears to have set out for San Antonio with all the men recruited for the campaign and to have taken with him all the extra horses and surplus supplies. Because of the illness of Lieutenant Eca y Músqiz, he placed the garrison of one hundred men at San Sabá under Captain Manuel Rodríguez, as suggested by the council. After his arrival in San Antonio he busied himself with the arrangements for the disbanding of the force gathered for the unfortunate expedition.

<sup>37</sup>Testimonio de los autos fijos, a Consta. del Coronel Don Diego Ortiz Parrilla, en que da Cuenta de las Provincias (sic) que tomo despues de haberse restituido al presidio de San Sabá con la Tropa que sirvió en la Campaña . . . A. G. I., *Audiencia de México* (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1761), pp. 174-179.

The presence of troops in San Antonio always aroused the cupidity of its poverty-stricken citizens, who ever since 1756 had suffered a considerable loss of stock as the result of the reduction of its garrison by the suppression of twenty-two men. In all justice this measure had not only affected the economic life of the community, but it had left the settlers almost at the mercy of the hostile tribes, whose boldness and daring constantly increased after the destruction of the Mission of San Sabá.

No sooner did Colonel Parrilla arrive with his men than Fray Mariano de los Dolores presented him with a formal petition in his name and that of all the missionaries, that he assign forty additional soldiers to the Presidio of San Antonio de Béjar. He remonstrated that as a result of the recent campaign the missions of San Antonio were in serious danger of being attacked by the aggrieved and revengeful tribes of the north. Enraged by the punitive expedition just closed, they might sweep down upon the practically defenseless post of San Antonio, which would have only twenty-two men to withstand the attack.

The request of the missionaries was immediately followed by a formal memorial drawn up by the Cabildo of the Villa de San Fernando. The frightened citizens, who already imagined themselves in the hands of the barbarous tribes of the north, whose victims were not only scalped but their very bones scraped clean of all flesh, painted in vivid colors the sorrowful plight of the presidio and villa. The garrison was totally inadequate to repel a concerted attack by the maddened and emboldened enemy. To allow the troops to disband would leave San Antonio and the entire province at their mercy. They begged, pleaded, and implored Parrilla to allow forty additional men to stay in San Antonio temporarily until the danger was passed and the viceroy was made to realize the importance of making the increase permanent. This heart-rending petition of a people threatened with extermination was signed by Francisco Delgado, Juan Joseph de Montes de Oca, Vicente Alvarez Travieso, Joseph Adeano, Alberto López, Juan Manuel Ruiz, Ignacio Lorenzo, Juan Granados, and Marcos de Castro.

The powerful voice of the good Bishop of Guadalajara, Francisco de San Buenaventura, who was at this time conducting an inspection of his vast diocese, was added to that of the zealous missionaries and the apprehensive citizens.

He arrived in San Antonio on November 17 from La Bahía. In a letter to the viceroy written a month later, he declared that there was not a single fortified place in the entire Province of Texas. The walls of the

Presidio of San Antonio were a hollow shell. The garrison was ridiculously inadequate with only twenty-two soldiers to defend the post against the countless savages that infested the land. The settlement had a scanty sixty families. "This place," he said, "maintains itself only by the grace of God and the pleasure of the Indians." The natives, he declared, handled their rifles and guns better than the Spaniards themselves. San Antonio deserved a better fate. Its fortification should be improved. "Should the Apaches become vindictive and join the French or the English, the Spaniards, in Texas," he exclaimed, "are lost." If he wrote in this tone to the viceroy, what he said to Parrilla may well be imagined.

Beset by this concerted demand for an increase in the garrison of San Antonio and fully convinced in his own mind of the justness of the request, Ortiz Parrilla ordered forty men to stay in San Antonio on his own responsibility until further instructions were received from the viceroy. On November 18, 1759, he wrote a long report to the officials in Mexico of the circumstances that had prompted his decision, sending copies of the petitions he had received. When the matter was referred to the *Fiscal*, he recommended on February 5, 1760, that the action taken by Parrilla be given approval by a *Junta de Guerra y Hacienda* as provided by law. The viceroy called a *Junta* as suggested and the action of Parrilla in increasing the garrison of San Antonio by forty men was duly approved on February 16, 1760. The increase was to be temporary, however, and the men were to be allowed to return home after the end of March. The *Junta* was of the opinion that the danger of a surprise attack or reprisals by the northern tribes would be past by that time.<sup>38</sup>

*Apaches still reluctant to settle down.* In the meeting held in San Antonio in January 1759, it was decided that immediately after the conclusion of the campaign against the northern tribes the Apaches should be requested to fulfill their long deferred promise to enter mission life at San Sabá. But days and weeks passed and no Indians came. On November 18, 1759, Ortiz Parrilla informed the viceroy that he had waited patiently for the Apache families to come but no one had appeared. Almost a month had now elapsed since his return. During the campaign

<sup>38</sup>Diego Ortiz Parrilla to the Viceroy, November 18, 1759. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1761), pp. 182-190; Petitions of Fray Mariano de los Dolores (undated) and *Cabildo*, November 28, 1759, in *ibid.*, pp. 179-182; Francisco de San Buenaventura, Bishop of Guadalajara to the Viceroy, December 26, 1759, in *ibid.*, pp. 197-200; Respuesta Fiscal, February 5, 1760, *ibid.*, pp. 190-194; Respuesta Fiscal, August 18, 1760, *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 5, pp. 180-191.

one hundred and thirty warriors had accompanied the expedition. They had rendered good service as guides and had lost no opportunity to take prisoners, but they had always played safe and had not sustained any losses. Their chief had solemnly sworn that he and all his people would join the mission when they returned. The women and children had left San Sabá and taken refuge far to the south, while the expedition marched to the north. After the campaign the big chief had gone with his warriors in search of their people to bring them back. But no reliance could be placed on their promises. Just recently they had sent word they would arrive in the presidio in a few days. Occasional Indians had informed him, however, that the Lipans were too busy celebrating the victory over their northern enemies with native dances, diabolical practices, and heathen festivals to return for many days.

In his opinion more stringent means of persuasion would have to be employed, if the faithless Apaches were to be successfully congregated at San Sabá. He did not approve the continuance of a friendly policy towards them. The enmity of the northern tribes against the Spaniards could not be laid entirely on the policy adopted towards the worthless Lipans and their kinsmen, the Natajes, Mescaleros, and Faraones. But while befriending them, a more firm insistence that they congregate in missions was advisable.<sup>39</sup>

*Parrilla's explanation of the defeat.* The disappointed commander attempted to explain the unexpected reverse suffered at the village of the Taovayas. The chief reason, he averred, was the lack of discipline and proper training of the hastily gathered troops that took part in the campaign. More than half of them were tradesmen and "gente de paz" (peaceful people), who had little or no previous experience in the use of firearms and lacked the martial spirit of the trained soldier. Nothing but seasoned troops could hope to cope with an enemy such as was faced by the expedition. The Indians in the village of the Taovayas were far more proficient in the use of the rifle, the lance, and the sword than the Spanish soldiers themselves. He declared that of all the contingents that took part in the expedition only the one from Nuevo Santander, sent by Escandón, was worth while.

But there was a third factor. Parrilla positively affirmed that the Taovayas and their allies were directed in their defense by the French. Everyone had seen the French flag that floated over the stockade. But

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<sup>39</sup>Consulta of Diego Ortiz Parrilla, November 18, 1759. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1761), pp. 228-240.

this was not all. He assured the viceroy that he had personally counted fourteen Frenchmen among the enemy. No one questioned the fact that it was the French who supplied them with both the arms and the ammunition so effectively employed in repelling the attack. The tactics adopted by the defenders were distinctly those used by European troops.<sup>48</sup>

*Activity of French and English traders.* In a later report Parrilla explained the full extent of the activity of French and English traders among the native tribes of Texas. The prisoners taken in the surprise attack on the Tawakonis had frankly admitted the frequent visits to their village of Frenchmen and other white men that resembled them. These men gave them guns, powder, and lead in exchange for pelts, skins, and horses. While in San Antonio three French deserters from Natchitoches had publicly confessed in the presence of the Governors of Coahuila and Texas that they had been instructed to accompany the Indians that attacked San Sabá in 1758. They described in detail the method used in penetrating new territory and in winning the friendship of the Indians. Five or six men would go out at a time, well supplied with merchandise attractive to the natives. These men would then establish their residence among the Indians and live with them, learning their language, their customs, and their habits, and winning their friendship by trading with them guns and ammunition for skins and stolen horses.

The declarations of the three deserters were more than borne out, Parrilla declared, by the revelations made by the Frenchmen captured in New Mexico recently by Governor Tomás Vélez Cachupín and by those taken by Governor Barrios y Jáuregui near the Orcoquisac. The first of these knew the language of the Comanches and Yutes, while the latter were well acquainted with the dialects of the Orcoquisacs and the Bidais, among whom they had lived for several years.

But it was not only the French who were penetrating into the confines of Texas. Just recently two Apache warriors and a squaw, who had been taken prisoners by the Taovayas and forced to live among them for a while, had returned to San Sabá. They told how they had seen some strange white men come to the village of the Taovayas. Although they were fair like the French and resembled them somewhat in their dress and manners, they were different. These men made frequent visits to the northern tribes and sold them guns and ammunition. The Apache captives further explained how they tried to teach the Indians the use of mortars.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 228-240, 182-190.

More recently Father Fray José de Calahorra of Nacogdoches had visited the Tawakoni villages. There he had learned that the English had captured Quebec and that a force of five thousand Englishmen had set out for the country of the Illinois. The Illinois River, the good friar explained, flowed into the Mississippi, which led to New Orleans.

Under the circumstances the entire line of Spanish outposts would have to be reorganized and reënforced by increasing their garrisons and building more adequate fortifications. The frontier presidios had been adequate against untrained Indians, armed with bows and arrows and an occasional rifle. But now that the number of hostile tribes had increased with the coming of new nations from the north, that the natives had learned the use of firearms exclusively and more skillfully than the Spaniards, and that they had been trained in European military tactics by the French and English, the old fortifications and their woefully reduced garrisons were little short of useless.<sup>41</sup>

*Parrilla asks permission to go to Mexico.* It seems that conscience troubled Parrilla. He had been given every resource the viceroyalty could afford. Every sacrifice to insure the success of the expedition had been made by the officials in Mexico. He had marched northward confident of success. But he had underestimated the number of the enemy, their skill, and their valor. Nevertheless, he felt that he was entirely responsible for the failure of the expedition.

The enemy had adopted the age-old practice of retreating before a superior force. The Spaniards had been drawn farther than they had intended. In the weary march against an invisible enemy, the men had lost their zest and enthusiasm, while the hostile tribes had reserved their strength and chosen a point of vantage to repel their pursuers.

Parrilla felt and knew these facts and wished to make a personal explanation to the viceroy and his advisers, who could not conceive the conditions that existed in the remote province of Texas. He was convinced, furthermore, that the presence of the French among the northern tribes and the more recent incursions of the English represented a serious menace to the interests of the Spanish crown. He earnestly begged the viceroy to allow him to go to Mexico.

After the end of March there would be no longer any danger of a new attack on San Sabá and his presence in the Presidio of San Luis would

<sup>41</sup>Diego Ortiz Parrilla to the Viceroy, November 8, 1760, *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 100-117; Consulta of Diego Ortiz Parrilla, November 18, 1760, *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1761), pp. 228-240; 182-190.



not be essential to its safety. Captain Manuel Rodríguez could take care of any emergency that might arise in his absence. In the meantime Father Fray Tomás Arcayos, the chaplain of the expedition, who was to return to Mexico, could be consulted concerning details of the campaign.

The request was referred to the *Fiscal*, who on February 5, 1760, recommended that it be granted. He also suggested that Fray Tomás Arcayos be asked to make a personal report to the viceroy. Parrilla was informed in due time that he might come to Mexico after the end of March.<sup>42</sup>

Dispatches traveled slowly in those days. Parrilla does not appear to have received his leave until late in April, although it was approved by the *Junta* on February 16, 1761. Just when he left for Mexico City is not clear, but he was there by the end of July or the first week in August. By that time Captain Felipe de Rábago y Terán, former commander of Presidio de San Xavier, had been absolved of the charges in connection with the murders at the San Xavier missions and ordered to take possession of the Presidio de San Luis de las Amarillas. Parrilla soon entered into a long wrangle with Rábago y Terán, who superseded him, but he failed in the restoration to his command. He was to return to Texas six years later to conduct a special exploration of Padre Island at the request of the viceroy, but he never again held command over any of the presidios within the Province. The viceroy appointed him Governor of Coahuila instead. He had been in charge of the largest and most important presidio in Texas, he had been entrusted to carry out the most important and pretentious expedition since the days of the Marqués of Aguayo. But he had failed to reduce the Apaches and to subdue or chastise the northern tribes.

His failure is significant. It was not entirely the result of personal inefficiency. New forces were at work. Foreign aggressors had armed the Indians and they were beginning to crowd in from their native haunts. The docile and disunited tribes first encountered had been replaced by the more fierce and barbarous nations that were beginning to be swept southward by a more ruthless invader. Spain's thinly populated frontier, weakly garrisoned, could not withstand the frequent attacks. Parrilla clearly foresaw the need of a reorganization, destined to be outlined and to be carried out in part, seven years later by the indomitable will of

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<sup>42</sup>Parrilla to the Viceroy, November 18, 1758, *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1761), pp. 240; 182-190; Respuesta Fiscal del Marqués de Aranda, August 18, 1760, *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Cunningham Transcripts, 1763), pt. 5, pp. 180-191.

the capable Marqués de Rubí. But the Spanish frontier was soon to feel the impetuous rush of a mighty flood of people. For a moment it stiffened, it groaned under the unbearable strain, then it crumbled before the irresistible tide of the new era. The mission and the presidio were about to fulfill their role and pass on into history. For almost a century the mission had attempted to civilize the Indian with Christian love and gentleness under the protection of the presidio. Its labor of love and faith was not in vain. The missionaries gave the natives the plow and the loom instead of firearms, they taught them love and understanding instead of strife and hatred, they encouraged them to persevere in peaceful pursuits instead of engaging in wars of destruction and annihilation.

*Northern tribes offer peace.* It has been generally held that the defeat of Parrilla at the village of the Taovayas nullified the good effects of his previous victory over the Tawakonis, and that the expedition made little or no impression on the bold and daring spirit of the northern tribes. But the facts in the case seem to show that although the campaign failed to attain a decisive victory, nevertheless the brave fight at the village of the Taovayas and the display of a respectable force of Spanish troops inclined the victorious Indians of the north to make overtures of peace and friendship to avoid as far as possible a similar battle in the future.

While the officials and missionaries in San Antonio and San Sabá apprehensively awaited a fresh attack in the spring of 1760, a delegation of Tawakoni Indians visited the missionary at Nacogdoches several times and expressed an ardent desire to reestablish peace with the Spaniards. Their allies and friends, the Bidais and Orcoquisacs, were also anxious to justify themselves and prove their friendship. They asked Athanase de Mézières and Louis de St. Denis, son of the renowned St. Denis, to intercede in their favor with the Spanish officials. The two young officers went to Nacogdoches and pleaded for these Indians in the belief that a campaign against them was being contemplated. Naturally they took occasion to disavow any connection with the past hostilities of these Indians.

Early in April another delegation of Asinai Indians went to Nacogdoches from San Pedro, accompanied by some Nazonis, to plead for peace in the name of the Tawakonis and their northern allies. Why were so many delegations sent to Nacogdoches instead of Los Adaes, which was in fact nearer to the lands of the northern tribes? The reason is not far to seek. There resided in Nacogdoches a kindly and experienced old missionary, who had spent many years among the Indians of Texas and

who had won their confidence. This was Fray Joseph de Calahorra. Moved by the laudable sincerity of the repeated delegations in soliciting peace, and his heart always yearning for their welfare, the good friar pledged his word that he would intercede with Governor Martos y Navarrete. On May 27, 1760, he wrote to the governor and informed him how joyfully the peace envoys had received his promise.

When told that their message would be relayed to the *Capitán Grande*, as they called the governor, they gladly returned many horses stolen from the missions of east Texas, promised to be true friends of the Spaniards, and even to respect and leave alone such Apaches as should congregate in missions. They could not bring themselves, however, to relinquish completely their implacable hatred of their treacherous and cunning enemies, whose extermination they had vowed to accomplish. They did promise as one more token of their sincere friendship, that the northern Indians would return the two cannon left by Parrilla at the Taovaya village.

Early in May, Chief Canos came with some Tawakoni, Taovaya, and Tejas Indians to say that the Tonkawas, Yojuanes, and Mayeyes had stolen some horses and mules in San Antonio and blamed the Tawakonis. They assured Fray José that they were innocent. To prove their good faith, they confessed they had taken three Spanish captives from the Apaches Pelones, who captured them in New Mexico. They offered to return them now.

A few days later, Fray Calahorra continued, the chief of the Tawakonis came to see him in person to confirm the promises made by his envoys, and to invite the kind old *Padre* to visit his people as his guest. If he would but agree to go, the chief offered to come in one moon and act as his guide. Father Calahorra was impressed by the sincerity of the Tawakoni chief, accepted his invitation, and solemnly promised to transmit his offer of peace and good faith to the governor. In doing so, he asked for permission to visit the pueblo of the Tawakonis and to have an escort.<sup>43</sup>

*Visit of Father Calahorra to the Tawakonis.* Governor Martos y Navarrete authorized Father Calahorra to visit the pueblo of the Tawakonis and agreed to pay all expenses. Although it had been his intention to start in June, the good *Padre* was detained until September. Accompanied by Corporal Antonio Gallardo, six soldiers, and five citizens from Los

<sup>43</sup>Fray Joseph Calahorra to Governor Angel Martos y Navarrete, May 27, 1760. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1748-1763), pt. 2, pp. 101-104; 110-111.

Adaes, he left Nacogdoches on September 16, and made his way to the pueblo of the Hainais, some eight leagues (twenty miles) northwest, located on the Angelina River, a few miles due east from Rusk. Here he was joined by one hundred Tejas Indians. The following morning, guided by the natives, he crossed the Angelina a short distance from the *ranchería* and following a northwesterly course, continued for ten leagues along pines, oaks, and walnuts to a creek called San Francisco Xavier on which the party camped for the night.

On September 18, they resumed the march and, after going fourteen leagues, crossed the Neches River. At the point where they crossed this stream it was wide and deep. Two leagues before reaching the river they came upon salines and the country traversed from San Francisco Xavier Creek to the Neches was a gently rolling country with an occasional hill. It seems that they arrived at the river in the vicinity of present Chandler. They found good timber, abundant pasturage and excellent fish. The following day the party went west for three leagues, possibly to the vicinity of present Brownsboro or Edom, and turning once more northward for eleven more leagues they arrived on a creek which they called Santa Bárbara, possibly the upper reaches of the Neches River near present Canton, where they camped that night. On September 20, they traveled twelve leagues and crossed the south or west branch of Sabine River. This day they reached the edge of the plains after going four leagues. They then continued their march over broad and open country.

The following day, still going north, they crossed the north branch of the Sabine River and came to the village of the Tawakonis after traveling four leagues. This must have been a few miles west of Mineola. Before they arrived, they were met by a group of Indians who came out to welcome them. It was about eleven o'clock when Father Calahorra entered the village. Four chiefs greeted him and his companions, while all the Indians of the pueblo made evident their great joy at seeing the *Padre* and his companions. The four chiefs conducted them to the special quarters which had been prepared for them beforehand. Shortly after their arrival they were treated to a splendid banquet prepared in their honor. The festivities and rejoicings continued for the entire eight days spent among the Tawakonis. Immediately adjoining their pueblo, which consisted of forty-seven large houses, in each of which lived twelve families, was another pueblo of almost the same size. This belonged to the Iscanis.

The Tawakoni village was governed by four chiefs who treated the Spaniards kindly. The four were brothers. One of them was called

Flechado en la Cara (Arrow-Scar-Face). The pueblo had two hundred fifty warriors. It was north of the north branch of the Sabine River and was carefully laid out with well-ordered streets and gardens. The warriors had good horses. Near the village, about a league away was a large common farm with irrigation, which was cultivated by all the Indians. Here they planted corn, beans, pumpkins, watermelons, and other vegetables. When the crop was gathered, it was divided among all the families who received share and share alike. At the time of the visit, the *Padre* observed that the Indians were engaged in the construction of a blockhouse and other fortifications to defend the village from attack. They were even building a subterranean passage. The stream of the river was not permanent, but there were abundant pools of clear water along the bed of the river at all times of the year.

The Iscani village was almost as large and equally well planned, with its streets and houses and its common farm lands.

While staying with the Tawakonis, Father Calahorra learned that the Taovaya village was about five days' travel to the northwest in the direction of New Mexico. The Indians told him that the pueblo was located at a site facing a broad plain similar to their own. The Taovayas were more numerous. They had over six hundred warriors. Before the zealous missionary started home, a Taovaya chief came to visit him at the Tawakoni village, accompanied by twenty braves and six women. They told him they came to offer peace in the name of their people, who wanted to be friends of the Spaniards in Texas. They were ready and willing to return the two cannon left by Parrilla, if the past was forgiven and forgotten. They asked the *Padre* to come to visit them and offered to escort him not only to their village but to far away New Mexico, assuring him they could take him all the way to the other Spaniards in fifteen days. They explained that beyond the Taovayas, to the north, were the Seautos (Sioux) Indians, called also Apaches Pelones (short hair Apaches) because of the manner in which they wore their hair. They were very numerous and occupied all the land to the north and west as far as New Mexico. The Taovaya chief also told him that the French had five houses (trading posts) established above his village along the way to New Mexico. These Frenchmen had come from the fort in Arkansas.<sup>44</sup>

*Recommendations of Fray Calahorra.* The good *Padre* longed to stay indefinitely among the northern tribes. Although much more fierce than

<sup>44</sup>Diario del Viage que hizo Fray Joseph de Calahorra. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1748-1763), pt. 2, pp. 106-110; Fray Joseph Calahorra to Governor Martos y Navarrete, October 18, 1761, *ibid.*, pp. 116-119.

the dwindling nations of central and south Texas, they were far superior in character to the shiftless and treacherous Apaches of San Sabá. They appeared to be sincere in their protestations of friendship and in their desire to be instructed in the faith. It was with difficulty that he finally took leave of them after a week's stay, having convinced them that he could not remain any longer without permission from his superiors. He promised them, however, that he would soon return to establish missions for them. Before leaving he appointed Chief Flechado en la Cara (Arrow-Scar-Face) Captain of the Tawakoni village and invested him with a silver mounted cane, the insignia of his office. He honored Chief Llasco, called by the Spaniards El Zurdo (Lefty), in similar manner, making him Captain of the Iscanis village, giving both of them Spanish flags to replace the French ones they had. All the Indians rejoiced publicly and bade a fond farewell to the enthusiastic missionary, wishing him God-speed and an early return. As a final token of their friendship they presented him with two Spanish women captives and a child they had bought from the Seautos (Sioux).<sup>45</sup>

On his return to Nacogdoches, Father Calahorra made a detailed and glowing report to the governor and warmly urged the establishment of missions for the northern Indians. He pointed out the superior character of these tribes and the advantages of reducing them to mission life. If their friendship was not won, the French and the English would eventually turn them against the Spaniards. The policy in regard to these Indians should be changed and the Apaches abandoned, unless they agreed to be reduced to mission life.

Most of the missionaries in Texas had become disillusioned by the perfidy of the Apaches (Lipans), who had repeatedly demonstrated their worthlessness, a lack of serious purpose and a complete disregard of their pledges. This opinion was fully in accord with the views of the governor, who, agreeable to the proposal of Father Calahorra, instituted an investigation to secure further evidence of the friendliness of the northern Indians. In the investigation Cayetano Gómez, soldier at Los Adaes, declared he had heard from those who went with Governor Alarcón to the Tawakonis in 1718, that they had penetrated as far as the country of the Wichitas, which was in the direction of New Mexico. Several years later, after Alarcón left Texas, he and other soldiers had gone out hunting and visited the village of the Wichitas, which was southwest of the Tawakonis. He had been surprised to find a large wooden cross still

<sup>45</sup>Father Calahorra to Governor Martos y Navarrete, October 18, 1761. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1748-1763), pt. 2, pp. 116-119.

standing in the village, made out of cedar logs, on which was carved the name of Juan de Alarcón. The Indians had told him the governor left it there and promised to return.

From the Wichitas, Cayetano Gómez and his companions had gone to the Tawakonis, where they found Alarcón had visited also. To these Indians he had likewise promised to found missions on his return. Moreover, he had assured them he would establish a presidio near their village for their protection. At the time Gómez visited these Indians, he had found they all used bows and arrows, but now it was well known that they had abandoned their former weapons for the more effective firearms furnished them by the French traders.

The governor further learned from other witnesses that the French established a trading post among the Tawakonis in 1754 or 1755 and lived among these Indians until the destruction of San Sabá mission in 1758.<sup>46</sup>

In his report to the viceroy, Martos y Navarrete declared that these Indians had always been friendly to the Spaniards, that they were still willing to welcome them to their land, and that they wanted missionaries to instruct them. Their recent enmity against the Spaniards was the result of the friendship shown by the latter for the Apaches, their inveterate enemies. The northern tribes claimed the Spaniards had promised them missions since the visit of Alarcón in 1718 but had not kept their word.<sup>47</sup>

*No action taken.* The matter was referred to the advisers of the viceroy, and Diego Ortiz Parrilla, who was in Mexico at the time, was requested to make a special report. Parrilla and Felipe de Rábago y Terán were still on friendly terms. Furthermore, the unfortunate commander of the expedition against the northern tribes still looked upon them with distrust and resentment. He took advantage, therefore, to discourage friendship with the enemy that had recently inflicted on him so severe and unexpected a defeat. On November 8, 1760, in a long report, he assured the viceroy that the northern tribes were as faithless and as treacherous as the Apaches. No reliance could be placed on their vows and offers of friendship, nor on their petition for missions. The northern Indians, he averred, were dangerous—he remembered too vividly his experience. It was well to listen to their overtures for peace and to humor them, but no trust should be placed in them.

<sup>46</sup>Investigation held by Governor Martos y Navarrete at Los Adaes, April 6, 1761; Report of the governor. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1748-1763), pt. 2, pp. 111-113; 115.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 113-115.

The proposal to abandon San Sabá and remove its presidio to the Tawakoni village was short of suicidal. San Luis de las Amarillas should be maintained at all cost, he assured the viceroy. He might not have been so firm in his opinion, perhaps, had he known he was never to return to his former post. The garrison should be maintained intact, he continued. One hundred men was the minimum force required for such an important post. He thought that instead of removing the presidio to the land of the Tawakonis, it would be better to establish a new post of forty men at the site of Los Amalgres, where Miranda had discovered rich mineral deposits. With a garrison to protect the Spaniards against Indian attacks, the area would soon be settled and the growth of population would become the most powerful factor in bringing about the reduction of the troublesome Apaches to mission life. From San Antonio to San Sabá and beyond was the land where the Apache nations roamed. It was here that the bitter struggle with their northern enemies was being waged. The Apaches could not be expected to agree peacefully to congregate in a mission at San Sabá, exposed to the attack of their fierce enemies, unless adequate protection could be afforded them.

There is little doubt that Parrilla was sincere in his recommendations. Whatever his shortcomings, he seems to have had a good understanding of the immediate and pressing problems that beset the civil officers and the missionaries of Texas. He concluded his report by recommending a meeting between the military, civil, and religious officials in Texas to determine amicably once and for all what would constitute adequate mission guards for the various missions; the proper escort to be allowed missionaries when they went into the wilderness to bring back recalcitrant neophytes or to visit and invite new tribes to join the missions; and the form and manner of requesting and giving each other mutual aid. Such a meeting was essential to prevent misunderstandings in the future between the various agencies in Texas, who should have one common end in view: the reduction of the Indians to Christianity and the safety of the king's domain.<sup>48</sup>

The viceregal officials were once more puzzled. Could they now abandon the Apaches, assume a harsh policy toward them and adopt a policy of reconciliation and friendship towards the northern tribes? Pride and honor and the natural aversion of human nature to admit an error caused the opportunity to pass.

Rábago y Terán, the new commander at San Sabá, whether out of

<sup>48</sup>Diego Ortiz Parrilla to Viceroy Marqués de Cruillas, November 8, 1760. *Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 100-117.



selfish interest or moved by a sincere desire to atone for his previous conduct, enthusiastically sponsored the cause of the worthless Apaches. This resulted in the rejection of the proposals for peace made by the northern tribes. A final effort was made to reduce the Apaches to mission life by attempting new establishments on the upper Nueces. An unforeseen circumstance, the cession of Louisiana to Spain, however, was soon to bring about a complete reorganization of the Spanish frontier and the so long sought reversal of policy with regard to the Apaches. But before this took place, two new missions were to be founded near present Barksdale and Montell for the faithless and thieving Apaches, a monument to the dauntless faith of the devoted friars, who continued to labor with unabated zeal among the unworthy plains Indians in whose cause they had shed their blood so generously at San Sabá.

## CHAPTER IV

### RETURN OF RÁBAGO AND THE FOUNDING OF THE CAÑÓN MISSIONS

For eight years the case against Captain Felipe de Rábago y Terán, for the murder of Father Ganzábal and the unfortunate Ceballos in Mission Candelaria on the San Xavier River, had been argued before viceregal officials. The *Auditor de Guerra*, Francisco Cagigal, and the *Fiscal*, Domingo Valcarcel, reviewed the entire case on June 7, 1760, and recommended to the viceroy that Rábago and his associates, Sergeant Miguel de Sosa, Tomás Iruegas, and the Sayopin Indian Andrés be absolved of all guilt. This strange miscarriage of justice was based on the allegation that the accused "were not and could not have been at or near Mission Candelaria at the time of the fatal [sic] murders," that the witnesses had been intimidated to give false testimony, and that the declarations had been maliciously altered in several instances. It was formally announced that the murders had been perpetrated by the runaway Coco Indians, who could neither testify nor be punished. But the presence of the Indian Andrés in the household of Captain Rábago, in whose service he had remained since the fateful night at San Xavier, lends a strong suspicion to the undeniable guilt of the former commander.

Agreeable to the recommendation, however, the viceroy exonerated Rábago y Terán and ordered that he be restored to his former post as commander of the Presidio of San Xavier, now moved to the San Sabá River and renamed San Luis de las Amarillas. Rábago was at this time still at Sacramento, Coahuila, where he received the order of June 19, 1760, to proceed to Texas to take charge of San Sabá.<sup>1</sup>

Colonel Diego Ortiz Parrilla, who appears to have left Texas early in May of the same year to make a personal report to the viceroy on his unfortunate expedition against the northern tribes, was already in Mexico when the favorable verdict was rendered. The restoration of Rábago to San Sabá was tantamount to his predecessor's removal. He immediately presented a long argument to the viceroy pointing out that Rábago y Terán had never been commander of San Sabá, that at the time of his temporary transfer to Sacramento he was commander of San Xavier,

<sup>1</sup>Autos y fallos del Fiscal sobre cargo de homicidio en misión de la Candelaria contra el Capitán Don Felipe Rábago y Terán . . . *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 16, pp. 1-10; Consulta del Capitán Rábago y Terán, October 31, 1760, *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 91-3-3 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1762), pp. 1-3.

that this presidio had in fact been abolished, that its garrison has been utilized to found a new presidio on the San Sabá River and increased from fifty men to one hundred, and that consequently Rábago could not be restored to the command of San Luis de las Amarillas, because this was a new post which he had never commanded.<sup>2</sup> But all protests were in vain. Rábago leisurely wound up his affairs at Sacramento and made preparations to take possession of Presidio de San Luis de las Amarillas on the San Sabá, the largest one in Texas. Parrilla was eventually appointed Governor of Coahuila.

*Opposition to Rábago's return.* Although news traveled slowly in those days, it was not long before the return of the man, who had so deeply disturbed the entire province in 1752, caused a wave of apprehension to sweep over Texas. The tireless and indomitable Fray Mariano de los Dolores felt compelled to journey all the way to Mexico, in spite of his years, in a futile effort to influence the viceroy. In a personal appeal to the Marqués de Cruillas, he reviewed the career of Rábago from his arrival in San Antonio through his scandalous conduct to its culmination in the sacrilegious murders at San Xavier, pointing out that his return might cause disturbances again and jeopardize the peace of the entire province. The Apaches, he claimed, knew Rábago only by name, but they had become sincerely attached to Colonel Parrilla, who had founded the mission for them at San Sabá. To antagonize these Indians at this time, by changing commanders, when the northern tribes were so resentful and the French and English so active among them, was dangerous in the extreme. The remonstrance of Fray Mariano was reduced to writing on October 28, 1760, and referred to the *Fiscal* on October 31. Conscious of the urgency of the request, he replied on November 1, recommending that former Governor Barrios y Jáuregui be asked to make a private report on the points raised by Fray Mariano.<sup>3</sup> In the meantime, Rábago had taken possession of San Sabá on October 1, 1760.

The request to Barrios y Jáuregui, who was at this time in Coahuila, must have been sent by a special messenger to enable him to answer by December 30. On that day, the former Governor of Texas informed the viceroy in a secret report that Rábago y Terán had come to San Xavier while a very young man with more money than judgment. Barrios y

<sup>2</sup>Informe del Coronel Don Diego Ortiz Parrilla . . . June 18, 1760. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 16, pp. 16-37; Protest of Parrilla, December 7, 1760, *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 91-3-3 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1763), pp. 5-7.

<sup>3</sup>Fray Mariano de los Dolores to the Viceroy, Marqués de Cruillas, October 28, 1760. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 61-79.

Jáuregui seems to have been acquainted with the history of the young commander. He explained how he had made considerable money in the mines of Zacatecas before coming to Texas. He said that the young man was of a domineering and overbearing nature, vain, jealous of command, and passionate. After the scandalous affair in Texas with the wife of Ceballos, that resulted in the awful murders at San Xavier, he had been again involved in a similar affair in Santa Rosa del Sacramento in Coahuila. The object of his affections had been a vulgar woman, the wife of an ignorant and unscrupulous soldier, Manuel Váldez, who had been consistently promoted and was now second in command as his lieutenant at San Sabá, the largest and most important post in Texas. Váldez could neither read nor write. Rábago had frequently set the woman at his table to the amazement and scandal of every one.<sup>4</sup>

The personal agent of Rábago in Mexico, Joseph Antonio de Santander, strenuously denied the charges and presented testimonials that appear to have convinced or temporarily appeased the viceroy, who took no action against the restored commander of San Sabá. But even granting there may have been personal vindictiveness in some of the accusations, and making due allowances for exaggeration, the specific nature of the charges and the personal references to the parties involved are significant.<sup>5</sup>

*The Indian Andrés is left in Coahuila.* The apprehension against the return of Rábago was not confined to those who had been unfriendly. Fray Diego Jiménez, president of the missions, on the Río Grande at San Juan Bautista, a close friend, who was to aid Rábago to found new missions for the Apaches on the upper Nueces, was visiting in Mission Espada in August, 1760. While at Espada, he wrote the former commander of San Xavier to advise him to use discretion and comport himself with circumspection when he returned to Texas. It was rumored, he said, that the Indian Andrés, a former neophyte of Espada Mission, was returning in his company. The news had stirred the mission Indians considerably. He suggested that Andrés should not be brought back either to Mission Espada or any other part of Texas. It would be better to send him anywhere else. His wife, now in the mission, would be sent to join him.

Not until October 2, after he had taken possession of the Presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas on the San Sabá, did Rábago write Fray

<sup>4</sup>Jacinto de Barrios y Jáuregui to the Viceroy, December 20, 1760. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 93-99.

<sup>5</sup>Joseph Antonio de Santander to the Viceroy, March 31, 1761. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 127-131.

Jiménez who was still at Espada Mission. He informed the missionary that agreeable to his request he had left the Sayopin Indian Andrés at the Tlaxcalteca Mission in Monclova, Coahuila, where his wife should join him. He took occasion to manifest his gratefulness for the friendly interest taken in his welfare and inquired if Fray Jiménez could induce the missions in San Antonio or the Río Grande to sell him some corn and beans, which he needed for the maintenance of the garrison and the establishment of a mission for the Apaches. With evident pride he narrated how he had blazed a new trail from San Fernando de Austria in Coahuila to San Sabá directly, eliminating the need of going by way of San Antonio.<sup>6</sup>

Fray Jiménez promptly replied on October 9, thanking him for having left the Indian Andrés in Monclova and informing him that he had sent the wife to join him. Corn and beans, he assured the new commander, were scarce, but Mission Espada could spare, perhaps, as much as three hundred *fanegas* (600 bushels) of corn. This was the only mission that had a surplus. It was willing to sell these products at two *pesos a fanega*. As to beans, there were none available in quantity, but the price for the little that could be obtained was six *pesos a fanega*.

Since he was about to return to Mission San Bernardo on the Río Grande, he suggested that future requests for supplies be made to Father Fray Acisclos Valverde, who had instructions to procure them for him from any of the missions. Aware of the strong antagonism felt against Rábago among the majority of the old Texas missionaries, Fray Jiménez advised that the captain communicate directly with him at the Río Grande in case of any differences or misunderstandings.<sup>7</sup>

*Conditions of Presidio de San Luis de las Amarillas.* When Felipe de Rábago y Terán finally arrived at the San Sabá River on September 30, he found a demoralized and poorly equipped garrison awaiting him. On the following day, he took formal possession of the post, which was turned over to him by Captain Manuel Rodríguez, of San Juan Bautista, who was left in charge by Colonel Diego Ortiz Parrilla upon his departure to Mexico. Fully aware of the antagonistic feeling that prevailed in San Antonio, he had made his way directly from San Fernando de Austria to San Sabá, thus opening a new and much more direct trail from the Río Grande to the new presidio.

<sup>6</sup>Fray Diego Jiménez to Captain Rábago y Terán, August 19, 1761, p. 160; Rábago y Terán to Fray Diego Jiménez, October 2, 1760. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 139-142.

<sup>7</sup>Fray Diego Jiménez to Rábago y Terán, October 9, 1760. In *Ibid.*, pp. 171-172.

The garrison was up to full strength. The one hundred men were reviewed and publicly took the oath of obedience to the new commander. But if the number of men was complete, not so was their equipment nor their arms. They were in sore need of clothes, munitions, arms, saddles, and food supplies. With unexpected generosity and a sense of duty and justice Rábago assured the viceroy, when he made his report, that the sorry plight of the troops was in no way to be imputed to negligence on the part of Colonel Parrilla, the former commander. The soldiers in all the frontier outposts were in the habit of gambling everything they had, and this pernicious practice was responsible for the plight of the garrison. This state of affairs was aggravated by the proximity of the Comanches, who were said to be encamped some twelve leagues away. Their presence required a constant watch and hindered considerably the acquisition of the supplies needed.<sup>8</sup>

The presidio was located on the north bank of the San Sabá River, commanding wide open plains to the east and west. There was an abundance of timber, rock, water, pastures, and arable lands for the construction and maintenance of both the presidio and the proposed missions for the Apaches. Around the presidio was a stockade three yards high. Portions had rotted or had been destroyed. Six cannon were mounted to protect the wings of the presidio, but there were no experienced artillerymen to man them. The garrison had too many men who were mere boys. Their duties, however, were varied and numerous. They had to patrol the country to the north, to guard against surprise attacks, to watch closely the horses and cattle, to escort supply trains from San Antonio for the presidio and mission, to do guard duty at the presidio, and to accompany parties of 'friendly' Apaches on their hunting trips to safeguard them in case of attack by northern Indians. Men had to be detailed to cut down the timber in order to clear a space in the vicinity of the presidio, and some had to go to Coahuila and to Nuevo Santander to obtain recruits and to purchase horses and cattle.<sup>9</sup>

*San Sabá Mission.* Two years had elapsed since the martyrdom of Fathers Giraldo de Terreros and Santiesteban, but the charred ruins of the old mission remained like an ugly scar upon the fair plains across the river opposite the presidio. The cowardly Apaches, in spite of their

<sup>8</sup>Testimonio de los Autos formados sobre la entrega del Presidio de San Sabá al Capn. Dn. Phe. de Rábago y Terán . . . *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 91-3-3 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1762), pp. 1-4.

<sup>9</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, March 2, 1761. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 91-3-3 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1762), pp. 15-25.

swagger, had a superstitious fear of being trapped by their relentless foes, the Comanches and their allies. Rábago y Terán visited the ruins. The location was well chosen. The unfinished irrigation ditch stood silent, waiting for the helping hand of the kindly *Padres* and the neophytes to carry the life-giving water from the limpid stream of the river to the thirsting fields. A few Apaches followed silently and stood mute with an inscrutable look on their expressionless faces. No *Padres* had come since the fatal destruction of the mission, but they were ready and anxious to return and labor with undaunted faith, if the worthless Apaches would agree to congregate. The captain had written his friend Fray Jiménez. He dared not appeal to those in San Antonio. He assured the Indians he would protect them and bring back the brown-robed men of God to minister to the wants of their body and soul.<sup>10</sup>

*Exploration of the surrounding country.* In his report to the viceroy, Rábago y Terán declared that the Presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas was the bulwark of four provinces: Texas, New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Coahuila. From San Sabá to Los Adaes there were two hundred and twenty-five leagues. The capital of Texas, where the governor resided, was to the northeast. To San Antonio it was seventy leagues southeast. The old Presidio of San Juan Bautista on the Río Grande was to the south, almost one hundred twenty leagues. Sacramento in Coahuila was thirty leagues farther to the southwest. The new presidio at La Junta (present Presidio) where the Mexican Conchos River joined the Río Grande was one hundred and fifty leagues northwest. There the new Captain Alonzo Vitores Rubín de Celis was in command. New Mexico lay to the north, but Rábago y Terán did not know how far. No one knew at this time.

He retold how he had spent much time in exploring the country while at San Xavier and at Sacramento. He had penetrated deep into the land of all the Apache nations, going two hundred leagues north and west to a large river of brackish water that flowed almost due north and south. On either bank were wide plains that sloped gently like the vast undulations of a becalmed sea. It was on these interminable plains that the Apache Lipans, the Mescaleros, and the Faraones (Pharos) lived and roamed, dragging behind them their portable tents that blossomed into flitting *rancherías* over the immense prairie as the tribes followed the restless buffalo. He had explored the Río Florido (Texas Concho) from its source to where it entered the Colorado, perhaps following the same route of the daring Mendoza expedition, which first penetrated the land

<sup>10</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 15-25.

almost one hundred years before. The river that ran almost due north and south, whose water was brackish, was none other than the Pecos.

*Description of Indian nations.* Rábago y Terán knew the Apache Indians and could differentiate the characteristics of the various nations that made up this numerous family. The Apache Lipans, he assured the viceroy, originally lived in the Presidio country, that is, the Big Bend, and as far east as the Concho River (Texas Concho), but they had been forced southward from their former haunts to the headwaters of the Frío and the Nueces Rivers and down these streams to the Rio Grande. The San Sabá River was not their country now, nor had it ever been. They visited this area only when the buffalo ranged along this stream on the way to the great plains to the north and west. The Natages, Mescaleros, and Faraones, although they spoke a similar dialect and appeared to be of the same stock, looked with disdain upon the Lipans and had their habitat to the north and west in the direction of Nueva Vizcaya (present Chihuahua) and New Mexico.

To the north and east of San Sabá lived the Comanches, Tawakonis, Taovayas, Yojuanes, Tonkawas, Mayeyes, Quitseys, and the Hierbipiames. Although these different nations were not of the same stock, they were allies in war, being joined primarily by their common hatred of the Apaches. They constituted the northern tribes and had become the enemies of the Spaniards, because of the friendship shown by the latter for the despised plains Indians. The Tejas and the Bidais had long been the friends of the Spaniards. They lived almost due east from San Sabá and only occasionally did they join the northern tribes impelled by circumstances, their natural greed, and the provocation of the Apaches.<sup>11</sup>

It seems strange that with so clear an analysis of the native alignment and so perfect an understanding of the issues involved in the relations with the rival tribes, Rábago should have advocated so strongly the continuation of a friendly policy toward the Lipan Apaches, the maintenance of San Sabá for their protection, and the founding of new missions for them.

*Importance of the Presidio at San Sabá.* In one thing did Parrilla and Rábago fully agree. San Sabá, in their opinion, should be maintained at all cost. It was the corner stone in the defense of four frontier provinces. Its abandonment would imperil the infant settlements of New Mexico,

<sup>11</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, March 2, 1761. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 91-3-3 (Dunn Transcripts, 1759-1762), pp. 15-25.



Nueva Vizcaya, Coahuila, and Texas. It would put an end to any effort to continue missionary activity among the Apaches. It would preclude all possibility of developing the mineral deposits found in the hilly country of West Texas. Furthermore, its abandonment would be a public admission of defeat, which would embolden the northern tribes and bring down upon the Spaniards the vindictive rage of the Apaches themselves, who would justly feel they had been betrayed.

Even now there were rumors of an impending attack by the Comanches. A squaw of that nation had been taken prisoner in a recent raid and she had told how her people were organizing a new attack. In the winter, numerous groups of the northern tribes visited San Sabá and other frontier posts under the guise of friendship to trade skins and hides for provisions. These Indians were in reality spies and scouts, who reported the strength of the garrisons and the approaches to the presidios. The favorite time for attack on San Sabá had always been in March. Constant vigilance was essential to prevent a surprise and possibly complete annihilation of the guard at San Sabá.

Communication with the outposts in Texas, Coahuila, and Nueva Vizcaya had long since been established and reënforcements could be secured from them, but up to this time no road had been discovered to New Mexico. Rábago y Terán enlarged upon the need and the importance of establishing such communication. He asked permission to undertake an expedition to find a route, and he suggested that the middle of May was the best time for the undertaking. At that time water was abundant in the plains country and the grass was at its best.<sup>12</sup>

*Exploration of the Concho and Pecos Rivers.* Without awaiting a reply, Captain Rábago y Terán decided to reēxplore the country to the west of San Sabá (present Menard). A party of forty men, under the command of a lieutenant, was sent into what is now Schleicher, Irion, Reagan, Upton, Crane, and Ward counties. The men were gone twenty-four days. Upon their return they reported that they had explored the country in a general westerly direction, with some inclination to the north, until they had reached a large river that ran north and south, which they called Puerco. The river flowed across apparently endless plains and was about eighteen *varas* wide and almost two *varas* deep at the place where they came upon it. This stream they were assured by the Indians, flowed into the Río Grande. The country along the river was more or less flat, but two ranges of mountains were discernible to the west. Not far from

<sup>12</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 15-25.

the place where they came upon the Puerco (present Pecos) they discovered two salt water lakes, one on the east and the other on the west side of the stream. From the description of the country it seems the exploring party reached the vicinity of the present city of Pecos, Texas. Here they declare they found a large settlement of Indians, who fled on their approach, leaving the pueblo deserted. But observing that the newcomers did not disturb the settlement, the Indians reappeared and told the Spaniards they had never seen men like them in this area. This statement should be taken with a grain of salt, for it seems strange that these roaming Indians of the plains should have never seen Spaniards before. Presents were exchanged and the natives promised to visit San Sabá and to bring their wares to trade at the presidio.

According to the report of the party, they first came upon a spring about five leagues after leaving San Sabá (present Menard) and on five others in the succeeding thirty or forty leagues. This seems to indicate they first passed by the headwaters of the South Concho, almost due west from Menard, and inclining north, went to the headwaters of the Middle Concho, somewhat north of present Big Lake and Ranta. They declared that in this area they had counted as many as five springs, which joined to form the Florido River (present Concho) that flowed into the Colorado. From the headwaters of this river the party appears to have gone west to the Puerco which they found to be some twelve leagues beyond the headwaters of the Florido. They evidently followed the Pecos for some distance, having first come upon it in the vicinity of present McCamey.<sup>13</sup>

*The Presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas is rebuilt.* While attempting to induce the Apaches by every means in his power to congregate in regular missions, and trying to learn everything he could about the surrounding country, Captain Rábago did not overlook the material improvement of the Presidio of San Luis de las Amarillas, which he began to call the Royal Presidio of San Sabá. A year and a month after his arrival he was able to report that he had completely rebuilt the tumble-down and half-rotten stockade and erected a *casa fuerte* (blockhouse) built entirely of stone and mortar. With pardonable pride he explained that the new fort resembled a veritable castle, with its strong stockade and a new moat dug around it as an additional protection. All the work had been done by the soldiers themselves and a few stone masons. The woods in the vicinity had been felled and a good area cleared, which set

<sup>13</sup>Felipe de Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, July 12, 1761. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 12-15.

off the fort. Before the end of November the work on the fort would be completed. As soon as the fortification was finished the soldiers would begin to replace their log cabins with stone and mortar houses. This would make San Sabá the strongest presidio on the entire frontier.

The garrison, too, had been improved. Although the number had been one hundred when turned over to him on October 1, 1760, he had subsequently found that eighteen of the men were not part of the regular garrison but a part of those recruited for Parrilla's campaign who had remained to fill vacancies temporarily. Furthermore, several were boys unfit for military service. In the garrison were included three tailors and a sacristan, who knew nothing about military life or duties and had never fired a gun or ridden a horse. Rábago informed the viceroy that he had gradually replaced these men with twenty new recruits, who were brought from Coahuila. He had also sent for horses to Nuevo Santander and Coahuila. Escandón had sent him three hundred and seventy, and two hundred and sixty had been brought from Coahuila. The garrison was now up to full strength and well mounted.<sup>14</sup>

*Changed attitude of Apaches.* The energy and determination displayed by Rábago since his return in placing the presidio on a firm basis to resist attack appears to have inspired confidence in the frightened Apaches. They began to frequent San Sabá and to speak of mission life again. Agreeable to his instructions, the new commander took advantage of every opportunity to win the friendship and confidence of the wayward, insolent, and treacherous Lipans. He sent out repeated invitations to the various chiefs, and he generously distributed presents, trinkets of various kinds, and such food as he could spare, to all who came to the presidio. He furnished them military escort to go and hunt the buffalo in safety, making them realize in various ways the material value of the friendship of the Spaniards to their welfare. At the same time he made them understand that the only way in which they could enjoy all these advantages permanently was by agreeing to be congregated in missions, where they could be instructed by the friars and be protected by the presidio. He patiently but firmly refuted all their excuses and pointed out to them how they had already been deprived of their hunting grounds by the Comanches, how they would starve without buffalo meat or the aid of the Spaniards, and how their enemies were pursuing them farther and farther into their own lands.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, November 1, 1760; same to same, November 6, 1760. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 20-30.

<sup>15</sup>Arriçivita, *Crónica*, 282-283.

The persistent efforts of the new commander, who seems to have set his heart on the reduction of these wily Indians, finally bore fruit. In August, 1761, Rábago informed the viceroy that he was about to succeed in his attempt to induce the Apaches to gather again in missions. He reported that several chiefs had just visited him, who had promised to bring all their people to live in a mission near the presidio. They had remonstrated, however, that in order to be reduced they needed to go on a last buffalo hunt to bring back enough meat to sustain them until supplies could be obtained. The request seemed reasonable and Rábago agreed to furnish a respectable escort of soldiers to accompany them on the hunt.

In the meantime, he had at once written to Fray Diego Jiménez at San Juan Bautista to acquaint him with the promising outlook and to invite him to come in time to be at San Sabá when the Lipans returned from their hunt, prepared to start the establishment of a mission, if the Indians kept their word.

At the same time, he suggested to the viceroy that the commanders at Béjar, Río Grande, and Santa Rosa del Sacramento be instructed to discourage the Apaches from visiting in their presidios and to repel them by force, if necessary, in order that they should be forced to find San Sabá the only place of refuge. If told all along the frontier that they were welcome only at San Sabá, this would aid greatly in their reduction.<sup>16</sup>

The hopes of the commander rose higher in October, it seems, when the most formidable of the Apache-Lipan chiefs, El Cabezón (Big Head) solemnly declared that all his people, who he claimed numbered three thousand, were ready to be congregated and to live in peace with the Spaniards forever. "This Indian," says Arricivita, "was more civilized and had greater judgment than Chief Chico, who had fooled the missionaries of San Antonio (in 1756) with his false promises. . . . The firmness, with which he assured the captain commander of the reduction and settlement of his people, led the latter to request the Father President of the missions at the Río Grande to come at once and give no occasion for the Indians to repent."<sup>17</sup>

*Return of the missionaries.* Like a clarion call of celestial music, the tones rang in the ears of Fray Diego, who had previously labored in San Sabá and had barely escaped the crown of martyrdom for which his heart

<sup>16</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, August 18, 1761. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 17-18.

<sup>17</sup>Arricivita, *Crónica*, 383.

longed. Two messengers brought him the news late in October. Without the loss of a moment, in order that the opportunity to retrieve the wayward children of the plains from their errors might not be lost, the zealous missionary wrote a hurried note to Fray Manuel Náxera, the Commissary General, and set out. By November 4, 1761, he was already in San Sabá, from where he reported to his superiors in Mexico City both to inform them of what he had found and done, and to enlist their support in the new enterprise. Aptly has the eloquent chronicler of the Querétaran missionaries in Texas said: "No undertaking seemed to them too difficult. Its very difficulty made it appear easy. Out of the thorns and brambles of their labors and privations bloomed the flowers of their undying faith, which watered with their sweat and blood, ever promised them richer and more abundant fruit."<sup>18</sup>

*Fray Diego Jiménez favorably impressed.* By the time he arrived in San Sabá, Chief Cabezón and the other Apache leaders had retired with all their people a short distance from the presidio. Two messengers were dispatched to inform them of the arrival of the missionary and to ask them to come immediately to take up their abode. On November 3, 1761, one of the chiefs came to the presidio. He told the captain and Fray Jiménez that there were ten chiefs who wished to be reduced to mission life and that their people were well disposed towards the plan. Unblinded by his enthusiasm for the enterprise the good friar wrote: "But as to myself, not until I see them already in a mission, well supplied with food, will I place any confidence in their words. They have failed to keep their promises too often." Nevertheless, he added that with the grace of God and the great zeal displayed by the new commander this nation might be reduced to mission life this time. While waiting for the other chiefs to come, he had asked permission to explore and examine all possible sites for the new mission "to dispel certain prejudices and false opinion spread by those who have placed private interest above the salvation of souls."<sup>19</sup>

By November 23, 1761, Fray Jiménez was already back at Mission San Bernardo on the Río Grande, where he had gone to make arrangements for securing the most essential supplies for the proposed mission.

*Apaches make solemn agreement.* Before he left San Sabá, however, the rest of the Apaches had come and had held a peace meeting with Captain Rábago and himself. They agreed to be congregated in the valley

<sup>18</sup>Arricivita, *Op. cit.*, 382.

<sup>19</sup>Fray Diego Jiménez to Fray Manuel de Nájera, Commissary General, November 4, 1761. *A. G.M., Historia*, Vol. 28, pp. 194-196.

of the San José River (upper Nueces) which was about halfway between San Sabá and San Juan Bautista on the Río Grande. The principal chiefs of the Apaches explained that they had chosen this site out of regard for the safety of their people. Cabezón agreed that San Sabá had good lands and abundant water and that his people liked it, but that it was not safe against surprise by their enemies. They were afraid of being killed if the mission was reestablished there, as the *Padres* and soldiers who were surprised there before.

But in order to be congregated in the valley of the San José River, the chiefs stipulated three conditions. In the first place, a big buffalo hunt to provide themselves with an abundant supply of meat would have to be undertaken, and Captain Rábago should furnish them with an adequate escort of soldiers to protect them against attack or surprise. In the second place, they asked for the return of the daughter of the big Natage chief, who was being held a prisoner in the mission at La Punta, Nuevo León. Thirdly, they requested the aid of the Spaniards in one last campaign against the Comanches, which they had planned to undertake when the *tuna* season came. To the first two, Rábago readily agreed, but to the third he objected. He finally succeeded in persuading them to give up the idea of such an enterprise, pointing out that it would only serve to bring the northern tribes in search of them. Fray Jiménez was to return to San Bernardo to make arrangements to bring another missionary and as many supplies as he could secure when notified of the return of the Apaches from their buffalo hunt.<sup>20</sup>

*Fray Jiménez requests approval from the College of Querétaro.* It was customary in the case of the founding of new missions to get the approval of the mother college and of viceregal officials. Captain Rábago, in his reappointment to San Sabá, had been instructed and urged to restore the former mission, or to found others in its vicinity. But from this proposal to the selection of an entirely new site, located some thirty or forty leagues from San Sabá was a far cry. Father Jiménez was fully aware of the fact, but realized how, to the innumerable handicaps attendant upon the founding of a new mission, would be added that of incurring the displeasure of his superiors and the viceregal officials. On the other hand,

<sup>20</sup>Fray Jiménez to the Guardian of the College of Querétaro, November 23, 1761; *Auto* of Captain Felipe de Rábago y Terán at Valle de San José, December 31-January 23, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 164-190; Vol. 28, pp. 195-197; Arricivita, *Crónica*, 383; Castañeda, *Morf's History of Texas* (Quivira Society Publications), Vol. VI, pt. 2, pp. 397-399.

the usual routine would consume endless months, perhaps years, and the opportunity would be lost.

Immediately upon his return to Mission San Bernardo, he decided to make a moving appeal to the Guardian of the College of Querétaro, his immediate superior, and to the *Discretorio* in order to acquaint them with the facts and enlist their coöperation in securing viceregal approval. In a detailed memorial he recounted the origins of the idea and proceeded to outline in five points the reasons for immediate action and the manner in which the college could contribute to the success of the enterprise.

In the first place, Captain Rábago y Terán had displayed such zeal and interest in the reduction of the Apaches, that he had succeeded in obtaining their solemn promise to congregate. "Many souls," he said, "may be saved through his efforts . . . if we continue to do that which we should." If the missionaries refused or failed to coöperate with him, they could not escape blame in the future for the failure.

In the second place, he pointed out that never before had he seen the Apaches less opposed to reduction to mission life. "I say less opposed," the good friar explained, "because all these Indians, if I am not mistaken, agree to be congregated half willingly and half unwillingly, as if constrained. This is their attitude until their barbarous nature, softened by instruction in the catechism, becomes more amenable to divine grace." Furthermore, the Indians had come fully to realize the material advantages of mission life at a time when, if left alone or abandoned by the Spaniards, they would be annihilated by the Comanches.

In the third place, he had personally examined the proposed location for the first group of projected missions in the San José Valley (upper Nueces near present Barksdale), as well as the Chanas (Llano) where a second group could be founded later. Both locations offered excellent advantages for the establishment of good Indian pueblos and prosperous Spanish settlements which could develop and exploit the numerous mineral deposits found in the region.

In the fourth place, he called attention to the material needs of the proposed missions, stressing their importance. "Apaches," he explained, "are not, as other Indians, humble of spirit and content to make out poorly with whatever is given them. They are half civilized already, as a result of their constant intercourse with Spaniards and the mission Indians." The viceroy should realize the need of granting the necessary royal aid to furnish the essential supplies to the new missions during the first years. In the meantime, until official approval was obtained, the missions on the Río Grande could furnish corn, beans, tobacco, and some meat, provided

the college authorized the project and assumed the responsibility of repaying Juan Bautista. These establishments had sustained heavy losses in their temporalities in recent years and could ill afford to give their surplus to the new missions without being reimbursed.

Lastly, he begged that the new missionaries assigned for work among the Apaches should be appointed and sent without delay. By the time they arrived everything would be ready for them. "In the meantime," he assured the college, "I shall do whatever is in my power to keep up the work with the help of God."<sup>21</sup>

*Site of new missions.* The site selected was a narrow valley, resembling a canyon, located about halfway between San Juan Bautista on the Río Grande near present Eagle Pass and San Sabá (present Menard). It was about the same distance from San Antonio de Béjar. The river that flowed through the valley had its source some ten leagues (thirty miles) due north and although it flowed southward through the canyon, it inclined gradually to the east after leaving it. Captain Rábago and the *Padres* refer to the stream as the New San Antonio River, but it was in fact the upper Nueces. Along the narrow valley of San José there were numerous springs that flowed into the river. The valley was from five to ten miles wide and some forty or fifty miles long. It was well protected against inclement weather and surprise attack by enemies, being banked on either side by high and steep hills. In the hills that rose almost to the height of mountains, there were rich mineral deposits, according to the natives and those who had explored the country. Elms, cottonwoods, oaks, pecan trees, and sables (evergreens) grew along the valley and in the surrounding hills, furnishing both firewood and timber in abundance. The land in the valley was rich and could be easily cultivated and irrigated. Manuel Valdez and others, who were asked to give official testimony as to its character, declared it was one of the best areas they had ever seen and added that as many as three irrigation ditches could be built to water the land. Corn, beans, and even wheat might be raised in the area chosen for the new missions.

It is to be noted that the location for the first mission was equidistant from San Sabá, San Juan Bautista, and San Antonio. It was some ten leagues from the Chanas (Llano River) and about the same distance from the Cañon de las Lechugas (Fern Canyon). There was one large spring

<sup>21</sup>Fray Diego Jiménez to the Guardian and *Discretorio* of the College of Querétaro, November 23, 1761. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 28, pp. 195-197. The full text of this interesting communication is found in Castañeda, *Morfi's History of Texas*, pt. 2, pp. 398-400.



just east of the river and two smaller ones near it. From this description of the Valley of San José, it could just as well be in the canyon of the upper Nueces as in the canyon of the Frío River. However, the distance to San Sabá, San Antonio, and San Juan Bautista, as well as to the Llano and Cañón de las Lechugas determine with considerable accuracy the actual location as having been at or near present Barksdale on the upper Nueces. If a point of a compass is placed at Barksdale and the other at San Sabá, swinging the instrument around in an arc towards San Antonio, it will be found that it passes over the present site of San Antonio and almost exactly over present Eagle Pass. The location is further confirmed by the specific reference to the Cañón de las Lechugas (Fern Valley) located east of the proposed mission. This can be no other than Río Frío Canyon, which is much narrower and where even today wild ferns abound on its craggy slopes.<sup>22</sup>

*The founding of Mission San Lorenzo del Cañón.* Late in December, Chief Cabezón and his people returned to San Sabá from their buffalo hunt and informed the captain they were ready to be congregated in the Valle de San José. Immediately thirty men were ordered to prepare themselves to accompany them to San José Valley, under the command of a lieutenant. On January 2, 1762, the soldiers and the followers of Chief Cabezón set out from San Sabá. They were soon followed by Captain Rábago. Seven days later, they arrived at their destination and camped by a copious spring on the east bank of the new Río de San Antonio (upper Nueces). Chief Cabezón informed Captain Rábago that this site was the exact location where his people wanted to be established as a mission.

An official exploration of the entire valley was immediately ordered, and a messenger was dispatched to call Fray Jiménez from San Juan Bautista. On January 16, the good friar, who had been anxiously awaiting the good news with hope and fear in his heart, arrived accompanied by Fray Joaquín Baños. He brought a good supply of axes, bars, hoes, and other tools necessary to clear the ground to erect the first buildings, and to begin the tilling of the soil. He also brought the much desired tobacco, some sweet *piloncillos* (brown sugar loaves), corn, beans, clothes, hats, beads, and numerous trinkets so dear to the heart of the Indians. Several yoke of oxen were supplied and a number of mission Indians from San

<sup>22</sup>Auto de Don Felipe de Rábago y Terán, December 31, 1761-January 23, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 164-190; Informe de los Padres Fray Diego Jiménez, Fray Joaquín Baños, and Fray Martín García, February 7, 1761. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 29, pt. 1, pp. 113-115.

Bernardo also came with the *Padres* to instruct the neophytes in the routine of mission life and the cultivation of the fields.

From January 20 to the 22nd, witnesses were formally examined and testimony was taken as to the suitability of the location chosen for the new mission. Lieutenant Manuel Váldez, Sergeant Francisco Longoria, soldiers José Félix Sáenz and Tadeo Flores, and others made detailed reports on the extent of the valley, the character of the soil, the facilities for irrigation, the amount of timber, and the various advantages of the site selected. Lastly the *Padres* were called, the testimony read to them, and their opinion requested. The good friars declared they had personally examined the valley during the last few days and found that the testimony given by the witnesses was true. They added that they were convinced of the existence of mineral deposits in the surrounding hills, and that the valley offered opportunities not only for the cultivation of farm products but of cattle, sheep, and goats. Furthermore, in their opinion the location was well chosen to serve as a base from which to spread their missionary endeavors to the Chanas (Llano River) and even to the Florido (Texas Concho). They added that they were convinced of the sincerity of the Indians, who were more favorably inclined than ever before to accept the teachings of religion and subject themselves to the routine of mission life. In their opinion no time should be lost in carrying out the formal founding of the mission.

The following day, on January 23, 1762, all the Indians and the Spaniards were gathered early in the morning. Through an interpreter, José Antonio, an Apache-Lipan who understood Spanish, the Indians were informed of the decision to establish a mission for them and of the privileges and duties that would accrue to them.

The Indians and the Spaniards made their way to low-lying flat hills near the spring, on the east side of the river, where in the intervening days a temporary shelter had been constructed to serve as a church. The two missionaries now solemnly rang the bell, hastily set up in the provisional shelter. The joyous sound rang across the narrow valley and echoed melodiously in the surrounding hills. As the sweet notes died down three hundred souls, men, women, and children stood before the little mission with anxious eyes and expectant faces, while several hundred more, still suspicious and undetermined whether to join in the ceremony, watched the proceedings from afar. An altar had been erected beneath the open shelter or arbor that could be seen from all sides. A cross, made of solid oak logs, had been set up in front of the chapel. Fray Diego and Fray Joaquín, dressed in their albs and wearing their stoles, formally

blessed the site, prostrating themselves before the cross, barefooted, in veneration. Rising, they intoned a hymn and raised the cross on high. Captain Rábago now came forth and received the cross from the missionaries; the soldiers and the Indians followed behind him in a long procession, as he walked around the proposed site of the new mission and finally deposited the cross on the altar. The *Padres* and the mission Indians from San Bernardo now sang joyously the *Alabado*. This ceremony was followed by the celebration of divine service, at the conclusion of which the *Alabado* was again sung.

Once more the interpreter explained to the assembled Lipan-Apaches how dearly the king desired their conversion and how, if they came to live in the mission and agreed to receive instruction in the Holy Faith, they would be taught how to live like Christians and they would be given food, shelter, and protection against their enemies. The many advantages were described and their duties outlined. To all this they gladly and formally agreed and asked to be placed in possession of the new mission. The captain took the chief by the hand and led him over the grounds assigned to the Indian pueblo that was to be formed in the vicinity of the mission. He then officially appointed Chief Cabezón as governor of the new pueblo, which he called Santa Cruz. Taking Fray Diego Jiménez by the hand, he led him to the temporary structure that served as a church and gave him possession of the mission, placing the establishment under his care and responsibility. Fray Jiménez then named the Mission, San Lorenzo, according to instructions which he had received from the College of Querétaro.<sup>23</sup>

*Solicitude of the missionaries.* The joy of the good *Padres* was tainted by an intimate foreboding of impending failure. A mission had been established, but it was forty leagues from the Presidio of San Sabá, it had not been approved by the viceroy, it had meager supplies, and it was surrounded by numerous hostile and treacherous Apaches, who on the least provocation might turn against the missionaries themselves. They knew from previous experience, that the Apaches were not satisfied with polite half rations, that they were by nature arrogant and little inclined to work. They were well supplied with horses, well equipped with arms and ammunition, and used to trade advantageously with the Spaniards and the French. They demanded an abundance of buffalo meat or beef, good and plentiful corn, tobacco, beans, pumpkins, and water-

<sup>23</sup>Autos del Capitán Don Felipe de Rábago y Terán, December 31-January 23, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 164-190; Arricivita, *Crónica*, 383-385.

melons, and requested Spanish clothes, copper kettles, *metates* and *comales* (grindstones and flat irons used for cooking).

In a petition to Captain Rábago the two friars pointed out the material needs of the enterprise, but explained that these could all be taken care of by the *Padres* until the viceroy approved the project. However, there was one need which only Rábago could supply, which was essential to the success of the new mission. The presence of the captain, with whom the Indians had in fact bargained, and of a respectable guard was indispensable. Only in this way could the neophytes be made to fulfill their promises and to submit to the routine and discipline of mission life until the new habits of orderly and uniform living were formed. The nature of the Apaches and the particular circumstances that had attended the founding of the new mission made their request all the more urgent and necessary. Without his presence and an adequate guard there was great danger that the whole enterprise would fail.

Captain Rábago was impatient to return to San Sabá, fully aware that praiseworthy though the enterprise might be, he was exceeding his instructions and that his prolonged absence from his presidio constituted in fact a serious breach of duty. He consequently agreed to leave twenty men under the command of Lieutenant Manuel Valdez to guard the new mission, and to send the missionaries such supplies as he could spare, with the understanding that when viceregal approval was obtained and royal aid granted to the mission he would be reimbursed for all expenses incurred.

Just at this time, there came a letter from San Sabá informing Captain Rábago of the arrival of a Texas chief called El Turnio (Cross-eyed) with a numerous following, who wished to be congregated. The captain lost no time now. He immediately left for San Sabá, giving instructions to Father Fray Diego Jiménez to join him as soon as possible in order to enter into an agreement with the new petitioner.<sup>24</sup>

*The founding of Mission Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria.* Thus hardly had Mission San Lorenzo been established when it was left in charge of Fray Joaquín Baños, protected by twenty soldiers, while Captain Rábago and Fray Diego hurried back to San Sabá to plan another mission. They were met by Chief Turnio and Chief Panocha (Pancake), who expressed a vehement desire to be placed in a mission with all their people.

<sup>24</sup>Petition of Padre Diego Jiménez and Joaquín Baños, January 26, 1762; Autos del Capitán Rábago y Terán, same date. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 191-197. Fray Diego Jiménez to Fray Manuel Nájera, February 5, 1762, in *Ibid.*, pp. 51-62. Arricivita, *op. cit.*, 384-385.



It seems they wished to be established in the Chanas (Llano River). After several councils held at San Sabá, it was decided to go to the new Mission of San Lorenzo in San José Valley in the upper Nueces to choose a convenient spot near the recently founded mission. Chief Turnio and Chief Panocha remonstrated that they had one hundred and fourteen warriors in addition to the women and children, which made a total of over three hundred souls, and that they wanted to be put in a mission near a spring on the west side of the river some four leagues (eight or ten miles) below San Lorenzo. They declared they wanted an adequate guard to protect them against attack, and according to Arricivita, they frankly told Captain Rábago that he must furnish a sufficient number of soldiers to make their people work. They assured the missionaries that by the time the corn had come up in the new fields many more members of the tribe would come to live in the mission.

Both the *Padres* and Captain Rábago were anxious and willing to grant the request of the two chiefs, but both realized their limited resources of food and men. Rábago agreed to place an additional guard of ten men in the new mission, being the most he could spare, and the good friars agreed to take upon themselves the responsibility of the spiritual and material administration. With misgivings in their hearts, the new mission was decided upon.

On February 8, 1762, Captain Rábago and Father Jiménez went to the chosen site, some ten miles south of present Barksdale, and where Montell is now located. Mass was said, the Indians were given to understand their duties and obligations through an interpreter, and formal possession was given them of the mission site in the name of the king. Chief Turnio was appointed governor of the new pueblo, and his brother, Chief Panocha, was made *Alcalde*. Father Jiménez was placed in charge of the new mission, which was officially called Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria.<sup>25</sup>

*Attempt to secure approval.* Contrary to the usual practice two missions had been founded within a month. The new commander of San Sabá and the energetic successor of the martyred Father Fray Giraldo de Terreros had boldly taken upon themselves the responsibility in a heroic effort to reduce the treacherous Apaches to mission life, before their fickle natures caused them to change their minds. But both felt

<sup>25</sup>Fray Diego Jiménez to Fray Manuel Nájera, February 5, 1762; Captain Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, February 6, 1762; *Auto* of Rábago y Terán, February 7-8, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 61-62, 201-206. Arricivita, *Crónica*, 385-386.

they had acted hastily and made strenuous efforts to secure official sanction to insure the success of the daring enterprise.

Three days before the formal founding of Mission Candelaria on the upper Nueces, Fray Jiménez made an ardent appeal to the Commissary General Fray Manuel Nájera. Over three hundred Indians had been settled in Mission San Lorenzo and another group just as large was about to be congregated, he explained. Their reduction might lead eventually to the conversion of the whole *Apachería*, consisting of over three thousand souls. The approval of the viceroy and the granting of the necessary support for the development of the proposed missions were of the greatest importance. He warned the Commissary General that personal opposition to Rábago for his past misdeeds would endanger the success of the enterprise. Whatever the former career of this man might have been, he was now displaying the most fervent zeal for the reduction of the Apaches and deserved to be supported in his earnest efforts. He appealed to the material importance of occupying the new region, extolling its beauty and natural resources. Incidentally he described how he was living in a tent and how a recent snowfall had not chilled his enthusiasm. Before he dispatched the letter the second Mission of Candelaria had been founded.<sup>26</sup>

The letter must have been dispatched by special messenger, for by February 22, it had reached the College of Querétaro and had been read by the *Discretorio*. The council of the College enthusiastically lauded the work of Fray Jiménez and his companion Fray Baños. They endorsed the recommendation of the zealous missionaries and officially petitioned the approval of the viceroy and solicited his aid. They declared that the enterprise had the full approbation of the College and that they were ready to send any number of missionaries that might be needed for the conversion and reduction of the Apaches.<sup>27</sup>

Captain Rábago also promptly reported the formal founding of Mission San Lorenzo on February 6, and informed the viceroy that he was about to found Candelaria. He deplored the circumstances that had made it necessary to establish them at a spot so distant from the Presidio of San Sabá and explained the difficulties of providing adequate military protection. He suggested that in view of the need of additional troops a part of the garrison of Presidio of Coahuila (Monclova) might be used.

<sup>26</sup>Fray Diego Jiménez to Fray Manuel Nájera, February 5, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 61-62.

<sup>27</sup>*Discretorio* to the Viceroy, February 22, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, p. 63.

In the present location this post had become practically useless. Monclova was adequately protected on the west by the Hacienda of Aguayo, where the Marquis maintained a private company of soldiers, on the north by Presidio del Sacramento and the more recently established Presidio of La Junta de los Rios, while to the east and south were the presidios of Nuevo Santander and Nuevo León.<sup>28</sup>

*Progress at Missions San Lorenzo and Candelaria.* Within a week after their establishment the number of Indians congregated in each mission had increased to four hundred. Five neophytes in each had been baptized with great solemnity and there was much rejoicing. The hope of converting the three thousand members of the Apache nation had again warmed the hearts of the enthusiastic missionaries, who momentarily forgot their misgivings and former disappointments. Faithfully they toiled day after day, waiting every minute for the formal approval of the project and the sorely needed aid and support of the royal treasury. Spring passed and summer came, but no news of action by the viceroy arrived. The dreaded enemy made its appearance in May in the vicinity and ruthlessly destroyed several *rancherías* of Apaches who had not joined the missions. This greatly disturbed the neophytes, who became more apprehensive when the Comanches repeated their depredations in July and the mission guards were unable or unwilling to go out in pursuit of them.

In spite of repeated dangers and the slight inclination of the unreliable neophytes to work, the *Padres* succeeded in planting six and a half *fanegas* of corn (some twelve bushels). The crop was well tended and soon there was an abundance of roasting ears. But long before the corn was ripe it was consumed by the numerous roving tribes that visited the mission and who were treated kindly in order to attract them. While some cultivated the fields, led and encouraged by the mission Indians brought from San Bernardo, others made adobes (mud bricks) and patiently began the construction of a church. By the end of the summer, the church of San Lorenzo was completed and a decent sacristy and monastery for the missionaries were erected. Almost as important to mission life was the granary in which the grain and supplies were kept. One had been started and would be finished in October. Plans also had

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<sup>28</sup>Rábago to the Viceroy, February 6, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 294-306.

been made to begin the construction of permanent houses for the soldiers and neophytes.<sup>29</sup>

*Difficulties and troubles.* But the failure to harvest the corn planted, the threatened raids of the Comanches and the lack of supplies had hampered the work of the missionaries considerably and had forced them to permit the neophytes to go on buffalo hunts to relieve their immediate wants. In September, Chief Cabezón, Chief Boruca (Chatter Box), Chief Borrado (Brown), and Chief Cojo (Peg Leg) had been allowed to go to gather *tunas* (prickly pears). The Indians had begged for permission to absent themselves primarily for lack of food, but their growing fear of the marauding Comanches and the lack of confidence in the ability of the mission guard to protect them against attack was likewise an important factor. The mission guard assigned to the two new establishments was plainly inadequate. The lack of proper support to meet the most urgent needs of the neophytes made it impossible to enforce the missionary routine and resulted in a relaxation of discipline. Success without more effective protection and a more determined support of the enterprise by viceregal authorities was impossible.

Furthermore the missionaries learned early in October that the governor and other officials of Coahuila and Texas had recently made a formal complaint against the Apaches, blaming them for depredations committed on the frontier settlements of the two provinces. The missionaries and Rábago protested that even if the accusation was true, it should not be assumed that the guilty Apaches were from among those now congregated in the San José Valley, (Upper Nueces). The Apaches included the Mescaleros and the Natages, besides the Lipans. But only the latter were congregated here. The Lipans of the two new missions had not absented themselves without permission since their reduction. Consequently it was unfair to lay the responsibility for the recent depredations upon them.

Fray Jiménez urgently requested Rábago to explain these circumstances to the viceroy and demanded that proper protection and adequate supplies be furnished. The missions at San Juan Bautista could no longer support the two new establishments. If Rábago could not continue to help them and secure royal approval, the missions could not be maintained much longer.

<sup>29</sup>Fray Jiménez to Captain Rábago, October 8, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 150-156. Copy also in *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1748-1763), pt. 2, pp. 148-152.



The letter of Fray Jiménez was received on October 14, 1762, and the following day it was transmitted to the viceroy by Rábago, with a personal report on the trying and almost desperate conditions that prevailed in the two new missions. He not only reiterated what Fray Jiménez so vividly described, but added his personal plea and begged the viceroy to grant royal aid to them before it was too late.<sup>30</sup>

*Appeal to the Commissary General.* Despair was beginning to grip the heart of the zealous Fray Jiménez. Late in October, 1762, he received a letter from Fray Manuel Náxera, written on February 27, informing him that the request for approval and aid had been presented to the viceroy, but that he had expressed an aversion to the new enterprise. Fray Jiménez hastened to recount the success attained in spite of handicaps and difficulties, and declared that the Indians gathered in the new missions seemed more amenable to instruction than ever before. "Although they persist in a thousand errors learned from their forefathers, they listen to me gladly and show little repulsion," he explained. But all the efforts of the missionaries and the favorable attitude of the Lipans would be of little avail "if His Excellency, the Viceroy, delayed the necessary approval any longer." A sufficient number of soldiers and an adequate supply of food were indispensable.

Fray Jiménez complained bitterly against the attempt being made by the Governor of Texas to befriend the northern tribes. The reported peace with the Comanches had greatly aroused the suspicions of the Apaches. These fears had been increased by the raids during the summer. Indians of San Lorenzo and Candelaria had told him in all earnestness that among the Comanches that attacked the Lipan *rancherías* in the vicinity of the Valle de San José, two Spanish soldiers and four mission Indians from San Antonio had been seen. "This has persuaded some," the good friar said, "that we have gathered them at this site in order to turn them over to their enemies." He pointed out emphatically that the reduction of the Apaches and peace with the Comanches "were two objects entirely dissimilar." Fray Mariano meant well in his efforts to befriend the northern tribes, but he was mistaken in his policy.

He seriously suggested the establishment of a new presidio in the Valle de San José to protect the two missions and permit the extension of missionary activity to the other Apache tribes. Failure to take active

<sup>30</sup>Fray Diego Jiménez to Captain Rábago, October 8, 1762, in *Ibid.*, 149-152; Captain Rábago to the Viceroy, October 15, 1762. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1748-1763, pt. 2), pp. 146-49.

measures immediately "and the opposition to the missions growing every day, unless God takes a hand, an enterprise will be lost," he concluded, "which would have been one of the most glorious of our day, the conversion of all the Apaches and the settlement of more than two hundred leagues of good land, said to be rich in minerals also."<sup>31</sup>

*Viceregal inquiry concerning new missions.* Almost at the same time that Fray Jiménez was making a desperate attempt for aid, the viceroy formally requested a report on conditions at Valle de San José and the need of the missions. But, although the request was issued on October 1, 1762, it was not received until January, 1763. In compliance with the viceregal decree, Fray Jiménez and his new assistant Fray Manuel Antonio de Cuevas prepared a report, which gives us a detailed description of conditions at San Lorenzo and Candelaria almost one year after their establishment.

Replying as to the general attitude of the Apaches, the two missionaries earnestly declared that they were more docile than ever before; that they showed more inclination to work; that they brought their children to be baptized and called the *Padres* when they were sick. Still more, they did not dare leave the missions without the consent of the friars. In former years, when at San Sabá, the same Indians would not hear the word of God preached, nor would they do any work in the missions, declaring it was the duty of the Spaniards and the docile Indians from other missions to cultivate the fields for them, alleging they had to go on frequent hunts to keep from getting sick. All this was changed now.

As to the number congregated, they declared that four chiefs had joined the two missions: Cabezón, Borrado, Boruca, and El Cojo. Two others had recently promised to come to live with the *Padres*, and a third, who had recovered his health, when baptized on the point of death, was also ready to join. But the missionaries did not urge them to carry out their good intentions, because they could not feed them with the scant supplies at their command. According to the Lipans there were about three thousand Apaches, including the Mescaleros, Natages, and Pelones. Of these, over four hundred were now living in the two missions. When these were completely converted and civilized, they would contribute greatly to the reduction of all their kinsmen.

With regard to their character, these Indians, the friars declared, were

<sup>31</sup>Fray Jiménez to Fray Manuel Nájera, Commissary General, October 28, 1762. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 28, pp. 197-200. The full text of this letter is translated in Castañeda, *Morfi's History of Texas*, Vol. VI, pt. 2, pp. 402-404. (Quivira Society Publications, Vol. VI.)

by nature distrustful and disloyal. Like all natives, they were inordinately fond of stealing, restless, insolent, and suspicious. Much like children, they frequently became obsessed with strange delusions and were convinced that the Spaniards were planning to betray them. On one occasion, while out hunting, an Indian chief had a dream that the Spaniards had abandoned the missions at Valle de San José and taken all the women and children to sell them into slavery. Convinced in his mind of the truth of his dreams, he aroused the whole tribe and returned posthaste to San Lorenzo only to find that nothing had happened. He then accused the women of living in sin with the soldiers and the mission Indians from San Juan Bautista, a falsehood that was easily disproved. Another conceived the idea that he ought to kill a *Padre*. For several days he sat in ambush with a gun in his hand. "Fortunately he changed his mind," says Fray Jiménez, "before he had an opportunity to put his ill-advised desire into practice." A third decided that he would use the altar covering for a breech cloth and only the strongest persuasion on the part of the missionaries held him from his purpose. Possession of firearms by a majority of the natives made their whims and plots all the more serious.

The most essential need was, the good *Padres* concluded, an adequate military guard, preferably a presidio in the vicinity of the two new missions. A larger number of soldiers or a regular presidio and garrison would induce the Indians already congregated to submit to mission routine; it would teach them respect for authority; it would give them a reassuring feeling of security; and it would enable the missionaries to extend their activities to the other tribes of the Apache family, such as the Natages, Mescaleros, and Pelones.

Equally important for the success of the enterprise was the duty to furnish the new missions the necessary supplies to feed and clothe all the neophytes until the establishment became self-supporting. If the food was insufficient, it was inevitable that the Indians should be allowed to go in search of sustenance. Under such conditions it was impossible to keep them in the missions under a routine conducive to the formation of systematic habits of industry and application. The usual grant of money made by the king for this purpose to all new missions was indispensable. "We humbly beg Your Excellency," the two friars implored, "the alms with which the king in his charity is wont to aid new missions."<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup>Fray Manuel Jiménez and Fray Manuel Antonio de Cuevas to the Viceroy, January 25, 1763. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1748-1763, pt. 2), pp. 140-146. A similar letter with some slight variations and dated January 3, in *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 29, pt. 1, pp. 168-173. The same letter is quoted in full

Captain Rábago y Terán transmitted the report promptly on January 27, 1763, merely adding that the twenty soldiers stationed in the Valle de San José were insufficient to afford adequate protection to the two new missions, and deploring his inability to extend them more help because of the distance from San Sabá.<sup>33</sup> Four days later he explained his difficult position. During the previous summer the Taovayas and their northern allies had repeatedly raided the vicinity of the presidio and actually killed two soldiers and carried away seventy horses on June 23. He was so short of men, as a result of the detachment of soldiers sent to protect the new missions, that pursuit of the enemy had been impossible. The rumored peace with the northern Indians had created serious doubts as to the sincerity of the Spaniards among the Apaches. The hostilities of their enemies during the summer had only added to their general apprehension.<sup>34</sup>

*New presidio suggested.* Rábago y Terán seems to have contemplated the possibility of establishing a new presidio in the Valle de San José under his immediate jurisdiction. Such a presidio would have afforded the new mission the desired protection, but it would have also increased considerably the expense of the royal treasury and given the commander of San Sabá not only more power and prestige but more profits as well. The missionaries and Rábago had previously hinted rather broadly the advisability of a new presidio. The utilization of part or all of the garrison of Monclova, generally referred to as Presidio de Coahuila, was advanced by Rábago in 1762. He now took up the matter again in more detail, encouraged by the report of the missionaries, in which the idea was openly sponsored. Arguing that no trust could be placed in the overtures for peace made by the northern tribes, and citing the repeated attacks of these Indians as proof of their perfidy, he suggested that a new presidio with a garrison of fifty men be established in Valle de San José to protect the two new missions and to encourage the settlement of Spanish families. This measure would release the twenty soldiers of the Presidio of San Sabá, who could return to their regular post. He could then effectively repel the attack of the raiding parties that had impudently threatened the weakened garrison, and he could pursue them to chastise their insolence.

by Arricivita in his *Crónica*, pp. 386-389, but he dates it January 24, 1763. There are some variations in the text of the three documents, perhaps traceable to the copyist.

<sup>33</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, January 27, 1763. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1748-1763, pt. 2), p. 140.

<sup>34</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, January 31, 1763, in *Ibid.*, pp. 164-171.

In order to force a decision, Rábago y Terán declared that the plan outlined was indispensable to the maintenance of San Sabá. He knew full well how the viceroy's advisers were set on the maintenance of this fort for reasons of sentiment and hoped to carry out his purpose in this way. Under the present conditions, the garrison was divided and consequently rendered impotent to resist attack effectively at San Sabá or to afford adequate protection to the new missions in the Valle de San José. Thus the garrison accomplished neither of its objects.

There were forty leagues from San Sabá to the Valle de San José. The more vigorous attacks of the northern tribes made the defence of San Sabá impossible with a reduced garrison. Consequently Rábago urged, in conclusion, that if a new presidio with a garrison of fifty soldiers could not be established for the protection of the new missions in order to restore San Sabá to its full strength, it would be best to abandon the post on the San Sabá River and remove the entire garrison to the Valle de San José. It was the only alternative in view of existing conditions.<sup>35</sup>

It was a bold move on the part of Rábago, but it clearly revealed the motives of his great zeal and interest in the establishment of new missions for the Apaches in the Valle de San José. While there can be little doubt of the earnest desire of the missionaries to convert these Indians, who had so long expressed a wish to become Christians, it seems that Rábago's real interest was his own material advantage. From this time until the final abandonment of the Valle de San José project his end becomes more and more evident.

*Refusal of the viceroy to approve the new missions and the establishment of a presidio in the Valle de San José.* The viceroy apparently saw through the designs of Rábago. He was suspicious from the very beginning. But the powerful *Auditor*, Domingo Valcarcel, befriended him and tried to get the approval of his schemes. In a report made on March 16, he summarized the recommendations of the missionaries and of Rábago y Terán in regard to the plans for the permanent occupation of Valle de San José. He favorably reviewed the advantages of establishing a new presidio, pointing out at the same time that San Sabá should not be abandoned. In his opinion the matter should be referred to the *Fiscal* for his serious study. The viceroy followed the advice without expressing his opinion, and the *Fiscal* instead of making any recommendations seems to have called for further information.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>35</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, January 31, 1763. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1748-1763, pt. 2), pp. 164-171.

<sup>36</sup>Domingo Valcarcel to the Viceroy, March 16, 1763. In *Ibid*, 171-174.

*Efforts to save the new missions.* When new information was requested, the missionaries, who had no particular interest in a presidio and ardently desired the indispensable royal aid to continue their labors, lost no time in advancing every argument possible to attain their purpose. Captain Lorenzo Cancio of Presidio de Coahuila (Monclova) was asked to secure the desired information. The viceroy and his advisers were at this time seriously trying to get a better understanding of the various Indian nations that harassed the entire Spanish frontier from New Mexico to Texas. Conflicting reports from officials in the two provinces made it impossible to determine the general policy to be adopted in regard to the various Indian tribes.

*The Apache Nations.* When Cancio submitted a questionnaire to the missionaries of the Valle de San José on September 12, 1763, they replied in detail. This document contains invaluable information about the various nations of the great Apache family. They declared that the Mescaleros were an Apache nation, known by this name since 1722. Although ranging more to the north and west than the Valle de San José and the San Sabá, the Mescaleros raided the outposts of both New Mexico and Coahuila and at times had attacked presidios in Texas. Closely allied to the Mescaleros were the Pelones (Roundheads, called such, because of the manner in which they cut their hair) and the Faraones (Pharos). The raids of these three nations, who were Apaches, had temporarily decreased after the establishment of San Sabá, but in the last year or two their attacks had become frequent. Although all three were Apaches and spoke similar dialects, they maintained their tribal identity and intermarried sparingly. The Lipans, who were also Apaches, were the only ones who had sincerely become friends of the Spaniards and were now congregated in part in the new missions. The Mescaleros no longer intermarried with the Lipans. They still traded amicably, but they met together much less frequently. In late years, the Mescaleros had actually begun to prey upon the property of the Lipans, because the latter had refused to join the former in their raids on Spanish outposts. But the Lipans were the firm friends of the Spaniards, and if they were completely won over and Christianized, they would prove an invaluable help in the conversion of the other Apache nations, who spoke a similar dialect and had more or less similar habits.

The Lipans were an idolatrous nation. They had no set places of worship nor heathen temples, but their high priests or wizards carried their idols with them. One of the idols had been turned over to the missionaries. It was a rudely shaped figure made of stuffed skins resembling

a human being with the face painted. The Indians would not reveal the rites they performed, nor the ceremonies held in honor of their idols. It was known, however, that many of the dance festivals were part of their religious ritual and it seems that the Lipans offered occasional human sacrifice to their more honored and feared idols, the victims being captives taken in war.

The gods of the Lipans told them, through the wizards of the tribes (Santones), when their enemies were near or far, when the buffaloes were plentiful, and when was the best time for them to hunt. When a new house was built by a family, the medicine men of the tribe assumed the form of buffaloes and prognosticated the future of those who were to reside in the new dwelling. It was a firm belief among the Lipans that their medicine men could cause or stop floods and droughts.

The Lipans believed in life after death and buried their dead with great ceremony. They not only dressed the deceased in his best finery, but they placed beside him his arms and a liberal supply of water and food. They generally practiced polygamy and baptized their children giving them names of stones, trees, flowers, and other objects of nature.<sup>37</sup>

On January 18, 1764, Fray Acisclos Valverde, as guardian of the College of Querétaro, made a moving appeal to the viceroy. He explained how the Apache-Lipans had refused to be congregated at San Sabá after the destruction of the mission founded by the martyred Father Giraldo de Terreros, and how, as the result of their unshakable fear, it had been decided to establish missions for them at El Cañón on the upper Nueces. Father Jiménez had founded two missions there in 1762, with the coöperation of Captain Rábago. For two years the faithful missionaries had maintained the two missions at great sacrifice. But they could not go on indefinitely without royal aid. He implored the viceroy to give his personal approval and grant the two missions of San Lorenzo de la Santa Cruz and Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria the funds given customarily by the king.

In a final effort to secure the long delayed approval, Father Fray Hemenegildo Vilaplana personally appealed to the viceroy. He remonstrated that the missions would have to be abandoned if no aid was granted, confirmed what Fray Valverde had so eloquently described in his memorial, and requested that the usual money be granted before it was too late. If the project met with viceregal approval, instructions should also

<sup>37</sup>Respuesta de los Padres al Sor. Cancio a barios puntos de un informe, September 19, 1763; Relación de la Presidencia del Río Grande del Norte desde octubre de 1768-hta. diciembre de este (1764). *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 29, pt. 1, pp. 173-185.

be issued for the increase of the guard assigned to the missions, and a regular garrison should be established for their protection and the encouragement of the neophytes in their daily tasks.<sup>38</sup>

But the viceroy was still undecided and faced with numerous problems that seemed more pressing than the welfare of the two unfortunate missions on the upper Nueces. On February 24, the indefatigable *Auditor* Domingo Valcarcel, to whom the two petitions for approval and help were referred, made his recommendations. He pointed out that the founding of the two new missions at El Cañón and the attending circumstances had been duly reported both by the missionaries and Captain Rábago y Terán; that the need of a new presidio with an additional garrison had been argued; and that, while awaiting the decision of His Excellency, Father Jiménez had used every means in his power to maintain the missions, securing the assistance of Fray Manuel Antonio de Cuevas. The various reports on the establishment and progress made had been previously referred to him, and he had made his recommendations. Under the circumstances, he was of the opinion that the two memorials be sent to the *Fiscal* for his opinion.<sup>39</sup> The recommendations were sent to the *Fiscal* together with the additional information, but this official had conceived a dislike for Rábago y Terán, whose selfish motives he suspected. Furthermore, a new inspection of the entire frontier was already being considered, and the *Fiscal* felt it would be best to postpone action until conditions were reported by an impartial observer.

*Conditions at El Cañón in 1764.* In the meantime the missionaries were experiencing the most trying conditions. They had to depend on the missions at San Juan Bautista and those of San Antonio for what supplies they could get. Captain Rábago y Terán, who realized that his hope of securing the approval of a new garrison for the Cañón enterprise depended on the maintenance of the missions, did everything he could to help the missionaries secure the needed food, seed, and livestock. But as time dragged on and the sorely needed royal aid was not granted, his resources also began to fail. Three years had passed and the expected amount had not been sent. Nevertheless, in spite of the shortage of food and resources, the two missions were in a flourishing state spiritually. Each had four hundred neophytes in December, 1764.

<sup>38</sup>Fray Acisclos Valverde to the Viceroy, January 18, 1764; Fray Hemenegildo Vilaplana to the Viceroy, February 21, 1764. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 12, pp. 94-101; 193-195.

<sup>39</sup>Domingo Valcarcel to the Viceroy, February 24, 1764. *San Francisco el Grande Archive*, Vol. 12, pp. 105-108.



But each year in December and January, the neophytes practically abandoned the missions to go in search of food. At this time the buffalo cows and calves were fat and came out on the plains. All the able-bodied men, boys, and even some of the women went out to provide themselves with buffalo meat. Again in May and June, they sallied forth, this time to kill buffalo bulls to replenish their scanty supply of food.<sup>40</sup> How could the missionaries instruct them in the *fatih* and teach them the habits of industry and perseverance under such a system? But Father Jiménez clung tenaciously to his task and with the ever-present hope of the long expected royal aid that would enable his neophytes to remain in the missions the whole year, labored unceasingly to curb their unruly natures and incline them to the sweetness of Christian love.

In 1763, a smallpox epidemic invaded the two missions and made deep inroads in the ranks of the already discouraged neophytes. Their first impulse was to flee from the dreaded disease. This was their time-honored practice, abandoning the sick to a lonely death. But the zealous missionaries found the desired opportunity in this misfortune to exercise their charity in comforting the afflicted. They redoubled their efforts in ministering to those in distress, and persuaded the majority to stay and help their brethren. In San Lorenzo Mission, forty children and twenty-seven adults were baptized during the epidemic, while in Candelaria, five children and two adults received the cleansing waters.<sup>41</sup>

By 1766, Mission Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria had taken the semblance of a formal establishment in spite of the sustained opposition of viceregal officials, who, although they had not ordered its abandonment, had practically ignored its existence. A decent friary and chapel of *adobes* had been erected near a beautiful spring of clear cold water that formed a small rivulet which flowed into the Nueces River a short distance beyond. There was also a large *jacal* made of brush and mud, that served as a granary and warehouse. Around these two buildings were the huts of the neophytes, temporary structures that were never replaced by more permanent homes. Fields had been cleared in the vicinity, but these were poorly cultivated.

Five leagues upstream, on the opposite bank of the Nueces was Mission San Lorenzo de la Santa Cruz, commonly called Mission del Cañón. Here were stationed the thirty men assigned for its protection and that

<sup>40</sup>Relación de las misiones de la Presidencia del Río Grande del Norte desde October de 58 hta. Diziembre de este (1764). *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 29, pt. 1, pp. 180-185. Arricivita, *Crónica*, 390-391.

<sup>41</sup>Relación de las misiones . . . *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 29, pt. 1, pp. 180-185.

of Candelaria. It, too, had a friary, its chapel, soldiers' quarters, and a granary. Lafora, during his visit with the Marqués de Rubí, drew a plan of the mission which may come to light some day. The experienced engineer criticized its location as poorly chosen for defense. It was provided, however, with two small cannon to repel attack and had a rude fortification in the shape of a quadrangle around it. "These buildings," Lafora explains, "were constructed by the Lipans to please and flatter the missionaries, making them believe they would subject themselves to the discipline of a permanent settlement, which they never did, taking advantage of the simplicity and credulity of the missionaries."<sup>42</sup> But the Lipans would not have so easily robbed the missionaries of their glorious dream had they been backed more resolutely by governmental officials. They were neither so credulous nor so simple in their hopes as the Marqués de Rubí and his observant engineer-secretary would make us believe.

"It was an imperfect conversion," says Arricivita, the official chronicler of the Querétaran missions, "because the Indians, being left to enjoy their barbarous freedom, no fatigues or efforts on the part of the missionaries availed to improve them . . . These Lipan Indians made constant raids and thefts in Chihuahua and brought before the eyes of the missionaries countless saddles, harnesses, mules, and horses taken from the Spaniards, all of which revealed how urgent was the need of checking a freedom so pernicious, and of reducing them by means more steadfast to the laws of Christianity." The missionaries fully realized the extent of their task. They were not deceived by the wiles of the treacherous Lipans, but they were determined to convert them to Christianity at all cost. They failed in their efforts because of lack of support and coöperation.<sup>43</sup>

These two missions on the upper Nueces were unique in the history of missionary endeavors in Texas. They were founded and maintained for six years without official approval or aid, and cost the royal treasury nothing. They were the product of missionary zeal, a monument to the enterprise, determination, and faith of Fray Diego Jiménez, President of the missions of San Juan Bautista on the Río Grande. They offer a remarkable contrast to the Orcoquisac venture in which, although full viceregal support was granted, and the necessary funds were provided, the enterprise failed through the petty and selfish quarrels of civil officials in Texas.

<sup>42</sup>Lafora, Nicolas. *Relación del viage que . . . hizo el capitán de ingenieros . . .* ff. 60-61.

<sup>43</sup>Arricivita, *Crónica*, 390.

Fray Arricivita has summed up in a fitting manner the spirit that animated the missionaries of El Cañón. When after seven years of incredible hardships and superhuman efforts, the devoted friars were forced to abandon the enterprise: "The missionaries left," says Arricivita, "without having to abandon the fruit of their labors. The total result of eight years of work were eighty baptisms in *articulo mortis* and a few children who were freely offered to them during the first years of the two missions. But they departed with flaming candles in their hand, with charity burning in their soul, with piety in their heart, with undaunted zeal in their work. In their face there shone a new hope, in their dress, their poverty, in their cruel adversities, their patient suffering. This alone crowned their labors in their long sufferance of the ungrateful, treacherous, ambitious, and selfish barbarians, whom they could find no means of redeeming even to the rank of neophytes."<sup>44</sup>

*Comanche attacks on San Sabá, 1764-1767.* It was the Apaches themselves who brought down upon their heads the renewed attacks of their traditional enemies. Hardly had they settled down in the new missions at El Cañón, than feeling secure in the secluded canyons of the Frío and the upper Nueces, they began to plan and to carry out successive raids upon the Comanches. After each semiannual expedition, they dispatched the old men and the women back to the missions with the fruits of their hunt, while all the able-bodied men went into the lands of the Comanches to taunt them and take revenge. After a rapid descent upon their enemies, they hurried back to the security of the hilly country beyond the Frío and the upper Nueces. As soon as they reached the Cañón de las Lechugas, Frío Canyon, just above present Sabinal, they felt perfectly safe and foolishly abandoned all caution. For two or three years their very daring surprised the Comanches, who would pursue them to the outskirts of the hilly country and turn back, fearful of ambush in the forbidding territory beyond the Frío. But repetition of the raids eventually forced the Comanches in desperation to follow the Lipans to their headquarters.

The *Padres* had often warned their unruly wards to desist from hostile attacks on the Comanches. In vain they tried to reason with them that their enemies would pursue them to the missions themselves and destroy them. In vain they pleaded with them, pointing out it was un-Christian to taunt the Comanches and take revenge upon them. They threatened their wards with refusal of permission to go on the semiannual buffalo

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<sup>44</sup>Arricivita, *Crónica*, 393.

hunts, if they did not agree to return directly to the missions. But the wily Lipans knew the threat could not be enforced.

The Comanches began to press the Spanish outpost on the San Sabá, more openly located than the new missions, and Captain Rábago y Terán felt the need of more men and of more adequate armament. Early in 1764 he reported a serious attack on Presidio de San Sabá and urged the immediate dispatch of ammunition, arms, and two new swivel guns. The viceroy replied on February 17 that he had issued instructions to Governor Lorenzo Cancio in Coahuila to send him the necessary munitions and the required swivel guns.<sup>45</sup>

A year rolled by but neither the ammunition nor the swivel guns arrived. The Comanches had learned by now that in January the Lipans went on their buffalo hunt and that the Presidio de San Sabá was left more defenseless than usual. In January, 1765, a band of Comanches lay in wait at the entrance of Lechuga canyon (Río Frío canyon) where they surprised a small detachment of Spanish soldiers on the *Camino Real*. The soldiers had been sent in pursuit of a deserter from Presidio de San Sabá. As they made their way back with the prisoner and his wife, the Indians attacked the party, killed three men and the woman, and allowed the corporal to escape. He arrived in San Sabá and reported the enemy, thus averting a surprise.<sup>46</sup>

By 1766 the Comanches had lost their fear of the hilly country south of San Sabá and west of Río Frío. This year they planned to surprise the Lipans in the Mission of San Lorenzo and to destroy them if possible with one blow. Without waiting for them to set out on their buffalo hunt, they silently stole into the canyon of the upper Nueces and approached to within a quarter of a league from the mission. El Turnio and his people had abandoned the mission early in the fall, feigning displeasure, but perhaps more likely forewarned of the impending danger by their spies. The thirty soldiers assigned for the protection of the mission and a small number of Lipans were at San Lorenzo, when a man who had gone out to gather wood early in the morning discovered the enemy and hurriedly returned, giving loud warning to the unsuspecting establishment. Everybody rushed to the mission and prepared to defend himself.

The mission had a square seventy *varas* on each side, protected by walls that were far from defensible, if vigorously attacked. There were

<sup>45</sup>The Viceroy to Rábago y Terán, February 17, 1764. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 36-37.

<sup>46</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, January 25, 1765. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 46-47.

two bulwarks crowned by two swivel guns. Only one gate gave admittance to the enclosure. The enemy soon came in sight. About three hundred men, most of them mounted and armed with guns, lances, and the dreaded Indian hatchets, approached the mission. The men on foot were equipped with bows and arrows. They dashed forward firing a shower of arrows and bullets, spurring their advance with a deafening din of blood-curdling yells. So sudden was the attack that the first drive reached almost to the walls of the mission. The soldiers within the enclosure returned the fire and used the two swivel guns to advantage. The Comanches gave way opposite the bulwarks, and the soldiers, elated by the initial success, removed one of the cannons from its parapet to use it on another side where the Indians were more concentrated. But without the protection of the bulwark, the men were unable to serve the gun under the withering fire of the Comanches. The attackers withdrew to a safe distance, dismounted, and returned the fire upon the defenders of the mission from behind rocks, trees, and the banks of the small stream that ran nearby. The soldiers returned the fire, but with little effect, being afraid to show themselves. Consequently their shots went wild. The fight continued until noon, when a heavy shower of rain seems to have cooled the martial spirit of the enemy, who retired unmolested, carrying away a herd of mares. Fortunately they did not discover the pasture where the horses of the garrison were kept.

During the battle the two missionaries labored incessantly, one of them ministering to the wounded and encouraging the soldiers, the other praying fervently in the chapel and exhorting the women to keep up their courage and beg God's mercy to save them from falling into the hands of the barbarous enemy. The lieutenant in command was wounded by a shot that shattered his right hand; one of the soldiers was severely grazed in the head; and several others received minor injuries. The Comanches lost several men in the first advance, but they took their dead and wounded back with them when they retreated, as was their custom, and their total loss could not be estimated.<sup>47</sup>

But the Comanches were not discouraged by the repulse of the attack on San Lorenzo. Rather it seems they considered their venture a success, for the following month, November, 1766, they again attempted to surprise the mission and to destroy it. They lay in ambush awaiting the appearance of the soldiers so that the warriors might surprise them, and then fall upon the defenceless mission. A guard discovered them and

<sup>47</sup>Arriavita, *Crónica*, 391-392.

gave the alarm by firing a shot. The women, who had gone to the river, rushed back to the mission and the men took their posts along the fence. The small detachment had been further reduced in size by having sent a detail of men to bring horses. If the Indians discovered the weakened condition of the little garrison, the mission was doomed. The commander ordered the women to put on the soldiers' overcoats and hats, to take guns and stand along the fence. This ruse produced the desired effect. The Comanches advanced and were surprised to find such a large number of soldiers stationed all along the four walls of the mission enclosure. They fired one solid volley and with a loud war whoop they wheeled their horses, dashing away to an oak grove a short distance from the mission. From this place of refuge and the banks of the river they kept up an ineffectual fire all day, and were answered as ineffectively by the few real soldiers beyond the fence. The battle lasted from nine in the morning until five in the afternoon. The enemy withdrew quietly with the coming of night. The only notable feat of the day was the bold display of courage of a Comanche chief, who shortly after the first attack, mounted his horse and galloped alone to within pistol shot of the mission enclosure, circling it three times. Although hundreds of shots were fired at him, not one took effect and he returned leisurely to his companions.<sup>48</sup>

All during the winter of 1766 and the spring of 1767 the Comanche hordes and their allies continued to harass both the missions at El Cañón and the garrison at San Sabá, as if bent on their complete destruction. From February to the end of April, 1767, they inflicted severe losses on the presidio. First, they surprised a group of twenty-three soldiers a short distance from San Sabá, attempted to cut off their retreat, succeeded in killing José Jiménez Sánchez and Juan Nuncio, and almost destroyed the entire band. The engagement took place in sight of the presidio, but Rábago did not dare attempt a rescue for fear of jeopardizing the safety of the women and children. Making a dastardly display of their accustomed barbarity, the Comanches severed the head of Jiménez in full view of the garrison, and removed every particle of flesh from his bones. They treated the corpse of Nuncio more kindly, and were satisfied with his scalp.

Two days before Easter Sunday, Rábago received information that a convoy of fifty men, who were bringing a much needed train of supplies and a large drove of sheep, were only a short distance away. For almost two months San Sabá had endured what was tantamount to a state of

<sup>48</sup>*ibid.*, 92.

siege. Fearful for the safety of the approaching relief, he dispatched a small detachment of soldiers to meet the convoy, warn it of the presence of the enemies in order that it might take proper precautions, and guide the relief corps safely to the presidio. The marauding Indians must have been appraised of the approaching train, as it could hardly have escaped their vigilance, but they allowed the little scout troop to depart in peace and to return. But hardly had the train of supplies and the drove of sheep appeared and the gates opened to receive them than the Comanches led a fierce attack, hoping to create confusion and to gain admission into the presidio. The convoy of fifty men, reënforced by those who had gone to meet them, withstood the attack firmly and succeeded in getting the train of supplies safely into the presidio. But the sheep herders and the sheep scattered at the first charge and fell an easy prey to the enemy who lost no time in gaining this prize.

The next day the Indians tried to lure the garrison out of the presidio. The sheep grazed innocently in sight of the soldiers with neither a shepherd nor a human being to watch or guide them. The countryside appeared deserted and peaceful, as the Indians watched from ambush. But the San Sabá garrison had had too many unfortunate experiences not to see through this simple trick. The day passed and darkness fell once more while the sheep grazed contentedly, the soldiers remained tensely at their posts within the walls, and the Indians watched without the quiver of a muscle from their places of concealment behind rocks and trees. Next morning the sheep had disappeared, the Comanches had decided there was no need of waiting any longer. They had achieved their purpose.

Rábago took occasion to make one last appeal to the viceroy. On April 26, he wrote a long report, recounting the frequent attacks upon the two new missions at El Cañón and on the Presidio de San Sabá with an obstinacy that clearly revealed the determination of the northern tribes to destroy all vestiges of Spanish occupation in the area of San Sabá and its vicinity. Since October, 1766, the enemy had made more than five different attempts to surprise the missions and the presidio. On three different occasions they had intercepted supply trains and on one of these, they had succeeded in driving off three hundred mules. On the last attack on the presidio they had driven away more than that many sheep. Since his return in 1761, Rábago explained that he had spent over twelve thousand *pesos* in the purchase of food, clothes, mules, horses, and livestock of which only a small part had ever reached either the missions or the presidio safely. He begged and pleaded that the viceroy give orders for

the royal treasury to reimburse him for this great expense in maintaining this important post and the two new missions.<sup>49</sup>

*Suggestions for new campaign.* Desperate before an enemy that was growing constantly bolder, disgusted with the fickle nature of the Apaches for whom the animosity of the fierce enemy had been incurred, confronted with the necessity of admitting his failure unless the viceroy and his advisers came to the aid, Rábago y Terán decided on one supreme effort to save his reputation and maintain Spanish supremacy in the San Sabá region. He made an ardent appeal to the viceroy to allow him to lead an expedition against the northern tribes similar to that of Colonel Ortiz Parrilla. If he was given three hundred men fully equipped for a three months' campaign against the Comanches and their allies, he assured the viceroy he would penetrate to the very heart of their lands, inflict such punishment upon them, and chastise them so severely that they would learn once for all to respect the might of Spanish arms. Furthermore, the treacherous and fickle Apaches would then gain respect for the Spaniards and would be left with no valid excuse for postponing their reduction to formal mission life. He declared that he fully realized that the men could not be recruited either in San Antonio or in any of the presidios in Texas; nor could they be brought from New Mexico, which was too far away. But they could be enlisted in Coahuila, Nuevo Santander, Nuevo León, and San Luis Potosí.

He then played his last card. He assured the viceroy that in the attacks made during the winter the Comanches and their allies had been led and directed by European officers, possibly French or English. All Rábago could tell with certainty was that the guns used by the Indians were made by the English. The Apaches claimed that the officers were English. It is curious to note how he attempted to revive the old ghost of the fear of foreign aggression. Although he did not know that by this time Louisiana had been a Spanish possession technically for four years, he had become aware that the animosity against the French had decreased in proportion as the fear of the English grew with their proximity.<sup>50</sup>

Neither the viceroy nor his advisers responded to the appeal. The fear of foreign aggression had lost some of its potency. Furthermore, even as Rábago was writing his impassioned appeal, the observant and penetrating

<sup>49</sup>Informe del Capitán Rábago y Terán, February 26-April 21, 1767; Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, April 26, 1767. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 75-76; 78-108; 119-120.

<sup>50</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, April 26, 1767, and July 18, 1767. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 124-127; 119-120.





Inspector General, the Marqués de Rubí was on his way to San Sabá, engaged in a general inspection of the Spanish frontier from California to Texas. Like Rivera, he was to make far-reaching recommendations, and Terán's days in Texas were soon to come to an end.

*Opposition of the governor.* Added to the suspicions of the viceroy were those of Martos y Navarrete. His opposition to Rábago y Terán at San Sabá was responsible in part for the reluctance of the viceroy to give his approval to the two new missions and the proposed new presidio for their defense. As early as 1756, the question of whether or not San Sabá was in the Province of Texas had been raised. The governor could not look with indifference upon the creation of a new jurisdiction in the immediate vicinity, particularly when it was to have the largest garrison on the entire frontier. In the last days of his administration, Governor Jacinto Barrios y Jáuregui had conducted a careful investigation at the request of the viceroy to determine whether the San Sabá area was within the Province of Texas. In a long report, amply substantiated with testimony, Barrios y Jáuregui showed in November, 1756, that the region was and always had been within his jurisdiction. The new governor, Martos y Navarrete, reasserted the claim in a letter to the viceroy on April 26, 1765. Rábago y Terán, in his desire to establish an independent jurisdiction, denied the authority of the governor. The result was a lack of coöperation which ultimately resulted in the failure of the two new missions.<sup>51</sup>

*Interest of the Governor of New Mexico.* Through the Indians, who had a well established line of communication across the great plains and along the Pecos River, the Spaniards of New Mexico learned of the establishment of the Presidio of San Sabá. Long before the formal attempt of Vial to find a road from Santa Fé to East Texas, Governor Tomás Vélez, curious to find out more about the new presidio and anxious perhaps to establish his claim to jurisdiction over it, tried to open communication with this outpost.

*First attempt to reach San Sabá from New Mexico.* In the fall of 1763, Tomás Vélez of New Mexico commissioned Francisco Romero and Joseph Antonio Miraval, two Indians from the mission at Pecos, New Mexico (the old Cicuye) to take letters to the captain of the new Presidio de San Sabá. He also gave them instructions to discover a good route to

<sup>51</sup>Martos y Navarrete to the Viceroy, April 26, 1765. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 204-205.

the new post. Romero, who previously had visited San Sabá, was to serve as guide. With five other mission Indians, they set out on their exploring expedition, following the Pecos River to the south and east from Pecos, New Mexico. For five days they kept together, but at the end of the fifth, four decided they would go no farther and took leave of their companions, who continued for two days more before coming to a *ranchería*.

This was a village of Lipan Indians who had established themselves near a spring called Coyote, located some six leagues north of the Pecos River. The spring and village must have been approximately some two hundred miles southeast of Pecos, New Mexico, allowing about twenty-four miles per day for the seven days' travel of the Indians. In the village there was a large number of men, women, and children. Romero and Miraval estimated the number of warriors at three hundred.

After a stay of five days in the *ranchería*, just as the two native messengers were about to leave, the village was attacked early in the morning by a band of twenty-one Comanches and two women. Six of them had guns, eight had swords, four were armed with lances, and the rest with bows and arrows. The fight, in spite of the small number of the enemy, lasted until three, and ended only with the death of every member of the Comanche band, except one of the women, who was captured. Better that she had fallen in the combat, for she was properly roasted with all ceremony during the festivities that followed to celebrate the victory and joyously devoured in a triumphant banquet. The Lipans lost one man killed, but had many wounded, among them the guest Romero, who was transfixed by an arrow that penetrated his chest and almost killed him. The celebration of the victory lasted twenty days, but Romero was forced to stay with his companion three months in the *ranchería* to recover fully from his dangerous wound. They sent back to New Mexico Miguel Romero, brother of the wounded man, with a report of everything that had occurred to them up to their arrival in the *ranchería* by the spring north of the Pecos River.

Francisco Romero finally recovered and set out for San Sabá once more in company with Joseph Antonio Miraval. For three days they followed the Pecos River until they came to a large *ranchería* called Faraones (Pharos) by those of New Mexico but better known by the Spaniards of Coahuila and Texas as Mescaleros. This was at Los Medanos (The sand-dunes) where they were welcomed and treated with kindness. But shortly after their arrival there came into the camp two Mescaleros, one severely wounded and the other with his ears cut off. They narrated how the Spaniards and the Julimes from El Paso del Norte and its vicinity

had killed their chief and many of their companions and had mutilated them that they might tell their people what they might expect. Great indignation seized the entire camp and the Mescaleros swore to avenge themselves by beginning on their guests from New Mexico. They took from them all their clothes, arms, horses, and the letters from Governor Vélez and declared they would feast upon the victims on the following day. Romero, who understood their language, did not wait for daylight, but secretly made his escape with his companions that night. He told how in a war council held early that night the chief had urged all the Mescaleros of the *ranchería* on the sand-dunes along the Pecos to steal as many horses as possible from the Spaniards, to make many bows and arrows, and to kill all the cattle and all the Spaniards they came across, because the Mescaleros would never again make peace with them.

Romero later revealed that in the *ranchería* there were three captive boys: one from New Mexico and two from Coahuila. According to the description, one of them was a boy from Santa Rosa, who was lost or stolen from his father four years before while the two were on their way to the Río Grande. The father had halted for a short rest on the banks of the Río de los Alamos and the young boy had walked to the water's edge. When his father called him the boy was nowhere to be found. In the *ranchería* he had also noted a quantity of horses, mules, mares, and even breed donkeys, besides long rifles, some arquebuses, and several suits of Spanish clothes.

After running away from the Mescaleros they came upon a Lipan *ranchería*, just about two leagues away. The chief was friendly, greeted them kindly, and furnished them guides to lead them to San Sabá, when he found out that it was their destination. For ten days they continued on their way, until they came to the Lipan village of Chief Bigotes (Mustaches), called Loma Pinta (Paint Rock). Here they spent the night and started out again the following morning. They had gone only a short distance, when they were overtaken by a messenger from Loma Pinta, who came to inform them that a party of Spaniards had arrived in the *ranchería* that morning. The two messengers from New Mexico returned to the village of Chief Bigotes and met Captain Manuel Rodríguez, from Presidio de la Junta de los Rios, who had surrounded the *ranchería* and had taken it without any resistance on the part of the Lipans. Romero and Miraval told Captain Rodríguez the object of their journey and all that had befallen them since their departure from Pecos, New Mexico.

Captain Rodríguez and his men were accompanied by one of the mis-

sionaries from the new missions at La Junta, who baptized five children in the *ranchería* of Chief Bigotes that morning. Romero, who acted as interpreter, explained to the assembled Lipans that if they wanted to be the friends of the Spaniards they must not steal from them any more, nor cause them any damage; that the governor of Coahuila, through his captain, offered them peace, but he would punish them if they refused to be friends. Romero informed Captain Rodríguez that he and his companion had followed the Puerco River (Pecos) all the way to this *ranchería*, that the country was generally open and fertile, that there were several springs along the river valley, abundant salt deposits, and many wild grapes and fruits of different kinds.

In his report to the viceroy, Captain Rodríguez explained that Captain Manuel Ramírez of the Presidio of San Juan Bautista, had known the Indian Romero while at San Sabá. Romero had at that time gone back to New Mexico and reported his successful trip to Governor Marín del Valle, who doubted his story. While there was a possibility that the two Indians from New Mexico might be fugitives from the missions there, since they could produce no documents from the governor of that province, Rodríguez declared that the coincidence of having found them at the *ranchería* of Chief Bigotes was a fortunate one. The two Indians had assured him that they could show him a route back to New Mexico, which would take only twelve days to traverse, and they were willing to wager their heads on it.<sup>52</sup>

*Inspection of Presidio de San Sabá by Rubí.* While Captain Rábago was bending all his efforts to secure the approval of the two new missions in the Valle de San José (upper Nueces), the Marqués de Rubí arrived to inspect the presidio. On July 27, 1767, he reviewed the garrison and inspected the presidio with his accustomed thoroughness. Whether he had been predisposed towards the commander of San Sabá by the current rumors concerning his character cannot be determined. In his official report to the viceroy he declared that the commander, although only forty-five years old, was broken down in health. The garrison consisted of ninety-four men, being short seven. It was, without doubt, the worst in the entire kingdom, made up of men kept at their post by debt. Constant vigilance alone prevented the desertion of the entire garrison. Many of

<sup>52</sup>Testimonio de los Autos a conzta. de Don Lorenzo Gansio Capitán del Real Presidio de Santiago de la Monclova, en que da cuenta de haver aprehendido dos Indios del Nuevo Mexico, que aquel Governador embio a descubrir la comunicacion de aquellas Provincias con el Presidio de San Savá. Año de 1763. *A. G. I., Audiencia de México*, 92-6-22 (Dunn Transcripts, 1748-1763), pt. 2, 176-182.

the men were unfit for military service and should be discharged. Thirteen were, in fact, entitled to be retired and pensioned.

Although each man should have from five to six horses for remounts, the garrison had not more than one hundred in all. Their guns, most of them imported from Catalonia and of good grade, were poorly cared for and were not of uniform caliber. Not more than half of the men were provided with pistols, and such as had them were obliged to pay forty *pesos*. The swords, saddles, and other equipment were equally poor. The uniforms worn by the soldiers consisted of blue pants and red cloaks with silver buttons, the same as in Coahuila. Each uniform was charged at eighty *pesos*.

While the courage of the captain was above reproach, his conduct was not unassailable. He was known to be most unscrupulous in money matters, and he maintained a horse ranch ninety miles south of the presidio, beyond the Río Grande, from where he was in the habit of supplying mounts to his men at his own price. With regard to the costs of goods sold to the garrison, the Marqués de Rubí declared emphatically that they were exorbitant. Beans were being sold at a *peso* and a half a bushel, soap at twelve *pesos* a case, *piloncillo* (brown sugar loaf) at four *pesos*, sugar at seventy-five cents a pound, Querétaro cloth at four *pesos* a *vara*, saddles at twenty-eight *pesos*, and hats at three and a half *pesos*.

At the conclusion of the inspection Rubí recommended to Captain Rábago y Terán that the price of commodities be reduced, suggesting the maximum to be charged for each item. It was essential that the guns be all of the same caliber and all the useless pieces should be replaced at once. In his opinion it would be well to employ a regular gunsmith to repair all the guns and keep them always in condition. He particularly enjoined the commander to maintain the presidio in its present site until the viceroy decided its permanent location. This last injunction was prompted by the insistent request of Rábago during the visit to be allowed to remove the presidio to the upper Nueces near the two new missions. Rubí was adamant on his refusal to comply with the request. Although he admitted its uselessness in the present location and had decided on its abolition in his mind, he refused to allow its temporary removal without the viceroy's consent.<sup>53</sup>

*Rubí's report to the viceroy on San Sabá.* The Marqués de Rubí spent almost a week at San Sabá meditating over his recommendations concern-

<sup>53</sup>Inspection of Presidio de San Sabá by Rubí, July 27-August 4, 1767. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara* (Dunn Transcripts, 1767), pp. 197-203.

ing the fate of this troublesome establishment, which had been the source of endless discussion by viceregal officials. With a practical military eye, he realized at once the poor choice of the location on which the presidio was built. The building stood between two ravines or gulches. The one to the north was formed by a small creek through which the waters of a spring flowed to the river for a distance of almost two leagues. The banks were heavily wooded and, being within gunshot distance from the presidio, permitted the enemy to fire upon the defenders with safety. The San Sabá River was to the south, almost at the foot of the stockade. This stream, which flowed from west to east, allowed the enemy to crawl unnoticed along its bed almost to the very walls of the presidio, and to fire from behind the high banks without exposing themselves. The moat along the stockade had been poorly planned and offered practically no advantages to the garrison. The presidio had two swivel guns for its defense, but these were mounted in such a way that the parapets left the men serving the two pieces exposed to the fire of the enemy, which rendered the cannon ineffective when most needed. The stockade that surrounded the presidio was low and could be easily scaled. With the weakened condition of the garrison, made up of men who were either too old, too sick, or too discouraged to offer a spirited defense, it was a wonder that the enemy had not made a determined effort to destroy it completely. There was grave danger that if the true state of the garrison and presidio were discovered by the Comanches, this frontier outpost might be blotted out of existence. Such a catastrophe would not only embolden the enemy, already grown impudent with inordinate pride, but it would be a blemish on the prestige of Spanish arms comparable to the defeat of Parrilla.

*Presidio de San Sabá has no purpose.* Rubí could see no use in maintaining this establishment in its present location. The cost of upkeep was excessive and had no justification in reason for its existence. It offered no protection to San Antonio, nor to any other Spanish outpost either in Texas or Coahuila. "It affords as much protection to the interests of His Majesty in New Spain," the Marqués declared, "as a ship anchored in mid-Atlantic would afford in preventing foreign trade with America." Its original purpose had been to protect the Apache Indians who were to be reduced to mission life in its vicinity. But since 1758, when the one and only mission for these Indians had been destroyed by the hordes of northern Indians, the Apaches had retreated to beyond the Rio Grande, more than eighty leagues (two hundred miles) to the south. The two missions on the upper Nueces at the Valle de San José were forty leagues away and were a poor excuse for the maintenance of this presidio. Their

location was as ill-suited for the establishment of a presidio as that originally chosen on the San Sabá River where it now stood. The chief enemies were the Tawakonis, the Taovayas, and the Comanches. These Indians were not in fact hostile to the Spaniards. They were merely seeking the destruction of their lifelong enemies, the Apaches. It was because of these faithless Indians that the northern tribes had recently attacked the Presidio of San Sabá with unusual vigor.

The Marqués de Rubí went on to explain that the hope that had been held out for the settlement of the intervening country from the Río Grande to the San Sabá by Spanish families was unfounded. During his recent inspection from San Juan Bautista to San Sabá he had not seen a single place worthy of being settled. Most of the country was grazing land unfit for cultivation unless it could be irrigated. But the difficulties which irrigation presented in this area were beyond the strength of the scanty and wretched settlers available for the purpose to effect. The hope that the Lipans would ever congregate and come to live in formal missions was equally a vain effort. They had never intended to give up their roaming, thieving life. They had led the Spaniards to establish a presidio at San Sabá to protect them against the Comanches only in order to continue to prey surreptitiously upon the Spanish frontier without being in turn despoiled of the booty by their enemies. After the destruction of the mission at San Sabá in 1758, they had lost faith in the ability of the Spaniards to protect them and had fallen back on their traditional means of defense, seeking refuge behind the hills and placing as much distance between them and their enemies as possible. This was the reason for the selection of a temporary refuge in the Valle de San José. But of late they had retreated further south and were now roaming in the vicinity of San Juan Bautista and were even found near the mouth of the Río Grande.

*San Sabá should be abandoned and San Antonio reënforced.* In the opinion of the Marqués de Rubí the Presidio of San Sabá should be razed to the ground, the entire fortification destroyed, the garrison discharged, and the few settlers moved to San Antonio de Béjar. This small village was in fact the only permanent settlement of Spanish families in Texas. The abandonment of San Sabá would very likely bring the Comanches to its walls in their raiding expeditions. Because of this fact, the small military detachment stationed at Béjar should be reënforced at all costs, even if the men had to be taken from La Bahía and the Presidio of San Agustín at Orcoquisac. The wretched and struggling little settlement represented the only real Spanish outpost in the entire Province of Texas

and deserved to be preserved and encouraged as the last vestige of Spanish power in the far-flung frontier of the north.<sup>54</sup>

*Rábago asks for promotion and suggests a new campaign.* The inspector general kept his counsel to himself and evidently made Rábago y Terán believe that he was well impressed in general with the state of affairs he had found. On August 12, the very day that Rubí made his secret report, the commander of San Sabá wrote a letter to the viceroy recounting his services to the king since the time he first took command at San Xavier. In addition to his service at that post, he argued that for seven years now he had maintained the outpost of San Sabá against the repeated attacks of the Comanches and their allies. As a reward for his long and faithful service to the king, he now petitioned the viceroy to secure for him the rank of Colonel in His Majesty's armies.<sup>55</sup>

He went on to explain that he had discussed with the Marqués de Rubí the advisability of removing the presidio to the Valle de San José or some other location more suitable to the defense of the new missions. A new campaign against the Natages and Mescaleros, who continually harassed not only the Presidio of San Sabá but all the outposts in New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya, should be undertaken as soon as possible. The Marqués de Rubí agreed with him, Rábago declared, that measures should be taken against this new scourge of the frontier. There was need of establishing not a new presidio, but a whole line of fortifications from Coahuila to New Mexico would serve to protect and encourage more active trade and communication between the two provinces. The Presidio of San Sabá could be moved to a location, where it would form an important link in the proposed line, when the frontier establishments were reorganized.<sup>56</sup>

*Renewed hostility of Indians.* But the Marqués de Rubí left and Rábago y Terán received no reply to his new overtures and proposals. In the meantime with the coming of another winter, the Comanches and their allies made their appearance again. On December 10, 1767, a large party of hostile Indians swept down upon the presidio, surprised the guard, and drove off the whole herd of cattle. The dispirited garrison offered little resistance and contented themselves with manning the stockade, but made no effort to recover the herd. The Indians taunted them boldly, riding close to the walls and jeering at them in a vain effort to draw them out.

<sup>54</sup>Marqués de Rubí to the Viceroy, August 12, 1767. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Transcripts, 1767), pp. 244-253.

<sup>55</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, August 12, 1767. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 128-129.

<sup>56</sup>Same to same, August 12, 1767. *Ibid.*, 130-131.



They retired a short distance to Loma de Piedra (Rock Hill) and in full view of the presidio nonchalantly slew several beeves, roasted them and feasted unconcernedly, while the rest of the herd grazed nearby unguarded.

Two days later either the same band, or another, tried a ruse. They were mostly Tawakonis, who brought with them a Tejas Indian as interpreter. They rode up to the walls of the presidio and presented a flag of truce, declaring they were friends. Rábago was suspicious and ordered the men to remain at their posts and to keep the gate closed, while he talked to the party through their interpreter. The Tejas Indian explained that the Indian visitors were friends, that they did not want to fight or hurt the Spaniards, that they were hunting for their enemies, the Apaches, and wanted to know if there were any in the fort. Captain Rábago ordered some presents distributed among them. The Indians pitched camp right under the walls of the fort and proceeded to spread out their wares for trade. But the Spanish soldiers remained at their posts and the settlers were not allowed to come out to barter with them. Seeing that their efforts to get the Spaniards to relax their vigilance were futile, the Tawakonis took friendly leave and retired to a camp they had established a short distance away.

Early the following morning they returned with a liberal supply of buffalo meat which they gave to the soldiers over the wall. The gate remained closed and the guards kept their posts. The Indians, through the interpreter, invited the entire Spanish garrison to come to their camp as their guests and feast with them. The invitation was politely refused and a few presents were again distributed among them, chiefly tobacco and beads.

For a week or more there was an ominous absence of prowling Indians, but on December 20, two soldiers, who had gone out to the river in the morning, suddenly returned with a brisk run to warn the garrison of the approach of the enemy. The Indians rushed to the walls, but finding the men posted at their places, slackened their pace and raised a flag of truce. This time the visitors were Comanches. They had a French interpreter who could not speak Spanish. With the aid of Pedro Miñón, an artilleryman of the presidio who knew French, a conversation was carried on. The Comanches declared, like the Tawakonis, that they were friends of the Spaniards and wanted to make peace. They wanted to kill all the Apaches because they were bad. While the parley was being held a train of supplies which was being expected and for whose safety Rábago had begun to fear, arrived. Among the muleteers were several Indians of

New Mexico who knew the Comanche language. They explained that the party was made up of Comanches and Taovayas, that these Indians were looking for the Apaches, but that they wanted to have a peace meeting with the Spaniards.

For three days the unwelcomed visitors stayed in friendly discourse just outside the walls of the presidio. During this time the peace pipe was smoked, dances were held each night, and presents were exchanged. Captain Rábago gave his guests clothes, *piloncillos* (brown sugar loaves), *tortillas* (corn cakes), and various trinkets from the supplies just received. Let it be said in all justice that the Indians had allowed the train to enter the presidio unmolested. On Christmas eve, the Comanches and Taovayas took leave of the Spaniards in the best of spirits.

But on January 2, 1768, another band of hostile Indians suddenly swept down upon the garrison in a vain effort to take the presidio. The attack was repulsed and the Indians disappeared almost as rapidly as they had come. They had attempted a surprise and had intended to steal the horses of the presidio, but they failed in both their objects.

Twelve days later, another group rushed out from the river bed, took eight horses at the very walls of the presidio and rode away in triumph without a Spaniard daring to pursue the malefactors.

From an Indian captured in the raid of January 2, the Spaniards learned that the Tawakonis, Tonkawas, Taovayas, and Comanches were being encouraged by the French to harass the fort on the San Sabá. He told the surprised Rábago that they had been told there were many supplies in the presidio, that many Apaches were living with the Spaniards, and that they had silver plate. This was the reason why they had been trying to surprise the post and take possession of it.<sup>57</sup>

*Epidemic at San Sabá.* In vain did Rábago make frantic appeals for help or for permission to abandon this spot which he had begun to think in good faith was accursed. On February 29, 1768, the Indians, who were still prowling in the vicinity like hungry wolves, surprised Lieutenant Joaquín Orendain and three soldiers who were out hunting turkey against the strict orders of Rábago. All four were cruelly tortured and killed. The commander of San Sabá was sick in bed at the time. He had, in fact, been severely ill for several months. As early as December 2, of the previous year, he had asked permission from the viceroy to go to Mexico City for treatment. He explained that ever since he was in prison he had contracted malignant sores. These were now on his feet, arms, and legs.

<sup>57</sup>*Autos* of Don Felipe de Rábago y Terán. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 151-187.

He had had a surgeon from Coahuila and a *médico* treat them, but to no avail.

During the last month an epidemic had appeared in the presidio which was about to disable the entire garrison. At first the ailment had affected only the women and children. It began with a sore mouth. Then the gums became inflamed and secreted pus. It seemed as if the gums began to rot. At this stage the lower limbs of the patient began to draw up and become stiff, impeding movement. The disease completely disabled the patient, who generally died in a few days. The ailment had spread from the women and children to the men, and the garrison was seriously imperiled by the dreaded malady, which was called in this area *Mal de Loanda*.<sup>58</sup>

*Garrison complains of ill-treatment.* Continued vexations, unrelaxing vigilance, endless privations, and constant peril seem to have worn the nerves of the garrison to threads. The men began to grumble and Rábago himself in no better humor appears to have become harsh and irascible. Early in 1768, a formal complaint was lodged with the viceroy in the name of the garrison. The men complained that Rábago was neglecting his duties, that the food supplied them and their families was poor and insufficient, that the equipment issued was inadequate, that the captain never took part in any campaign, that he had deprived the men of their personal liberty, and that he freely made love to their wives. When the viceroy was confronted with this long list of abuses, he was indignant. He had never liked Rábago. He now took occasion to reprimand him with great severity for his shortcomings and warned him in no uncertain terms that a second complaint would be sufficient cause for his removal.<sup>59</sup>

*Rábago abandons post without authority.* Conditions at San Sabá apparently grew worse in the spring and early summer of 1768 and Rábago y Terán could no longer stay at his post. Without consulting the viceroy and asking his formal permission, he ordered San Sabá abandoned early in June and moved with the entire garrison and with the few families to Mission San Lorenzo in the Valle de San José, where he arrived on June 22, 1768. Not until July 10, did he make a formal report to the viceroy of his daring decision to move. He now informed him without a preamble that he had been forced to move by circumstances and merely announced the incident as a *fait accompli*. The reasons for

<sup>58</sup>Rábago to the Viceroy, December 2, 1767; same to same, February 29, 1768. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 1, pp. 145-150.

<sup>59</sup>Viceroy to Rábago y Terán, May 3, 1768; complaint of soldiers against Captain Rábago y Terán. In *Ibid.*, 24-28.

this bold step had been repeatedly transmitted to the viceroy. In the first place, the continuous hostility of the Comanches and the northern tribes had made the acquisition of supplies at San Sabá more and more difficult every day, until the garrison was on the point of starvation. When the Marqués de Rubí visited the presidio, Rábago had explained to him in detail the advisability of moving to the Valle de San José and the inspector general had seemed to acquiesce in the proposal. But lastly the epidemic, which had greatly reduced the garrison, had made the removal imperative. He concluded his report by expressing the hope that His Excellency would approve a measure which had been dictated by dire necessity. The removal was, of course, provisional and subject to the viceroy's ultimate disposition.<sup>60</sup>

The report of the unauthorized removal reached the viceroy with unusual promptness. By August 19, he had written to Rábago concerning the matter. He had no words strong enough to express his disapproval and to condemn the unsoldierly conduct of the commander of San Sabá. A military post should never be abandoned by anyone in charge except when driven from it by force of arms. Was the presidio simply vacated and left standing? This was the question that loomed largest in the mind of the viceroy. He hoped that Rábago had had the presence of mind to destroy completely the fortifications and raze the presidio to the ground before abandoning it. Otherwise it might be occupied by the enemy in his absence and become a strong outpost in their power. Such a risk should never have been taken. He should repair to the presidio on the San Sabá at once and reoccupy it while there was still time. Furthermore, he was to hold it at all costs and remain there until otherwise instructed.<sup>61</sup>

*Rábago removed from command.* The breach between the viceroy and Rábago y Terán was widening. Winter slowly came and went and the commander at San Sabá received no moral or material support, nor was formal approval given to the two missions on the upper Nueces, which were likewise slowly languishing. Early in the spring of 1769, Rábago was ordered by the viceroy to dispatch twenty-one men from his garrison to the Presidio de San Antonio de Béjar to reënforce that post. He knew full well that this order was the beginning of the end of San Sabá. The twenty-one men detached to San Antonio were the same who had been taken from that post in 1756 to found San Sabá, and although the order did not say that the transfer of the men was to be permanent, he knew

<sup>60</sup>Rábago to the Viceroy, July 10, 1768. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 2, pp. 6-9.

<sup>61</sup>Viceroy to Rábago y Terán, August 19, 1768. In *Ibid.*, 10-11.

very well they would never return. He decided, therefore, to use the traditional tactics of delay and postponement. This might have worked under more favorable circumstances, but Rábago was a marked man and his action was naturally misinterpreted, or better still his real intention was quickly and shrewdly discerned by the vigilant and exacting officials in Mexico. When on March 18, 1769, Rábago informed the viceroy that he had deferred complying with the order to send the twenty-one men to San Antonio to Hugo Oconor, the new governor, because this official had gone to Los Adaes, the viceroy immediately replied with a strong reprimand and repeated the order for the transfer of the soldiers in the most peremptory terms.

Before Rábago received the new reprimand, while in San Antonio, he was informed of his removal by Manuel Antonio de Oca, the new appointee to the Presidio de San Sabá. Rábago y Terán had no recourse but to abide by the orders of the viceroy. On the first of April he formally turned over his command to his successor and set out for Mexico City to make a personal report and a plea before the viceroy for the reimbursement of the great expenditure he had incurred in the maintenance of San Sabá during nine trying years. On April 19, he notified the viceroy of his compliance and departure. On June 23, the viceroy thanked him coldly for his prompt obedience to the decree.

Only once more do we hear of this unfortunate man, who played so sinister a part in the history of the Province of Texas. In his first appearance in Texas he caused the sudden death of Father Ganzábal and the ruin of the San Xavier missions. In his second he kindled the hope of Father Jiménez and was instrumental in bringing about the temporary establishment of two missions in the upper Nueces destined to languish and to dwindle by neglect. On July 5, 1769, Rábago y Terán was in San Luis Potosí, prostrated in bed while on his way to Mexico, too ill to continue his travel. He wrote to the viceroy to tell him he would be delayed here for medical treatment. It is doubtful whether he ever continued his journey.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>63</sup>Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, March 18, 1769; Viceroy to Rábago y Terán, May 6, 1769; Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, April 19, 1769; Viceroy to Rábago y Terán, June 23, 1769; Rábago y Terán to the Viceroy, July 5, 1769. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 94, pt. 2, pp. 60-65.

## CHAPTER V

### PLANS FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE FRONTIER

It was the fear of foreign encroachment, particularly on the part of France, that had impelled Spanish officials to accede to the many petitions of the missionaries for the occupation of the remote Province of Texas. The news of La Salle's unfortunate venture in the Spanish domain had aroused New Spain and caused the mobilization of the land and sea forces of the mother country to expel intruders and to undertake the formal occupation of the territory threatened by foreign aggression. Ever since the establishment of the first missions in East Texas this apprehension of attack by enemies created the desire to make Texas secure against the advance of France in America. It had been the all powerful force which had animated the Spanish officials in their policy of defence. It was that determination to safeguard the interests of Spain at all costs in this remote province that also furnished the stirring motivation for the support of missionary efforts, which attempted to bring about the complete evangelization and civilization among the natives of these extensive borderlands. Here may be found the chief reasons for the maintenance of a guard, the needs of the missions.

For a few years prior to the destruction of San Sabá and immediately following it, a new menace appeared in the horizon, faintly at first but significantly ominous. The aggressive English settlers of the Atlantic coast had begun to pour over the mountains into the fertile valleys of the Mississippi and its tributaries. The more daring pioneers and traders had begun to penetrate into both the French Province of Louisiana and those of New Spain. Spanish officials, however, had felt a certain measure of security behind the French outposts along the Mississippi, which acted as a buffer to the Spanish dominions beyond the great river. But this satisfaction and complacency were soon to be disturbed by an unforeseen circumstance which eliminated France from North America and brought the Spanish and English frontiers suddenly face to face.

*The Seven Years' War.* Kindled in America, where it is better known as the French and Indian War, this struggle for colonial supremacy soon spread from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, across the seas, and on to distant India. On the widest battle front the world had known up to that

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time, French and English interests clashed. Unfortunately for France she lacked an able leader. Under the indolent and dissolute Louis XV the patriotism and heroic efforts of the French were unavailing. Strange as it may seem, France attached little or no importance throughout the contest to the vast Province of Louisiana. Little wonder that instead of following up with energy and determination the brilliant victory of Captain D'Aubrey at Fort Duquesne, the only bright spot for the French in the entire war in America, Louis XV ordered shortly thereafter the withdrawal of thirty-six companies of French soldiers to reduce the unnecessary expense of the colony.<sup>1</sup> The same shortsighted policy was displayed on all fronts.

By 1761 France was ready to sue for peace in an effort to save from the wreckage what had not been already irretrievably lost. The English seemed well satisfied with the gains and felt there was little use in continuing the struggle. When Choiseul, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, therefore, suggested negotiations, the British welcomed the proposal. But no sooner were conversations started than public opinion in England became divided not on the importance of acquiring Louisiana, but on the relative significance of Canada and the West Indies. At this time the larger part of Louisiana was still in French hands, but neither the French nor the English appear to have attached much importance to this vast territory along the most fertile river banks in America.<sup>2</sup>

Contrary to general opinion, Great Britain showed as little concern with regard to the fate of Louisiana at this time as she did throughout the final negotiations for peace. The portion west of the Mississippi was eventually ceded to Spain, not to save it from falling into the hands of the English as popularly claimed, but to compensate Spain for the losses sustained as ally of France.<sup>3</sup>

*Mistaken policy of Charles III.* Spain had managed to observe neutrality in the struggle under Ferdinand VI, who was sympathetic towards the English. But his death on August 10, 1759, brought about a reversal of policy under his successor, the practical minded, liberal, and energetic Charles III. This Bourbon prince who now ascended the Spanish throne, had successfully been King of Naples, but unlike Ferdinand VI, he had

<sup>1</sup>W. A. Goodspeed, *The Province and the States* (Madison, 1904) I, 219-220.

<sup>2</sup>C. W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics*, Cleveland, 1917, I, 47-62.

<sup>3</sup>E. Wilson Lyons, *Louisiana in French Diplomacy, 1750-1804* (Norman, Okla.) 16-33.

little love for the English, who in 1738 had threatened his capital with bombardment. This personal animosity and a mistaken colonial policy were to cause him to plunge into the war, a blunder which he was to regret within a year.

Choiseul, correctly said to have been one of the ablest statesmen of his day, immediately saw the opportunity for a French-Spanish alliance that would strengthen the position of France in the negotiations with England. The first step in his plan was the renewal of the Family Compact on August 15, 1761. At the same time a secret agreement was entered into by which Charles III unwittingly bound Spain to declare war against Great Britain, if a satisfactory peace was not concluded by May 1762.<sup>4</sup> This secret treaty joined the fate of Spain to that of France in her struggle for colonial supremacy with England and was destined to change the course of history to a far greater extent than either Louis XV or Charles III ever dreamed.

Quickly matters reached a crisis. The news of the alliance caused a rupture of the peace negotiations and the resignation of Pitt in England. Choiseul now bent all his efforts to induce Spain to become an active ally, and Charles III formally declared a war on January 2, 1762. The renewal of hostilities proved disastrous to both France and Spain. The English soon captured Santa Lucia, the key to Martinique and Guadaloupe, the two most prized French island possessions in the West Indies. Shortly afterwards they took Havana, the open sesame to the Gulf of Mexico.

*The cession of Louisiana to Spain.* France was the first to realize the futility of continuing the war. Early in the spring of 1762 she began negotiations and offered to cede all the territory east of the Mississippi to Great Britain. The Spanish ambassador in Paris, the Marqués de Grimaldi, strenuously objected to such a proposal, apprehensive of the danger which such an arrangement represented to the interests of Spain in America. He emphatically declared that France had no right to dispose of any part of Louisiana without the consent of Spain.<sup>5</sup> This contention ruffled the pride of the French. Choiseul was determined to obtain peace at all costs and deemed the loss of either a part or the whole of Louisiana to the English a small price to save her West Indies Island possessions.

<sup>4</sup>F. P. Renault, *Le Pact de Famille et L'Amerique* (Paris 1932); Aiton "The Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession," *American Historical Review*, XXXIV (1931) 701-710.

<sup>5</sup>W. R. Shepherd, "The Cession of Louisiana to Spain," *Political Science Quarterly*, XIX, (1904) 443.



This determination was frankly communicated to the Spanish Court on September 27, 1762. "The King has decided in his Council," the French ambassador declared, "that he would order the French to evacuate the whole of Louisiana rather than miss the opportunity for peace on account of discussion about a colony with which we are unable to communicate by sea, which has not and cannot have either a port or a roadstead . . . and which costs France eight hundred thousand *livres* a year, without yielding a *sou* in return."<sup>6</sup>

France could not, however, conclude peace without the consent of her ally. The reluctance of Spain was suddenly broken by an unexpected event. When news reached the Court a few days later that Havana had fallen into the hands of the English, Spain felt that she had been vanquished at a blow. Her successes against the Portuguese were forgotten. All her ministers desired now was to save Havana at any price. Thus unexpectedly the fate of Havana became bound with that of Louisiana.

Fully aware of the significance of Havana, the English demanded either Florida or Porto Rico in exchange. France gallantly offered all Louisiana to save Florida, but the British rightly concluded that Florida was far more valuable to them in consolidating the colonies along the Atlantic coast and refused the offer. Spain was forced to cede Florida to save Havana.

Moved by the loss sustained by his ally, and unwilling perhaps to be burdened further with the expense of defending what remained of Louisiana west of the Mississippi, the French king in a grand gesture made a free gift of it to his cousin Charles III on November 3, 1762. The cession was a complete surprise even to the Marqués de Grimaldi who accepted it, subject to his master's royal will. "His Most Christian Majesty", the minister of Louis XV declared in the secret treaty of Fontainebleau, "truly regretting the sacrifices which the Catholic King has generously made to contribute to the reestablishment of peace, desires to give him proof of the lively interest he feels in the welfare and success of his kingdom . . . His Most Christian Majesty . . . therefore, has agreed to cede to His Catholic Majesty and his successors in perpetuity all the country known as Louisiana, as well as the City of New Orleans and the island on which it is located."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup>Shepherd, *loc. cit.* 447.

<sup>7</sup>Fortier, *A History of Louisiana*, (Paris, 1904) I, 263-64. The French text of the treaty reproduced in Fortier has been translated by the author.

*Significance of the cession.* Thus by a series of unforeseen circumstances Spain suddenly found herself in possession of the vast territory of Louisiana lying west of the Mississippi, including the all important City of New Orleans at the mouth of the great river which was the undisputed key to its navigation. Texas had ceased to be a bulwark against foreign aggression and had automatically become an interior province. Heretofore the chief justification for its military occupation, its settlement, and the conversion of the Indians had been in a broad sense the defense and protection of Spain's colonial empire against the French. But this powerful urge was removed over night. The excitable French neighbors were now replaced by the implacable, grasping, and unscrupulous English. The long disputed frontier between France and Spain in Texas, with the struggling outpost of Los Adaes, the unsuccessful Presidio of San Agustín on the Trinity, and La Bahía on the Gulf coast had lost its purpose. A complete reorganization of the Province of Texas was a logical and inevitable sequence to the Treaty of Fontainebleau. Seven years were to elapse, however, before the transfer became an accomplished fact and the effects of the cession were fully felt in Texas. The problems of the reorganization that followed this transcendental transfer are to be the chief subject of the present chapter, with emphasis on the effect upon the missions and the control of the native tribes.

Before taking up the proposed reorganization that followed, a brief summary of the steps that led up to the final occupation of the Province of Louisiana will not be amiss. The display of Spanish power in bringing the rebellious French subjects under control, and the administrative reorganization of her new colony are significant in connection with the subsequent development in Texas.

*Causes for delay in the occupation of Louisiana.* The impression has been left on the public mind, largely through the greater and better acquaintance with French sources, that Spain was loath to occupy Louisiana and that, perhaps, she actually regretted the acceptance, and at heart wished to withdraw from the agreement. Documents in the Spanish archives, however, show no record of this state of mind. French officials were anxious to be rid of the burdensome expense of administration of the rejected colony, and Choiseul did urge upon the Spanish government the immediate occupation as early as May 23, 1763. But that this was only a public gesture is proved by the fact that when the Spanish representative in Paris informed the French on January 13, 1764, that Spain was ready to take over the proffered colony, Choiseul replied with some



embarrassment that the necessary papers had not been drawn. It was not until April 21, that the documents were completed.<sup>8</sup>

It is necessary to keep in mind that the transfer implied serious administrative problems which required time. Spain undertook her responsibilities with characteristic seriousness and thoroughness. Diligent inquiry was made concerning the organization of its government under French rule, of the existing offices and their duties, of the relations with the Indians, of the population, the products, the ecclesiastical organization, and of the administration of justice from the French ministry, former residents of Louisiana, and even former Governor Kerlérec during the latter part of 1763 and through 1764.

One of the chief obstacles to the immediate occupation was the difficulty of detaching the necessary number of troops to garrison the new colony. Choiseul gallantly offered to allow such French troops as were in Louisiana to pass under Spanish service, seeing in the arrangement the immediate reduction of expense to the French treasury.<sup>9</sup> Never thinking that the French soldiers in Louisiana might refuse to enter the service of Spain, the officials made final arrangements for the formal occupation late in the summer of 1765. Antonio de Ulloa, one of the most distinguished Spanish men of science of his day, who had had considerable experience in administrative matters in Peru, was appointed governor of the new province. He was to be accompanied by a Spanish company of one hundred and four officers, an agent of the royal treasury, an accountant, and two Capuchin friars. The Spanish government appropriated one hundred and fifty thousand *pesos* for the expedition, and instructions were issued for a frigate to sail from Ferrol in September, 1765, which was to proceed to Havana, where Ulloa was to embark for Louisiana.<sup>10</sup>

*The French revolt against Spanish rule.* Regardless of the little value attached to Louisiana by Louis XV and his advisers, the people of the province were deeply and reverently devoted to France, and even the Indian tribes resented the transfer. The cession was kept secret until after the arrival of the Governor D'Abbadie to succeed Kerlérec. Although the new French governor came in June, 1764, it was not until October of that year that he received and published the letter of April 21, ordering and instructing him to turn over the government and the province to

<sup>8</sup>E. Wilson Lyons, *Louisiana in French Diplomacy*, 40-41.

<sup>9</sup>N. M. Miller Surrey, *Calendar of Manuscripts in Paris for the History of the Mississippi Valley*, (Washington, 1928) II, 1761.

<sup>10</sup>E. Wilson Lyons, *Louisiana in French Diplomacy*, 43-44.

the first accredited representative of Spain to arrive. Vague rumors of the cession had reached the colonists, but they refused to believe their mother country capable of such a deed. When the official communication was published "consternation and despair were universal."<sup>11</sup>

A public meeting was called by the bereaved citizens and a stirring appeal to Louis XV prepared, begging to be kept under the government of France. Jean Milhet, the richest merchant of New Orleans, left shortly thereafter for Paris to present the petition. In vain did he and the aged Bienville, founder of Louisiana, now eighty-six years old, plead with Choiseul for an interview with the king. "I am deeply grieved at not being able to give you any hope," the minister replied. "I have no hesitation to tell you that I cannot address the King on this subject, because I myself advised the cession of Louisiana."<sup>12</sup>

In the meantime another year passed without the arrival of Spanish officials and the voluble citizens of Louisiana placidly convinced themselves that the cession had been annulled or would never be carried into effect. Governor D'Abbadie died on February 4, 1765, and was succeeded by Philippe Aubry. Great was the shock experienced, therefore, when in the summer of that year an official communication was received in New Orleans from Don Antonio de Ulloa, dated in Havana on July 10, announcing his arrival to take possession of Louisiana in the name of the King of Spain. A wave of deep resentment at their abandonment by France swept the colony and talk of resistance was soon heard.

When Ulloa finally appeared on March 5, 1766, he was accorded a cold and sullen reception. The Spanish governor sized up the situation at once and tactfully decided to postpone the formal transfer in view of his small military escort. The French soldiers refused to accept service under Spain. The people of New Orleans were openly rebellious. Ulloa agreed to allow Aubry to continue to govern. The Spanish flag was to be raised at Balize, where Ulloa would reside, and at all other posts in Louisiana except New Orleans. He quietly proceeded to gather first-hand information on conditions in his province and tried by every means to give as little offence to his resentful new subjects as possible. Aubry showed as much tact as Ulloa. His letter of January 20, 1768, reveals the success he had attained in preventing an open rupture. "My position is most extraordinary," he declares. "I command for the King of France and

<sup>11</sup>Goodspeed, *The Province and the States*, I, 242; Gayarre, *History of Louisiana*, II, 113.

<sup>12</sup>Gayarre, *op. cit.*, II, 129.

at the same time I govern the colony as if it belonged to the King of Spain. I have almost succeeded in being able to make French vivacity agree with Spanish gravity, by the trouble which I have given myself. There has happened, thanks to God, no accident; not a Spaniard killed, not even a quarrel at all serious."<sup>13</sup>

The prudent policy of Ulloa and the tactful management by Aubry were misinterpreted by the citizens of Louisiana, who were emboldened in their determination to revolt against Spanish authority by its very mildness. The return of Milhet in 1767 fanned the spirit of discontent. "Every change made, though for the general benefit, was turned to sport and mockery. Every act, public and private, of Ulloa was burlesqued and caricatured, and his conversations and household customs (for he had returned with his wife to New Orleans) became the object of satire and disrespect, all without the slightest justification."<sup>14</sup>

During the summer and fall of 1768 the leaders of the opposition held repeated secret meetings and sent agents to the remotest posts of the colony. It seems they intended to proclaim their independence from Spain and then join the English. On the night of October 26, the guns of New Orleans were spiked and early next morning a large body of insurgents, under the command of Marquis unceremoniously seized all the public places in the city. Ulloa and his wife took refuge in a ship and the Spanish officers barricaded themselves, determined to sell their lives dearly.

The revolt had been led by Lafrénière, attorney general of the colony, assisted by certain members of the Supreme Council. On October 28, a petition signed by over six hundred citizens demanded the expulsion of Ulloa, who was given three days in which to leave. Aubry tried in vain to restore order. He was removed from office. On November 1, a group of drunken rebels cut the cable of the frigate and the ship bearing Ulloa drifted down the river and out of Louisiana. To his credit be it said that in the exciting days of the revolt, he found time to leave instructions for the continuance of payment of Spanish and French soldiers and officers who remained behind.

*Spain puts down the revolt.* Ulloa went to Havana and from there continued to Spain, landing in Cádiz on February 14, 1769, from where he forwarded a detailed report of events and his conduct to both the

<sup>13</sup>Fortier, *History of Louisiana*, I, 159-162; Goodspeed, *The Province and the States*, I, 241-245; Wilson Lyons, *Louisiana in French Diplomacy*, 44-45.

<sup>14</sup>Goodspeed, *op. cit.*, I, 250.

Spanish and French governments. The rebels had made an urgent appeal to Louis XV to take them under his rule, which they dispatched to France with two messengers from New Orleans. The citizens of Louisiana found no encouragement at the French Court. Their fate was in the hands of Spain. Would she attempt to subdue them and reestablish her authority, or would she return the colony to France?

Charles III called a special council to determine "whether Spain should retain Louisiana, on account of the extreme importance of establishing barriers to the aggrandizement of the English or leave it in the hands of France." From January to March, 1769, the great council discussed every phase of the important question. The ablest statesmen of Spain expressed their opinions. Among the members were the Duke of Alba, Don Jaime Masones de Lima, Don Juan de Arriaga, the Marquis of San Juan de Piedras Albas, the Count of Aranda, Don Juan Gregorio Muniain, and Don Miguel de Múzquiz. Individual reports in writing were submitted to the Marqués de Grimaldi, now Secretary of State. All but Múzquiz agreed that Spain should keep Louisiana and subdue the rebellious colony. The reasons were well expressed by the Duke of Alba. Louisiana should be retained in order to define the western limits of the English possessions; the rebellious colonists should be subdued in order to strike at the root of all future disorders; and the form of government of the province should be changed to a form that should make future revolutions impossible. "Finally," he declared, "what to my judgment appears to be of more importance than all the rest, is that it be seen throughout the world and particularly in America, that the king knows and is able to repress any attempt whatever derogatory to the respect due to His Royal Majesty."<sup>15</sup> The Count of Aranda, who may be said to have been the foremost Spanish diplomat of his day, foretold the difficulties that were to arise over the western limits of the French province and how the failure to define them by France would be used as an excuse to include the larger part of Texas. If the province was now returned to France as suggested by some, he pointed out that it would probably soon be abandoned to the English or become, perhaps, an independent republic. In either case it would threaten the integrity of Texas and the commerce of all New Spain.

In his opinion, Masones de Lima seems to have formulated for the first time the condition which was to be exacted of Napoleon in 1802. "If

<sup>15</sup>Gayarre, *History of Louisiana*, II, 249-270. In this work are found summaries of the various opinions rendered, taken from documents in the Spanish archives.



GOVERNOR O'REILLY TAKES FORMAL POSSESSION OF LOUISIANA FOR SPAIN, AUGUST 18, 1769. ORIGINAL DRAWING BY SISTER M. MARIETTA, C.S.C., B.F.A., ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, AUSTIN, TEXAS.



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His Majesty should be inclined to leave it in the hands of France, then, the better to provide for the future," the counselor said, "I recommend a stipulation by which it should be understood that France shall never cede that Province either to the English or to the colonists themselves, without the consent of Spain, reserving its reversion to us, whenever France shall be disposed to part with it."

Grimaldi added his recommendations for the retention of the colony and the crushing of the incipient revolt directed by members of the council. The king accepted the recommendations and decided to put down the revolt and retain Louisiana for obvious political reasons.

Having decided on the policy to be pursued, Spain acted with unaccustomed energy and decision. Alexander O'Reilly, lieutenant-general and inspector of the Spanish army, was on the point of sailing for America to inspect Spanish fortifications in the Gulf area. He was instructed to hasten his departure to Havana, take such troops and armament as were needed from Cuba, and proceed secretly to Louisiana, where he was to suppress the rebellion, punish its leaders with as much clemency as was possible under the circumstances, remove all those whose presence endangered the tranquillity of the colony, and restore order. He was given considerable discretion and was invested with almost dictatorial powers in order to meet whatever situation might arise "on account of the distance we are from that country," declared Grimaldi.

O'Reilly was primarily a military man and his long experience in Europe had taught him the importance of thoroughness. With a force variously estimated as between three and four thousand seasoned Spanish troops, a train or artillery of fifty guns, and all the necessary supplies and ammunition, he set sail from Havana about the middle of July with a frigate and twenty-three or twenty-eight transports. The expedition anchored at Balize on July 23, 1769. Francisco Boulogny was sent immediately to report the arrival to Aubry in New Orleans and to prepare for the official reception of the new governor and the taking possession of Louisiana in the name of Spain.

All opposition vanished upon receipt of the news of the arrival of the Spanish expedition. For several months the jubilant citizens of New Orleans had been apprehensive of the repressive measures that might be adopted by Spain. Only a few spoke of opposing the landing of O'Reilly and his men. After some consultation with Aubry, the leaders of the revolt decided to throw themselves upon the mercy of the new governor.

When Boulogny returned to Balize he was accompanied by Lafrénière, Marquis, and Milhet.

O'Reilly received them on the deck of his flagship, surrounded by all his officers assembled there for the purpose. The leaders of the rebellion presented their respects to the commander and assured him of their submission to the King of Spain. With great politeness the veteran commander replied in gracious terms, promised them he would listen impartially to all explanations in due time, and invited them to have dinner with him. The courtesy and courtly bearing of General O'Reilly disarmed and reassured the former rebel leaders. They returned much pleased by the kind treatment they had received.

But O'Reilly had no intention of forgetting the affront which these men and their companions had offered to his royal master. On August 18, he anchored with his entire force in front of the City of New Orleans. Aubry and all the other French officers went aboard and presented their respects to the new governor. He then came ashore and returned the courtesy. Arrangements were made for the landing of the Spanish force and for the formal act of possession to take place late that afternoon.

"A signal gun at five o'clock announced that the disembarkation had commenced." Aubry and all his men were drawn up in the main square, ready to receive them. "The Spanish soldiers, with great precision, marched down the flying bridges, in solid columns, clad in the glittering paraphernalia of war, with arms blazing in the sun, and with an appearance of strength and invincibility that elicited the admiration of the beholders. Moving on like clockwork, they drew up in battalions, forming the three sides of a square, and were followed by the artillery of more than fifty cannon and mortars, and by about one hundred mounted men. Of course it was the most imposing scene ever witnessed in New Orleans up to that time. Every flag was flying from the vessels and from the houses, for now everybody seemed loyal to Spain. Every bell in the city was ringing.

When the troops had taken their respective positions, General O'Reilly came down the bridge preceded by attendants in royal livery, bearing long silver maces, and surrounded by a dazzling array of brilliantly uniformed officers. "He advanced to the center of the square, where Governor Aubry stood with his retinue, waiting to receive him and where from a tall mast still flew the flag of France. Here the credentials were exhibited and exchanged, and here the instruments were read which transferred Louisiana to the crown of Spain." Salutes were fired, the large crowd assembled, cheered, and shouted "Long live the King," and the officials marched in state to the cathedral where they were received

with due ceremony and a *Te Deum* was sung. Louisiana had formally passed into the dominion of Spain.<sup>16</sup>

*O'Reilly administers grim justice.* Courteous but firm, the new governor immediately turned his attention to the arrest and trial of the chief conspirators in the revolt. On August 24, Lafrénière, Villere, Noyan, Marquis, Carrese, Milhet, DeMassan, Petit, Poupet, DeBoisblanc, and Doucet were arrested and charged with rebellion against their king, placed in solitary confinement, and their property confiscated as provided by Spanish law. They were quickly brought to trial with the observance of all legal procedure, and convicted on October 24. Joseph Petit was condemned to life imprisonment, Balthasar DeMassan and Julian Jerome Doucet to imprisonment for ten years, Boisblanc, Jean Milhet, and Pierre Poupet to imprisonment for six years. Lafrénière, Noyan, Carrese, Marquis, and Joseph Milhet were condemned "to be led to the gallows on asses, with ropes around their necks, to be hanged until death shall follow, and to remain hanging until I (O'Reilly) decide otherwise." But no one could be found to act as executioner, not even a negro slave, whereupon it was decided that the five men sentenced to death be executed by being shot. The execution took place under heavy guard on October 25, 1769, in the barracks of the Lisbon regiment, located just above the convent of the Ursulines on Chartres Street.<sup>17</sup>

*Determining the status of Louisiana with regard to New Spain.* But let us return to New Spain and the Province of Texas and note the effects of the cession of Louisiana to Spain. Almost immediately after the acceptance of the unsolicited gift, the king informed the viceroy of New Spain on December 8, 1762, of the terms of the treaty of Fontainebleau, sending him a copy of the document. He was laconically told that the time and manner of taking possession had not been decided.<sup>18</sup> It was a logical conclusion to expect that the new province would be placed under the jurisdiction of the viceroy of New Spain and added to this vast territory. But with the vexing problems that followed the cession, the King and his Council thought that it would be prudent not to place the recalcitrant province on the same footing as the other Spanish possessions under the administration of the viceroy and the Council of the Indies.

<sup>16</sup>The summary account here presented is based chiefly on Goodspeed, *The Province and the States*, I, 251-265; Fortier, *History of Louisiana*, I, 206-211; Gayarre, *History of Louisiana*, II, 249-300.

<sup>17</sup>Fortier, *History of Louisiana*, I, 224-226.

<sup>18</sup>Real Cédula, December 8, 1762. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 321, pp. 187-190.

In a genuine effort to conciliate the people of Louisiana and to make their transfer less distasteful, it was decided to introduce as few changes in the government as possible. The same day that Antonio de Ulloa, captain in His Majesty's Navy, was appointed governor, the viceroy of New Spain was informed that the king had agreed to set up the province as a separate jurisdiction, that no changes were to be made in its government, that free trade with other Spanish possessions was not to be allowed, that rule was to be administered by its governor independently of the Council of the Indies, and his authority was to be subject only to the Minister of State, through whom the governor was to communicate with the crown. Nevertheless the expense of administration was to be borne by the Kingdom of New Spain. The viceroy was instructed to send one hundred and fifty thousand *pesos* a year from the royal revenues for this purpose.<sup>19</sup>

New Spain was not only to bear the expense of administration for the new province, but it was to give material aid in its development. Shortly after the order for the remittance of funds to Cuba, the king informed the viceroy that Andrés Olvera y Abreu, of Louisiana, had presented a plan through Governor Ulloa for the cultivation of peace with the Indians of Louisiana and New Mexico through the establishment of a settlement and post at Cheti Manchac. The viceroy was instructed to give his full cooperation to the plan and to furnish such soldiers as might be needed from the presidios in Texas and Nuevo Santander.<sup>20</sup> When the viceroy transmitted the order to Escandón with a request to cooperate, the latter wisely pointed out that Cheti Manchac on the upper Red River was too distant for him to render any effectual aid without going through the Province of Texas. The order plainly reveals the ignorance of the Court concerning the geography of the new province and its relative position in regard to New Spain.

Although the trade with the adjacent possessions of Spain was prohibited, Louisiana was granted the privilege of carrying on commerce directly with the mother country, a privilege strictly denied individually to the other provinces of New Spain. This was, no doubt, done at the instigation of the merchants of Cádiz and Seville, but it was a short-sighted policy which failed to strengthen the ties between Louisiana and Texas that would have been mutually advantageous. "Since the Province of Louisiana came under my sovereignty," the king declared, "it has been

<sup>19</sup>Arriaga to the Viceroy, May 21, 1755. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol 321, pp. 194-195.

<sup>20</sup>King to the Viceroy, October 22, 1765. *Reales Cédulas*, 1678-1772 (Bolton Transcripts) p. 181.

my desire that my new subjects shall not experience any vexations as the result of the change of sovereignty." On March 24, 1768, by royal decree direct trade with Spain was duly authorized and the corresponding regulations drawn. Ships engaged in this commerce were not to stop in any port in the Spanish possessions or to engage in trade with them either on the way to or from Spain. But if driven into port by adverse weather they were to be allowed to make repairs and restock themselves in whichever port necessity and emergency drove them. Furthermore, if the ships were completely disabled, making the continuance of their voyage impossible, the shipmasters were to be allowed to dispose of their cargoes on payment of a ten per cent impost.<sup>21</sup>

*Fear of the English.* The cession of all Spanish and French territory east of the Mississippi to Great Britain in 1762, and the prompt occupation of that area had brought grave fears to Spanish officials, who foresaw the inevitable penetration of English goods into the Gulf Coast provinces of New Spain. As early as the fall of 1764, the presence of a large fleet at Pensacola had been reported by the viceroy of New Spain, who had suggested on November 28 of that year the advisability of providing a coast guard to watch the movements of foreigners. The king's secretary acknowledged the letter and informed the viceroy on February 9, 1765, that the suggestion would be given serious consideration by the Council.<sup>22</sup> But the viceroy felt that the matter was urgent, and on his own responsibility, dispatched several ships to watch the movements of the English in the Gulf.<sup>23</sup>

Rumors soon reached the viceroy that the English were in fact planning to establish themselves on the islands along the coast between San Bernardo Bay and the Río Grande. Colonel Ortiz Parrilla, who was in Monclova had reported that in a recent expedition to the Gulf coast he had discovered two long, narrow islands on which, it was said, the English were planning to erect a fort. At this time Don José de Escandón was about ready to set out on a tour of inspection of Nuevo Santander. The viceroy requested him to investigate the truth of the report. The

<sup>21</sup>Arriaga to the Viceroy, May 3, 1768. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 321, pp. 198-199. A copy of the printed regulations of March 3, 1768, was enclosed. It was printed in Madrid. *Real decreto que previene las reglas y condiciones con que se puede hacer el comercio desde España a la Provincia de la Louisiana*. Madrid, 1768. Copy in *Ibid.*, pp. 200-207.

<sup>22</sup>Arriaga to the Viceroy, February 9, 1765. *Reales Cédulas, 1678-1772* (Bolton Transcripts) p. 41.

<sup>23</sup>Manuel Rivera, *Los gobernantes de México*, I, 404.

islands had been known since his first *entrada*, declared Escandón, and had been described minutely in his report of the previous year. He seriously doubted that they could be occupied, because they were too barren to sustain life. If foreign intruders had visited the area recently, he would have been apprized of the fact by the settlers, who had moved into that region since the establishment of La Bahía on the San Antonio and by others examining the land for settlement of the proposed Nueces River. Nevertheless, he assured the viceroy that he would make a thorough investigation immediately upon his arrival.<sup>24</sup>

Before the facts could be verified, the rumored plans of the English intrusion reached the king's ear and filled his advisers with deep concern. In August, 1766, Governor Ulloa wrote the king that on July 16, the commander at Natchitoches had received a letter from a French trader, which stated: "It is said the English are to establish a line of forts every fifty leagues. They are going to construct a fort at San Bernardo Bay with one thousand men and two hundred negroes." With other discomfiting details, the correspondent closed with the significant phrase: "Adieu le Mexique, si les marines, Francaises et Espagnoles, ne previent le dessein."<sup>25</sup> Ulloa hastened to observe, however, that the commander at Natchitoches had also heard that the viceroy had already given orders to Colonel Diego Ortiz Parrilla to organize an expedition to expel the English from Isla Blanca (present Padre Island) near the mouth of the Río Grande, known also as Río del Norte. This stream he estimated to be some one hundred thirty leagues west of New Orleans. Ulloa explained that he had been inclined to disregard the rumor, until the appearance of three English sailors in New Orleans, who claimed that they had run away from the fort which was being built on San Bernardo Bay. He pointed out that the Río Grande permitted access to Santa Fé, New Mexico, and that if the English succeeded in their plans, they would surround Louisiana on the east and west.<sup>26</sup>

The astonishment and apprehension of Spanish officials only grew when the same news was transmitted by the Conde de Fuentes, Spanish Ambassador in Paris. Copies of the two letters were immediately sent to the viceroy on February 10, 1767, with a sharp rebuke for his failure to report

<sup>24</sup>Escandón to the Viceroy, November 8, 1765. *Provincias Internas*, Vol. 110, pp. 232-234.

<sup>25</sup>"Goodbye to Mexico, if the French and Spanish navies do not prevent the design."

<sup>26</sup>Ulloa to Arriaga, August 26, 1766. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Transcripts) 1767, pp. 39-41. Copy also in *Reales Cédulas*, 1678-1772 (Bolton Transcripts) pp. 149-151.

so important a matter. While expressing the king's reluctance to believe the rumors, his secretary thought it would be best to make a thorough investigation. The viceroy was instructed to send intelligent and trustworthy agents by land and sea, if he had not already done so, to explore the bay and the reputed islands along the coast. If the English were found, they were to be asked to leave. Should they refuse, they were to be driven out by force. On July 31, the order was repeated in more urgent terms and implicit orders given to find out when and how the English had come to settle on the coast and to drive them out at any cost.<sup>27</sup>

*Reports of Escandón on Padre Island.* Be it said to the credit of the Marqués de Cruillas, the viceroy, that while faced with numerous problems of grave importance in the closing months of his administration, he did not neglect his duties in safeguarding the Texas coast. From the time the first rumors reached him, he had taken every measure at his command to ascertain the truth and meet every eventuality. In addition to the request sent to Escandón for information, he commissioned Ortiz Parrilla to proceed to La Bahía and from there conduct a thorough investigation. If the English were found to have settled anywhere on the coast, they were to be expelled by force.

The first to report was Escandón. In his letters he summarized all he had been able to learn concerning the islands along the coast and the presence of foreigners. Since here are found many details concerning an area heretofore neglected by historians of Texas, it may be well to give a full account of the exploration and investigation conducted by both Escandón and Parrilla as a result of the English scare.

Upon his arrival in Nuevo Santander Escandón dispatched a detachment of soldiers from Camargo to explore the coast. Under the leadership of José de la Garza Falcón, the twenty-five men set out from Camargo on June 19, 1766, and went to Santa Petronila. This was a ranch owned by Blas María de la Garza Falcón, located about five leagues southwest from Río de las Nueces and not far from the coast. This would place them in the vicinity of present Chapman ranch, due south of Corpus Christi. After a few days in Santa Petronila, the men secured a number of Indian guides, who told them that the Islas Blancas (White Islands) were opposite the coast from the ranch. The guides led the little band across shallow and marshy lakes to a long, narrow, flat island, that

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<sup>27</sup>Arriaga to the Viceroy, February 10, 1767; same to same, July 31, 1767. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Transcripts, 1767) pp. 37-39; *Cédulas Reales*, 1768-1772 (Bolton Transcripts) p. 146.

extended for many miles to the south. It was cut by shallow canals at intervals, through which the sea flowed at high tide into the lake along the shore facing the mainland. There was practically no vegetation, not a single tree was to be found anywhere, and the white, glistening sand gave the island its name. The Indian guides assured the Spaniards no one lived on the island, which was visited by them only during certain seasons of the year.<sup>28</sup>

While waiting for the return of the explorers, Escandón obtained depositions from men who were acquainted with the coast. This information and what he himself knew he summarized in a long report which he sent on May 2, 1766. The mouth of the Río Grande he placed at twenty-six degrees and fifteen minutes. From Tampico to this point the coast was clear and low, with no islands of any consequence. The current off shore was strong and flowed to the north with a heavy drift. In the ranch of Blas María de la Garza Falcón, located five leagues to the southwest from the bay at the mouth of the Nueces, a number of settlers were now living, who planted corn, and tended their herds of cattle and sheep. These people were in a position to know if the English had been in the vicinity. Escandón reported, however, that he had heard nothing from them.

*Mustang and St. Joseph Islands.* From the bay at the mouth of the Nueces the coast ran to the north and east. About one or two leagues to the north of the bay and across from it were some sand banks or islands, which continued along the coast as far as Espíritu Santo Bay (present San Antonio Bay). The water between them and the coast was very shallow. José Garabito Campechano, sailor and fisherman, who had resided for five years at La Bahía and had explored the coast, declared that the island or islands, for they seemed one separated by narrow and shallow passages that shifted after storms, were from one-fourth to one league wide, made of nothing but sand, with a few low sand dunes, which were almost covered by the sea in time of storms as shown by the waste and driftwood left on them. The islands were uninhabitable, there being no trees, nor animals, except a few deer that went back and forth from the mainland. The only drinkable water was found in scattered shallow pools filled by the rains. The shore towards the sea sloped imperceptibly in a long shallow flat that made approach by ships impossible. The islands described were, no doubt, present St. Joseph and Mustang.

<sup>28</sup>Escandón to the Viceroy, November 15, 1766. *A. G. M. Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, 252-253.



From the presidio at La Bahía on the San Antonio to the coast the distance was about fifteen leagues, and from the presidio to the mouth of the Nueces and San Miguel Bay (Corpus Christi) some twenty-five or thirty leagues. Beyond La Bahía (San Antonio Bay) some two or three leagues off shore, there was another island called Culebra, which was said to extend as far as the Trinity. This island was, perhaps, present Matagorda, which adjoins Matagorda Peninsula to the north.<sup>29</sup>

*Expedition of Ortiz Parrilla.* Much more formal was the exploration and report made by Parrilla. Having heard from the Malaguita Indians, recently congregated in the Missions of San Juan Bautista and San Bernardo, of an island along the coast known as San Carlos de los Malaguitas or Isla Blanca, and in accord with the instructions of the viceroy to reconnoiter the coast from La Bahía to the mouth of the Río Grande, he set out from San Juan Bautista on the Río Grande on September 13, 1766. With a sufficient number of men and Indian guides he first went to Santa Petronila, where he established his camp. From here he sent a party of twenty-five men and nine Indians to make a thorough exploration of the island opposite the coast. It is to be noted that in his report he refers to the bay at the mouth of the Nueces River as Corpus Christi for the first time.<sup>30</sup>

José Antonio de la Garza, Eugenio Fernández, and Matheo Martínez, who conducted the exploration with the twenty-five soldiers assigned for this purpose reported on September 23. They crossed the intervening shallow lakes and found themselves on a long, narrow, flat, sandy island, varying in width from a quarter to a league, with no permanent source of drinking water. From its northern end, opposite to the southern shore of Corpus Christi Bay, about two leagues from shore, the island extended in a general southern direction, with a slight inclination to the west, for fifty-five leagues parallel to the main coast line. From its southern extremity to the mouth of the Río Grande it was likewise about two leagues. There were ruins of abandoned *rancherías* in the southern extremity, but it was evident that these had never been permanently occupied, but were used by coastal tribes for relatively short seasons each year. The rain water that gathered in small pools did not last long, and the exploring party had to dig shallow wells, as the Indians did, for

<sup>29</sup>Escandón to the Viceroy, May 2, 1766. *A. G. I., Provincias Internas*, Vol. 110, pp. 237-241.

<sup>30</sup>Testimonio de las Diligencias practicadas por el Coronel Don Diego Ortiz Parrilla en que da punttual noticia de la Ysla de los Malaguitas. Año 1767. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Transcripts, 1767) pp. 17-35.

drinking. There was no wood or timber, except along the eastern shore, where the sea threw up the remains of shipwrecks and where numerous logs were brought down by the rivers that flowed into the Gulf. The party noted several canoes, small boats, and the half of what appeared to have been a twenty-gun vessel which they set on fire.

The little grass that grew on the island was unsuited for either cattle or horses because of its toughness. There was no rock for construction purposes, nor any other kind of building material. Two old Indian chiefs who accompanied the expedition, Miguel el Fuso and Jacobo, told the Spaniards they frequently visited the island and it was not uncommon to see ships passing within sight. Mateo Martínez, a pilot by occupation, who had repeatedly sailed from Veracruz to the Río in the ship operated by Escandón to bring supplies, declared that between the Río Grande and Veracruz there were only two other islands called Lobos and Blanquilla. In 1765 he had made a special exploration of the mouth of the Río Grande and had drawn a map of it at the request of Escandón. The distance to the Nueces was estimated to be about seventy leagues.

The islands offered no facilities for landing, its shore sloping very gently and being dotted with numerous sand banks marked in the distance by the surf. There were two places where it seemed the water flowed across the island into the lake between it and the coast. When the weather was severe these channels made it appear that there were several islands, but at low water it was evident that there was only one.<sup>31</sup>

*Parrilla goes from Santa Petronila to La Bahía.* With the return of the exploring party, Colonel Parrilla was ready to continue his exploration to the northeast. It had been his intention to reexplore Corpus Christi Bay, proceeding as near the coast as possible to La Bahía on the Santa Dorotea River (San Antonio) and from there go perhaps as far as the Presidio of San Agustín de los Orcoquisacs (Arkokisas). But during the last six days of his stay, while awaiting the return of the explorers, it rained heavily and this condition together with the heavy seas and the swollen waters of the streams that enter the bay forced him to retrace his steps, going up stream for forty-two leagues, before he was able to cross the Nueces in rawhide boats to find the road to La Bahía. The rains

<sup>31</sup>Testimonio de los autos, y diligencias fhas, por el coronel D. Diego Ortiz Parrilla sre, las circunstancias de la Isla de los Malaguitas, que comunmte, han llamado Isla Blanca. Año 1767. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara* (Dunn Transcripts, 1767) pp. 11-16; Parrilla to the Marqués de Croix, May 4, 1767. In *Ibid.*, 3-4. In this letter Parrilla says he drew a careful map of the island and sent it with the report. This map is in the Archive of the Ministry of War in Madrid, according to Dunn.

had been general, and upon his arrival at La Bahía, located about twelve leagues from the mouth of the San Antonio, Parrilla found it impossible to reach the coast to continue his exploration of the adjacent islands as far as the Orcoquisac mission. But at La Bahía he observed several soldiers from Orcoquisac. This enabled him to secure the desired information from those who had had the longest experience in this area.

*Conditions at Orcoquisac, near the mouth of the Trinity.* Among those questioned by Parrilla was Francisco Xavier Ramos, soldier of Presidio de San Agustín, who had just arrived in La Bahía to secure supplies. He declared that in September the presidio had been visited by a severe storm and that continued heavy rains had swollen the rivers and lakes along the coast, making the lower road impassable. The flood caused by the storm had forced the soldiers to remove the Presidio of San Agustín to higher ground. In his opinion, it would be useless to attempt to explore the coast at this time. Asked if he knew of any islands in the vicinity of San Agustín de los Orcoquisac, he replied that he had lived there for several years but knew of no islands along the coast opposite the mouth of the Trinity. His statements were corroborated by Diego Martínez, another soldier from the same presidio, who made a deposition on October 7, 1767.<sup>32</sup>

*Description of the coast from San Antonio Bay to Corpus Christi.* The next to testify in the investigation of Juan Gregorio de Alvarado, soldier of the Presidio of Nuestra Señora de Loreto and mission guard in Nuestra Señora del Rosario. He had returned a few days before from the coast to the southwest of the presidio, where he had gone with Toribio and two mission Indians to bring back some runaway neophytes. On September 6 or 7, while on the coast in the Bay of Santo Domingo, located between Espíritu Santo Bay (San Antonio) and the mouth of the Nueces, a violent storm had overtaken them which lasted for four days. For one entire week he was marooned by the flood waters from the streams and lakes along the shore. He had succeeded in bringing back twenty-five mission Indians, found similarly marooned on a sand dune along the shore, where they had been for five days without food.

He explained that the Bay of Santo Domingo was some five or six leagues (about fifteen miles) from Corpus Christi. On the way to this bay in search of the runaways, he had spent two days, but on the return

<sup>32</sup>Declarations of Francisco Xavier Ramos and Diego Martínez, in *Testimonio de las Diligencias practicadas . . .* (Dunn Transcripts, 1767) pp. 20-21.

march, due to the high water, it had taken him seven days. Much interested in the mention of a bay between La Bahía and the Nueces, the Indian Toribio was questioned and he declared that this bay was about six leagues above (north of) the mouth of the Nueces River.

Desirous of learning more about the Bay of Santo Domingo, the character of the coast and the tribes that lived in the area between La Bahía and the Nueces River, Parrilla next examined Tomás de Ojeda, Lieutenant of the Presidio of La Bahía. He estimated that the actual distance along the coast from La Bahía to the Nueces was about forty leagues, but that it was impassable at this time of the year because of the heavy rains. As to islands he declared he knew of only two, one opposite the Bay of Corpus Christi, known as Culebra and one opposite the Bay of San Domingo, some five or six leagues above the mouth of the Nueces. There were several other much smaller, which were frequently submerged by high waters. On the two larger islands had seen Copano, Piguique, and Karankawa Indians, who made their permanent home there. But at the present time he knew there were very few of these Indians left on the two islands as a consequence of the severe epidemics of smallpox and measles which had visited them in recent years. They had been further reduced by the large number who had decided to join the missions at La Bahía and San Antonio.

Questioned concerning ships known to have landed along the coast, he declared that approximately seven years before a vessel had been wrecked on Culebra Island. The Captain of La Bahía had succeeded in rescuing one English boy, nine years old, and in obtaining some salvage, but that most of the cargo and all the survivors with the exception of the boy had been destroyed by the fierce Karankawa tribe. The incident had been reported to the viceroy at the time. Another ship had been similarly wrecked about five years before on the island opposite Santo Domingo Bay. No survivors had been found when the captain of the presidio came upon it, and only a part of its cargo was rescued. But recently he had neither seen nor heard that any foreign vessels had attempted to land on these islands.<sup>33</sup>

From the declarations of the witness examined, it is safe to conclude that we have here the first detailed description of Mustang, St. Joseph, and Matagorda Islands and of Copano Bay, called Santo Domingo. Culebra

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<sup>33</sup>Declaraciones de Juan Gregorio de Alvarado, the Indian Toribio, and Tomás de Ojeda in *Testimonio de las Diligencias Practicadas* . . . (Dunn Tr. 1767) pp. 22-29.

Island seems to have been St. Joseph, opposite present Copano Bay, where Indians of this tribe lived.

*Suggestion for coast guard.* Before Parrilla left La Bahía and made his report to the viceroy, he asked Captain Manuel Ramírez de la Piscina to offer suggestions. The aged and experienced old commander confirmed everything that had been said by the different persons who had been examined by Colonel Parrilla. In his opinion, the best way to safeguard the entire coast was to establish a small detachment of soldiers under a subaltern officer on the coast at a point approximately half way between the Guadalupe and the Nueces Rivers. This detachment should be provided with two boats of small draft fitted with sails and oars. In this way the men could make periodic inspections of the entire coast line from La Bahía del Espíritu Santo through that of Santo Domingo, to Corpus Christi and beyond to the mouth of the Río Grande. Such a measure would prevent smuggling, give timely notice of the presence of foreigners, and save the unfortunate victims wrecked on the coast from the bar barbarous treatment and cruel death dealt them by the fierce Karankawas and other coastal tribes.<sup>34</sup>

The English scare had been proved false. But as a result of the unfounded rumors a careful exploration of the Gulf Coast from the Trinity to the mouth of the Río Grande had been conducted and detailed information about the coast, its bays, and the adjacent islands had been gathered. On June 23, 1767, the new viceroy, the Marqués de Croix, informed the king that the reported plans of the English to occupy the Bay of San Bernardo and to establish a line of forts on the Gulf Coast were unfounded. They had very likely been originated by the commission entrusted to Colonel Ortiz Parrilla by the Marqués de Cruillas. The officer at Natchitoches had probably obtained a distorted idea of activities through the soldiers at Los Adaes, when the Governor of the Province of Texas had been notified as a matter of form to extend such aid as might be needed to Colonel Parrilla. The reports of Ulloa and Conde de Fuentes, the viceroy assured the king, had no foundation in fact. The king expressed his approval of all that had been done and thanked the viceroy for his solicitude on October 21, 1767.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup>*Certificación* by Manuel Ramírez de la Piscina, October 14, 1766. In *ibid.*, 33-35.

<sup>35</sup>Marqués de Croix to the king, June 23, 1767. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara* (Dunn Tr. 1767) p. 130; Arriaga to the Viceroy, October 21, 1767, *Reales Cédulas, 1678-1772* (Bolton Tr.) p. 155.

*Need of inspection of the presidios of New Spain.* Since Don Pedro de Rivera made his comprehensive report in the years 1728-1730, no inspection of the important northern outposts of New Spain had been ordered. Repeated complaints of the excessive prices charged for commodities by presidial commanders had called the attention of the king to this abuse, which in recent years had become the chief source of illegal profits made at the expense of the efficiency and general morale of the frontier garrisons. Even before the cession of Louisiana had made the reorganization of the Texas frontier imperative, the king had recommended that an investigation be conducted concerning the schedule of prices at which essential commodities consumed by different presidios were being sold. When the Marqués de Cruillas was about to take charge of the government of New Spain in 1760, article 11 of his instructions recommended that upon his arrival in Mexico he should call a meeting of his principal ministers and such persons as experience in presidial matters qualified as experts, to study the regulations adopted in 1730, after the inspection of Rivera, in regard to the price of commodities supplied to presidial troops.

More pressing matters occupied the attention of the conscientious and upright viceroy after his arrival and the revision of price schedules was postponed. The king, however, had not lost sight of this important subject, the principal cause of complaint in the *residencias* of all frontier commanders. Furthermore it was felt that a lapse of thirty years had naturally changed conditions. Perhaps some of the presidios were no longer necessary in their present location and could be moved to more advantageous sites. With the growth of settlements the prices of many of the goods consumed might be now excessive. On June 23, 1764, the king categorically reminded the Marqués de Cruillas of his negligence in putting into effect article 11 of his instructions of 1760. He was informed that the regulations adopted in 1730 were annulled by the present decree, that the schedule in force was to continue only until a new one was worked out, and that no time should be wasted in the requested revision.<sup>36</sup> The viceroy made apologies on October 8 for the delay in carrying out the king's instructions concerning this important matter and explained it was being studied by the *Fiscal* and the *Auditor* prior to its presentation to a general *Junta* for discussion. But when the king again urged the prompt solution of the problem on January 23, 1765, and on March 17,

<sup>36</sup>Arriaga to the Viceroy, June 23, 1764. *Reales Cédulas*, 1751-1789, Vol. 4, pp. 35-36.

the viceroy reported that the *Junta* had held the first meeting to discuss the regulations of prices and had decided to wait until the necessary data was gathered to arrive at a satisfactory new schedule for presidial commodities.<sup>37</sup>

A general inspection of presidios had been contemplated for some time. The urgent need of data to formulate a new schedule of prices now decided the king to order its execution. On August 7, he informed the viceroy that he was issuing orders for a general inspection to be carried out by the Marqués de Rubí, Field Marshal in His Majesty's Army, who would set out for New Spain immediately. He was to visit the entire frontier from California to Texas, to report on the status of each presidio, its location, condition of its garrison, the price of commodities and its fairness in view of changed conditions, and to make suitable recommendations. The viceroy was to furnish the Marqués de Rubí a copy of the regulations of 1730 and to give him all the information necessary for the more efficacious execution of his commission. Two days later the former order was issued to Rubí in Spain where he was at this time.<sup>38</sup>

*Instructions for the inspection.* The Marqués de Rubí set out shortly thereafter and arrived in Mexico early in February, 1766. After a number of conferences with the viceroy, the necessary arrangements for the inspection were completed, and Rubí started from Mexico on March 6, without waiting for the formal instructions. These were duly drawn on March 10 and sent to him by special messenger. The full importance of his commission may be inferred from the instructions given him. The primary purpose was to make a thorough military inspection of each presidio from California to Texas. But he was furthermore to make special reports on the Presidio de Pasage in Nueva Vizcaya (Chihuahua) and Guajuquilla, which were being seriously menaced by the Apaches. While in Sonora he was to determine the causes for the recent revolt of the Seri and Pima Indians, the need of new presidios, or the relocation of those already established, and to recommend whatever changes were needed. He was also to investigate the possibility of sending supplies to Sonora by sea from Acapulco.

He was to make an investigation into the character and conduct of Governor Tomás Vélez of New Mexico to ascertain the facts about his

<sup>37</sup>Arriaga to the Viceroy, January 23, 1765; Same to Same, August 1, 1765. *Reales Cédulas*, Vol. 4, pp. 44-45.

<sup>38</sup>King to the Viceroy, August 7, 1765; King to the Marqués de Rubí, August 9, 1765. *Reales Cédulas*, 1751-1789, Vol. 4, p. 46; *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 321, p. 196.

reputed explorations and campaigns against the Comanches and to estimate the strength of these Indians and their attitude with regard to Santiago de Taos. This being an important post, he was to make a report on its defense.

It was with regard to Texas, however, that he was given the most detailed instructions. Beginning with the Presidio of San José del Paso del Río del Norte, then within the jurisdiction of New Mexico, he was to examine the condition of the garrison, the defense of the fort, and the activity of Captain Pedro de la Fuente, and to determine the advisability of moving this post to a more advantageous position.

In the case of the Royal Presidio of San Sabá, founded on the border of Texas and New Mexico to restrain the Indian nations that raided Coahuila, Nueva Vizcaya, and Texas, he was to ascertain the need of maintaining it in its present location, or of moving it in consequence of the proposed settlement of Cheti Manchac, planned by Governor Ulloa of Louisiana.

Since the posts of Los Adaes and Natchitoches were so close to each other, it might be advisable to suppress one of them in view of the cession of Louisiana. He was, therefore, to make recommendations concerning this important point.

With regard to the Presidio of Nuestra Señora de Loreto at La Bahía, Rubí was to decide whether it should be moved to a point closer to the coast. The reported activity of the English along the coast from the Bay of San Bernardo to the Pánuco and the rumored occupation of the adjacent islands might make the change advisable.

With a view to putting an end to the excessive drain on the royal treasury caused by the permanent maintenance of presidios along the northern frontier, Rubí was requested to select with care the site of new posts. "He shall keep ever present," declared the viceroy, "how useful it would be to establish presidios in locations where population might in time be capable of dispensing with the aid of the garrisons for their subsistence, so that after a number of years these may be advanced to more exposed positions, leaving their rear protected by the new settlements."<sup>39</sup>

The Marqués de Rubí was to be paid twelve *pesos* a day over and above his regular salary, the same as Rivera, from the day he left Mexico City until his return to the capital and the completion of his mission. He was

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<sup>39</sup>Instrucciones al Marqués de Rubí, March 10, 1766. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr., 1757-1766) pp. 240-244.



to be accompanied by Nicolás de La Fora, captain of engineers, and an assistant who were to draw maps and sketches of the presidios and of the country to make the reports and recommendations clearer.<sup>40</sup>

*Route of Rubí and La Fora.* The Marqués de Rubí set out from Mexico twelve days before La Fora was ready to join him. Following the route of Rubí, La Fora left Mexico City on March 18, 1766, and made his way north to Querétaro, continuing to Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, Sombrerete, and Durango. It was in the latter city that he finally overtook Rubí on April 14. Before resuming the journey, mules had to be secured and a supply of provisions gathered. This required twelve days, during which time La Fora took observations on the sun and found the latitude to be twenty-four degrees north. On April 26, the march was again taken up and after four days they arrived in the Presidio de la Limpia Concepción del Pasage, completely surrounded by mountains except on the northwest. Here they found a small garrison of thirty-six men, including three officers. It took fourteen days to conduct the inspection, draw maps and plans, and secure a new supply of provisions.

On May 14, the march was resumed and on the following day the site of the abandoned Presidio de Gallo on the Nazas River was inspected. On May 17, they camped on the site of the old Presidio de Cerro Gordo, now abandoned and continuing along the valley of San Bartolomé, arrived in Chihuahua on June 2, "located in an arid valley watered by a small stream with scant water." The decline of the mines in the vicinity and the continuing raids of the Indians had reduced the population to some four hundred families. Here the Marqués de Rubí and his little band were obliged to remain until July 7, to give the horses and mules an opportunity to recover from the hardships of the journey through the inhospitable lands traversed.

On July 7, the march was resumed to the northwest. Passing through the Missions of Santa Anna and San Gerónimo, of Concho and Taramore Indians, they came to Mission San Francisco de los Conchos on July 9. Here the route branched eastward to Julimes and La Junta. It was the intention of Rubí to inspect the recently founded presidio at La Junta, but while at San Francisco he was informed that the Governor of Nueva Vizcaya had ordered its temporary abandonment and the retirement of its garrison to the old site of the Julime pueblo on the Conchos River (Mexico).

<sup>40</sup>*Reales Cédulas*, 1751-1789, Vol. 4, p. 48; Marqués de Croix to Arriaga, July 16, 1767. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13, (Dunn Tr., 1767), p. 179.

Changing the course to the north, they continued to Hacienda de Agua Nueva, where they came upon the main road from Chihuahua to El Paso del Río del Norte on July 13. On the following day, they arrived in Carrizal, in the jurisdiction of New Mexico. A detachment of ten men and an officer from Presidio del Paso were stationed at this point to safeguard the small settlement, but they afforded scant protection. From here it took Rubí until July 19 to reach present El Paso. To the east of the presidio and the Pueblo de Guadalupe, along the river bank, were the pueblos of San Lorenzo, Real de San Antonio de Senecú, San Antonio de la Isleta, Purísima Concepción del Socorro, and Hacienda de los Tiburcios, forming a continuous settlement for a distance of seven leagues. In San Lorenzo lived the Zumas, in Senecú the Prios, in Isleta the Tiguas, and in Socorro the Piros, with a total of about five thousand souls. Five Franciscans looked after the Indian missions. In the opinion of La Fora the neophytes were so far advanced that the missions were ready to be placed under the care of seculars. The inspection delayed Rubí until August 5, 1766, at which time he continued his march to Albuquerque, where he arrived on August 16. There were seventy Spanish families living at this post. He proceeded to Santa Fé, where he arrived on the 19th, remaining there until September 15. La Fora drew a map of the presidio and town, while Rubí conducted the inspection of the garrison of eighty men.

From Santa Fé, Rubí retraced his route to El Paso and on to Carrizal, hence to Casas Grandes in present Chihuahua, and on west to Presidio de Janos in the jurisdiction of Sonora. Continuing west and north, he then visited Presidio de Fronteras, passed on to Presidio de Terrenate, and finally arrived in the Presidio de San Ignacio de Tubac on December 20, 1766. His party remained in Tubac until January 5, when they set out again for Presidio de Santa Gertrudis del Altar, thirty-six leagues to the southwest, and only thirty-two from the coast of the Bay of California, arriving at their destination on January 9. Having reached the westernmost post, they began their return march on January 23, traveled seventy-three leagues to the south and east, and arrived in San Miguel de Horcasitas on January 30. After a stay of three weeks, Rubí turned east again, and working his way through Coahuila, arrived in Monclova on June 15, 1767.

It was from Monclova that Rubí began his careful inspection of the Province of Texas. He first went to Presidio de Santa Rosa, still within the jurisdiction of Coahuila, where a garrison of fifty-two men was main-

tained, and from there he set out for the Presidio of San Sabá. The route followed was to the northeast. Three leagues from Santa Rosa the expedition crossed the Río de Sabinas (Coahuila), where headwaters were eight leagues to the south, and halted at a point called Zenzontle (mocking bird), after having travelled eight leagues during the day. On July 11, they marched sixteen leagues to the Villa Nueva de San Fernando de Austria. The course lay northeast. During the day they passed Paraje de San José, crossed the Arroyo de La Laja, and went by the headwaters of San Ildefonso River. The next day Rubí's party covered thirteen leagues to the north northeast, crossing two small streams, the San Antonio and the San Rodrigo, both in Coahuila. On July 14, the Río Grande was crossed at or very near the present site of Del Río, and after travelling four leagues to the northeast, they came upon Las Moras Creek, which was followed to its source, where they camped for the night. On this day they must have passed the site of present Brackettville. In crossing the Río Grande a Pausan Indian and two horses were drowned.

Resuming the march on July 18, they crossed Cíbolo Creek, nine leagues northeast of the headwaters of Las Moras Creek. A league beyond the Cíbolo to the east they came upon the Valley de San José, commonly called El Cañón, through which the upper Nueces flows. The valley was about a league and a half wide and some twelve leagues long, extending from north to south. Following the valley they turned north for five leagues and came upon the Mission of Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria located on a small stream of cool and delightful water. The following day they went northeast and crossed the Nueces after travelling two leagues and continuing hence to the north for two more they arrived at the Mission of San Lorenzo de la Santa Cruz, located east of the Nueces. Here a detachment of thirty men from San Sabá was kept for the protection of the missionaries and the Indians. La Fora drew a map of the mission and of the surrounding country. During the next two days they marched almost due north, following the bed of the river upstream, and passing by present Barksdale to the headwaters of the Nueces River, near present Rockspring. Continuing along their course, they reached the Chanas (Llano) River some distance below present Junction. For two more days they followed the Chanas first, and then crossed over to the San Sabá and came to the Presidio of the same name on July 25, 1767, where they remained until August 4. Having completed the inspection they went on to San Antonio. La Fora used the time to draw a careful map of the presidio, a copy of which has been preserved.

*Route followed from San Sabá to San Antonio.* From San Sabá to San Antonio the route followed was mostly southeast and the party appears to have pursued a course in general similar to the present highway from Menard. They arrived in San Antonio on August 8. The garrison consisted of twenty-two men, fifteen of whom were generally stationed in the five missions located along the river for a distance of three leagues. La Forá and Rubí were of the opinion that the missions were prosperous and the Indians so civilized that they should be placed in the care of seculars. There were in the five missions eight hundred and nine Indians of the Payaya, Xarame, Chana, Coco, Pajalate, Tacame, Pampopa, Mesquite, Aguataya, Pamaca, Chayopin, Pacaos, Venado, Borrado, and Pata de Perro nations. Rubí and La Forá remained in San Antonio until August 25, when they again set out for the distant post of Los Adaes.<sup>41</sup>

*Route followed from San Antonio to Los Adaes.* Going east, southeast, they crossed Salado Creek about four leagues from San Antonio. Four leagues beyond they came to Aguila Creek, which they crossed at Las Calaveras, continuing four more leagues to Los Chayopines, where they camped on the left bank of the San Antonio, above present Floresville. On August 26, they went more to the east and crossed a partially dried creek which they called Marcelino, seven leagues from Chayopines. Two leagues beyond they came upon the Cibolo, along which they noted San Bartolo ranch and other similar estates owned by citizens of San Antonio. Here some corn was raised and herds of cattle and horses were pastured without molestation from the Indians. Continuing in the same general direction they reached Cleto Creek after going six leagues and here they camped. The creek was almost dry and had only some stagnant pools. This, like the Cibolo, flowed into the San Antonio River.

The next day they changed their course and went north, northeast. After travelling six leagues, they came to Cuchillo Creek, formed by three short streams that came together a short distance above the crossing. Eight leagues beyond, they crossed the Guadalupe at the place called Vado del Gobernador, perhaps at the point where Alarcón came near drowning in 1728. "The water came to the horses' stomachs," says La Forá, "but the stream was very swift because of its narrowness. A slight rain soon renders it impassable, except on barges." The crossing must

<sup>41</sup>The account of the route of Rubí, never given in detail before, is based on La Forá, *Relación del Viaje que de orden del Excelentísimo Señor Virrey Marqués de Cruillas hizo . . . Nicolás de La Forá en compañía del Mariscal de Campo Marqués de Rubí . . .* ff. 1-67.

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have been a good distance below present González, perhaps only a few miles from Hochheim. They had travelled in all fourteen leagues from Cleto Creek. On August 28, they continued to the northeast, mostly east through frequent oak woods, and crossed Cuervo Creek after going four leagues; six leagues beyond they came to Rosal Creek, one league farther was Padre Campos Creek, and a little more than a league beyond was Los Ramitos and San Esteban Creeks close to each other. Their route must have taken them by or very near present Yoakum and several miles below present Hallettsville, having covered a total of fourteen leagues. From here they resumed their march in the same general direction for eighteen leagues to just beyond the Colorado River. During the day they crossed La Vaca Creek one league from San Esteban; El Breviario three leagues beyond; La Navidad six leagues; Los Cedritos seven leagues; and Colorado River one league. They must have crossed this river at or near present Columbus. After going a short distance to be out of the river thickets, they camped for the night. At the crossing the water came up to the horses' breasts.

Their course was northeast for the next two days. Passing over numerous small streams, most of them stagnant at the time, they reached the Brazos on September 1, and crossed it somewhere in the vicinity of present Washington-on-the-Brazos. "The gentle Xaraname Indians live in the lands between the Colorado and Brazos de Dios," declared La Fora, "roaming as far as the coast of the Mexican Gulf. Although these Indians are not to be feared, it is necessary to proceed with caution to avoid their thieving activities." The following day they crossed the Navasota some distance above the city of that name and camped on a small lake formed by the river. On September 3, they passed by Laguna del Francés (Frenchman's Lake) twelve leagues beyond, having previously crossed Carrizo spring, and continuing for seven leagues beyond the lake, crossed Atascoso Creek. Here they turned north and went three leagues, reaching the Trinity. They camped on the right bank of the river for the night, and next day passed over at a point that should be easily identified from the description. "We crossed the Trinity River," says La Fora, "over a rock ledge that extends across the whole breadth of the stream, and over which there was hardly more than a span of water. The only inconveniences are the approaches which are very bad in time of rains, being steep and sharp because of the deep river bed." Probably it was in the vicinity of present Riverside.

On September 8, they passed by Castañas, Santa Coleta, and San Pedro

Creeks. On this last named stream were located the *rancherías* of the Tejas Indians, their lands extending to the Neches River. One league beyond the Neches "we climbed a hill on top of which there is a mound that seems to have been made by hand," says La Forá. "It was here that the first Spaniards met the principal chiefs of this nation with whom they negotiated a peace observed without violation by the Indians ever since." But La Forá did not know of the threats which these Indians had made against the missionaries, nor of their participation in the destruction of San Sabá.

From the mound beyond the Neches, they went east, northeast, and travelling four leagues came to the Angelina. Four leagues farther was El Conductor Creek, and four leagues from this arroyo was the Mission of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de los Nacogdoches, tended by a Zacatecan missionary. Here were two soldiers who acted as guards, who, with their families and a few servants, cultivated the fields. There were no Indians living at the mission. Rubí and La Forá rested in Nacogdoches for a day.

On September 7, they set out for Los Ais Mission, where they arrived on the following day, after travelling seventeen leagues. They went three leagues southeast and fourteen east, crossing La Nana, El Carrizo, Amoladeras, and Atoyague Creeks. The mission was on a small hill at the foot of which flowed a small stream. There were two missionaries stationed here and a lay brother. Two soldiers acted as guards, and with their families and servants constituted the whole population of the mission. The Ais Indians were very "ladinos" (sly) and generally spoke Spanish, but did not reside in the mission.

On September 9, Rubí and La Forá proceeded to Los Adaes, where they arrived on September 10, after two days travel, during which time they covered twenty-eight leagues, mostly to the northeast, and crossed Lobanillo and Patrón Creeks before coming to the Sabine River. Beyond the Sabine, some seventeen leagues, they crossed Arroyo Hondo, less than half a league from the Presidio de los Adaes. La Forá drew a careful plan of the presidio and the surrounding country. The garrison consisted of sixty men, whose commander was the governor, who resided at this post. A short distance from the presidio was the Mission of San Miguel de Cuellar, where two missionaries were stationed. There were Indians living in the mission at the time.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>La Forá, *Relación del Viaje* . . . ff. 68-72.

*Route to Orcoquisac.* After a careful inspection of the Presidio of Nuestra Señora del Pilár de los Adaes, which kept him at the post until September 28, Rubí set out for Orcoquisac. He retraced his route for forty-five leagues as far as Nacogdoches. From here he followed an almost due south course, crossed Nana Creek, the Angelina about three leagues east of where the present highway to Lufkin intercepts the river, and camped after going five leagues. On October 3, after travelling ten leagues in the same general direction, they crossed Bidai Creek, near where they noted an abandoned *ranchería* of these Indians and continued for two leagues to the north bank of the Neches, which flowed almost due east at the point where they camped, probably a few miles east of Diboll. The following day in spite of rain, they resumed the march and travelled ten leagues, inclining slightly to the west. They crossed two unidentified streams, one after going three leagues and the other seven. On October 5, the rain continued and slowed their march, but they succeeded in going twelve leagues notwithstanding the thick woods, fallen timber, and numerous marshes encountered. They were approaching the swampy area east of Livingston. The next day the rains made travel impossible, but on October 7, the march was resumed and seven more leagues were covered to the south, quarter southeast, through muddy and soggy paths. Keeping to the east of the Trinity, they marched fourteen leagues on October 8, passing probably by or near the present sites of Ace and Moss Hill. The following day they went ten more leagues to the Presidio de San Agustín de Ahumada generally known as Orcoquisac. This day they crossed Calxones Creek, and passed by the site of Los Horconcitos. The presidio was "in the country of the Indian nation of the Orcoquisacs, located one league from the coast of the Gulf of Mexico on the east, and five on the south in the direction in which the river empties into the sea. The river flows a quarter of a league west of the presidio, is very wide and deep, and subject to frequent floods, because of its low shore line and a sand bank which by closing the mouth impedes the flow. The result is that the surrounding country is filled with lakes which prevent examining the coast." The garrison consisted of thirty-one men, including the captain. Two missionaries looked after the spiritual welfare of the troops, their families, and the mission Indians gathered in Nuestra Señora de la Luz, founded a short distance from the presidio. The Indians were half-hearted in their interest and Rubí thought that the presidio was of little use in its present location.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, ff. 72-74.

*Route to La Bahía.* The Marqués de Rubí spent a week at Orcoquisac and set out for La Bahía on October 16. He crossed the Trinity in a canoe, just where the river enters a lake, and taking a northwest course, travelled that day four leagues. The following day they went more to the west and crossed Caramanchel Creek, continued along the valley of the San Jacinto and after going eight leagues crossed this stream on a barge a short distance above the battlefield of the engagement that was to decide Texas independence. On October 17, Rubí and his companions must have passed close to the present site of Houston. La Fora comments that during the night and all through the following day they were seriously bothered by "an infinite number of the most voracious mosquitoes" he had ever seen. Continuing their march along the coastal plain during the next three days the members of the expedition came to the Brazos River after going about twenty leagues, probably in the vicinity of present Richmond. On October 22, after having gone seventeen more leagues west, with inclination to the north, they came upon the road taken on the way out from San Antonio and arrived at the crossing on the Colorado near present Columbus. The river was high and had to be crossed in a canoe. The exhausting labor required two days. Seven horses and mules were drowned because of the steep banks of the stream. By the 28th, they had reached the Guadalupe which they crossed two leagues below the point on the outgoing march and with much more difficulty because of its high waters. From here they changed their course almost due south and going thirteen leagues, arrived in the Presidio of Nuestra Señora de Loreto de la Bahía on October 31, having passed by Mission Espíritu Santo a quarter of a league before and crossed the San Antonio River in a canoe.

The garrison consisted of fifty soldiers, including the officers. There were forty-six families living in the vicinity and at the two missions. Mission Espíritu Santo had only twenty-three families with ninety-three persons, and Mission Nuestra Señora del Rosario, located two leagues up the river on its east bank, had seventy-one baptized Indians and thirty under instruction. Three Zacatecan missionaries tended the two missions. The presidio was twenty leagues from the coast by the most direct route, but the road was impassable in times of rain. Nevertheless the proximity to the sea was sufficient to make the location very unhealthy. Malaria (*tercianas*) and the dreaded "*mal de loanda*" caused numerous



deaths each year and incapacitated the garrison and settlers most of the time.<sup>44</sup>

From La Bahía, Rubí went directly to San Juan Bautista without passing by San Antonio. On the main route he followed a southwesterly course, crossing the San Antonio some twenty-five miles west of present Goliad, to the Nueces near present Sandia. As La Forá observes, it was below the juncture with the Frío, and continuing southwest they passed by or near present San Diego and a creek which they called Carrizo, where the captain of Laredo had a ranch. Shortly above Carrizo Creek, La Forá noted a road that went north to San Antonio, perhaps connecting Laredo. On November 18, they arrived in present Laredo, having seen during the day numerous rattlesnakes. La Forá observed that they seemed to thrive in this region. Laredo, he describes as having about sixty *jacales* (huts) built on both banks of the Río Grande, where an equal number of families lived under the administration of a captain of militia subject to the Governor of Nuevo Santander. He explained that Nuevo Santander extended to the Nueces and that the settlers of Laredo were spiritually being cared for at this time (1767) by a cleric sent by the Bishop of Guadalajara.

On November 19, he crossed the Río Grande in a good canoe. He describes the crossing as being at a point where the river flowed almost due east and its stream was divided by an island into two channels. They continued their march to the northwest, keeping close to the river in the main and arrived in San Juan Bautista on November 22.<sup>45</sup>

*Significance of the inspection.* Not until February 23, 1768, did the Marqués de Rubí and his faithful engineer return to Mexico City. They had travelled two thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight leagues, approximately seven thousand miles, in a little less than three years. They had visited twenty-four presidios along the northern frontier of New Spain from the coast to the Gulf of California to Los Adaes in present Louisiana, just a few miles from Natchitoches. They had crossed and crisscrossed the country from the west coast to Santa Fe, back to Chihuahua and Sonora, and again to El Paso, hence back to San Bautista and across to San Sabá, San Antonio, Los Adaes, Orcoquisac, Espíritu Santo, Laredo, and eventually back to Mexico City by way of Coahuila

<sup>44</sup>The "*mal de loanda*" caused considerable damage at San Sabá, see ante, p. 197. The description of the march and presidio and missions is based on La Forá, *Relación del Viaje* . . . ff. 74-78.

<sup>45</sup>La Forá, *Relación del Viaje* . . . ff. 78-79.

and Nuevo León. Forty years had elapsed since the indomitable and indefatigable veteran Don Pedro de Rivera had trudged undismayed over the unexplorable frontiers of New Spain with an eye quick to detect abuses and correct irregularities. The Marqués de Rubí was a worthy successor. Like his predecessor, he was an uncompromising military man, with a high sense of duty and honesty, with a penetrating mind that took in situations at a glance, a high regard for Spanish tradition, proud, arrogant perhaps, but analytically critical and just in his appraisals. Fearless in his dealings with the viceroy, he was considerate with the commanders of the posts visited, to whom he gave constructive advice while pointing out their shortcomings.

A marshal in His Majesty's armies, he had many years of military experience and was naturally shocked with the deplorable conditions he found along Spain's frontier in North America. With soldierly brusqueness he pointed out the defects he found and wrote with a frankness and directness to which the viceroy was not accustomed. He lacked the diplomatic tact of the trained statesman, but he made a remarkable analysis of conditions in New Spain, outlined the policy which the government should follow in its relations with the native tribes that menaced the frontier, and anticipated De Mézières by ten years in denouncing the temporizing attitude towards the Apaches and advocating a friendlier attitude towards the more virile and dangerous tribes of the north that were being driven relentlessly upon the Spanish frontier by the Anglo-American advance to the Mississippi. His reports, which he personally sent to Frey Julián de Arriaga, secretary of the king, must have had a profound influence upon the king and his advisers and made them more receptive to the innovations proposed and carried out by Hugo Oconor and the Caballero de Croix during the following ten years. The joint campaign against the Apaches, planned by De Croix in the *Junta* held at Monclova in December 1777 is thus explained by Bolton, who declares: "It is seen at a glance that this is only a repetition of the proposals made by Ripperdá in 1772, which probably originated with De Mézières." The action can in reality be traced directly back to the brilliant report of the Marqués de Rubí made on April 10, 1768. The significance of this inspection has heretofore been ignored.<sup>46</sup> He turned

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<sup>46</sup>Bolton, *Athanase de Mézières and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier, 1768-1780*, I, 111; Digtamen que de orden del Exmo. señor Marqués de Croix Virrey de este Reyno expone el Mariscal de Campo Marqués de Rubí en orden a la mejor Sittuazió de los Presidios. Mexico, May 4, 1768. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara* (Dunn Tr. 1767) pp. 31-34.

in twenty-four separate reports on as many presidios visited, seven volumes of extracts and depositions gathered while engaged in the commission, and a special *dictamen* (opinion) on the reorganization of the entire frontier. In these voluminous reports is to be found the most reliable information concerning the conditions that prevailed not only in Texas but in the entire northern line of outposts on the eve of the actual transfer of Louisiana.

What he found in Texas was typical of all the other presidios. No preconceived plan had been observed in the establishment of the various posts, discipline was practically non-existent, no attention had been paid to the need of mutual support between the different garrisons, the missions had failed to bring the Indian tribes under submission through a series of circumstances beyond their control, while the Indian policy adopted in general had encouraged and invited hostilities, bringing upon the Spaniards the enmity of the fiercer tribes of the north. His analysis of the Indian problem is remarkable for the clearness with which he saw the inevitable issues. Equally remarkable is the vivid picture of economic conditions which he painted, with the great misery of the suffering garrisons and the fabulous profits made by the unscrupulous commanders of the decadent outposts. A brief summary of his general recommendations and of his inspection of the Texas presidios will not be out of place in view of the fact that it has been generally ignored by Texas historians.

*General conditions found in Texas.* Beginning with El Paso, which he visited in August, 1766, Rubí was exasperated with the reprehensible practice of using the soldiers of the garrison to look after the horses, mules, and cattle of the private ranch of the commander of the presidio and of the different droves and herds owned by the settlers in the vicinity. Equally against all regulations was the frequent employment of considerable portions of the garrison to escort merchants and private individuals conducting merchandise for trade in Chihuahua or in Santa Fe. The presidial guard was made ineffective by the assignment of ten men and an officer to duty at Carrizal, some twenty-five leagues southwest, and from two to three men to each of the missions in the vicinity. This left hardly enough soldiers to mount guard and attend to the duties of the presidio. Naturally under such conditions discipline and military instruction to improve the efficiency of the garrison was impossible. The arms were of different calibers and over half of them in bad condition. The horses were far short of the number required to provide each man with six mounts. The soldiers were poorly and grotesquely attired, lacking the

essential articles of dress and displaying gaudy baubles. Captain Pedro de la Fuente was rigidly enjoined not to permit his men to squander their pay on useless ornaments, gold and silver braid, silver buttons, silk handkerchiefs and lace, earrings, rings, and other jewelry. Furthermore, he was to limit the amount of cigarettes and sweets which each soldier could buy monthly.

It had been his intention to inspect the recently founded Presidio de la Junta de los Rios, at or near present Presidio, while on the way to El Paso, but he had learned just in time to save himself a useless trip, that it had been temporarily abandoned and the garrison moved to the old Pueblo de los Julimes on the Conchos River (Mexico) some thirty miles west. The move he uncompromisingly branded as a concrete example of the arbitrary and foolish judgment exercised by governors along the frontier. The former presidio commanded by Captain Manuel Muñoz, founded after long investigations and at great sacrifice to the royal treasury, was now in the hands of the natives, who had destroyed most of it and used its timber for firewood. The six pueblos founded in its vicinity and under its protection were now also in ruins. The few faithful Indians who had followed the missionaries to the Pueblo de los Julimes had abandoned the presidio in its new location, because it failed to offer effective protection. More deplorable still, the Spaniards had lost a group of brave and powerful allies in their war against the Natages and Apaches who ceased to have faith in them, when they forsook La Junta. Regardless of the cost, the presidio should be reestablished at La Junta, a key position in the defence of the Province of Nueva Vizcaya.<sup>47</sup>

In July, 1767, he made his inspection of the presidio at San Sabá. Although he made up his mind immediately regarding the necessity of moving it to a more advantageous position or abolishing it, he did not express his determination to its commander. The garrison of one hundred men was reduced to seventy by the assignment of thirty to guard the two missions at El Cañón, some forty leagues south, near present Montell and Camp Wood. The men showed a little better instruction and had more discipline than those of El Paso. Their rifles were of uniform caliber and make, being imported from Catalonia, but many of them were in sad need of repair. He advised that a gunsmith should be employed to keep them in condition. The horses of the presidio had been greatly diminished by the fierce hostility of the northern tribes who had made frequent

<sup>47</sup>Rubí, Digtamen, May 4, 1768; *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara* 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr., 1768-1772) pp. 20-26; Inspection of Presidio del Paso August, 1766. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guad.*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr. 1767) pp. 107-120.

attacks upon this post during the last year. He recommended that a reasonable number of horses be kept within the enclosure of the presidio to enable the garrison to make sallies upon the enemy and to avoid the necessity of having to wait until horses were brought from the distant pastures to pursue the insolent attackers.<sup>48</sup>

From San Sabá Rubí went to San Antonio. He was shocked at the conditions he found in the garrison of this, the most important settlement in Texas. When the twenty-two men were mustered for inspection by Captain Luís Antonio Menchaca, they made a strange and colorful but most unmilitary appearance. Each one wore his own selected colors and insignia without attention to regulations or style. Various shades of red predominated, while silk handkerchiefs and lace and silver buttons, contrasted woefully with the poor quality of the cloth and the wretchedness of the wearers. Captain Menchaca was instructed that in the future the uniforms of the men must be simplified in style and made according to official pattern and proper sizes, that no metal ornaments were to be used other than the buttons prescribed by the regulations, and that red facings were to be confined to the coat collars and not to exceed a span in length. The sale of silver and gold trinkets, ribbons, silk goods, and other luxuries was strictly prohibited. Their lavish use of ornaments was responsible in part for the indebtedness of the garrison and the penury of the soldiers.

The pistols and rifles were found to be of various calibers and makes, but worst of all one-third of them were useless. A gunsmith should be brought to this presidio to repair their arms and keep them in condition. The horses were so jaded that they were unfit for work. The presidio was anything but a defensible fort and should be made into a decent fortification as soon as possible. The parish priest of the Villa de San Fernando was the chaplain of the troops and received four hundred *pesos* a year for his services. In summing up the situation, Rubí declared that the lack of discipline and military instruction of the garrison was due to the employment of the majority of the men on mission duty. The missions he found to be in a prosperous state, capable of defending themselves without the aid of the garrison. The wretched condition of the soldiers he attributed to the exorbitant prices charged for the supplies, furnished, the poor quality of the goods sent by the purchasing agent of the captain in Saltillo, Manuel Antonio Bustillo, and to the reprehensible practice of the soldiers, exchanging their property and gambling. It is strange to note the purchase of soap listed as an expensive luxury indulged

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<sup>48</sup>Inspection of San Sabá by Rubí, July-August, 1767. In *Ibid.*, pp. 180-210.

in by the soldiers. The amount of *piloncillo* (brown sugar loaf), soap, tobacco, and cigarettes consumed by each man was excessive and called for restriction.<sup>49</sup>

The astonishment of Rubí reached its limit when he arrived in Los Adaes in September, 1767, the capital of the province and residence of the governor. Martos y Navarrete was absent on leave by order of the Viceroy Marqués de Croix, who had requested him on July 15 to report in Mexico City. Sergeant Major Hugo Oconor was governor *ad interim*, having taken command on August 7. There were sixty-one men and one hundred seventeen horses. Of the latter, however, forty-nine were totally useless and only twenty-five fit for service.

When the men formed in line for inspection, the exacting Marqués de Rubí could not restrain his utter amazement. Only two rifles of those inspected were found serviceable. The whole company of sixty-one men had seven swords that could pass inspection. Although each man was supposed to have a shield, there were only six in the entire garrison and only a few soldiers had powder horns. Military uniforms were things of the past. The little ragged band resembled beggars more than soldiers. Nearly every soldier inspected lacked hat, shirt, and shoes. Their families were no better off, some of them having to remain at home for lack of clothes to cover their bodies.

When the accounts of the absent governor were examined, however, the books showed that he had reaped a profit of eight thousand four hundred *pesos* in eight years from the supplies furnished to his men. This was in addition to his salary and to the returns from the products of his private farm and ranch, maintained and operated by the soldiers for his benefit. Until very recently this presidio had been Spain's most advanced outpost, charged with the responsibility of defending the interests of the king against the encroachments of the French.

The absent Governor Martos y Navarrete had not only made a profit of one thousand per cent on many of the goods sold to the garrison, but he had purchased all his supplies during the last five years from the neighboring post of Natchitoches in violation of all regulations. In this way he had saved paying imposts and the excessive expense of transportation from the remote centers of commerce of New Spain. Flour, lard, corn, beans, coffee, dry goods, and clothing, everything had been bought at a reasonable price from the French at Natchitoches. On one occasion

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<sup>49</sup>Inspection of San Antonio by Rubí. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr., 1767) pp. 211-243.

he even sent six soldiers to New Orleans, one hundred fifty leagues down the river, to obtain flour and corn. The men complained to Rubí that they had had to row two boats both ways. Similarly, the men were frequently sent to San Antonio to bring droves of horses intended for the garrison, which upon arrival at Los Adaes were carefully divided into good, fair, and poor. The poorest were then sold to the soldiers at sixteen *pesos* each, while the best were sold to French traders for as much as sixty. The cost was approximately ten *pesos* a head in San Antonio.

Another flagrant violation of the regulations, adopted in 1729 after the Rivera inspection and supposedly still in force, was the employment of the soldiers to care for the commander's stock ranch and to cultivate his farm. There was a communal farm also, on which the soldiers attempted to raise crops to help support themselves and their families. The arrangement which prevailed for many years was that the men did all the labor when not on duty, the governor supplied the seed, stock, and tools, and the crops were shared between them, half going to the governor and half to the garrison. In recent years, however, the governor supplied neither the seed nor the stock nor the implements, but he still demanded half of the crop. He sold his share to the men as part of their supplies at the same price as if he had bought it in Mexico.<sup>50</sup>

From Los Adaes the disappointed inspector traveled through heavy woods and over dismal swampy marshes to the recently established presidio at Orcoquisac, one hundred twenty leagues to the southwest, not far from the mouth of the Trinity. The misunderstandings between Governor Martos y Navarrete and Captain Pacheco had been scandalous and had resulted in the burning of the presidio. Contrary to his expectations, however, he found the garrison better uniformed than any in Texas, the presidio in fair condition after its stormy career, and the arms more suited for use.

Captain Rafael Pacheco was absent, having been called by the viceroy in the summer of 1765 to answer charges. The garrison was in command of Captain Melchor Afán de Rivera, appointed on August 27, 1765, who had taken charge on October 30 of the same year. There were thirty-one men, all fairly well uniformed. Although their rifles were not of the same caliber, they were in good condition, with the exception of four.

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<sup>50</sup>Inspection of Los Adaes by Rubí, September, 1767. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr., 1767) pp. 313-336.

The garrison had only fifty-three horses, however, lacking eighty-three to make up the required number provided by the regulations. But it was impossible to keep horses in good condition at this post, Rubí observed, because of lack of proper forage and the need of making frequent trips to Los Adaes, La Bahía, or San Antonio for supplies over the most difficult roads in Texas. On the whole the men showed more military instruction and discipline than any he had visited in the province, and Captain Afán de Rivera had done his duty well under trying circumstances. He deserved to be rewarded by promotion, if possible.

The location of the post was ill-chosen and the maintenance of the garrison seemed to serve no purpose. It was inaccessible both by land and sea. Nothing could be raised in its vicinity. The men were often forced to subsist on roots because of delay in securing supplies from distant posts. The fear that this area might be occupied by pirates or foreign intruders was a wild figment of the imagination and only those who had never seen the region could believe such tales. The river did not even flow into the open sea, but lost itself in a series of shallow lakes before it reached the coast. The climate was unhealthy and the dampness prevented the storage of supplies even when these were brought in sufficient quantity. He was thoroughly convinced of the uselessness of this presidio and made up his mind at once to recommend its suppression.<sup>51</sup>

The last presidio visited was Nuestra Señora de Loreto at La Bahía, near the mouth of the San Antonio River. Lieutenant Tomás de Ojeda was in command of its garrison when Rubí arrived in November, 1767, to conduct his inspection. The old commander Captain Manuel Ramírez de la Piscina died on July 26 of that year and although Francisco Tovar had been already appointed to succeed him, the new commander had not arrived at his post. Piscina had been captain for many years. In his will he revealed the attachment that had grown between him and his soldiers. He absolved from their debt to him all men, who had served at La Bahía for ten years or more. His attitude offers a refreshing contrast to the conditions at Los Adaes.

The fifty soldiers of the garrison passed inspection in their best uniforms, consisting of red jackets and red flannel trousers adorned with metal buttons. But the stern marshal noted that many of the uniforms were threadbare and soiled. The horses numbered two hundred thirteen, of which only eight were unfit for service. But their guns were of different

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<sup>51</sup>Inspection of Orcoquizac by Rubí, October 10, 1767. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr. 1767) pp. 341-356.







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calibers and six were useless, while fifteen swords were found unsatisfactory. The men lacked shields, cartridge belts, and lances. This appeared to be a shortcoming of all the garrisons in Texas and Rubí noted the fact with an urgent recommendation that this deficiency should be repaired without delay. The soldiers appeared better fed and more contented than any of the garrisons inspected.

The missions in the vicinity were in a prosperous condition. The guards assigned to them for their protection should, however, be relieved more frequently, and the men should be instructed not to perform any other duties at the missions than those pertinent to their position. The practice of exacting contributions from the soldiers for the celebration of religious feasts should be abandoned. Such contributions should be left to the will of the individual. This practice, be it said, was not confined to La Bahía, but appears to have been common to all the presidios in Texas.<sup>52</sup>

*Rubí returns to Mexico.* On February 23, 1768, Rubí arrived in Mexico. On March 1, he informed Arriaga, the king's secretary, that he had retired to the town of Tacubaya with the permission of the viceroy to complete his reports on the inspection and he promised to send him copies as soon as they were finished. The Viceroy Marqués de Croix, who had taken possession of the government of New Spain in August, 1766, appears to have taken a dislike to Rubí on grounds that are not clear and which seem to have had no justification. Don Carlos Francisco de Croix was, like Rubí, a stern military commander who had attained honor and distinction in Europe in the service of the king. The dislike may have been caused by a feeling of rivalry. Be that as it may, Rubí requested permission to return to Spain even before he had completed the inspection. This request the king granted on November 25, 1767, at which time he informed the Viceroy Croix that Rubí was to be allowed to return to Spain as soon as Brigadier General Marqués de Torres or Colonel Duchet arrived in Veracruz to succeed him as military inspector. The viceroy resented the haste shown by Rubí in arranging his departure. This only prepared the way for further misunderstandings. These circumstances account perhaps for the little importance given heretofore to the inspection conducted by Rubí.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup>Inspection of Espíritu Santo at La Bahía by Rubí, Noember 1, 1767. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr., 1767) pp. 357-366.

<sup>53</sup>Croix was a native of Lille, Flanders. He was appointed to succeed the Marqués de Cruillas and took the oath of office in Mexico City before the *Audiencia* on August 25, 1766. He discontinued the custom of elaborate celebrations in connection with

By April 10, 1768, Rubí had completed his various reports and prepared a detailed opinion on the reorganization of the entire line of presidios along the northern frontier of New Spain, which he sent to Viceroy Croix from Tacubaya. Shortly thereafter, he left for Veracruz, where he remained until July 6, waiting for an opportunity to embark for Spain without further delay.

*General recommendations.* In a carefully worded opinion, he presented a serious indictment of the policy followed by viceregal authorities in the establishment of presidios at random along the northern frontier of New Spain. With the experienced eye of a military commander, he pointed out that the entire northern frontier should be considered as a unit, whose effectiveness in restraining the hordes of savages that raided the settled areas and of repelling foreign attack, whether from the Russians in the northwest or the English in the northeast, depended on the effectiveness of each post and the ability of giving each other mutual support. The presidios now maintained numbered twenty-four, but their distribution was authorized without due consideration for the full and proper protection of the royal domain, having been founded haphazardly at the dictates of interested parties or misguided idealists, without regard for the true interests of the king or the ability of aiding each other in time of need. Proposals and plans for the establishment of new presidios and for the purported extension of the frontier were constantly being presented and were being given serious consideration by viceregal officials, which a knowledge of the facts involved would reveal as utterly impractical and unworthy of any consideration. Concrete examples were the recent requests for a presidio in the village of the Taovayas in the Province of Texas, more than one hundred leagues northwest of Los Adaes and even farther from San Sabá, in hostile territory; or the proposed establishment of communication between Santa Fé and the mouth of the Colorado on the west coast, or the penetration to Monterrey Bay by way of the Gila and the Colorado. A more intimate acquaintance with the true character of the frontier would have prevented the blunder of attempting the founding of a settlement and the establishment of a post near the mouth of the Trinity which proved so costly. Projects of this nature would receive

the taking of office. Devoted to Charles III, he served him faithfully in New Spain, and carried out with stern resolve the expatriation of the Jesuits, aided by his able cousin Teodoro de Croix, styled the Caballero de Croix. Rivera, *Los Gobernantes de Mexico*, I, 407-421; Rubí to Arriaga, March 1, April 3, and September 30, 1768; Viceroy to Rubí, April 12, 1768. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr., 1768-1772) pp. 2, 69-73, 66-68.

no consideration, if the northern frontier was considered as a single unit extending from the west coast of California Bay to Texas.

Equally reprehensible was the disregard of the welfare of the garrisons enlisted and maintained at the expense of the king for the protection of his dominions. The chief source of discontent and injustice was the failure to pay the soldiers in cash or specie. The practice of paying them in kind and of making the commanders the purchasing agents and distributors of supplies was directly responsible for the wretched conditions that prevailed in every presidio. If the soldiers were paid in specie, their hardships would disappear, and flourishing settlements would soon spring up in the vicinity of presidios, attracted by the inducement of commerce.<sup>54</sup>

There were no regulations concerning the term of enlistment. This matter worked a grave injustice. Once a man signed for duty on a frontier presidio, he could not get an honorable discharge except at the pleasure of the captain. The only way he could leave his post was by desertion or death. There were men who had served faithfully twenty-six years, who were now old and ready to retire, but who would not be granted an honorable discharge. Furthermore, a system of pensions should be established to reward those who served the best years of their lives, or who became disabled while in the performance of duty.

The nature of the service expected of presidial troops made good mounts indispensable. Each presidio should be required to keep a minimum of two hundred fresh horses on reserve. Furthermore, the rifles and pistols supplied to the troops should be of uniform caliber and preferably imported from Spain to insure better quality. A proper uniform should be designed for these troops and every man should be required to wear it while on duty. The maintenance of their arms and uniforms in good condition might be accomplished by frequent reviews and inspections.

Each presidio along the frontier should have in addition to its garrison eight or ten Indian guides and scouts, who should be considered part of the enlisted men and to whom regular pay and supplies should be assigned. They should be on the same footing as the soldiers. Their services were indispensable to the duties of presidial troops.

Lastly, regulations should be adopted concerning prizes and booty obtained in campaigns waged against natives. The general practice in vogue was that booty obtained was distributed among the settlers of the presidios that volunteered for the campaign. This was fair and just, since these men received no pay and sacrificed their time and risked their lives

<sup>54</sup>Missionaries in Texas had advocated this measure repeatedly.

in chastising the enemies of the king. But the soldiers too should share in some measure. A more difficult question was the disposition of captives. It was a relatively general practice to sell the Indian prisoners, whether adults or children, into slavery. There was no justification for either selling or giving them away as slaves.<sup>55</sup>

*Shortcomings of commanders.* It was La Fora in his diary that recorded the harshest indictment against the frontier commanders. The exaggerated ideas that prevailed in Mexico among officials concerning the fierceness of the Indians along the frontier were attributable chiefly to the commanders of the presidios to whose ignorance, inexperience, and laziness were due the repeated depredations, thefts, and outrages committed with impunity. All along the frontier the ill-advised policy of sitting quietly in the presidios had been adopted by the commanders. Not until the distressed victims of the Indians' raids came to complain, did they bestir themselves to action. Usually a day or two were lost, six or eight hours being the least time consumed in bringing the horses from the pastures, before the pursuit was undertaken. Under such circumstances there was positively no possibility of overtaking the enemy. Better mounted, with a good start on their pursuers, and with limitless remounts from the stolen horses themselves, the Indians were never overtaken. Foolishly the Spaniards would attempt the recapture and set off with much show and noise, only to return in a day or two empty-handed and with their horses half dead. When the Indian waited for them, the result was as bad, because the soldiers lacked discipline and training. In action they showed less coöperation than the natives, who, knowing the country better, chose the site, and excelled the troops in their use of the arms. While La Fora is inclined to exaggerate the prowess of the natives, there is, nevertheless, considerable truth in his charge against the competence of frontier commanders.<sup>56</sup>

*New line of presidios.* Rubí proposed the reduction of the frontier outposts to fifteen, along a line drawn from the coast of the Gulf of California to the mouth of the Guadalupe River in Texas, following the thirtieth parallel. The anchor on the west was to be the Presidio del Altar, which was to be moved closer to the coast and placed approximately at thirty degrees north latitude. From here the direct distance to the

<sup>55</sup>Rubí, Digtamen, April 10, 1768. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, (Dunn Tr., 1768-1772) pp. 56-61.

<sup>56</sup>La Fora, *Relación del Viaje*, ff. 97-98.

Guadalupe in Texas was calculated to be five hundred eighty-five leagues. Allowing for inevitable detours and deviations dictated by the terrain, the actual distance might be said to be from six hundred fifty to seven hundred leagues. Along the indicated line the presidios were to be placed as nearly equidistant as circumstances permitted. This would make the average distance between them forty leagues. In this way each post could render effective aid and support to its immediate neighbor, a thing impossible when located over two hundred leagues apart, as were San Antonio and Los Adaes.

The line proposed was impossible, Rubí admitted frankly, since it would necessarily have to be modified so as to take in New Mexico, which jutted northward. With this one exception, however, the arbitrary limits suggested marked in reality the true bounds of actual Spanish dominion. Paradoxical as it might appear, the confinement of Spanish arms to the restricted limits of the new line would in fact extend the *de facto* dominions of the king by affording real and not imaginary protection to the settled areas of New Spain along its northern frontier and by allowing them to develop free from Indian raids.

Briefly the line suggested would start at Altar on the west coast and extend east first to Tubac. This post, founded in a prosperous mining area, should be moved a short distance west to bring it within the required forty leagues. It was an important presidio, being the key to the effective defense of Sonora. Next was Presidio de Terrenate, somewhat south of the thirty degree parallel. From Terrenate to El Paso and on into Texas was the area menaced by the perfidious Apaches. The fourth presidio was Fronteras, which should be moved slightly farther east to bring it closer to Janos in Nueva Vizcaya. The location of Janos was well chosen and on the desired line, but the commander Captain Francisco Loyzaola was perhaps the most incompetent of all the commanders on the northern frontier. Through his "shameful inaction an artificial and indecorous peace" had been established with the Gileños, who like the Apaches raided Chihuahua unmolested under a feigned friendship. Southeast from Janos was Presidio de San Buenaventura in the valley of the same name. No worse location for a military post could have been chosen. But it was to be expected, Rubí sarcastically remarked, when the Governor of Nueva Vizcaya entrusted its founding to Captain Manuel de Villaverde, who knew nothing about such matters. The site was ideal for the total extermination of the unfortunate garrison. The presidio should be moved northward as soon as possible to bring it up to the line, possibly to a site at

or near Laguna de Guzmán and Valle de Ruiz. From here it would be approximately forty leagues to El Paso.<sup>57</sup>

*Recommendations concerning El Paso.* This presidio was within the jurisdiction of New Mexico, whose limits extended southwest to El Carrizal. While it had the largest population of any frontier settlement, totaling five thousand souls, counting the villa and missions, it was unfortunately too far north of the proposed line, being thirty-three degrees and some minutes north. Nevertheless it was not close enough to Santa Fé either, being one hundred thirty-five leagues from the capital of that province. The presidio and garrison stationed in the prosperous settlement, however, was not needed in its present location because the settlers and mission Indians were fully capable of taking care of themselves. Rubí proposed therefore that the presidio be moved to the vicinity of El Carrizal and placed at or near Samalayuca springs, where a struggling settlement had been erected by thirty brave families who were greatly in need of protection. Furthermore, at Carrizal the presidio would be more closely in line with the proposed chain of forts and would afford more effective protection to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya. In fact, the villa and missions at El Paso del Norte should be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of New Mexico and placed under that of the Governor of Nueva Vizcaya.

The constant trade between Santa Fé and Chihuahua required protection and the settlers of El Paso could not be expected to defend themselves and furnish escorts. This would require the establishment of a new post north of El Paso, to insure safe communication with Santa Fé. Rubí suggested this could be established at or near Robledo, some twenty leagues north, on or near the Río Grande, with a garrison of thirty men and an officer from Presidio de Santa Fé. These could be reënforced by the founding of a settlement in the vicinity of the new post, offering free lands and other inducements to the poorer and less fortunate settlers of El Paso. If deemed advisable, a number of the settlers up to thirty might be enlisted as volunteers, to form a body of militiamen, who would aid the regular garrison in defending the settlement, or in their campaigns against hostile Indians, by being assigned fifteen *pesos* a month, amounting to half the regular salary allowed to the soldiers. This would constitute an added inducement to the prospective settlers, particularly if the salary was paid in specie.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>57</sup>Digtamen of Rubí, April 10, 1768. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr., 1768-1772) pp. 6-17.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 18-21.



*Another new post at San Elzeario.* From the new location of the El Paso garrison at El Carrizal to La Junta de los Rios there was a long stretch of unprotected country thickly infested with hostile tribes. Rubí recommended the removal of the Presidio de Huaxoquilla (Guajuquilla) in Nueva Vizcaya to a point some forty leagues southeast of El Paso, suggesting Agua Nueva, San Bernardo, El Sáuz, or the Valle de Elzeario on the Río Grande as suitable sites. "The last named site," he said, "joins to its natural advantage of being next to the Río Grande del Norte and its facilities for the cultivation of crops, the greater advantage of being at the juncture of the mountain passes of La Cueva, El Nogal, Peña Blanca, and others through which the savages commonly enter to raid Chihuahua."<sup>59</sup>

The Valle de San Elzeario begins just above the present town of that name (spelling modernized to San Elizario) just west of Clint, and extends for several miles almost to present Fort Hancock. The recommendation of Rubí resulted in the first formal occupation of this area. The purpose of San Elzeario was twofold, the protection of Nueva Vizcaya and of the El Paso area. Thus it will be seen that while the proposal to remove the original garrison and presidio from El Paso seemed to leave that important settlement unprotected, in fact it provided greater security by the establishment of the presidio itself at El Carrizal to protect its rear, an outpost at Robledo (near present Las Cruces) to cover its northern frontier, and the erection of a new post at San Elzeario to prevent attack from the southeast.

*Reestablishment of Presidio de la Junta.* The abandonment of this presidio in 1766 by order of Governor Joseph de Aguero of Nueva Vizcaya was condemned by Rubí in the strongest terms. "Without the previous inspection of the site," said the Marqués, "disregarding the orders of the present viceroy, which I transmitted to him, by which he was instructed to act jointly with me in deciding upon the maintenance or removal of this presidio and the founding of two others, and against the respect due my commission and rank, of which I complained in vain, he decided to abandon its site, and removed its garrisons and missions of northern Indians (who soon fled) to the location, where it now is in the Pueblo de los Julimes." Whatever the cost, the old site at La Junta (near present Presidio) should be occupied and the garrison reestablished. The hostile natives there, fully aware of the importance of this site in curtailing

<sup>59</sup>Rubí, *Diittamen*, pp. 22-23.

their raiding activities, naturally would oppose strongly such a move. But with the aid of the neighboring presidios all resistance should be overcome and the site reoccupied.

*Presidios along the Río Grande.* From La Junta to San Fernando de Austria, located in the vicinity of the old Presidio de Santa Rosa, some forty miles north of San Juan Bautista, the line of presidios was to follow the little known course of the Río Grande. The river flowed through deep canyons, Rubí observed, that cut the Santa Rosa mountain range all the way to Coahuila. This range had long since been the refuge of the Toboso Indians, but in more recent years had been occupied by the Natages and Salineros. Just before the Río Grande emerged from the mountainous country, it was joined by the Pecos River from the east and below this by several smaller streams on the west such as San Diego and San Rodrigo. Although the distance between the two points mentioned was calculated to be one hundred ten leagues by the most direct line, the nature of the country made it much longer.

Along this area, to the east of the Río Grande, roamed the Mescalero-Apaches, close kinsmen of the Natages. These Indians were in fact variously called Mescaleros, Carlanes and Salineros as one went up the river towards New Mexico. They communicated with the distant Jicarillas in the upper Pecos, who lived in that province, by going behind the Sandia mountains. Since these various tribes or nations were kinsmen and spoke similar dialects, they constituted the most dangerous menace to the Spanish settlement west of the Río Grande. It was the Lipan-Apaches, also of the same family, who lived south and east of La Junta, who guided the others to the Spanish settlements. For this reason they were generally called "*entregadores*" (deliverers). These Indians, under the guise of friendship, treacherously preyed on the Spaniards and committed severe depredations, leading their friends in their devastating raids. The lack of fortifications along this area made the Río Grande an open door to these perfidious enemies.

Between La Junta and San Fernando de Austria, therefore, Rubí proposed the establishment of three presidios, to be located approximately forty leagues apart and as near to the Río Grande as possible in order to erect an effective barrier to Indian raids and depredations in Nueva Vizcaya, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Texas. He suggested the use of the garrisons stationed at Cerro Gordo, Monclova, and San Sabá for this

purpose. Their respective locations could be determined after a more careful exploration of the entire area.<sup>60</sup>

*Recommendations concerning San Antonio.* "How painful and assailable to many," explains Rubí, "would be the proposal I would like to make now, the abandonment of the site of the villa and the five wealthy missions of San Antonio de Béjar, located on the banks of the river of the same name, removing them to this side (Mexican) of the Río del Norte, within the protection of the new line of presidios, such as the missions of San Juan and San Bernardo at San Juan Bautista. Such a removal, which undoubtedly involved many difficulties, could be justified by repeated examples of what has been done with other larger colonies to promote their development or security. But I do not dare go so far, nor do I trust my own judgment sufficiently to propose so great an innovation. Let the Presidio and Villa de San Antonio de Béjar remain in their present location." The establishment of this settlement, the bringing of the colonists from the distant Canary Islands, the erection of its church, the expense of supplying the settlers with the means to start life anew, all these things had cost too much to the royal treasury to abandon the site now, he reflected. Its five missions, too, should remain on their pleasant locations.

From San Antonio to San Juan Bautista, however, there were more than fifty leagues. The intervening country was being overrun by the faithless Apaches. With the abolition of San Sabá, the northern tribes would be attracted to San Antonio, whose north and west fronts would be left exposed to their hostilities. Furthermore, if Los Adaes was either abolished or incorporated in Louisiana, and Orcoquisac was suppressed, San Antonio would be left as the most advanced and exposed frontier outpost in New Spain. Since its abandonment was out of the question, in order to maintain this settlement, the garrison should be increased to constitute a respectable and adequate force to defend it against both native or foreign attack. Under the reorganized frontier San Antonio would become the front line of defense and would require not less than eighty men. The twenty-two now stationed there were totally inadequate.

How could this be accomplished without additional cost to the treasury? By utilizing a portion of the garrison of the Presidio de San Sabá, which if not abolished would need only fifty men on its new location near the Río Grande, or from the men stationed now at Orcoquisac.

<sup>60</sup>Rubí, Digtamen, April 10, 1768. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr., 1768-1772), pp. 20-26.

if that garrison was not used to establish a new post between San Antonio and La Bahía.

In connection with the increase of its garrison and in view that Los Adaes, long the official residence of the governor, was likely to be abandoned or incorporated in Louisiana, Rubí suggested that it would be well to make San Antonio the capital of the province. The residence of the governor in this settlement would "strengthen its defense, increase its commerce, and stimulate the circulation and consumption of goods and money." The abandonment of east Texas and the elevation of San Antonio to the capital of the province might make it advisable also to extend the jurisdiction of the governor beyond the Nueces to include San Juan Bautista, withdrawing it from Coahuila. It was possible that the governor might decide to remove this presidio, bringing it closer to San Antonio, if it was under his jurisdiction. This matter should be left entirely to his discretion.

There were political considerations, why the governor should come to reside in San Antonio. Let Rubí, in his own words explain. "Let us suppose now," he says, "that the attitude of the Comanches and other northern tribes, who today are attacking only San Sabá, which they consider a perfidious ally of the Lipan-Apaches, should change, and they should decide to attack other Spanish posts—a design which I cannot believe them capable of—and supposing, letting our imagination run, that aided or encouraged by other European nations, those closer to us, a thing to which I have never been able to bring myself to believe . . . they should undertake a formal attack upon the dominions of the king, in either case San Antonio, our foremost and principal settlement, would be the first objective. But for the same reasons it should likewise be the rallying and concentration point for the troops intended to repel the attack. Within the two hundred fifty leagues between Los Adaes and San Antonio it is impossible to offer stout resistance, because of the difficulties of mobilizing and maintaining an adequate force in uninhabited country. It would be best to leave these difficulties to bother the enemy, whose troops, weakened by their long march and an unprotected line of communication, would be more effectively checked by the force gathered in San Antonio in the meantime and the successive reinforcements called out by the governor."<sup>61</sup> It was this suggestion of Rubí, made at this time, that caused San Antonio to be designated the capital officially four years later.

<sup>61</sup>Rubí, *Diittamen*, pp. 29-33.

He likewise recommended that in case Los Adaes was not joined to the jurisdiction of Louisiana, but it was decided to abandon the site, the families should be removed preferably to San Antonio. With the fairness that characterized his judgment, he added that their settlement in San Antonio should not be arbitrary. The families of Los Adaes should be given the right to choose, whether they wanted to remain in San Antonio, or retire farther into the interior of the new province of Nuevo Santander.

*Recommendations for a site on the Cíbolo.* Pointing out that the original line from the west coast to the Guadalupe had been modified by the terrain and the course of the Río Grande, as well as by the location of a considerable settlement at El Paso, Santa Fé, and San Antonio, he now suggested that since the distance from San Antonio to La Bahía, which should be the eastern end of the reorganized chain of presidios, was seventy leagues, a new post should be established between the two presidios. This did not have to be exactly half way, because there was little or no danger of attack or molestation by Comanches and northern Indians beyond fifteen or twenty miles south of San Antonio. Under the circumstances he suggested that a new post with twenty men should be established on the Cíbolo, at the distance indicated. The men could be detached from the eighty assigned to San Antonio, under whose jurisdiction they would be. If this arrangement was not found satisfactory, perhaps a part of the Orcoquisac garrison could be utilized for this purpose, when the presidio at that point was suppressed. In that case the commander in San Antonio would have one hundred men available in case of an emergency.<sup>42</sup>

*Giving up east Texas.* "There will not be lacking those who will consider my suggestion ungenerous and contrary to the accepted maxim that the king's dominions must be ever advanced at whatever cost, when I propose the curtailment by several hundred square miles of that which we are wont to call improperly the king's domain in Texas," he explained, in discussing the abandonment of Los Adaes, the mission at Nacogdoches, and the presidio at Orcoquisac. Thus virtually withdrawing from the extended and uncertain eastern frontier. Fearlessly, frankly, and emphatically he declared that in the entire area of two hundred fifty leagues between Los Adaes and San Antonio, and the two hundred to La Bahía, the only part where Spanish dominion was in fact exercised was along

<sup>42</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

two narrow paths called roads, and even there it was shared with the natives, from whose thieving activities Spaniards were not entirely free. In this vast area there was not a settlement or semblance of one, nor hope of any being established, until one reached Nacogdoches. There a lonely mission, aided by a few soldiers and an occasional Indian, eked a miserable existence with hope in Providence undimmed. Twenty leagues beyond in the direction of Los Adaes was Mission Nuestra Señora de los Dolores de los Ais, where two holy men prayed and hoped for the conversion of the natives who never came. Still beyond was Los Adaes, twenty-six leagues farther. There a company of soldiers, who cost the king over twenty-seven thousand *pesos* a year, but resembled a band of starving beggars, marked the limits of the so-called dominions of the king. Two more religious faithfully toiled there with but scant reward, and thirty wretched families struggled in vain to shelter their nakedness and appease hunger. What could be gained by prolonging their agony in an empty gesture of a dubious tenure, which only the tolerance of the natives and the indifference of the French permitted to endure?

To the south, about one hundred twenty leagues, on the banks of the Trinity, upon a desolate slope that barely rose above the level of the encompassing lakes and marshes, and which the sea threatened to engulf any day, driven by the fury of tropical storms, stood the presidio commonly called Orcoquisac. Why such a place had ever been chosen as a site for a settlement was beyond human understanding. But there lived now thirty-one men and their families, comforted by the presence of the unselfish missionaries, the first serving their king and the second their God. In this uninviting and inaccessible location the unfortunate wretches were frequently forced to live for months on weeds and roots until supplies arrived. "Permit me, then," exclaims Rubí, "to ask in all justice if by suppressing the presidios of Los Adaes and Orcoquisac, the king loses in reality any part of his dominions?" He strongly urged their immediate abandonment and the withdrawal of Spanish forces and settlers to the real frontiers of the king's domain, which were marked by the two outposts of San Antonio and La Bahía.<sup>63</sup>

*Recommendations concerning Bahía.* While this presidio was twenty leagues from the coast, there were reasons why it should not be moved closer. Chief among these considerations were the unhealthy climate and the character of the country. Although the Guadalupe River had been

<sup>63</sup>Rubí, Digtamen, April 10, 1768. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr., 1768-1772), pp. 48-51.

intended as the end of the reorganized line of presidios, it would be best to allow La Bahía to remain on the San Antonio River, where a substantial settlement had grown up whose colonists had developed extensive cattle ranches. This place could be reënforced with such families from Los Adaes as chose to come to this presidio instead of San Antonio. The natives in the vicinity, who were the Cujanes, Piguis (Pihiques), Jaranames, and Karankawas, were generically called Borrados, Rubí explained, and were no menace to the welfare of the settlement. Like Rivera, he formed a low opinion of their prowess. "Their exhaustion, pusillanimity, and wretchedness make them despicable," he averred.<sup>64</sup>

*Inhospitable nature of coast.* Some had advocated the occupation of the entire Gulf coast from the Mississippi to Nuevo Santander (at the mouth of Soto La Marina River) for fear of foreign aggression. Such an idea was erroneous and should not be contemplated. The very character of the coast precluded both the possibility of settlement by foreigners and the establishment of effective defenses by Spain. Repeated explorations by land and sea had amply proven its inaccessible nature, and innumerable wrecks along the shore bore mute testimony to its inhospitability. Posts such as Orcoquisac and La Bahía could never prevent an enemy from landing, nor render aid to the unfortunate victims of the infuriated sea cast upon the shore. Recently two ships, the Nuevo Constante and the Santa María, were wrecked on the banks opposite Orcoquisac and its garrison could do nothing for them. More recently still Governor Ulloa of Louisiana had sent two ships to reconnoiter and map the Gulf coast, but the sailors could not approach the shore even in the ship's boats. They had difficulty entering San Bernardo Bay and returned to New Orleans, according to letters received from Ulloa by Rubí. Lastly there was the report of Colonel Ortiz Parrilla. The proposal was impossible.<sup>65</sup>

*Laredo should be well garrisoned.* The struggling new settlement on the east bank of the Río Grande did not escape the attention of the watchful Rubí. This new colony lay well to the southeast of San Juan Bautista. If the new line of presidios was reorganized as suggested and the Lipan-Apaches were further pressed by their enemies, they might penetrate into Nuevo Santander by this crossing to commit their accustomed depredations in the young colonies. In view of this possibility a regular garrison ought to be established at Laredo.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>64</sup>*ibid.*, 40-41.

<sup>65</sup>*ibid.*, 41-42.

<sup>66</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

*Price schedules on the frontier.* It will be remembered that one of the special matters which Rubí was to investigate was the price of commodities consumed by the garrisons of the frontier presidios in order to determine the changes that should be made on those fixed in 1729 after the inspection of Rivera. Although Viceroy Marqués de Croix upbraided Rubí for not having made a special report on this subject, alleging that as a result of his negligence on a matter of such importance, the king's orders could not be carried out, the fact remains that Rubí gave the requested information in each of his reports. It was for this reason that the sensitive inspector was ruffled at the implied reprimand and replied with spirit: "As to recommendations concerning fair prices, I must admit that the regulation of the price of commodities is totally foreign to my calling, being subject to the subtle fluctuations of trade understood only by those initiated in the intricate mysteries of commerce." Rubí stated the facts and the changes made during his inspection, but he refused to draw up a series of recommendations similar to those concerning the presidios, because he felt it was beyond his official duty and beyond the limits of his knowledge of economics.<sup>67</sup>

In the individual reports are found detailed lists of goods consumed in the different presidios in Texas from El Paso to Los Adaes. The quality and quantity of the goods and supplies being sold to the garrisons and their families give us an index of the standard of living and of the cost of life on the Spanish frontier in 1768. Let us take a few items as examples. Chocolate was of two grades, one sweetened and one unsweetened. The first cost twenty-five cents in Mexico and Querétaro, but it sold for a *peso* twenty-five *céntimos* in El Paso, and two *pesos* in San Antonio. This was the price of the sweetened chocolate, but the captains of the presidio were buying the cheaper grade and selling it at the price of the better. Rubí ruled that the captains should supply one pound of sugar free of charge with each pound of unsweetened chocolate or credit the men with the value of seventy-five cents.

The guns or rifles cost ten *pesos* in Puebla, but sold for thirty *pesos* from El Paso to Los Adaes. These guns were made in Mexico and were inferior to those imported from Spain. He ordered a reduction to twenty *pesos* and recommended they be purchased in Spain and that all should be of the same caliber. Swords cost four and a half *pesos* in Mexico and were sold for fourteen. They were of such poor steel that they had to

<sup>67</sup>Marqués de Croix to Rubí, April 12, 1768; same to Arriaga, April 27, 1768; Rubí to the Viceroy, July 6, 1768. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr., 1768-1772), pp. 69-73; 74-80; 81-83.



be sharpened often. The result was that they wore off at the point and became too short for effective use. Gun stocks cost seven and a half *pesos* a dozen and were sold to the soldiers at three and a half each, or forty-two *pesos* a dozen. They were of poor quality and rudely made. Equally indispensable regardless of price to a frontier soldier were the saddles. These were generally brought in Pénjamo for twelve *pesos* and sold for twenty-eight. A pistol that cost in Mexico fifteen *pesos* sold in Texas for forty. Horses were generally bought in Coahuila and from the missions in San Antonio at eight or ten *pesos* a head. They were sold to the men at from sixteen to twenty-five. Hats were sold for three and a half *pesos* each and cost eighteen a dozen.

Powder puffs, consisting of a two-inch sack of downy cloth filled with powdered rice, were still selling for fifty cents and were being consumed in such large quantity by the different garrisons that Rubí ordered the number purchasable by each man restricted, with a warning that they should in fact be stricken from the list of supplies. The charge for soap was excessive and outrageous. It cost at the rate of fifty-four bars for one *peso*, each bar weighing one and a half ounces, but they were sold at ten bars for one *peso* in El Paso, twelve in San Sabá and San Antonio. Metal buttons, which cost twelve cents a dozen, sold for fifty.

The price of foodstuffs was very high due to the fact that little or nothing was raised by the soldiers or in the settlements in their vicinity. Corn sold for two and a half to five *pesos* a *fanega* (two bushels) from El Paso to Los Adaes; flour sold at fifty cents a pound at Orcoquisac but at three *pesos* an *arroba* (twenty-five pounds) in San Antonio, and four at Los Adaes; and beans sold for fifty cents a pound in El Paso but for only one and a half *pesos* at San Sabá. However, the average price was twelve *pesos* a *fanega* (one hundred pounds) in San Antonio and Los Adaes. A head of beef sold for ten to twelve *pesos*, sheep for three to four *pesos*. A string of red chiles cost from one to three *pesos*, sugar sold for sixty to seventy-five cents a pound, *pilconcillo* (brown sugar loaf) from four to ten for a *peso*. Rubí remarked that these were purchased in Mexico at the rate of sixty for one *peso*, although they were even cheaper if bought in large quantities. But they sold in Paso at ten for one *peso* and at four for one *peso* in San Antonio. Salt sold for fifteen cents a pound.

Articles of clothing and luxuries were proportionately high. There appear to have been four kinds of cloth sold: Mitán, Tripe, Queretano, and red woolen. Mitán cost one *peso* and sold for two; Tripe cost two *pesos* and sold for four a *vara*; Queretano cost one and a half *pesos* and

sold for four; and red woolen cost seventy-five cents and sold for two and a half *pesos*. Silk handkerchiefs were very much in vogue. They cost ordinarily fifty to eighty cents and were brought from Seville. They sold for one and a half to two *pesos*. Cloth for shawls, cotton and silk mixture, cost six and a half *pesos* a dozen (pieces cut) and sold for two *pesos* each. The same grade with a fringe sold in San Antonio for as much as sixteen *pesos*. The all-silk shawls of better grade cost ten *pesos* but sold for thirty in El Paso and San Antonio. In Los Adaes they were cheaper because they were imported from New Orleans. The cheapest cotton hose cost sixty-two cents and sold for two *pesos*. Plain cotton blankets cost one *peso* but sold for four *pesos*. Silver braid cost one *peso* and eighteen cents an ounce, but sold for two and a half *pesos*. Black and colored ribbon No. 80 cost twenty cents and sold for seventy-five.

In his inspections of the presidios in Texas, Rubí insisted on being shown the invoices. In several cases he considered the overcharge so great that he ordered the captains to credit the accounts of their men with the excess charged.<sup>68</sup>

*Recommendations concerning Indian policy.* The impression that the Spaniards were materially aided by former French officials and traders in formulating a practical Indian policy after the Louisiana cession has been created by historians.<sup>69</sup> But a study of the reports of the farsighted Marqués de Rubí seems to indicate that many of the changes put into effect by the Cavallero de Croix in the Provincias Internas after 1772, and particularly in Texas with regard to the Indians can be traced directly to him. At any rate a summary of his views on this subject will show that he at least paved the way and prepared the officials of Spain and Mexico to view with favor the proposals for a more realistic and vigorous policy in regard to the Indian nations in Texas.

Rubí was particularly bitter against the perfidy of the Lipan-Apaches, but he blamed the Spaniards largely for the treachery of these Indians. "Our own credulity and our selfish indulgence have made them daring and shameless," he declared, in referring to their faithlessness and the manner in which they had made Spanish officials believe they were sincere in the loud protestations of their desire to be reduced to mission life. From San Juan Bautista to San Sabá, and hence to San Antonio and La

<sup>68</sup>The facts summarized here concerning the cost and sale price of goods and supplies are found in the various reports on the Texas presidios made by Rubí. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr., 1767), pp. 107-856.

<sup>69</sup>Bolton, *Athanase de Mézières*, I, 17-122.

Bahía, the line of communication of the Spaniards was menaced chiefly by these supposedly friendly Indians, who committed depredations as far south as Sabina and Nadaores in Coahuila and Nuevo León. They were led by numerous petty chiefs such as Boruca (Chatter Box), Zapato Bordado (Embroidered Slipper), Casaca colorada (Red Coat), Cabezón (Big Head), and Canos. Their chief occupation was to rob the unwary travelers and steal everything from the missions and settlements under guise of friendship. They were a depraved nation who preferred horse flesh to all other meat. They were hated by every other nation. For years they had been slowly driven from their northern haunts, in the vicinity of the place now occupied by the Taovayas, two hundred leagues or more southward. They had found a temporary respite from the relentless persecution of their enemies bent upon their destruction in the refuge offered them by Spanish presidios and missions. But while enjoying their hospitality and protection they continued to prey upon their defenders and friends and to antagonize their enemies.

In their retreat they had brought down upon the Spaniards the enmity of the northern Indians who pursued them relentlessly. Chief among these were the Comanches, the Iscanis, the Tawakonis, and the Taovayas. These Indians attacked San Sabá and destroyed its mission, continuing their attacks on this presidio and penetrating as far as the more recently established missions of El Cañón, not because they hated the Spaniards, but because they desired to exterminate the Lipan-Apaches. San Antonio itself might be their next objective. Even now the northern nations were beginning to settle along the Guadalupe, the San Sabá, and their tributaries.

This evil which had become like an ulcer upon the Spanish frontier would require a radical remedy. Although it might be shocking to the Christian spirit of the king and the missionaries, a firm policy must be adopted in dealing with the Apaches, who had proved themselves unworthy. Rubí recommended that in spite of its apparent harshness, the first step was to drive the Apaches out of every Spanish mission, presidio, and settlement on the frontier along the line suggested for the reorganization of its defense. The immediate effect would be to place this treacherous nation outside the protection of Spanish arms and to throw them upon their merciless enemies. Without a place of refuge they would either be exterminated by their enemies or they would be forced to seek with sincere humility admission into the missions. When they did, they were not to be allowed to enter the missions along the frontier, but they must be

told that they must enter missions far in the interior. Such as sought refuge should then be distributed among missions widely separated and well in the interior of New Spain in order that they might be successfully Christianized and civilized. The Apaches would have to be totally exterminated or reduced to impotence to assure peace on the northern frontier of New Spain.

With regard to the Comanches and their allies Rubí declared that these nations were inevitably destined to reach the northern frontiers of New Spain and become neighbors. It was an error to believe, however, that when they did they would come as enemies. These same Indians were already on the frontier of Louisiana, but they were not hostile to the Spaniards there, nor were they hostile in New Mexico, as shown by the relations that existed in the Valle de Taos. There annual fairs were being held, which were attended by numerous Comanches and northern Indians who came in peace to trade their wares. The northern Indians were not hostile to the Spaniards at Los Adaes, nor had they been the enemies of either San Xavier or San Sabá. In these two instances they had directed their hostility against their traditional enemies, the Apaches. If this perfidious nation was removed from the frontier or exterminated, the Comanches and their allies might become peaceful neighbors of the Spaniards, interested chiefly in the free hunting of the buffalo. It seemed that these nations followed the herds of the buffalo throughout the year depending upon them for their livelihood.<sup>70</sup>

Before taking up the effect of Rubí's inspection and recommendation, it will be necessary to record the withdrawal of the sons of the College of the Holy Cross of Querétaro from the missionary field in Texas.

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<sup>70</sup>Digitamen, que de orden del Excmo señor Marqués de Croix Virrey de este Reyno expone el Mariscal de Campo Marqués de Rubí en orden a la mejor Situación de los Presidios. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-13 (Dunn Tr., 1768-772), pp. 30-34.

## CHAPTER VI

### WITHDRAWAL OF QUERETARAN MISSIONARIES FROM TEXAS

To the trying hardships of conversion was added the more thankless task of the temporal administration of the missions. The success attained at the cost of countless sacrifices and endless toil seemed only to arouse the cupidity of the unredeemed tribes and the envy of the less fortunate civil settlers in the proximity of the missions. This was particularly true of San Antonio, where the Canary Islanders and the families of the wretched soldiers looked upon the prosperous missions with deep resentment. They contrasted the affluence of the neophytes with their own penury and want, and like all those in less fortunate circumstances begrudged them the success attained by dint of systematic labor and orderly administration. Again and again the missionaries had to protest the wanton destruction of the mission herds, the encroachment upon the cultivated fields of the neophytes, and the unscrupulous dealings of the neighboring settlers.

*Offer to resign temporal administration, 1769.* While the Governors of Coahuila and Texas were meeting in San Antonio with Colonel Ortiz Parrilla, early in 1769, to plan a campaign against the northern tribes, the veteran missionary Fray Mariano de los Dolores made a formal resignation of the temporal administration of the missions. Speaking for all the sons of the College of La Santa Cruz de Querétaro, he declared that the cardinal aim of the missionaries was to convert the natives and to instruct them in the principles of Christianity. This was the chief reason for their being sent to the frontier and the only justification for the payment allotted them by the king's treasury. On the other hand it was the express duty of governors and military officers to coöperate with the missionaries in attaining the desired purpose by bringing the Indians to the missions, helping to keep them in proper subordination, and instructing them by word and example in the manners and habits of civilized life. It was their duty and not that of the missionaries to protect them against their more barbarous brethren, as well as from unjust and unfair treatment by their Christian neighbors.

From the beginning of the occupation of Texas, civil and military officials had been reluctant to assume their respective responsibilities. This

had forced the missionaries to perform duties foreign to their sacred ministry, which in the course of time had brought upon them unmerited criticism and abuse. Obligated to defend the Indians, their lands, their stock, and the products of their labor against the sordid ambitions of unscrupulous Spaniards, the missionaries had been accused of being more interested in the accumulation of temporal goods than in the salvation of souls, of forgetting their vows of poverty for the ease and comfort of worldly luxuries.

Fray Mariano went on to state that what the missionaries desired was peace and union. Theirs was a mission of love and not of hatred. Realizing that the root of all their troubles was in the temporal administration of the missions, they now wished to resign formally this onerous task and live henceforth on the alms provided by the charity of the king, free from all worldly cares, devoting all their time to the instruction of the natives in the holy faith of the Redeemer. They were ready to turn over to the civil and military authorities all the property of the four missions in San Antonio and the two in San Juan Bautista now under the care of the College of the Holy Cross of Querétaro by inventory, showing the number of families, persons, herds of cattle, flocks of sheep and goats, droves of horses and mules, farms under cultivation, stores in the warehouses, equipment, and implements.

But the good *Padre* warned the officials of the responsibility that the temporal administration implied, and solemnly declared it would be their duty to preserve and increase the worldly possessions of the helpless neophytes. Under the new order of things, the officials would be expected to coöperate willingly and actively in the transformation of the uncivilized natives into useful and Christian subjects of the king.<sup>1</sup>

Governor Jacinto del Barrios and Angel Martos y Navarrete and Colonel Ortiz Parrilla were thus given an opportunity to take over the temporal administration at this time. What may have been the result of their acceptance will remain a matter for speculation. They replied on the very same day that as far as they knew there was no reason for so serious an innovation. They unstintedly praised the missionaries for their efficient administration of the missions, both spiritual and temporal, but firmly declared that in their opinion the change proposed was so sweeping that it could not be considered without first consulting the viceroy.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Representación de Fray Mariano de los Dolores, February 6, 1769. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 28, ff. 183-188.

<sup>2</sup>Reply to the missionaries, February 6, 1759. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 28, ff. 188-189.

*Increasing burden of the missionaries.* From 1750 to 1767 there was an unusual expansion in missionary activity along the northern frontier of New Spain. The establishment of missions in the newly settled province of Nuevo Santander was followed by new missions in Texas, Nuevo León, and Coahuila. At the same time the formal occupation of Pimería Baja (at present Sonora) was being pushed actively. Then new missions taxed the man power of the three colleges of *propaganda fide* of San Fernando, the Holy Cross of Querétaro, and Guadalupe of Zacatecas to their limit.

In 1767 occurred the lamented expulsion of the Jesuit order from all the colonies of Spain. Unjustly accused of being a menace to the absolute power of the king of Spain and of having amassed fabulous wealth, their enemies succeeded in obtaining an order for their expulsion. Like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky the order was read to the astonished followers of St. Ignatius at the same time and hour throughout New Spain and they were given only a few days to gather their belongings before embarking at Vera Cruz.<sup>3</sup> The story of the expulsion and their sufferings does not form a part of our history.

Other missionary orders, chief among them the Franciscans, were called upon to take over the missions formerly administered by the Jesuits. Burdened as they were already, it soon became evident to the provincial of the Franciscans in Mexico that the colleges of *propaganda fide* would be unable to supply missionaries for the missions.

*Attempted resignation of the missions in Pimería Baja.* Unwilling at first to withdraw from the missions in Texas, where they had labored faithfully for so many years, the missionaries of the college of Querétaro suggested to the *Padre Procurador* (legal representative) in Mexico that he request permission from the viceroy to give up the seven missions entrusted to the college in Pimería Baja. The *Discretorio* of the college explained that these missions had progressed sufficiently and were ready to be erected as parishes under a cleric. By being relieved from the care of these seven missions the college could undertake the conversion of the numerous tribes of Pimería Alta, where the zeal of the missionaries could find better employment. The viceroy, while anxious to accede to the request, was reluctant to turn over the missions in Pimería Baja to the administration of seculars. A formal inquiry revealed that the change proposed was premature.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup>For a good account of the expulsion of the Jesuits from Mexico in 1767 see Cuevas, *Historia de la Iglesia en México*, Vol. 4, Alegre, *Historia*, Vol. 3.

<sup>4</sup>Arricivita, *Crónica Seráfica*, pp. 437-438.

*Proposed resignation of missions in Coahuila and Texas.* A new memorial was presented to the viceroy. The College of Querétaro pointed out that it had under its care at this time six missions in Coahuila and Texas with twelve missionaries, and fifteen missions in Pimería Alta y Baja with twenty-three missionaries. In the case of the latter the college received the customary allowance for only fifteen, but it had been obliged to send eight additional men without receiving any aid for their maintenance from the royal treasurer. The number of the neophytes in the missions of the two Pimerías was so large, however, and the missions themselves were so distant from each other that the services of the eight additional workers were indispensable. Up to now the college had been able to attend diligently to the multiple duties which the care of missions so numerous and in such distant provinces required. But in recent years few recruits had entered the college and it was becoming increasingly difficult to replace the aged and disabled missionaries.

In view of these circumstances it was necessary for the college to be relieved of a part of its responsibilities. Since the viceroy felt that the missions in Pimería Baja were not ready to be placed under the care of seculars, the college humbly asked to be allowed to withdraw from the six missions in Coahuila and Texas. The four in San Antonio and the two in San Juan Bautista were in a prosperous condition and in the midst of well established communities. Consequently, being well provided with permanent churches, supplied with all the necessary ornaments and sacred vessels, and possessing decent quarters for the ministers and sufficient cultivated and irrigated lands, their administration would entail no hardships on those, whoever took them over.

These missions were not ready, however, to be placed under the care of seculars, because there were many neophytes who were still under instruction as the result of the practice adopted of bringing new groups at regular intervals to replace those that died in the frequent epidemics and those that ran away. But there were other religious in the vicinity who had under their care missions and *doctrinas* who might take over their administration.<sup>5</sup>

*Viceregal reaction to the proposal.* The request was favorably considered by the viceroy, who replied that it seemed reasonable and that, if granted, it might enable the College of Querétaro more effectively to take care of the missions in the two Pimerías and perhaps to expand its activity to the new territories along the Colorado and Gila rivers now being opened.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 438-439.



He informed the college that he was consulting the Franciscan Province of Guadalajara and the College of Zacatecas to ascertain if they were willing to assume the administration of the six missions stipulated.

The Guardian of the College of Querétaro promptly notified the viceroy that he was pleased with his wise determination. He took occasion to state, however, that unless capable and worthy ministers could be found to take care of the six missions in Texas the college preferred to continue to care for them in spite of the great sacrifice entailed.<sup>6</sup>

*Acceptance of the missions by the Province of Guadalajara and the College of Zacatecas.* Both the Province of Guadalajara and the College of Zacatecas informed the viceroy and the College of Querétaro that they were ready to receive the six missions in Coahuila and Texas. In view of their ready acceptance the viceroy on July 28, 1772, issued a formal decree for the transfer, after first having consulted the *Fiscal*. Since this decree marks the formal withdrawal of the missionaries of the College of the Holy Cross of Querétaro from Texas and the Río Grande, it should be quoted in full. "The offers made by the holy Colleges of Guadalajara and Zacatecas having been approved by me," declared the viceroy, "in accord with the opinion rendered by the *señor fiscal*, whereby they agreed to receive the missions administered by your reverences in the Province of Coahuila, known as San Bernardo and San Juan Bautista, as well as those known as San Antonio, Nuestra Señora de la Concepción, San Juan Capistrano, and San Francisco in the Province of Texas, I have issued on this date the corresponding orders to the reverend prelates of the said colleges. In consideration of the urgency which attaches to the effective fulfillment of this useful measure involving the welfare of the gentile Indians, the tranquillity of the interior provinces, and the service of God and the King, they are to send the respective number of missionaries as soon as possible to the said missions, selecting for the purpose those worthy of the greatest trust to receive them from the ministers actually in charge of them. The transfer is to be effected with all due formalities under an exact inventory of the spiritual and temporal belongings of each one of them. Every person in each mission is to be included in the inventory."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 439.

<sup>7</sup>The Viceroy to the Guardian of Querétaro, cited by Arricivita in *Crónica Seráfica*, p. 439; Carta orden in "Testimonio de los Bienes de la misión de San Juan Bautista del Río Grande. Año 1772," *Saltillo Archives*, Vol. 3, pp. 76-80.

*Protest of the civil authorities.* The commander of San Juan Bautista felt considerable apprehension and feared the complete abandonment of the missions by the neophytes would follow the withdrawal of the missionaries from Querétaro. The garrison and the civil settlers at San Juan Bautista drew up representations, which they sent to the viceroy posthaste, protesting the proposed change in the administration of the missions. They expressed their fears and cited numerous examples in which the change of missionaries had caused the abandonment of missions. Furthermore the discontented neophytes might ally themselves with other hostile tribes and lead their new friends to the settlement to take vengeance for their feigned wrong.

The viceroy referred the matter to the *Fiscal*, who advised that the Guardian of the College of Querétaro should be consulted concerning the matter. The Guardian called the *Discretorio* of the College, and after some deliberation, prepared a memorial in which the objections raised by the well-meaning settlers of San Juan Bautista were answered. They assured the viceroy that the Indians themselves would be entirely indifferent to the change. It was the nature of the natives to be ungrateful. Their attachment was not deep. As a matter of fact, like most persons with a childish mind, they were inordinately fond of change and were more likely to view with pleasure the coming of new missionaries to take care of them. In the final analysis, if they should attempt to run away, granting that they should resent the change, the garrison stationed at San Juan Bautista was sufficient to prevent their flight, or to bring them back if they succeeded in their ill-advised design.

The reply of the College of Querétaro to the protest appears to have satisfied the viceroy, who repeated his previous orders and instructed the commander of San Juan Bautista and the governor of Texas to witness the transfer in person or delegate persons to represent them. The College of Nuestra Señora de la Santa Cruz and the Provincial of the Province of Guadalajara were to send sworn copies of the inventories of the transfer and the names of the missionaries assigned to the new missions in order that the corresponding instructions might be issued to the officers of the treasury for the payment of their respective salaries.<sup>8</sup>

*Transfer of missions at San Juan Bautista.* On November 22, 1772, Governor Jacobo de Ugarte y Loyola of Coahuila issued the necessary orders to the Captain of the Presidio of San Juan Bautista for the official transfer of the two missions in his jurisdiction to the representative of

<sup>8</sup>Arriacivita, *op. cit.*, 440-441.

the Province of Guadalajara. According to this order Captain Vicente Rodríguez informed the President of the Missions of the College of Querétaro in Coahuila and Texas, Fray Diego Jiménez, that Fray Luís de Lizarrana, of the Province of Guadalajara, was ready to receive from him the missions of San Juan Bautista and San Bernardo.

On November 27, the official transfer began. First the church, the baptistry, the sacristy, and all the linens, ornaments, vestments, and sacred vessels were turned over. The list of vessels, silver and brass candlesticks, monstrances, crucifixes, and paintings is truly remarkable. Having listed every item, they proceeded to the Indian quarters and made an inventory of the houses and all their equipment, furnishings, and utensils. The cultivated farms were about a league from the mission and had a special building to keep the implements and a stable. Six or seven leagues to the southeast was the cattle ranch, where there were a good stone and mortar house, the necessary corrals, saddles, and other ranching equipment. Returning to the mission an inventory was made of the equipment of the carpenter shop, the blacksmith shop, the loom, the dining room, the kitchen, and the stores in the warehouse. When the cattle and stock were rounded, it was found that San Juan Bautista possessed six hundred seventy-two branded cows and bulls, six hundred ninety-eight horses, mules and donkeys, over fifty-three hundred sheep, and six hundred fifty-seven goats. There were ninety-six male and seventy-three female Indians living in the mission at the time. "Aware of the care, vigilance, and constancy with which the said Reverend Father President and his missionaries have labored," declared Captain Rodríguez, "in the fulfillment of their duty, the education of the natives, and the teaching of the catechism, as well as in the efficient administration of the temporal interests of the missions, I hereby declare the College of Querétaro exonerated from all further responsibility and thank its missionaries for their faithful services."<sup>9</sup>

*Transfer of the Mission of San Bernardo.* On December 15, 1772, Captain Vicente Rodríguez, accompanied by Fray Diego Jiménez of the College of Querétaro and Fray Luis de Lizarrana, went to the Mission of San Bernardo to turn it over to the representative of the Province of Guadalajara. The church, the sacristy, the missionary quarters, the Indian pueblo, the farm, the storehouse, the implements and tools, and all the cattle and other stock were carefully listed and the inventory given to

<sup>9</sup>Testimonio de los Vienes de la Misión de San Juan Baptista del Río Grande del Norte. Año 1772. *Saltillo Archives*, Vol. 3, pp. 76-134.

Fray Lizarrana. An idea of the wealth in cattle and stock possessed by this mission may be gained from the number listed in the inventory. One thousand two hundred four head of cattle, six thousand nine hundred sheep, and over nine hundred goats, besides eight hundred thirty-five mares, two hundred twelve horses, and one hundred one mules. The Indians living at the mission were counted and found to be one hundred eighty-five, including men, women, and children, all well instructed in the tenets of our faith. All those over seven years of age went to confession and received communion at least once a year. They were all provided with sufficient clothes and some had good overcoats and jackets. All had shoes and stockings which they wore when they went to church on Sunday. They were not only well instructed in the Christian doctrine, but they all had been taught a trade and were skilled farmers and tradesmen. As in the case of San Juan Bautista, Captain Rodríguez paid tribute to the industry, patience, and love of the missionaries of Querétaro, who in the course of years of painful toil had been able to convert and civilize these Indians and to administer their interests so efficiently for their welfare.<sup>10</sup>

*Transfer of the missions in San Antonio.* The Marqués de Rubí, who was not free with his compliments and who viewed the work of the missionaries rather coldly, could not help but describe the missions of San Antonio as "opulent." Both San José, administered by the apostolic missionaries of the College of Zacatecas, and the other four missions of the College of Querétaro had attained a remarkable success in view of the many vicissitudes and adversities that befell them from the beginning. "Why?" asks Captain Rafael Martínez Pacheco in a special report made to the viceroy, "did the Marquis de Rubí call them the 'opulent missions of San Antonio?'" And he answers: "Because of the apostolic zeal exercised by the missionaries, who did not spare fatigue or discomfort at any time of the year to solicit with fervor the increase of the spiritual and temporal welfare. Religiously and constantly they labored, going persistently in search of new converts and apostates, visiting gentile tribes to bring new recruits for their pueblos. Many times a lonely *Padre* would set out, accompanied by only two neophytes, because the military commander refused to give him an escort, and he would make his way to the Lipan-Apaches in search of runaways. In July of this year [1772]

<sup>10</sup>Testimonio de la Entrega de la Misión de San Bernardo del Río Grande del Norte. A los Rds. Pds. de la Santa Prova. de Xalisco. Año de 1772. *Saltillo Archives*, Vol. 3, pp. 34-74.

Father Fray Manuel Carrasco, minister of Mission San Antonio de Valero, undertook such a mission and brought back eight apostates. He might have returned with all of the runaways, if he had been given an adequate escort, as had been done in the past."<sup>11</sup>

It fell to the lot of Governor Baron de Ripperdá to witness the transfer of San Antonio de Valero, San Juan Capistrano, San Francisco de la Espada, and Concepción to the representatives of the College of Zacatecas, which took place early in 1773. The order of July 28, 1772, instructing the officials to proceed with the transfer arrived in San Antonio in October of that year and the Querétaran missionaries were requested to prepare the inventories of all the property of each mission and to make lists of the Indians living in each pueblo. The exact date of the transfer cannot be ascertained from the available documents. Probably Father Fray Diego Jiménez, who was president of the missions on the Río Grande and San Antonio, must have come to San Antonio after he finished the transfer of San Bernardo. At any rate, on March 10, 1773, the viceroy informed the Governor of Texas that he had received certified copies of the inventories, lists, and other papers concerning the transfer of the four missions to the College of Nuestra Señora de Zacatecas. A good idea of the state of development of these missions may be gathered from the detailed description given in the present volume.<sup>12</sup>

"The materials of their houses, the churches, and the missionaries' quarters are not only of the best quality but of the best construction known to the Spaniards in the entire province," declared Pacheco. "All this was directed from its very beginnings by the *Padres*. The silver ornaments and sacred vessels of each one of the missions are such as would grace the best church in any city. The farms, ranches, and irrigation ditches of these missions are the best and most successfully operated in the province. The herds of cattle, flocks of sheep, and other stock are the most numerous, with the exception of their horses, which have been stolen by the enemy in recent years."<sup>13</sup>

In summing up the work of the missionaries from Querétaro in Texas,

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<sup>11</sup>Ynforme echo al Exmo Señor Virrey por el Capitán Pacheco sobre el nuevo metodo de Govno. Espl. y templ. November 8, 1772. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-20 (Dunn Tr., 1767-1772), pp. 121-129. The report was transmitted to the king by the viceroy on November 26.

<sup>12</sup>Viceroy to the Governor, March 10, 1773; Governor to the Missionaries, October, 1772, *Béxar Archives*; Arricivita, *Crónica Seráfica*, 440-441.

<sup>13</sup>Martínez Pacheco to the Viceroy, November 8, 1772. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-20 (Dunn Tr., 1767-1772), pp. 127-128.

the Franciscan chronicler exclaims that the pain of parting from their neophytes was greater than any experience in their reduction. The simple and loving *Padres* became deeply attached to their ungrateful wards. "Amidst so painful a sacrifice," Arricivita explains, "they had the powerful consolation that they had exercised their zeal and vigils to illumine the souls who dwelt in darkness, and to furnish them the means by which they might persevere, whether in sickness or in health, in the faith of Jesus Christ, fulfilling with unselfish charity all the duties of their sacred ministry."<sup>14</sup>

*Methods employed by the missionaries.* Just at this time viceregal officials in Mexico had become conscious of the problems which the maintenance of the missions along the northern frontier implied. The expulsion of the Jesuits and the new advance into California and present Arizona, coupled with the renewed activity in Texas and New Mexico had made the viceroy desirous of learning more about the mission system. He consequently questioned both the prelates of the various religious orders engaged in the propagation of the faith and the governors and officials of the northern provinces as to how the missions along the frontier could be improved. It was in reply to these inquiries that Father Fray Antonio de los Reyes of the College of Querétaro presented a long report on a plan for the organization of the spiritual and temporal administration of the missions of New Spain. It was likewise the result of this inquiry which prompted Captain Rafael Martínez Pacheco to present a similar plan to the viceroy.<sup>15</sup>

In his *Crónica*, Fray Arricivita describes vividly the methods employed by the missionaries of Querétaro in Texas with such admirable results. In obtaining new converts those who had been in the missions for a while were the best means for the attainment of the desired purpose. The *Padres* would give them a few trinkets, articles of clothing and food and tell them they had permission to visit with their friends or relatives. This was generally done in the winter, when the work in the mission farm was light. The Indians would visit their friends, often their relatives, who at this season of the year were generally reduced to a diet of bitter

<sup>14</sup>Arricivita, *Crónica*, 441.

<sup>15</sup>Antonio de los Reyes, Plan para arreglar el gobierno espiritual de Pueblos, y Misiones en las Provincias Septentrionales de Nueva España. Cited in an *Acuerdo* of the Council of the Indies. June 30, 1777. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-3-13 (Dunn Tr., 1777-1780), pp. 1-17; Martínez Pacheco, Informe sobre el nuevo metodo de Govno. Espl. y templ. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-20 (Dunn Tr., 1767-1772), pp. 121-129.

weeds, unappetizing worms, and roots. The mission Indians would tell them of the comforts of mission life during the inclement weather and of the abundant food. On their return to the mission the neophytes would tell the *Padre* where their friends lived and suggest that he should go to visit them. Before the end of the winter a missionary would set out with a liberal supply of clothes and food. Without a military escort, guided perhaps by one or two faithful converts, he would penetrate the unexplored woods and swamps, returning after an absence of a week or ten days with a group of hopeful natives.

The natives had no fixed ideas on religion. They ignored the existence of God, but they had a deep and overwhelming fear of the evil spirit, who they claimed pursued them with fiendish glee and ambushed them in the woods. Idolatry was almost unknown among the tribes the missionaries met in Texas. They lived more like animals than human beings, but they had no great depravity. They generally established their villages along the rivers or the seashore, lived from the chase and from fishing, depending often for their livelihood on roots and insects in the winter. They were visited by devastating epidemics of measles and smallpox, and venereal diseases were not unknown among them when the missionaries first met them. It was during the unwelcome visits of epidemics that the missionaries succeeded in inducing them to give up their roaming lives and to come to live in the missions. The mere fact of living in a mission did not save them from epidemics, but when these scourges came, they knew they would be taken care of, given medicine, nursed, and looked after. Rude and ignorant though they were, the natives realized the advantage of mission life and soon came to feel the compelling urge of Christian charity. The unselfish devotion of the missionaries, their patience and love, soon won the hearts of the neophytes. Arricivita declares with some pride that not a single case of violence on the part of a mission Indian against a *Padre* was recorded. He says that the most the mission Indians did when displeased was to run away. But when the *Padre* came after them, they soon forgot their grievance at sight of his kindly face and Christian mien and came running to greet him.

But the presence of a respectable military force was an indispensable factor in the success of the missionary endeavors of the good *Padres*. The peaceful Franciscan frankly admits that for the permanence of conversion the respect inspired by military force in the early years was of inestimable value. The great success of the first missionaries in Mexico, Arricivita points out, was due in large measure to the presence

of considerable forces. Furthermore the first missionaries worked in thickly populated areas, where rich mineral deposits, which attracted numerous Spanish settlers, were found. In the absence of rich mines, other natural resources or wealth were the stimuli that brought settlers, whose presence made the work of the missionaries easier.

In the northern frontiers of New Spain, particularly in Texas, conditions were far different, he explains. The coöperation of the military arm of the government and of civil officials was of the utmost importance. Wherever the missionaries had sallied forth along the northern frontier without an adequate military escort, tragedy had overtaken them and martyrdom crowned their efforts. In New Mexico, in Texas, and more recently in Sonora, experience had demonstrated the truth of this simple fact.

Are we to imply from this that Fray Arricivita was a believer in the use of brute force as the most effective means of conversion? Let him explain his position himself. Speaking of the importance of the presence of an adequate military force he says: "The respect which this inspires, and not the exercise of brute force or fury is what the missionaries implore. Without it the missions cannot long endure, either because of the inconsistency that characterizes the natives, or because they attempt to live within them with the unrestrained liberty and pagan customs of savages."<sup>16</sup>

*Suggestions of Martínez Pacheco.* The former commander of the ill-fated Presidio of San Agustín at Orcoquisac, in his report on what was wrong with the missions in Texas and Coahuila, frankly admitted that the chief trouble had been the incompetent governors and commanders of the various presidios. Most of these had limited previous experience in dealing with natives and, blinded by selfish interests, they had failed to coöperate with the missionaries, sacrificing to their inordinate ambitions and sordid passions the property and lives not only of the inmates of the missions but of the struggling settlers in these remote provinces. The failure to support the efforts of the missionaries had resulted in the abandonment of the missions by many Indians, who had sought refuge either with the numerous tribes that lived along the coast, or with those in east Texas, or the fiercer nations of the north. These apostates, who were acquainted with the missions and Spanish settlements, were more dangerous and caused greater losses to the Spaniards in Texas than those who had never known Christianity. Many of the runaways would never have left the missions, or having left them would long since have been

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<sup>16</sup>Arricivita, *Crónica*, 442-443.



brought back, if the civil and military officials had coöperated with the zealous missionaries.

Pacheco pointed out that it was publicly known that the governor at Los Adaes had permitted the sale of guns and ammunition by the French to the Indians in the vicinity and down the Trinity to the coast, because he was interested in this trade himself. He suggested that the Indians, who were now at peace with the Spaniards, should be made to join the missions and come to live in them. Those who refused should be considered enemies. He was of the opinion that a more virile policy would cause all the friendly tribes to rally to the Spanish standard and to aid the Spaniards in waging a formal campaign against the Indians of the north.

To improve the condition of the missions, the first thing was the appointment of an experienced, upright, honest, and fearless governor with jurisdiction over both Coahuila and Texas. Under his leadership, the forces of the two provinces could be utilized for a single purpose whenever circumstances demanded it. The settlers in the older towns, such as San Antonio, San Juan Bautista, and others, could garrison the presidios while the regular troops were engaged in formal campaigns. An energetic policy, initiated with a few unmistakable successes over the enemy, would do much towards restoring confidence in the might of Spanish arms and inspiring respect for Spanish authority.

As to the actual administration of the missions, Pacheco emphatically declared that the system and method developed by the experienced missionaries of the two colleges of Querétaro and Zacatecas could not be improved. The only thing needed to enable the *Padres* to accomplish their praiseworthy labor of Christianization and civilization was to afford them the coöperation so long denied them. While it was the general practice, it should be made uniform that in each mission there should always be two missionaries. This might entail a slight increase in the cost to the royal treasury, but the benefits derived by the neophytes would more than compensate the added expense. In this manner one could look strictly after the temporal while the other attended to the spiritual welfare of the mission. In case of sickness, the neophytes would not be deprived of spiritual comfort and instruction.<sup>17</sup>

Although the sons of the College of Querétaro withdrew from the missions in Texas, this incident does not mark the end of missionary endeavor. As a matter of fact there was a renewed interest in the extension

<sup>17</sup>Martínez Pacheco, Informe, November 8, 1772. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-20 (Dunn Tr., 1767-1772), pp. 121-130.

of missionary work and their withdrawal was for the purpose of engaging in new fields. The Zacatecan missionaries were to carry on the work with unabated zeal and before the showerings of renewed interest subsided, like a belated blossoming, a new mission was to be founded in Texas, whose name was destined to become associated with one of the most tragic episodes of the struggle for independence in 1836.

## CHAPTER VII

### ABANDONMENT OF EAST TEXAS

"In 1772, the Spanish government decided to give back to nature and the Indians, temporarily at least, all that portion of Texas lying northeast of San Antonio de Béjar and La Bahía del Espíritu Santo, some parts of which had been occupied, continuously even if weakly, for more than half a century," frankly declares one of the pioneer historians of Spanish Texas.<sup>1</sup> The withdrawal, however, is not to be interpreted as an admission of failure on the part of either the missionaries or of Spanish authorities. A series of circumstances combined to bring about the attempted consolidation of the far-flung and insecurely held frontier of Texas. Chief among these were the increasing frequency and intensity of the attacks by the Comanches and their northern allies; the cession of Louisiana, which removed to its own eastern limits the danger of foreign aggression; and the urgent demand made upon the meager resources of Spain in the occupation and fortification of both Louisiana and Alta California under the more aggressive policy of Charles III. It was these facts which contributed to the adoption of the radical recommendations made by the discriminating and clear-minded Marqués de Rubí.

Conditions had steadily grown worse. The westward advance of the English to the Mississippi had driven before it the fierce and desperate nations of the north, who in turn had encroached upon the more docile tribes of Texas, penetrating far into the dominions of Spain. To the constant menace of the vicious thrusts of the Comanches was now added the treachery of the Apaches within the weakened defences. Rubí's appraisal of the situation seems prophetic in view of the trend of events that followed his inspection. In order to understand better the abandonment of east Texas it is necessary to recount the gradual retreat which preceded the official order of the king. This will show more clearly the difference between official policy and individual initiative and will reveal the part which selfish interests, misdirected enthusiasm, and lack of reliable information played in the tragic withdrawal from Los Adaes.

*Hugo Oconor in Texas.* In the summer of 1767 there came to Texas the virile and energetic Sergeant Major Don Hugo Oconor, who was

<sup>1</sup>Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 377.

soon to be promoted to colonel and to become the Commandant Inspector of the Provincias Internas. During the next three years he displayed unusual energy and activity in the settlement of the feud between the commander of Los Adaes and the captain of Orcoquisac, the reorganization of the garrison of San Antonio, and the restoration of order. During his short administration he checked temporarily the onslaught of the northern tribes and chastised the thieving Apaches. His flaming red hair and his no less flaming spirit won for him the name of Capitán Colorado (Red Captain) among the Indians.<sup>2</sup>

*Governor Ripperdá in Texas.* In the meantime, early in 1769, the king appointed Juan María Vicencio de Ripperdá, Baron de Ripperdá, Governor of Texas. The Baron, who was a legitimate descendent of the dukes of that name, immediately set out from Spain and arrived in Mexico in the fall of that year. While waiting to succeed Oconor, he met, fell in love, and married on October 22, 1769, Doña Mariana Gómez de Parada Gallo y Villavicencio, a rich and beautiful heiress. He did not tarry long in Mexico, for by March of the following year he and his young bride were already in San Antonio.

One can imagine the shock of the romantic couple when the best lodging they could find was an abandoned calaboose. "The *Cuerpo de Guardia* (military quarters) is in ruins," declared the governor in astonishment, "and a small calabozo (jail house) no longer in use, which we had to repair, serves as the one room in which my wife and myself spend our days. The *Casas Reales* (government buildings) where I transact my business is likewise in ruins, but the citizens refuse to repair it." In this uninviting chamber the young baroness gave birth to her first born.<sup>3</sup>

*Difficulties with the citizens of San Antonio.* His efforts to improve conditions met everywhere with indifference if not with open hostility. When he issued orders for the citizens to cart the necessary materials for the reconstruction of the presidio, the *Casas Reales*, and the stockade, they not only refused to coöperate, but they complained bitterly to the

<sup>2</sup>Elizabeth Howard West, "Bonilla's Brief Compendium," *The Quarterly*, VIII, 62. Morfi, in his *History* disagrees and laconically states "He did what he could, but because he lacked the necessary means . . . he accomplished little." Castañeda, *Morfi's History of Texas*, (Quivira Society Publications, VI, pt. 2, 416).

<sup>3</sup>Governor Ripperdá to the Viceroy Marqués de Croix, March 8, 1771. *Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pp. 91-92; Castañeda, *Morfi's History of Texas*, pt. 2, pp. 442; also *Historia*, Vol. 83.

viceroy and threatened the governor with the complete abandonment of the Villa de San Fernando, if they were not accorded better treatment and afforded some relief from the continuous depredations of the Indians.<sup>4</sup>

On July 3, 1770, a sergeant and twenty soldiers arrived from San Fernando de Austria in Coahuila, to relieve an equal number of men, who had been taken from the garrison of the Presidio of San Sabá almost a year before, to protect the harassed Presidio of San Antonio. In the meantime San Sabá had been abandoned and the garrison had taken refuge at San Fernando de Austria. Governor Ripperdá instructed Captain Menchaca to comply with the request.

This was the occasion for a spirited protest on the part of the citizens and of the captain. The *Cabildo* of San Fernando remonstrated that the twenty-one men now in San Antonio were in fact a part of its original garrison; that the abandonment of San Sabá left San Antonio more exposed than ever and justified keeping the men; that the additional twenty-one soldiers should likewise be kept and sent to establish a post between La Bahía and San Antonio in order to enable the settlers to reoccupy their abandoned ranches and to gather the remnants of their scattered herds; and lastly that the governor should immediately petition the viceroy to order the former garrison of San Sabá to found a permanent presidio on the San Marcos to protect San Antonio from attack by northern Indians. Captain Luis Antonio Menchaca proved in detail that the twenty-one men brought to San Antonio almost a year before had been formally and officially made a part of its garrison. Having proved this point, he joined the citizens in their petition to keep the new detachment sent to relieve the former one, assigning the men to an advance post, and requesting that the remainder of the San Sabá garrison be likewise sent to Texas where it was needed more than in Coahuila.

On July 8, Governor Ripperdá reluctantly yielded and countermanded the order issued to Menchaca, informing the viceroy of the circumstances that had forced him to disregard his instructions.<sup>5</sup>

*Futile attempts of Ripperdá to defend the province.* Aware of the impossibility of raising sufficient troops to inflict exemplary punishment on the bold Indians of the north, the governor proposed the enlistment

<sup>4</sup>The details of this incident are found in a long memorial by the citizens of San Antonio, February 7-24, 1771. *Nacogdoches Archives*, Vol. 5, pp. 27-46.

<sup>5</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, July 3, 1770, Representation of the citizens of San Antonio, July 7; Decreto del Gobernador, July 8; Representación del Capitán Menchaca, July 12, *Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pp. 18-57.

of three hundred French hunters from Louisiana to defend San Antonio. On July 2, 1770, the commander of Natchitoches had informed Lieutenant González at Los Adaes that he had just learned that the Taovayas had joined a large group of Panis Mahas (Pawnees?) who together with the Tonkawas, Xaranames, Juxanes, and Comanches were on the way to San Antonio to drive out all the Spaniards. González had transmitted the warning at once to Ripperdá, explaining that the Indians had sworn vengeance and planned to kill even the children.<sup>6</sup>

While anxiously awaiting the decision of the viceroy, the governor received the discouraging news that his proposal to raise troops in Louisiana could not be contemplated, because it involved too great an expense. The viceroy recognized the need of reënforcing San Antonio, however, and authorized him to order fifty men from Los Adaes, thirty-one from Orcoquisac, and fifty from the former garrison of San Sabá to San Antonio and to solicit ten Indians from each of the five missions to meet the emergency. This would give him an effective force of over three hundred men. A supply of guns and ammunition was also being sent to arm the citizens if necessary. With this reënforcement, the viceroy observed, the governor should not only be able to repel any attack but to take the offensive and carry the war into the enemy's territory.<sup>7</sup>

As an additional defence measure Ripperdá had also suggested the establishment of a presidio in the Almagre hills, sixty leagues to the northwest of San Antonio. This proposal was likewise refused as extravagant and impractical.

In order to rebuild the crumbling fortifications, construct a respectable stockade, and erect redoubts for fourteen cannon, Ripperdá solicited ten thousand *pesos*. To this the viceroy replied that it was the duty of the citizens and garrison of so large and important a settlement to undertake the construction and reënforcement of the defences without royal aid. The most he was willing to do was to send eight hundred pounds of powder, sixteen hundred pounds of lead, and one hundred guns for the use of the citizens when necessary.<sup>8</sup>

*The use of mission Indians.* When the order of the viceroy was presented to Fray Acisclos Valverde, President of the missions of Querétaro,

<sup>6</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, July 22, 1770. *Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pp. 35-36.

<sup>7</sup>Marqués de Croix to Ripperdá, July 24, 1770. *Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, p. 58.

<sup>8</sup>Marqués de Croix to Ripperdá, July 24, 1770. *Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pp. 60-62.

and to Fray Ignacio Lanuza of the College of Zacatecas, they promptly replied that they were ready to supply ten Indians from each mission whenever they were necessary for the defence of San Antonio or for the pursuit of the enemy. But they made it clear that the neophytes were not to be expected to render service except when the citizens of San Antonio were also called out. "To expect the mission Indians to be more patriotic than the Spaniards and to be constantly engaged in military service without receiving other pay than their rations and furnishing their own mounts and arms is to expect the impossible," declared the good *Padres*.

Ripperdá plainly admits in his letters to the viceroy that he had intended to call on the missions more frequently than on the citizens, feeling that the settlers could ill afford to leave their families. He complained to the viceroy that the missionaries were firm in their determination not to allow their Indians to serve unless citizens were called upon at the same time. A bit resentful, he doubted the sincerity of the missionaries, and even suspected them of giving comfort to the enemy. He recounted how bands of Tonkawas, Yojuanes, and Yerbipiamas stole horses from the very houses and appeared to be in communication with the Indians of Mission Valero and Mission Concepción. When one of these bands was pursued, he avers that in its camp were found *tortillas* and *tamales* which they could not have obtained except from the missions. Granting that they had communication, this does not prove that it was with the knowledge or consent of the missionaries.<sup>9</sup>

*Abandonment of Orcoquisac.* Agreeable to the orders of the viceroy of July 24, 1770, Ripperdá issued instructions to the commander of Orcoquisac on September 19 to bring his entire garrison of thirty-one men to San Antonio. He explained to the viceroy that this was tantamount to the abandonment of that post and expressed regret that the Orcoquisacs, whose chief was already a Christian, should be left without spiritual ministrations. The close friendship of these Indians with the Bidais and the Attacapas made their conversion all the more important. He took the liberty, therefore, to instruct the captain of the presidio to inform the Indians that they would be welcome in San Antonio, where, if they decided to come, they would be placed in whichever mission they chose.

Not until February 12, 1771, did twenty-eight men, including Captain

<sup>9</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, September 19, 1770, Fray Valverde to Ripperdá, September 3; Fray Lanuza to same, September 6; Ripperdá to the Viceroy, October 14, 1770. *Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pp. 67-70, 76-78.

Pacheco and his lieutenant, arrive in San Antonio. Fray Ignacio Maria Lara sent word to the governor how loud and moving had been the lamentations of the Orcoquisacs when the determination of the viceroy was made known to them. "You have betrayed us," cried in anguish the old and faithful Chief Calzones Colorados, "just when we were learning to pray. You are leaving us without protection." In view of the genuine dismay of the natives, and fearing their revenge, Captain Pacheco explained to Ripperdá that he had decided to leave three soldiers to protect the two *Padres*, who chose to stay among the inconsolable natives, hoping that the garrison would soon return. The weary band of soldiers left their sickly post on December 17, 1770 and would have arrived in San Antonio on foot, had not the governor sent a scouting party with remounts to meet them. They consumed fifty-five days in the painful journey.

In March the governor informed the viceroy that he had received word from the missionaries at Orcoquisac, that the Indians were unwilling to let them retire or to accompany them to San Antonio. The most they would consent to do was to go to the Brazos, where they demanded that the presidio and the mission should be established. The governor asked the viceroy to let him know his decision. After patiently waiting, and not hearing from him, the missionaries and the three soldiers finally abandoned the ill-fated presidio of San Agustín and the unfortunate Mission of Nuestra Señora de la Luz.<sup>10</sup>

*Practical withdrawal from Los Adaes.* Pursuant to the orders of July 24, 1770, Ripperdá issued similar instructions to Lieutenant Gonzáles on September 19, to send all but ten men to San Antonio. The men set out for their destination on November 2, and after innumerable difficulties, arrived in San Antonio on February 12, having consumed on the road three months and ten days, due to flooded streams, sickness, and lack of horses. The ten that remained in Los Adaes to protect the two missionaries and to keep informed regarding the activity of the Indians might have just as well been recalled at this time.<sup>11</sup>

*Establishment of the Post of Santa Cruz on the Cíbolo.* As early as July, 1770, the citizens of San Antonio remonstrated that the increasing

<sup>10</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, September 19, 1770; same to same, February 12, 1771; also letter of March 8, 1771. *Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pt. 1, pp. 67-69, 70-82; 91-92.

<sup>11</sup>Letters of Ripperdá to the Viceroy, September 19, 1770; February 12, 1771; and March 8, 1771. In *Ibid.*, pp. 67-69, 70-82, 91-92.



hostility of the Indians had forced them to abandon numerous ranches and farms along Cíbolo Creek and in the area between this stream and the San Antonio River. They suggested at that time that the relief party of twenty-one men from San Sabá, who had arrived in San Antonio, should be detailed to establish an advance post halfway between San Antonio and La Bahía, "in order that under their protection and safeguard the citizens may return to their abandoned *estancias* (cattle ranches), without which this settlement cannot subsist, and that they may gather the scattered remnants of their herds."<sup>12</sup>

When in February, 1771, the troops recalled from Los Adaes and Orcoquisac arrived in San Antonio, Governor Ripperdá informed the viceroy that he would utilize a part of this force to establish a post at the point thought most convenient to afford the citizens the necessary protection to enable them to reoccupy their abandoned ranches. By March, he had detailed a detachment to establish a post on the Cíbolo, but in order to determine the best location to protect all the ranches, he had called a meeting of the citizens. He went further and suggested that the citizens select a site, where a common farm and ranch could be operated under the immediate protection of the soldiers for the benefit of the Villa de San Fernando until the Indians subsided and each settler could return to his own estate. The proposal met with no encouragement.

Forced to make his own choice, Ripperdá selected a site on Cíbolo Creek, at the Tawakoni crossing of this stream, said to be some eighteen leagues east of San Antonio on the road to La Bahía, approximately halfway between the two presidios. This would place the old fort a few miles southwest of present Stockdale. Writing to the viceroy on April 12, 1771, the governor declared that there were fifty men stationed at the new post, which was to the right of the road to La Bahía. A fort was being constructed with a good stockade. He now asked for the official approval of the new post, which he claimed was indispensable for the protection of the citizens of San Antonio who occupied the numerous ranches in its vicinity.

By June, the new fort of Santa Cruz on the Cíbolo was almost finished. Governor Ripperdá again pleaded with the viceroy for its recognition, unaware that the establishment of such a post was included in the recommendations of Rubí and would be part of the *Nuevo Reglamento* (New Regulations) being considered at this time in Spain.

<sup>12</sup>Representación del Cabildo de la Villa de San Fernando, July 7, 1770. *Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pt. 1, p. 49.

The viceroy replied on June 22 by stating that he had noted that steps had been taken for the establishment of a new fort on the Cibolo. He did not express either approval or disapproval, but contented himself with merely acknowledging the accomplished fact.

In spite of strenuous efforts Ripperdá began to realize his inability to cope with a situation that was constantly growing worse. He felt that his efforts to help and to defend San Antonio were not appreciated either by the viceroy or the ungrateful settlers. When the viceroy asked him in June, 1771, to restore twenty-nine men to the garrison of San Sabá in Coahuila, the governor replied that without the necessary force, there was little use in his remaining in San Antonio. He asked the viceroy to allow him to burn or destroy the fort and stockade of Santa Cruz, built at such great sacrifice by the citizens and soldiers. It mattered little that he had contributed three hundred *pesos* of his own money to the enterprise. Three months of painful labor would be lost, but it was better to destroy it than to allow it to fall into the hands of the Indians. He added that his presence in San Antonio was useless. Under the circumstances he could do more good by taking up his official residence in Los Adaes. This important post was slowly crumbling with only ten men to look after it. He asked permission, therefore, to be allowed to return to Los Adaes with the fifty men of that garrison. In San Antonio he lacked the coöperation of the citizens; in La Bahía his authority was ignored; and in the missions he was refused aid.

The viceroy referred the request to the *Fiscal*, who promptly rendered a long opinion stating the reasons why the governor should not be permitted either to burn the new fort of Santa Cruz on the Cibolo, or be allowed to return to Los Adaes. The viceroy adopted the recommendations and on November 2, 1771, instructed Ripperdá regarding his decision, giving at this time his formal approval to the establishment of the Fort of Santa Cruz.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup>Brief accounts of the establishment of this fort are found in Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 114-115, 392; Castañeda, *Morfi's History of Texas*, pt. 2, pp. 418-419. But the account given here is based on the following documentary sources: Ripperdá to the Viceroy, February 12, 1771; March 8, 1771; June 7, 1771; Viceroy to Ripperdá, June 22, 1771; Ripperdá to the Viceroy, August 25, 1771; and the Viceroy to Ripperdá, November 2, 1771, all in *A. G. M. Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pp. 37-57, 79-82, 91-93, 126-131, 171, 193-196, 314-316. Ripperdá had many reasons for his grievances. But to those in Texas was added that of being denied promotion to a Brigadier in 1771, because of his marriage in Mexico without permission from the king. See *Ibid.*, pp. 172-173.

*Relations with the Indians and condition of the missions.* On the eve of the transfer of the four missions of Querétaro, these foundations were almost left without neophytes as the result of the thefts of the perfidious Apaches and the growing boldness of the northern tribes. On July 9, 1771, Captain Luis Antonio Menchaca with thirty soldiers and a group of mission Indians, accompanied one of the *Padres* on a trip to the coast to bring back runaways and to get recruits. It was difficult to secure new Indians for Mission Valero in particular, because its inmates were not from the coastal tribes and the general policy was to place those who were brought back in the mission where there were others of the same nation.

The expedition proved successful. It returned to San Antonio on August 7, bringing back one hundred seven men, women, and children, found on the coast and in the adjoining islands. Among them were several runaways from both the San Antonio and La Bahía missions. Ripperdá remarked in reporting the incident that such an expedition had not been undertaken for years. Of the Indians brought back sixteen were given to Mission Concepción, where Fray Juan Joseph Sáenz de Gumiel signed a receipt for them, stating that ten were runaways from Mission Rosario, for which reason he had notified the missionary there. San Juan Capistrano, which was being administered by Father Fray Andrés de San Buena-ventura y Santiesteban, received sixty-five. It was Father Andrés who had gone in search of them. He declared in his testimonial that of the sixty-five, eighteen were Christians who had run away. San Francisco de la Espada received twenty-six recruits, for whom Fray Antonio Ramos signed a receipt.<sup>14</sup>

While the expedition was away, an order arrived in San Antonio urging Governor Ripperdá to send a detachment of fifty soldiers and thirty Indians from the five missions to reënforce the presidio at La Bahía and prevent the future escape of the neophytes from its two missions. The order, when made known, aroused indignant protests on the part of the *Cabildo*, the captain of the presidio, and the missionaries. It was Father Fray Ignacio Maria Lanuza of San José who made the strongest remonstrance. To the request for seven Indians, armed, equipped, and mounted, he replied that he could not comply with the order, because the number of neophytes was small, the mission had only a few horses left, and it

<sup>14</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, July 20, 1771, and August 25, 1771; Testimonios de los misioneros, August 8, 1771. *A. G. M. Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pt. 1, pp. 174-178, 193-198.

could not supply the required forty-six. The Indians themselves were needed to help provide the necessities of life to their families. Furthermore, the neophytes of the San Antonio missions had been running away as much as those of La Bahía. Who could be certain that those sent to help keep the others within the missions would not escape themselves? To the second and more vigorous request, Fray Lanuza replied that he could not comply with the wishes of the person asking for assistance because the fundamental law of self-preservation prevented it.

Ripperdá, chagrined at the refusal, insisted a third time, making Fray Lanuza responsible for the consequences that might follow his refusal to coöperate in saving La Bahía. The good *Padre* was still adamant. He coolly replied that every one knew the danger that threatened La Bahía had passed, that it was foolish to expect him to send seven or even five Indians on foot to participate in a campaign, that such an act would hinder rather than contribute to the success of the proposed campaign. The governor was forced to admit the reasonableness of the *Padre's* contention.<sup>15</sup>

The most influential chief of the Tejas was Bigotes. To him Ripperdá sent special presents in July, 1771, which were presented by Father Fray Pedro Ramírez. This Indian was the only one in Texas who was given one of six medals and a Spanish flag by order of the king of Spain through Governor O'Reilly, who sent it to him with De Mézières. When he received the presents sent by Ripperdá, he handed Father Ramírez two buffalo rugs, one white, signifying peace, and the freeing of the roads from bloodshed, and the other with four crosses neatly drawn upon it, to signify he would obtain peace for the Spaniards with four other nations in the vicinity of Los Adaes. The old chief was taken to Natchitoches and there feasted by De Mézières.

The eastern tribes had long since ceased to live in missions. But they were on friendly terms, visited the missionaries, and called them when any Indians were sick. Ripperdá explained to the viceroy at this time that Chief Bigotes had manifested to Lieutenant González that his people and their friends, such as the Bidais and others, resented the refusal to give or sell them arms as in the past. They complained that the French refused to furnish them guns since they had become brothers of the Spaniards, but that they sold them to other nations who were their enemies. The

<sup>15</sup>Fray Lanuza to Ripperdá, August 1, 1771; Ripperdá to Fray Lanuza, August 2, Fray Lanuza to Ripperdá, August 3, 1771, Ripperdá to Fray Lanuza, August 4, 1771; Cabildo de la Villa de San Fernando to Ripperdá, August 2, 1771. *A. G. M. Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pt. 1, pp. 202-214.

northeastern tribes needed arms and ammunition to hunt. Without these means of providing themselves with a livelihood they would starve to death.

It was shortly after the visit of Bigotes to Natchitoches that De Mézières set out on his first expedition to the Cadodachos in an effort to secure the friendship of the nations of the north for the Spaniards. Going by way of the Adaes, Yatasi, and Petit Cado, he met representatives of the Taovayas, Tawakonis, Yscanis, and Kichais at the appointed place and obtained from them a promise that they would go to San Antonio to negotiate a formal treaty of peace. The promise was kept and a peace was actually concluded in 1771 with the Kichais, Tawakonis, Yscanis, Cainiones, and Taovayas, through the combined efforts of De Mézières, the missionaries, and Governor Ripperdá.<sup>16</sup>

*Proposal for a presidio and mission among the nations of the north.* After the peace was concluded, the Indians expressed a strong desire for a presidio and a mission in their lands. Needless to say the primary incentive of the natives was the advantages of trade. Nevertheless, Governor Ripperdá discussed the idea in detail in a long letter to the viceroy on July 5, 1772. He explained that he had consulted on the matter with the experienced missionary Fray Pedro Ramírez, President of the missions in east Texas, to find out the possibility of the removal of the missions of Nacogdoches and Ais to the site of the proposed presidio. This would save the treasury additional expense. The two missions, founded among the Tejas Indians, were practically abandoned, and they would not resent their removal to the country of their neighbors and friends. The two missionaries could take care of the more numerous group of natives that would likely come to the new mission.

But Father Ramírez, according to Ripperdá, made a curious and interesting suggestion. He declared that the success of the presidio, mission and possible civil settlement in the new location would depend in large measure upon the character and ability of the captain and chief justice. He expressed a lack of confidence in the success of the enterprise if it was entrusted to any one in the Province of Texas. He knew of only one person, a resident of Natchitoches, in the Province of Louisiana, suited for this delicate commission. This was Louis de St. Denis, Lieutenant in His Most Christian Majesty's Army, forty years of age, son of the former commandant of the post of Natchitoches, the renowned St. Denis, and a holder

<sup>16</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, July 20, 1771; *A. G. M. Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pt. 1, pp. 174-178; Bolton, *Athanase de Mézières*, I, 92-94.

of the Cross of St. Louis. Father Ramírez went on to explain that this man had known the natives from his childhood, that all the Indian nations for many miles around loved him as a father. Ripperdá adds that he consulted De Mézières concerning the character of young St. Denis, and was given a glowing account of his qualifications and character. St. Denis knew Spanish and he could speak many of the dialects of the nations of the north.

If the viceroy was in favor of the plan, the settlement could be started with thirty or forty of the families living at Los Adaes at present. If the presidio was suppressed to found the new post, the settlers there would naturally follow.<sup>17</sup>

Neither the proposal for the presidio nor the mission among the northern nations was approved. The request for a change in policy with regard to the sale of arms and ammunition to these Indians in order to retain their friendship called forth a long opinion from the *Fiscal*. He could see no possible justification for arming the natives and encouraging them to live from the chase, when they might as well be taught the more peaceful pursuits of agricultural life as had been done through the missions from time immemorial. "It seems best," he declared, "to offer them the implements for the cultivation of their lands, than those of the chase, which they may abuse and use to our sorrow and the injury of the missionaries, who have always attracted them with gifts, kindness and love."<sup>18</sup> The viceroy adopted the recommendations.

The new viceroy, Bucareli y Ursua, who took office in 1772, gave serious consideration to the alarming conditions that prevailed along the entire northern frontier. In a letter to the king he reveals a knowledge, not suspected, of the real issues with regard to Indian relations. The reports showed that all the troubles had a common origin and varied only in detail. Under the name Apache numerous nations were included, from whose depredations no place along the frontier was free. In Texas it seemed the northern tribes were not as dangerous as the Apaches, because the former kept their word, while the latter were faithless. In his opinion the greatest menace was the possible alliance of the Apaches with the Bidais and the Tejas which would enable them to obtain firearms. This eventuality justified the fears of Governor Ripperdá.

The viceroy declared that he was not surprised that the English should sell arms to the natives, but it was unbelievable that the subjects of the king in Louisiana should follow this practice. It made useless the orders

<sup>17</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, July 5, 1772. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 36-41.

<sup>18</sup>Dictamen Fiscal, Julio 31, 1772. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 12-21.

prohibiting this trade in New Spain. Was the Spanish policy sound? "It is to be noted," he observed, "that the natives of that area (east Texas), guided by the apostates from our missions, have successfully attacked our dominions. This has not happened in Louisiana. From this it may be deduced that we have not known how to reduce the Indians or that the happy hour of their divine conversion has not arrived." He frankly admitted that the situation in Texas was confusing and regretted that the distance of six hundred leagues between that province and Mexico made it difficult to adopt measures conducive to its solution.<sup>19</sup>

*Fear of English attack.* In April, 1771, Ripperdá was informed by the viceroy that the relations between Spain and England were strained. He was asked, therefore, to make a report on the defense of his province in case of an outbreak. He replied that Los Adaes was the nearest post to Louisiana, that to the north were the Cadodachos, among whom was the post of Arkansas, only six leagues distant from the English. Texas was the master key to New Spain. He recalled that during the previous year two Indians of an unknown nation, accompanied by a white man, who appeared to be English, had been observed near Opelousas, Louisiana, making a reconnaissance. Shortly afterwards, three other strange Indians were discovered north of Natchitoches by a French hunter. The Comanches, Tawakonis, Quitseys, Iscanis and Taovayas would be invaluable allies in case of war to fight the Indian allies of the English.

He considered the coast region in the vicinity of the mouth of the Trinity another vulnerable spot, and he deplored the lack of information concerning this vast area. Brother Sedano, of the College of Zacatecas, who conducted the trains of supplies to the missions in east Texas, had heard that during the last three or four years not less than three white men, who might be French or English, had visited and lived for short periods on Culebra Island (Matagorda) opposite the mouth of the Guadalupe, where numerous Karankawas lived.

In case of hostilities, the English should be checked if possible on the frontiers of Texas. If they penetrated beyond Los Adaes, San Antonio could afford little or no protection. Its stockade was more a corral than anything else, "affording greater protection to those that approach it than those that defend it." La Bahía, perhaps, offered a better position for resistance.

Ripperdá made a strange suggestion to improve the efficiency of the

<sup>19</sup>The Viceroy to the King, October 27, 1772. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-3-2 (Dunn Transcripts, 1773-1774) pp. 156-158.

garrison in San Antonio and to increase its population. He declared that the only way to have a well-disciplined force was to send convict troops. "These can be trained rigorously, and when they have served their time they can be assigned lands and given the means to enable them to start life anew."<sup>20</sup>

In July, 1772, Governor Ripperdá learned that a group of English traders had established a post along the coast in the vicinity of the mouth of the Trinity, the San Jacinto, or the Brazos. He immediately ordered Captain Luis Cazorla to make a reconnaissance of the coast area with an adequate force of soldiers and Indians.

*Exploration of the coast by Luis Cazorla.* On September 18, Cazorla joined a detachment sent by Ripperdá at the crossing of the Guadalupe known as Paso del Gobernador (possibly where Alarcón came near drowning in 1718). This must have been near present Victoria. With a force of forty soldiers, two sergeants, an *alférez*, and five mission Indians from Mission Rosario, he proceeded on the eighteenth towards Orcoquisac, crossing the Colorado on September 21, in the vicinity of present Wharton. The next day, he halted one day's journey from the Brazos, with the intention of exploring the mouth of the river, but when informed by the Indian guides, it was impossible to do so on account of lakes, marshes, and heavy thickets, he resumed his march, crossed the Brazos on September 24, near present Richmond, and camped.

After going a short distance towards the mouth of the river he came upon a *ranchería* of Karankawas, where many Cocos, Bidais, and Xaranames had gathered. He noticed sailor shirts, various colored ribbons, silk cloth, and other foreign goods among them. Inquiry revealed that they had obtained them from traders in a village above Orcoquisac. The Indians told Cazorla they were now hunting deer in order to go back to secure more goods. The captain noticed with much surprise numerous guns with an English trade-mark "stamped on the barrel." By means of liberal gifts he obtained the service of a guide who promised to lead him and his men to the village where they traded with the foreigners.

On September 25, the march was resumed and on the 27th the party crossed the San Jacinto, probably near present Houston, continuing as fast as possible to the Trinity, where they arrived on the following day. They struck the river above Orcoquisac, near present Liberty. Leaving

<sup>20</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, April 20, 1771. *A. G. M. Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pt. 1, pp. 118-123.



the horses under heavy guard, Cazorla crossed the river in a canoe with a few men and proceeded to the *ranchería* where the trading post was established. He arrived at eight that night and found the natives celebrating the death of an Apache killed in battle. There were Orcoquisacs, Cocos, Bidais, and Attacapas, all showing signs of abundance of foreign goods and armed with English guns.

The anxious inquiry of Cazorla revealed that the origin of this merchandise at the *ranchería* was due to the operations of French traders, who had a trading post a relatively short distance away, east of the Neches River within the jurisdiction of Louisiana. It was a day and a half from the village to the post. A certain M. Dutrive and his brother were at the post at this time, with four negroes. Questioning brought out the fact that the French obtained the guns from the English and sold them to the Indians. An Englishman did visit them once, they told Cazorla, who gave them forty lead bullets for one deer skin, but he was taken prisoner by the French and carried to Natchitoches and the Indians had never since seen another English intruder.

Cazorla attempted to explore the country by following the east bank of the river to its mouth, but found the road impassable and returned to where he had left his horses and the remainder of the party. From there he set out on September 30, following the regular Orcoquisac road to La Bahía as far as the San Jacinto crossing, where he again halted in order to explore its mouth. Taking only a few men on the best horses he followed the San Jacinto to its mouth, which was about nine leagues distant (some twenty-four miles). He found it emptied into a bay (present Galveston Bay) which he judged to be six or eight leagues wide (twelve or fifteen miles). There were no signs of foreigners having ever been in this area; neither had the natives seen any strangers.

Returning to his camp, he resumed his march on October 3, crossing this stream and following the same route as before to the Brazos, where he arrived on October 5, to find the Karankawa village deserted. For two or three days the main party camped on the river, while Cazorla tried to reach the mouth first by following the east and then the west bank. He found that the river separated into two branches about three leagues before entering the sea, that the country was heavily wooded, filled with lakes, and extremely marshy. He evidently reconnoitered the vicinity of old Velasco and present Freeport. One of his men, José Hidalgo, with a group of four or five soldiers, crossed the west branch and made his way to the seashore where he found the hull of an old ship that had been

wrecked many years before. In a half-rotted box he found a string of amulets with false stones, a bunch of old rosaries, and fifteen silver dollars (*pesos columniarios*). From this it was deduced it was either a French or Spanish ship that had been driven ashore in a storm many years before.

On October 16, Cazorla returned to his camp, crossed the Brazos, and following the old Orcoquisac road continued to the Colorado, where he arrived on October 19. Here he left the main road and turning to the right, followed the west course, which brought him to the Guadalupe on October 21, far to the north of the Orcoquisac crossing of this river, possibly near present Cuero. From here he continued cross-country in the general direction of San Antonio, where he arrived on October 24, made his report to Governor Ripperdá, and returned to La Bahía, where he was by November 1.<sup>21</sup>

*New regulation of presidios, 1772.* While the governor of Texas and the viceroy were trying to solve the numerous problems that confronted them in their relations with the Indians and in the prevention of English trade in the Spanish dominions, the Court of Spain had been seriously considering the recommendations of the Marqués de Rubí, who, it will be recalled, had sailed shortly after his inspection in 1768. On September 10, 1772, the king issued a long *cédula* (decree) under the title of *Reglamento e instrucción para los presidios que se han de formar en la línea de frontera de la Nueva España*, more commonly known as the "New Regulations." The decree incorporated practically all the recommendations made by Rubí and provided the necessary machinery and legislation for putting them into effect.

*Number of presidios, location, and garrisons.* It provided that there should be fifteen presidios beginning at Altar, near the head of the Gulf of California, and continuing towards the east at proportionate distances of forty leagues apart to La Bahía del Espíritu Santo. In the order of their location these were to be Altar, Tubac, Terrenate, Fronteras, Janos, San Buenaventura, Paso del Norte, Guajoquilla, Julimes, Cerro Gordo, San Sabá, Santa Rosa, Monclova, San Juan Bautista, and La Bahía del Espíritu Santo. All, with the exception of Janos, San Juan Bautista and

<sup>21</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, December 3, 1772; *Diario de mi marcha pa. el reconocimiento de la Costa de la Sur, de esta Prova. con un destacamto . . .* Luis Cazorla. La Bahía, September 17-November 1, 1772. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 133-138; 138-150; The Viceroy to the King, November 26, 1772; *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-15 (Dunn Tr., 1755-1776) pp. 168-170.

La Bahía, were to be moved to the new locations designated on the map drawn and prepared by Nicolás de la Fora.<sup>22</sup>

San Antonio de Béjar and Santa Fé, which were not on the new line of defense, were to be reënforced, bringing their garrisons up to eighty men respectively, including the officers in this number. But from Santa Fé thirty men, under the command of a lieutenant, were to be detailed to establish a post at Robledo, twenty leagues north of El Paso; while from San Antonio twenty were to be detailed under a competent officer to garrison the new post on the Cibolo. The governor of Texas, whose official residence had been at Los Adaes, was to establish his headquarters in San Antonio, which was henceforth to be the capital of the province.<sup>23</sup>

Every one of the fifteen presidios on the new line was to have a captain, a lieutenant, an *alférez*, a chaplain, and forty-two soldiers, including a sergeant and two corporals, except La Bahía del Espíritu Santo, which was to have five additional soldiers, making the total of its garrison fifty-one. Agreeable to the recommendations of Rubí, each one of the frontier presidios was to have as part of its garrison ten Indian scouts in addition to the soldiers. The captains were to receive three thousand *pesos* a year, lieutenants seven hundred, *alféreces* five hundred, chaplains four hundred and eighty, sergeants three hundred and fifty, corporals three hundred, soldiers two hundred ninety, and Indians one hundred thirty-six. In the case of San Antonio, its captain, who was to be the governor of the province, was to receive four thousand *pesos* a year, the same as the governor of New Mexico, who was to serve likewise as captain of Santa Fé.<sup>24</sup>

*Arms and uniform.* The irregularity noted heretofore in the equipment and dress of frontier troops was to be corrected. Every soldier was to be provided with a broadsword, a lance, a shield, a firelock musket, and pistols. The barrels of the muskets were to be three feet long, while those of the pistols were not to exceed ten inches. The Indian scouts of each garrison were to be given a pistol, a shield, and a lance in addition to their regular bows and arrows. In each presidio a reserve supply of arms was to be kept in order to replace those lost, worn out, or impaired. Furthermore, each presidio was to have a gunsmith, who was to be

<sup>22</sup>*Reglamento, instrucción para los presidios que se han de formar en la línea de Frontera . . . Cédula de 10 de septiembre de 1772.* (Madrid, 1772) 81-83. The map of La Fora is reproduced in this volume.

<sup>23</sup>*ibid.*, 9-10, 82, 106-107.

<sup>24</sup>*ibid.*, 9-17.

exempted from all military duty in order that he might keep the arms in repair.

Each soldier was to have six horses, one stallion, and a mule. The Indian scouts were to have three horses each and in each presidio they were to be given five mules for the transportation of the baggage of the ten. The soldiers should be required to keep day and night one horse ready for immediate service within the presidio. The saddles to be used were to be simple, with wooden stirrups and saddle bags. Large and fancy stirrups were strictly prohibited.

The uniform to be worn by all frontier troops assigned to the presidios was to consist of a short coat of blue cloth, trimmed with a red collar, trousers of the same color and material, and a cloak to match. The cartridge pouch, chaps, and carbine belt were to be of deer skin, the name of the presidio being embroidered on the belt to distinguish the various garrisons. A black tie, hat, and shoes were to complete the uniform.<sup>25</sup>

*Indian warfare.* "War should have as its object the attainment of peace" says the new *Reglamento*. A new policy was outlined for the future. The declared enemies of the king were to be vigorously pursued and attacked in their own *rancherías* if possible, but the prisoners taken in the campaigns were to be treated with fairness and kindness. The death penalty was to be imposed upon any one who maltreated or killed in cold blood those taken prisoner. The same rations allowed to Indian auxiliaries should be given to the men, women, and children captured. In the case of the Apaches, who under different names harassed the frontier, no peace was to be granted to them by any captain. They had repeatedly abused the magnanimity of the king, pleading for peace when hard pressed, and breaking their pledged word when strong. Only a short truce might be negotiated, to allow the matter to be consulted with the viceroy, who alone was to stipulate the terms.

The exchange of prisoners was to be encouraged and the natives made to realize the value of sparing their victims from torture and death. The exchange should be man for man, but officers might agree to give two, and even three Indians for one Spaniard. This was not to apply to the rescue of Indian allies, who were to be exchanged strictly on an even basis. Whenever an exchange was agreed upon, this was to be carried out with the greatest solemnity, in the presence of all the officers and troops and the principal chiefs of the enemy in order that they might be duly impressed with the ceremony.

<sup>25</sup>*ibid.*, 17-23.

Horses, mules, cattle, food supplies, and other goods seized from the enemy were to be distributed evenly among the soldiers and Indian allies actually engaged in the campaign in which the booty was taken. Captives, however, were not to be distributed or sold into slavery but regarded as prisoners of war and treated with kindness until they were exchanged or sent to the interior as directed by the viceroy.<sup>26</sup>

*Economic administration.* The source of many of the evils that afflicted the presidios along the frontier was the administration of the commissary departments by the captains. The funds of the company, the supply of rations, and the sale of all goods were now to be in charge of a new officer called *Habilitado* who could not be the captain. He was to serve for three years and to be elected and appointed by all the officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, and one duly chosen representative of the soldiers. He was to purchase all provisions and goods as cheaply as possible and to furnish them to the soldiers and their families at the most reasonable prices. He was to keep on hand an adequate supply of arms, uniforms, and other things necessary, which were to be furnished to the soldiers as needed, or as the captain requested after the weekly reviews.

The missionaries had long advocated the importance of paying the soldiers in cash. Rubí agreed with them and recommended this innovation which was granted now in part. Each soldier was to be allowed two *reales* (about twenty-five cents) in cash daily for himself and his family's needs in addition to the daily rations which were to be furnished him in kind by the *Habilitado*. The remainder of his pay was to be kept to create a surplus on which the soldier could draw to replenish his supply of horses. The term of enlistment was to be for ten years. Every year twenty to twenty-five *pesos* from each soldier's pay was to be retained by the *Habilitado* of the company until a credit of one hundred *pesos* was accumulated. This was to be held for the benefit of his family in case of death, or for his own benefit when he retired on account of age or disability. The Indians enlisted as scouts were to be allowed one *real* (about twelve cents) in cash daily, besides their rations for themselves and families.

Each year, on an appointed day, the entire company was to be drawn up and in their presence the amounts charged to each soldier read and the balance due each one paid in cash. This, the regulations observed,

<sup>26</sup>*Reglamento e instrucción* . . . 43-51.

would impress the spendthrifts by revealing how much those who were careful during the year were able to save.<sup>27</sup>

*The office of Comandante Inspector.* In order to put into effect the various regulations and reorganize the entire line of presidios along the northern frontier in accord with the recommendations of Rubí and the map of La Fora, the New Regulations provided for the appointment by the king of a *Comandante Inspector* who should be at least a colonel. He was to be responsible only to the viceroy. If in the future a Commandant General of the Interior Provinces should be created, the inspector was to be subordinated to him. While holding this office, he could not be governor of any province or captain of a presidio. He was to have two assistants, whose rank should be at least that of captain. The *Comandante Inspector* was assigned a salary of eight thousand *pesos* a year, while the two assistants were to receive three thousand *pesos* each.

He was to have general supervision of all the presidios and to put into effect the new regulations. Under the direction of the viceroy he was to choose the sites of the presidios in accord with the suggestions made by Rubí. Much discretionary power was given to this new officer.<sup>28</sup>

*Duties of the chaplain.* He was to administer the sacraments and to take care of the spiritual needs of the officers and soldiers when sick or wounded, performing the same duties for their wives and children as well as for any settlers who might come to live in the vicinity. He was to guard the morals and to report to the captain any serious irregularities. No charges were to be made for his services.

It was his duty to keep a registry of baptisms, marriages, and deaths, and to keep the usual records of a parish priest. If any soldier or officer died intestate and no heirs were found, the estate of the deceased was to be turned over to the chaplain that he might use three-fourths for prayers and one-fourth for charity. He was to accompany the troops whenever ordered to do so by the captain.<sup>29</sup>

*Provisions concerning changes in Texas.* Although El Paso was not at that time within the jurisdiction of the Province of Texas, the changes ordered by the new regulations will be noted here. Agreeable to the recommendations of Rubí, the garrison stationed at El Paso was to establish a new presidio in the vicinity of El Carrizal without loss of time. But in

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, 54-62, 23-28.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, 54-67.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, 70-73.

order to maintain communication with the Province of New Mexico, and to protect the large settlement and missions in El Paso, the viceroy was to appoint an army officer of accredited merit to organize the citizens of El Paso into a company of militia, to consist of Spaniards and others who were to be provided with the necessary arms at the expense of the royal treasury. The officer in command was to be assigned one thousand *pesos* a year. The duty of this company was to defend El Paso, escort supply trains and passengers going to or returning from New Mexico as far as the new post of Robledo, located twenty leagues to the north. This new post was to be garrisoned by thirty men from the Presidio de Santa Fé.<sup>30</sup>

San Sabá was to be moved as soon as possible to a more advantageous position on the banks of the Río Grande, where together with those of Cerro Gordo, Santa Rosa, and Monclova it was to form a new line of defense between La Junta (Presidio) and San Juan Bautista. Its garrison of one hundred men was to be reduced to forty-six to conform with that of the other posts. The new regulations provided for a thorough exploration of the intervening country along the Río Grande to determine the best location for the proposed presidios, which was to be undertaken by the commander of Nueva Vizcaya and the Governor of Coahuila.<sup>31</sup>

Nuestra Señora de Loreto at La Bahía was to remain in its present location. Its garrison was to consist of fifty-one men, including the officers. The five additional soldiers assigned to this presidio were in place of the ten Indian scouts allowed the other frontier outposts.<sup>32</sup>

San Antonio de Béjar, being more than one degree north of the new line of presidios, and exposed more than any other point to the vindictive fury of the northern tribes, attracted by the perfidious Apaches, its garrison was increased to eighty men. The additional number of troops required for this purpose was to be taken from the garrisons of Los Adaes and Orcoquisac, which were to be suppressed as useless. The governor was to establish his residence in San Antonio. From the eighty men of this presidio, twenty were to be detailed under a lieutenant to establish a permanent post on the banks of Cíbolo Creek to protect the ranches of the settlers of San Antonio and safeguard communication with La Bahía.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup>*Reglamento e instrucción* . . . 92-95, 110-111.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 98-103.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>33</sup>*Reglamento e instrucción* . . . 106-108.

It will be well to quote in full the order for the abandonment of east Texas. "Having already provided for the suppression of the Presidio of San Sabá in order to establish another one under the same name on the banks of the Río del Norte, and the two of Orcoquisac and Los Adaes being useless at present, I command the Governor of Texas and the officers of these two presidios to dismantle them and to abandon their sites at once. The few settlers found in their vicinity are to be moved to the Villa de San Antonio de Béjar or its suburbs, where I order that they be given lands for their establishment and subsistence. The useless missions of Nacogdoches, Ais, and others which have been maintained without Indians under the protection of the said presidios are to be suppressed. The remaining officers and soldiers are to be disbanded, their salaries and the allowances of the missionaries being discontinued in favor of my royal treasury."<sup>34</sup>

*Appointment of a Comandante Inspector.* On January 20, 1773, Viceroy Bucareli informed the Governor of Texas that the king had appointed Don Hugo Oconor *Comandante Inspector* of Presidios, with the rank of colonel. The ability and energy displayed by this excellent officer during his sojourn in Texas had not passed unperceived. Four days later the viceroy notified Ripperdá that the new regulations had arrived. He advised him to keep peace with both the Apaches and the northern tribes and to prevent all trade with Natchitoches until the provisions of the king's order were transmitted to him. Not until March 4 did Bucareli send him a copy of the regulations. At this time he explained that since Oconor was already engaged in the removal of the presidios in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila and would have to go immediately to Sonora, he would be unable to attend to the changes ordered in Texas. For this reason the viceroy was informing Oconor to delegate to Ripperdá the necessary authority for him to put into effect the changes in his province, subject to the approval of the Inspector and with the understanding that the governor would consult him in case any questions arose. For the moment the contemplated campaign against the Apaches should be ignored and all energies directed to the abandonment of east Texas, the establishment of its settlers in San Antonio, and the restoration of harmony with the *Cabildo*.<sup>35</sup>

At the same time he wrote to Ripperdá, the viceroy sent detailed

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, 108-109.

<sup>35</sup>Viceroy to Ripperdá, January 20, 24, and March 4, 1773. *A. G. M. Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pt. 2, pp. 387, 403, 439-440.



instructions to Oconor. He gave him at the same time copies of all the reports which the Governor of Texas had made prior to the arrival of the new regulations and of the proposals for the solution of the problems that faced him in Texas. In view of the new orders, the establishment of a presidio and mission among the northern tribes was out of the question. He should be instructed to carry out the abandonment of the presidios and missions in east Texas without delay, and apprised of the allowance of two thousand *pesos* for the construction of a new fort on the Cíbolo.<sup>36</sup>

*Instructions for the abandonment of east Texas.* Pursuant to the orders of the viceroy and the king, Oconor prepared with care the instructions that should serve as guidance to Governor Ripperdá. He was to proceed at once to the suppression of the four missions of the College of Zacatecas: Nuestra Señora del Pilár de los Adaes, Nuestra Señora de los Dolores de los Ais, Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de los Nacogdoches, and Nuestra Señora de la Luz del Orcoquisac. He was to make an inventory of all the ornaments and sacred vessels given to each mission by the king, which were to be turned over to him by the respective missionaries. These he was to retain and be personally responsible for until the viceroy disposed of them.

He was likewise to destroy and abandon the Presidio of Los Adaes. The artillery, ammunition, and all other property, as well as the ornaments and sacred vessels of its chapel were to be listed and transported to San Antonio. All the families living in Los Adaes, and any that might have settled at Orcoquisac or the suppressed missions were to be moved to Villa de San Fernando and given lands and the privilege of constructing an irrigation ditch at their expense to water their farms, but the property of the citizens of San Fernando and the missions was not to be violated. The aged and faithful Lieutenant Joseph González of Los Adaes was to be given an honorable discharge.<sup>37</sup>

*Ripperdá prepares to carry out instructions.* The copy of the new regulations and the letter of the viceroy requesting the governor to proceed to its fulfillment were received on April 15, 1773. On that date

<sup>36</sup>The Viceroy to Hugo Oconor, March 1, 1773. *A. G. I. Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-14 (Dunn Tr., 1755-1776) pp. 112-115.

<sup>37</sup>Ynstrucción reservada, que ha de tener prezente el Coronel de Cavalleria Baron de Ripperdá de la Provincia de Texas. March 3, 1773. *A. G. M., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-14 (Dunn Tr. 1773-1774) pp. 27-57. Copy also in *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 161-182.

Ripperdá informed the viceroy that he was ready to carry out his orders and that he was sending word to Orcoquisac and Los Adaes to begin preparations for the final abandonment. He was only waiting to hear from Oconor before going to Los Adaes in person to take charge. The instructions from Oconor reached him on May 18.

It is time here to state that Governor Ripperdá and Inspector Oconor had a jealous hatred for each other. This will explain in part the lack of coöperation between the two men. Ripperdá resented the promotion of Oconor, who was a younger man, to the rank of Colonel, and his appointment as *Comandante Inspector*. It is easy to understand then, how deeply the governor resented the instructions of May 8, sent to him from El Carmen, in which Oconor went into great detail on matters purely administrative. Ripperdá immediately addressed himself to the viceroy and inquired: "Am I to exercise the political administration of this province without being dependent on the *Comandante Inspector*?" He pointed out that he was his senior in rank and asked if he had to obey Oconor under the circumstances in matters both civil and military. The viceroy replied on June 30 that although Oconor was Ripperdá's junior in rank, nevertheless the appointment as *Comandante Inspector* of the Interior Provinces placed him above the governors of the provinces regardless of military rank or length of service. Under the circumstances it would be well to abide by his instructions.<sup>38</sup>

Ripperdá did not await the reply of the viceroy. As early as May 10 he had sent additional orders to the men at Los Adaes and Orcoquisac to stop all planting and to begin gathering their cattle and other property in preparation for the withdrawal. He mentioned for the first time a certain Antonio Gil Ibarbo, who he declared had established a prosperous ranch at a place called El Lobanillo, near the old Ais Mission, where fourteen families with sixty-five members were now living. The place was thirty leagues on this side of Los Adaes. Gil Ibarbo was one of those remarkable leaders of men which pioneer communities sometimes engender. At his initiative and under his leadership, the purpose of the New Regulations to abandon east Texas was to be eventually defeated. But more about him will appear later.

Ripperdá informed the viceroy that he had also instructed the missionaries and the officers at Los Adaes and Orcoquisac to use every means to appease the Indian nations, particularly the Tejas, Bidais, Orcoquisacs

<sup>38</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, April 15, 1773; May 22, 1773; Viceroy to Ripperdá, June 30, 1773. *A. G. M. Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pp. 456, 466, 468-469.

(Arkokisas), and Ais, who might resent the withdrawal and misinterpret its purpose. They were to explain to these Indians that the Spaniards and the French in Louisiana were now brothers; that for this reason the "Big Captain" (viceroy) had ordered the Spaniards to move to San Antonio where they could cultivate the soil and raise horses more comfortably. He had asked the governor of Louisiana to order De Mézières to do the same among the Indians of the north.<sup>39</sup>

*Ripperdá goes to Los Adaes.* The instructions of Oconor reached Ripperdá on May 18, but he was then sick and unable to start. On May 25, he finally departed for Los Adaes to carry out the orders for the abandonment of east Texas. It was his intention to arrange personally for the dismantlement of the presidio and to remain long enough to get the settlers started on their way to San Antonio. But since he had to return as soon as possible, he informed the viceroy that he would leave the details of the withdrawal to Lieutenant Joseph González.<sup>40</sup>

The governor, it seems, went directly to Los Adaes, where he arrived on June 6. He immediately caused the settlers to assemble and issued a public proclamation commanding them to make preparations to leave their homes and march to San Antonio not later than June 12. But it was impossible for the wretched settlers to comply with the peremptory order and they humbly begged to be given a few more days. Ripperdá agreed to set the date of departure for June 25, remaining in Los Adaes until June 14, on which day he started back, with the intention of stopping in Nacogdoches to suppress the mission there.<sup>41</sup>

On the day of his departure he wrote a letter to Governor Unzaga y Amezaga of Louisiana, informing him of the abandonment of Los Adaes, and explaining that he could not stay longer because he had to return to San Antonio to reorganize the company of soldiers there, disband the garrisons of Los Adaes and Orcoquisac, and hold an inspection in La Bahía before July 1.

The lack of adequate means of transportation had forced him to leave in Los Adaes five small bronze and two iron cannons, eight hundred and seventeen four-pound cannon balls, thirty-five smaller ones and sixty-six *arrobas* (about sixteen hundred pounds) of scrap iron. He had asked

<sup>39</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, May 10, 1773. *A. G. M. Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pt. 2, pp. 470-472.

<sup>40</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, May 25, 1773. In *Ibid.*, 489.

<sup>41</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, July 11, 1773. *A. G. M., Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pt. 2, pp. 493-494.

some of the inhabitants of Natchitoches, who were planning to come to live in the abandoned site, to look after the farming implements left behind. He hoped that the governor of Louisiana would instruct the commander at Natchitoches to watch this property also, until means for its transportation to San Antonio were found. The Tejas and other neighboring nations had expressed deep resentment at the withdrawal and were laboring under the misapprehension that the Spaniards were going to join their enemies, the Apaches, to return in force to annihilate them. The commander at Natchitoches should be instructed, therefore, to explain to these Indians the real reason for the abandonment of this post and the missions in its vicinity.

Governor Ripperdá had one more request to make before leaving. He informed Unzaga y Amezaga that several families from Los Adaes had fled to Natchitoches, when the orders for their abandonment were published. The permanence of their abode was contrary to the orders of the king, who had expressly commanded them to go to San Antonio, where they were to be resettled.<sup>42</sup>


*Despair of the settlers.* Humble though their miserable huts were and wretched their condition of life, the citizens of Los Adaes and its vicinity were thrown into what was equivalent to a panic, when they were told the order for withdrawal was to be carried out in earnest and with the greatest speed. It is true that the governor had informed them as early as April of the determination of the king. Nevertheless they had hoped with that hope that dwells forever in the hearts of pioneers that they would not be made to abandon what was to them their home, the only one they had ever known. Although Rubí had estimated the total number of settlers to be thirty families, Ripperdá found not less than five hundred persons, including young and old, living at or near Los Adaes. They pleaded for time, they made a thousand excuses, they begged to be allowed to remain without the garrison. Ripperdá firmly informed them they must make immediate preparations and leave in a body to find new homes in San Antonio.

The corn fields were green and the golden tassels waved their promise of a rich harvest. The warmth of early summer was beginning to animate the settlers; their cattle droves, which appear to have been numerous, were scattered over the countryside. How could they gather all their belongings, abandon their crops, round their herds, and start on such

<sup>42</sup>Ripperdá to Governor Unzaga y Amezaga, June 14, 1773. *A. G. I. Papeles de Cuba*, (Dunn. Tr., 1768-1780) 8-10.

REGLAMENTO,  
E INSTRUCCION  
PARA LOS PRESIDIOS  
*QUE SE HAN DE FORMAR*  
EN LA LINEA DE FRONTERA  
de la Nueva España.

RESUELTO POR EL REY N. S.  
en Cedula de 10. de Septiembre  
de 1772.



DE ORDEN DE SU Magestad.

MADRID: Por Juan de San Martín, Impresor de la Sec-  
retaria del Despacho Universal de Indias.

Año de 1772.

217213

TITLE PAGE OF "NEW REGULATIONS" FOR PRESIDIOS, PRINTED FIRST IN MADRID IN 1772. THIS IS A RARE  
AND IMPORTANT SOURCE FOR THE HISTORY OF THE SPANISH SOUTHWEST.



short notice? How could they transport all their household goods and their farm products without adequate means of transportation? Little wonder that in their bewilderment many fled to Natchitoches, where they possibly had friends and even relatives, determined to stay there until the garrison and the governor departed, at which time they would return to their abandoned homes. Others took refuge among the Indians themselves in their effort to evade the summons of their king.

Governor Ripperdá left strict orders with Lieutenant González to gather all the settlers and their belongings and start the march to San Antonio on June 25. He left as many horses and mules as he could spare and some provisions, for which he himself paid and offered to provide a recompense to those who would furnish oxen to cart the artillery and ammunition of the abandoned presidio. He gave orders that such property of the presidio as could not be transported at this time should be buried.<sup>43</sup>

*Ripperdá's march to San Antonio.* It was not necessary for the governor to go to Orcoquisac, for it will be remembered the garrison from that post had been previously withdrawn and its commander Rafael Martínez Pacheco was already in San Antonio.<sup>44</sup>

He stopped for a few days in Nacogdoches to suppress the mission there. While at this place, he was visited by Chief Bigotes of the Tejas. He, like all the other chiefs of the different tribes of east Texas, had become alarmed at the withdrawal and stopped a campaign he had planned against the Osages to come to plead with Governor Ripperdá. With him marched a large group of Indians in their war paint. Their angry insistence that the Spaniards remain in east Texas upset the governor, who had some difficulty in explaining to them that the Spaniards were not going to join the Apaches against them. With the aid of the missionary he finally succeeded in quieting their fears. He cordially invited them to come to San Antonio with the Spaniards, who were on their way there, and to serve as an escort for them. The Indians declined the invitation and the governor, his bodyguard, and the missionary from Nacogdoches proceeded without further interruption to San Antonio.

Immediately upon his arrival, the governor proceeded to reorganize the garrison of San Antonio, by adding to it the necessary number of

<sup>43</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, July 11, 1773, September 28, 1773, Gil Ibarbo to Oconor, January 8, 1774. *A. G. M. Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pt. 2, pp. 493-494; *Historia*, 51, 248-251, 259-266.

<sup>44</sup>See p. 98 *ante*. Bolton makes some conjectures concerning the circumstances of the abandonment of Orcoquisac, but the real facts have been given in detail in the present volume. Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 387.

men from the soldiers of Los Adaes and Orcoquisac, to make up the eighty stipulated by the new regulations, disbanding the rest. The viceroy had asked him in his letter of March 1 to put into effect the military instructions of the new ordinance, if possible, before July 1, which he did with commendable diligence.<sup>45</sup>

*The trek to San Antonio.* On June 25, the aged Lieutenant González, who had lived in Los Adaes for thirty-seven years, mounted his horse and went from house to house to urge the inconsolable settlers to make haste and join the line of march. From the miserable huts poured forth men, women, and children, made more miserable by this sort of banishment. With bundles that beggared description, leaving behind most of their household furnishings, taking only the most essential articles of clothing and food, oftentimes burdened with babies on their backs, the women tearfully joined the weary caravan as they looked back with longing eyes at what had been their homes. Many Indians gathered to see the distressed and forlorn crowd leave their homes built in the wilderness under so many hardships and at such great sacrifices. The old missions had already been abandoned, the missionaries having joined the settlers to encourage them in the long and wearisome march. In an endless, winding line the pitiful procession moved along, with cattle, horses, mules, donkeys, and goats mixed with human beings.

The first much needed rest was taken at the prosperous ranch of Gil Ibarbo, known as El Lobanillo (wart or mole), located near the Mission of Los Ais. There Gil Ibarbo went to the sick bed of his mother, who for ten years had been an invalid. But she was not the only patient in his home. One of his sisters lay in bed also, where she had been confined for more than nine months with chronic ulcers all over her body, and there also was his brother's wife, suffering from the effects of an abortion. It was impossible to move them. Ibarbo secured permission to leave with them one of his sons and another family to help take care of them. It was necessary for the missionaries to intercede in his behalf so that the afflicted persons might receive medical attention. All together twenty-four persons, young and old, remained at El Lobanillo with orders to continue the march as soon as circumstances permitted.

Once more the caravan took up the line of march and painfully made its way to Nacogdoches. By this time the company had begun to experience want and many had become ill as the result of the hardships, while

<sup>45</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, July 11, 1773. *A. G. M. Provincias Internas*, Vol. 100, pt. 2, pp. 493-494.



the majority were footsore. The old lieutenant could go no further. González, veteran of many a campaign against the Indians, who had given his best years to the service of his king, but who was scheduled for discharge upon arrival in San Antonio, was spared the ignominy by the kind hand of death. At Nacogdoches, on July 30, 1773, the old pioneer soldier breathed his last. Two women also died here from illness contracted on the road.

The Tejas Indians gathered at the old Mission of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de los Nacogdoches and Chief Bigotes pleaded with and threatened the Spaniards if they persisted on withdrawing. With González dead and only a sergeant now in charge, it was thought best to accede in part to the demands of the alarmed Indians and to leave at Nacogdoches two families, nine persons in all, to show the natives that the Spaniards were not deserting them, but would return later. The chief agreed to come to San Antonio with his warriors to plead with the governor for the return of at least one missionary and some Spaniards to live among them.

It was after the departure from Nacogdoches that the footsore and weary travelers experienced their worst sufferings. It was now the middle of summer. The heat, the lack of water, the consumption of all the available food, the death of the few beasts of burden which necessitated the transfer of the heavy loads to the tired shoulders of the worn-out men and women, all these trying conditions exacted their toll, particularly among the weak and emaciated children. Before San Antonio was reached ten persons had been left in unmarked graves along the path of the tragic trek. Shortly after they left Nacogdoches many of the marchers had been obliged to trade their holy medals and their rosaries to the Indians to obtain food.

One can well imagine the joy with which the footsore travelers greeted a rescue party sent by Governor Ripperdá. It was on the Brazos River that the relief party with horses and provisions reached them. But the one hundred and sixty-seven families were well-nigh exhausted with many days of fasting and so weak that they profited little from the unexpected abundance of supplies. "Hardly had the relief provisions reached us," says Ibarbo, "than, because of our weakened condition, we all took sick." With feet swollen from walking and muscles aching with fatigue, they trudged on to Santa Cruz, the new post on the Cíbolo, where a few of them decided to stay, too weak to go farther. Finally, after untold hardships the group reached San Antonio on September 26,

almost three months after they set out from Los Adaes. Drought first and later the floods had slowed their exceedingly irksome pilgrimage.

With them came four missionaries from the three missions. The few soldiers that had remained behind escorted the party and brought back twelve four-pounders, fifteen cases of ammunition, and eight *tercios* (about one thousand pounds) of scrap iron. In the transportation of this property of the old presidio of Los Adaes, the mules and oxen left by Ripperdá for the purpose had been used, but several of the former had died on the way.

*Effect on Los Adaes.* Founded by Aguayo, this post had defended the frontier of New Spain against the French for more than half a century. The cession of Louisiana had made its existence unnecessary, and the king, with a stroke of the pen had put an end to a settlement that had cost thousands of *pesos* to his royal treasury and thousands of sacrifices to its settlers. Hardly had the bereft Spaniards left Los Adaes when bands of Indians began the destruction of the houses and the pillage of the abandoned village, unearthing the ammunition and other belongings of the presidio which had been buried. French families from Los Adaes moved into the territory of the Tejas, the Bidais, the Orcoquisacs, the Quitseys, the Ais, and the Nacogdoches, while some of the Spaniards who had taken refuge in Natchitoches returned likewise to their old homes and, no doubt, pillaged what was left by their companions. Thirty-five persons stole away from the caravan of settlers on the trail to San Antonio and returned to their homes. These and some persons at Natchitoches soon afterwards joined the small party that had remained at Lobanillo with the permission of the governor.<sup>46</sup>

In the following chapter we will see how this determined group of dispossessed and wandering Spanish settlers was to return to east Texas and eventually establish a permanent settlement on the site of present Nacogdoches.

<sup>46</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, September 28, 1773; Antonio Gil Ibarbo to Oconor, January 8, 1774; Representation of the settlers of Los Adaes to Governor Ripperdá, October 4, 1774, *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 248-251, 253-256, 259-266; Bolton, "The Spanish Abandonment and Re-occupation of East Texas, 1773-1779," *The Quarterly*, IX, 86-89.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE BEGINNINGS OF PRESENT NACOGDOCHES

Founded by the saintly Margil in 1716, Mission Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de los Nacogdoches had maintained a precarious existence ever since 1729 when the Presidio of Nuestra Señora de los Dolores de los Tejas was abolished by the decree of April 26, at the recommendation of Rivera. On more than one occasion it had been suggested that this mission be suppressed or moved to a more advantageous location. The missionaries had tenaciously clung to the friendly natives in this vicinity, who had welcomed them in the early years and who were still favorably disposed and seemed inclined to accept Christianity. But the abandonment of east Texas ordered by the new regulations promulgated in 1772 after the Rubí inspection left them no choice. With depressed hearts and reluctant steps, the *Padres* withdrew and joined the throng of discouraged pilgrims that made their way painfully to San Antonio in the summer of 1773.

But unforeseen circumstances were to turn the tide of fortune. The abandoned mission site was to resound anew with the life and activity of a pioneer settlement. The old mission itself was to hear once more the fervent prayer of thankful hearts, and *Padres* were again to intone the praises of Almighty God within its walls. The leadership and determination of one man, the enduring attachment of human beings to the place of their birth, humble as it was, and the stern fortitude of the resolute Spanish pioneers were to defeat the ill-advised order of the king and to push forward the frontier of New Spain as far as the old Mission of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de los Nacogdoches. The new settlement was to become the center of Spanish activity, taking the place of the former capital of Los Adaes. It was destined to become the most important Indian agency in dealing with the dozen or more tribes that lived in its vicinity. Antonio Gil Ibarbo, to whose enterprise, firmness and perseverance the change was due was to become the most powerful influence of his day in the maintenance of peaceful relations with the natives of the vicinity.

But in order to understand the circumstances that brought about the founding of a civil settlement upon the deserted site of the old Mission of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, it will be necessary to follow the story of

the unlucky adventures and the listless wanderings of the dejected exiles of Los Adaes during their sojourn in San Antonio, their new trek back east, and the reports of happenings and decisions that eventually resulted in their final occupation of the region at Nacogdoches.

*Petition to return to the site of Mission Ais.* The day after their arrival in San Antonio, the tired wayfarers from Los Adaes were officially ordered by Governor Ripperdá to proceed at once to the selection of building sites, farm lands, and ranches where they might establish themselves on areas within the jurisdiction of the Villa de San Fernando, taking care not to interfere in any way with property already owned or occupied by citizens of the Villa or the missions. At the same time he sent a personal representative to the Cibolo post to distribute and give lands to those settlers from Los Adaes who had remained there.<sup>1</sup>

But the former residents of Los Adaes were not inclined to take advantage of the offer, because their chief desire was to return to their old homes. On October 4, 1773, a petition signed by seventy-six dwellers of that place was presented to Governor Ripperdá.<sup>2</sup> They remonstrated that it was impossible for them to find the required lands for their settlement near the Villa de San Fernando without encroaching upon the rights of others; that deprived of most of their property and means, it was likewise impossible for them to undertake the construction of an aqueduct for the irrigation of their lands; and that in view of the circumstances in which they found themselves and of their great sufferings endured in loyally obeying the orders of His Majesty, they begged permission to found a new settlement on the site of the abandoned Mission of Nuestra Señora de los Dolores de los Ais. This site, being near Los Adaes, would enable them to recover much of the scattered property they had been forced to abandon because of the short time allowed them in leaving their homes. If their petition was granted, they agreed to bear all the expenses of their return, but they hoped that the king would provide a parish priest for a period of ten years, after which they would be able to relieve the royal treasury of this expense.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, September 28, 1773; Ibarbo to Oconor, January 8, 1774. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 238-251, 259, 266.

<sup>2</sup>Some question as to the actual number of signers has been raised. The copy of the petition in Volume 51 of *Historia* which we examined has seventy-six signatures. Cf. Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, 394-395.

<sup>3</sup>Autos que se han introducido por los Vecinos del Presidio de los Adaes. Sobre que se les deje á Vecindar en el de la Misión de los Ais . . . *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 211-216.

It is hardly credible that in the vast area surrounding San Antonio the *Adaesanos* (settlers of Los Adaes) could not find vacant lands on which to settle. The choice of the proposed site near Mission Dolores in the country of the Ais is also significant. It will be recalled that it was in this vicinity that the Lobanillo ranch of Ibarbo was located, that his mother and sister were left there, together with twenty-four other persons, and that the bulk of his interests were in this region.

*Reasons for the sympathy of Ripperdá with the petitioners.* Shortly after his arrival in Texas, Governor Ripperdá had come to the conclusion that the friendship of the northern tribes was of the utmost importance to the peace of the province. Under the influence of the capable Athanase de Mézières, who was to attain even greater influence over Spanish officials in determining the policy with regard to the native tribes, the governor became convinced of the soundness of his policy and staunchly advocated the establishment of a presidio and mission among the northern tribes. His proposals in this regard and the use made of the new fear and danger of possible English incursions as the result of the Louisiana cession have already been discussed.<sup>4</sup> It was well known that the eastern tribes living between the Neches and the Trinity had always been friendly towards the Spaniards, but more recently the Tejas and the Bidias were becoming too friendly with the Apaches, whom they were accused of supplying with firearms. This made the maintenance of close relations with the east Texas tribes a very important policy.<sup>5</sup> It was only natural, therefore, that the governor should look with favor upon a petition that might result in the restoration of direct communication with the eastern tribes. He promptly replied that it was beyond his power to grant a request that implied the infraction of a royal order. They should try more earnestly to find appropriate lands in or near San Antonio, the Cibolo, or the abandoned ranches in the vicinity. Should they fail, however, to find suitable lands, they might then present their petition directly to the viceroy.<sup>6</sup>

*Ibarbo and Flores sent to Mexico.* The *Adaesanos* may or may not have exerted themselves to find suitable locations to establish themselves in or near San Antonio. They waited over a month, however, before deciding to follow the advice of the governor. On December 7, repre-

<sup>4</sup>See previous chapter.

<sup>5</sup>Expediente sobre proposiciones del Gobernador de Texas Baron de Ripperdá . . . *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 1-60.

<sup>6</sup>Ripperdá to the settlers of Los Adaes, October 4, 1773. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 216-217.

sentatives of the one hundred and twenty-seven families appeared before Ripperdá and appointed Antonio Gil Ibarbo and Gil Flores their legal agents to proceed to Mexico and solicit permission from the viceroy to found a settlement on the abandoned site of Mission Dolores de los Ais.<sup>7</sup> Three days later the courageous agents began preparations to set out for Mexico, armed with letters of recommendation from the governor to the viceroy and Hugo Oconor. They took with them other documents, such as certificates issued by Father Pedro Fuentes, Curate of San Fernando and Chaplain of the Presidio, as to the number of baptisms performed in Missions Guadalupe and Dolores, which showed that three hundred and forty men, women, and children had received this sacrament.<sup>8</sup>

In his letter to the viceroy Ripperdá heartily endorsed the petition and urged that it be granted. He frankly admitted that he did not know all the reasons for the abandonment of east Texas, but that he was still of the opinion that it was to be to the advantage of San Antonio and other interior settlements to maintain Spaniards among the northern Indians, particularly the Tawakonis and the Taovayas. These tribes were new friends, and closer communication with them was essential to the retention of their good will, invaluable because of their number and power. If the Spaniards were organized as a military unit, they would come to form a line of defense between San Antonio and Natchitoches. The objection that such a settlement might give encouragement to trade with Natchitoches was short-sighted, because as a matter of fact such trade was now going on more briskly than ever. Not only the Taovayas and Tawakonis but many other nations far in the interior of Texas were being supplied freely and abundantly with French goods. During a recent visit by Indians from central Texas to San Antonio, they had offered the Spaniards guns in trade. But speaking on this subject, Ripperdá reminded the viceroy that an attempt to cut off all trade with Natchitoches as proposed might have a more lamentable consequence, the establishment of trade between these tribes and the English.<sup>9</sup>

To Oconor, the governor repeated the same reasons in soliciting his approval for the proposed return to the abandoned Mission of Dolores. But he added a second request in behalf of Ibarbo, who, it seems, had

<sup>7</sup>Document 2, in *Autos que se han introducido . . . A. G. M. Historia*, 51, pp. 218-221.

<sup>8</sup>Certificado del Padre Pedro Fuentes, December 7, 1773. In *Ibid.*, 240.

<sup>9</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, December 10, 1773. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 222-226.

won his confidence. Should Oconor and the Viceroy feel inclined not to grant permission for the reestablishment of the former settlers of Los Adaes at Mission Dolores, Ripperdá asked the former to permit Ibarbo and his friends and relatives to return to El Lobanillo, where they could establish a small settlement of possibly sixty persons. This alternative proposal seems to indicate the personal interest of Ibarbo in assuming the leadership of the enterprise.<sup>10</sup>

*Ibarbo and Flores present their petition.* Late in December the two agents of the *Adaesanos* left San Antonio, intending to call on Oconor in Chihuahua before continuing to Mexico. By January 8, they were in Santa Rosa, Coahuila, from where they wrote a long letter to the *Comandante Inspector* at the suggestion of his assistant, Roque Medina. A vivid panorama of the sufferings of the *Adaesanos* was presented in an effort to enlist the sympathy and support of Oconor, who they knew would oppose the plan. More than thirty former residents of Los Adaes had died in San Antonio since their arrival in September and many were desperately ill, when the two commissioners left for Mexico. They explained how two days after their arrival a band of Indians had robbed them of the few animals they had brought from Los Adaes. From that day to the present the families had been obliged to beg for alms from the presidio, the citizens, and the missions. Some had been forced to commit petty thefts to keep from starving to death, and this had occasioned bitter complaints. Their helpless situation grew worse day by day. In view of these circumstances, Ibarbo and Flores saw no other solution than to be allowed to return east to found a settlement at Mission Dolores. They argued that such a mission should be established to prevent the influx of French traders and they humbly solicited his approval and support in securing the desired permission to carry out their plan.<sup>11</sup>

Shortly after dispatching the letter to Oconor, Ibarbo and Flores went on to Mexico, where they arrived early in February. But it was not until the 28th of this month that they presented a formal petition to the viceroy, in which they recounted their troubles from the time they received the first instructions for the abandonment of their homes in Los Adaes to the date of their arrival in San Antonio, the difficulties of finding suitable lands, and their desire to return to found a new settlement on the site of the abandoned Mission of Dolores, located thirty-five leagues west of

<sup>10</sup>Ripperdá to Oconor, December 11, 1773, *Ibid.*, 267-269.

<sup>11</sup>Ibarbo to Oconor, January 8, 1774. In *Ibid.*, 259-266.

Los Adaes. They stressed the fact that the journey east would be entirely at their own expense, that it would result in the renewal of direct communication with the now friendly tribes of the north, and asked only that a priest be supplied by the king for a period of ten years to minister to their spiritual wants.<sup>12</sup>

*Approval of the request.* Notwithstanding the royal order of September 10, 1772, which unequivocally decreed the abandonment of east Texas and the placement of its inhabitants in the vicinity of San Antonio, the viceroy and his advisers agreed to grant a request that nullified in record time the royal will in this regard. The most influential official in Mexico was José de Areche, *Fiscal* and former member of the king's council. It was chiefly at his recommendation that the viceroy called a *Junta de Guerra y Hacienda* for the 17th, when the terms for permission to return to Mission Dolores were approved.

In his report Areche declared that the proposal made by the *Adaesanos* was commendable as a means of checking Indian assaults; that the king's reason for the suppression of Mission Dolores de los Ais had been due to the failure of the natives to congregate; that there was no reason, therefore, for refusing to grant the petition of the settlers to return; and that in view of the multiple duties of Oconor, it might be well to instruct the Governor of Texas to attend to the execution of the new measure. As to the provision of a spiritual pastor for the flock, the President of the missions in Texas should be requested to send one of the missionaries from the abandoned missions and to inform the royal treasury of the allowance required for his maintenance, so that this might be paid during the period stipulated in the petition. Every effort should be made to establish other settlements among the northern tribes to assure permanent peace with the English and other foreign nations.<sup>13</sup>

When the petition, the letter of Governor Ripperdá, and the opinion of the *Fiscal* were presented to the *Junta* on March 17, this body unanimously accepted the recommendations of Areche and instructed the governor to permit the former residents of Los Adaes to establish a settlement on the site of the abandoned Mission of Nuestra Senora de

<sup>12</sup>Gil Ibarbo and Gil Flores to the Viceroy, February 28, 1774. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 31, pp. 228-231.

<sup>13</sup>Areche, Dictamen, March 7, 1774. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 231-234. Bolton declares Areche made no reference to the suggested danger of English encroachment played up by the petitioners. This is evidently an oversight. Bolton, *Texas*, 401.



los Dolores de los Ais. In doing so they were to observe the provisions of the *Laws of the Indies*.<sup>14</sup> The viceroy was also to ask the president of the Texas missions to appoint a *Padre* for the proposed settlement, provide for the equipment of the chapel and its maintenance, and to instruct the missionary to bring to the new community as many of the neighboring tribes as possible in order to promote closer friendship and to prevent trade relations, alliances, and treaties with the English and other foreign settlements on the frontier.<sup>15</sup>

*Oconor's opposition.* Remarkable had been the success of the petition of Ibarbo and Flores up to this point. But four days after the *Junta* approved the petition and ordered that its provisions should be granted, a letter from Oconor was referred to Areche, which was to cause the whole matter to be reconsidered. Oconor had written to Ripperdá on February 17, in reply to his letter of December 11 of the previous year. He had categorically informed the governor he could not support the petition of Ibarbo and expressed surprise at his failure to carry out in every detail article 22 of the *New Regulations*, which provided for the immediate removal of all settlers in east Texas to San Antonio. He declared he knew there were ample and sufficient lands on which the *Adaesanos* could locate without encroaching on the property of others in the vicinity of San Antonio, the Cíbolo, the San Antonio River, and La Bahía. He peremptorily ordered Ripperdá, therefore, to take steps to bring back to San Antonio the stragglers who had remained at Los Ais, Nacogdoches, and in the country of the Tejas, as well as any who might have returned from Natchitoches, to have all ammunition and other property of the suppressed presidio transported at once, and to proceed to the distribution of land to the settlers in accordance with the instructions of the *New Regulations*. The expense account presented for carting the cannon and other presidial property was irregular and should be revised.<sup>16</sup> He concluded by questioning the motives of Ibarbo.

His letter to the viceroy, which was referred to Areche on March 21, was couched in stronger terms. He not only disapproved the petition of Ibarbo, but he seriously doubted the rectitude of the governor in recommending such a project. He declared he was convinced that private interest, ignorance, mistaken piety, and malice had combined to defeat

<sup>14</sup>*Novísima Recopilación de las Leyes de las Indias*, Lib. iv, Título VII.

<sup>15</sup>Junta de Guerra y Hacienda, March 17, Decreto, March 23, 1774. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 235-239, another copy pp. 270-273.

<sup>16</sup>Oconor to Ripperdá, February 17, 1774. In *Ibid.*, 244-247.

the real purpose of the royal order of September 10, 1772. Los Adaes, he assured the viceroy, had long been the center of contraband trade in arms and ammunition, carried on among the Indians in spite of repeated royal orders to the contrary. The Marqués de Rubí had been moved primarily by this consideration in recommending its abandonment. Hence the real reasons for the desired return to east Texas of Ibarbo and his companions was that they might engage in this illicit trade. He regretted the whole-hearted support and endorsement given to the project by the governor and bitterly reproved him for his lack of judgment in having permitted a northern Indian to go to Mexico City with a passport. This afforded potential enemies an opportunity to learn the routes into Coahuila and its defenses. It grieved him to see others obstructing the execution of the orders of the king, while he was laboring day and night to put them into execution. His present duties made it impossible for him to go to Texas. He asked the viceroy, therefore, to instruct Governor Ripperdá in the strictest terms to carry out to the letter the orders with respect to the exiles from Los Adaes and to suppress all contraband trade from Natchitoches.<sup>17</sup>

*Effect of Oconor's opposition.* Areche, the *Fiscal*, was deeply impressed by the report of Oconor, with whom he was personally acquainted. The objections raised by so faithful and loyal a servant of the king deserved consideration. He recommended, therefore, on March 28 that the question of the return to Los Adaes be reconsidered by a *Junta*. The viceroy accepted his advice, a new *Junta* was convoked on May 5, and after due deliberation it was decided to submit the previous decision to Oconor for his approval or rejection.<sup>18</sup>

*Ibarbo and Flores return to Texas.* If the reoccupation of east Texas was left to Oconor an adverse decision was inevitable. The two emissaries felt their presence in Mexico was no longer necessary. They decided to play their trump card and to make one final appeal to the sympathy of the viceroy. On May 10, they addressed a petition to Bucareli, stating their sorrowful plight and how they had survived only through the mercy of His Excellency, who had generously ordered a daily allowance of two *reales* (twenty-five cents) to each for his maintenance. They could stay

<sup>17</sup>Oconor to the Viceroy, February 21, 1774. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 274-280.

<sup>18</sup>Areche to the Viceroy, March 28, 1774, *Junta* of May 5, *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 280-283, 301-304.

no longer. They asked permission to return to Texas and to be allowed to go hence to Natchitoches with their families, from where they could rescue perhaps the remnants of their scattered herds and property. They promised that they would return and settle in Texas, when a site was decided upon for their establishment and that of their companions.

The long stay in Mexico had consumed all their resources and forced them to pawn their arms and even their clothes. They asked the viceroy, therefore, to give them or lend them the funds necessary for the return trip.

Upon being consulted, the *Fiscal* saw no objection to their being given the means necessary to return to Texas, with the understanding that the money was to be repaid to the governor of Texas for reimbursement to the royal treasury. But he was vigorously opposed to their being granted permission to move their families and property to Natchitoches. The viceroy accepted the recommendations and on May 16 ordered the treasury to pay thirty-five and a half *pesos* for the maintenance of the two envoys during their residence in Mexico from March 8 to May 19, on which day they were to return to Texas. The officers of the treasury were also to give Gil Ibarbo and Gil Flores two hundred two *pesos* for traveling expenses. This amount and that of their upkeep were to be paid back to the governor by the citizens of Los Adaes now in San Antonio for the reimbursement of the royal treasury.<sup>19</sup>

*Creation of a loophole.* It seemed as if the plan of Ibarbo and Flores to return with their companions to Mission Dolores de los Ais had been nipped in the bud by the opportune arrival of the letter of Oconor. The initial success had been suddenly turned into a complete failure. But the vacillating policy of the viceroy was to give the determined settlers and the reluctant governor a good chance to turn the tide and carry out their long cherished scheme. On May 17, the viceroy unwittingly gave Ripperdá the desired permission by instructing him that the exiles from Los Adaes were not to return to Natchitoches under any circumstances, but that he was to aid them in finding a suitable location "as agreed upon." This phrase and the claim of Ibarbo and Flores that the viceroy had told them verbally that the new settlement was to be not less than one hundred leagues from Natchitoches was to result in the establishment of a new colony on the Trinity River.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup>Petition of Ibarbo and Flores to the Viceroy, May 10, Dictamen Fiscal, May 12, Decreto del Virey, May 16, 1774. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 305-311.

<sup>20</sup>The Viceroy to Ripperdá, May 17, 1774. *Bejar Archives*, Ripperdá to the Viceroy, September 10, 1770. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 312-314.

That same day the viceroy sent Oconor the decision of the *Junta* of May 5, which placed in his hands the final disposition of the question raised by the former citizens of Los Adaes. This strange contradiction fate was to decide in favor of the unfortunate settlers. For six weeks Oconor was too busy to reply. When he, at last, found time he asked to be relieved of the responsibility of acting because of the other numerous duties to which he had to attend elsewhere and because he felt the problem and its solution were affairs that concerned Governor Ripperdá. The viceroy merely insisted with greater firmness that Oconor should execute the orders sent to him. But it was now too late. When the *Commandante Inspector* finally decided to act as urged by the viceroy, Ripperdá blandly replied that the exiles had already established a new settlement in accord with the instructions communicated to him by the viceroy. Oconor was furious and reprimanded the governor with severity for exceeding his authority, ignorant of the fact that on May 17, Ripperdá had received instructions from the viceroy contradictory to those sent to the *Commandante Inspector*.<sup>21</sup> But let us take up the steps that led to the founding of the short-lived settlement of Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Bucareli.

*The selection of a site.* When Gil Ibarbo and Gil Flores returned to San Antonio they made known to the governor the verbal instructions that they claimed to have received from the viceroy. Ripperdá aided, no doubt, by Ibarbo, who was well acquainted with the country, fixed upon a site for the new settlement on the right or west bank of the Trinity, at the crossing known as Paso Tomás. This seems to have been at the point where the two roads leading to Los Adaes and La Bahía from San Antonio joined to form a passage over this stream. "It is on this side of the Trinity River on the road that leads to the said Los Adaes and Orcoquisac," declared Ripperdá.<sup>22</sup> Shortly afterwards he added that it was about half way between San Antonio and Los Adaes, three days' journey up the river from the coast, and that although there were no facilities for irrigation from the river, it was the intention of the settlers to open farms on the opposite bank near some permanent lakes.<sup>23</sup> The site of the new settlement has been identified with the crossing on the

<sup>21</sup>Oconor to the Viceroy, July 5 and December 31, 1775; the Viceroy to Oconor, August 30, 1775; Oconor to Ripperdá, November 20, 1775; Ripperdá to Oconor, February 5, 1775. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, 323-334.

<sup>22</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, September 10, 1774, in *Ibid.*, 312-314.

<sup>23</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, November 15, 1774. *Ibid.*, 315-316.

Trinity later known as Robbin's Ferry, at the old village of Randolph in Madison County.<sup>24</sup>

*Settlement of Pilar de Bucareli.* During the latter part of July and throughout the month of August the impoverished exiles made desperate efforts to obtain means for their return to east Texas. With the generous aid of the missions and the *Padres* from whom they obtained supplies and seed, and with the coöperation of Governor Ripperdá, they finally set out before the end of the month to found a new settlement on the Trinity River.

Before starting they agreed to call the new colony *Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Bucareli* in honor of the patron saint of their old home in Los Adaes and of the viceroy who had been their benefactor. The governor, out of consideration for the exposed condition of the new settlement and of the distance that separated it from San Antonio, thought it wise to organize a provisional company of militia, consisting of fifty men chosen from among the settlers. He appointed Gil Ibarbo Captain and *Justicia Mayor* (Chief Justice) of the projected pueblo, he being "the best fitted and the most acceptable to his compatriots." His companion Gil Flores was made lieutenant and Juan de Mora *alférez*. The appointments were subject to the approval of the viceroy. Little protection could be expected, however, from the militia company thus organized, explained the governor, since most of the men had neither arms nor ammunition. He begged the viceroy to repair this want by supplying sixty or eighty guns and the corresponding lead and powder, expressing the hope at the same time that a parish priest would be provided at government expense, for a period of ten years.

When everything was in readiness the little band of exiles, numbering from fifty to seventy men and their families, set out to retrace their steps as far back as the Trinity River under the escort of Lieutenant Simón Arocha and four soldiers. Arocha was commissioned by the governor to place the settlers in possession of the new site and to make a personal investigation of the possibility of digging an irrigation ditch. Having established the families, Arocha, with the four soldiers and Ibarbo, was to visit the Bidais, Tejas, Quitseys, Iscanis, Tawakonis, Xaranames, Taovayas and Wichitas if possible, to inform them of the new settlement founded by the Spaniards who desired to live in peace among them.

Arocha and his men were back in San Antonio by the middle of

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<sup>24</sup>Bolton, *Texas*, 406.

November. He reported that irrigation was impractical because of the low banks of the river but that the land was fertile and well suited to cultivation. The scarcity and poor condition of the horses made it impossible for him to visit the neighboring tribes as instructed. He had only been able to see the Bidais in whose country the new settlement was and the Tejas to whom he had paid a visit.

When the escort returned to San Antonio, the governor reported to the viceroy that there were many families who were anxious to join the others, but the shortage of horses kept them from going to Pilar de Bucareli. He estimated at this time that seventy men capable of bearing arms and their families were already established in the new settlement.<sup>25</sup>

*Reasons for the selection of the site.* What had decided the former citizens of Los Adaes and the Governor of Texas to choose the location on which the new settlement was founded? The recently abandoned presidio of Orcoquisac had fully demonstrated the unhealthy character of the country and the climate, but the chief difficulty as a military post was its inaccessibility. In his correspondence Ripperdá explained that the new site was selected because it was approximately midway between San Antonio and Natchitoches, on the main road and would be invaluable in maintaining communication with the latter post. This was, however, the strongest reason for the opposition of Oconor. A second reason for its location was said to be the protection against the Comanches which the friendly Tawakonis and Tonkawas afforded it. Furthermore, its fertility and facilities for raising cattle and horses showed conditions favorable to provide San Antonio and La Bahía with these and other necessities. A fourth reason was its strategic position in cutting off the French contraband trade. In this respect a fifth argument was advanced. Being in the middle of several Indian nations who were friendly, it would be invaluable in maintaining and extending Spanish control over the natives of the entire northern, eastern, and southern areas through trade and missionary activity. Lastly, Pilar de Bucareli was an advantageous location from which to keep a watch on the incursions of the English who were beginning to penetrate this region.<sup>26</sup>

The sincerity of Ripperdá was questioned, however, in spite of the fact that at his request Ibarbo conducted a thorough exploration of the

<sup>25</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, September 1, and November 15, 1774, *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 312-316.

<sup>26</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, September 1, and November 15, 1774, and January 15, 1776. *Ibid.*, 312-316; 337-342; De Mézières to Croix, March 18, 1778.



THE TREK TO SAN ANTONIO. FROM AN ORIGINAL DRAWING OF THE ABANDONMENT OF LOS ADAES BY  
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area in the vicinity of the mouth of the Trinity to determine the presence of the English. His enemies maintained, and circumstances seemed to lend support to the accusations, that the real motives for the selection of the site were interests in the forbidden Indian trade and in contraband. Paso Tomás was in the middle of a group of northeastern tribes, too distant from the coast to afford any effective protection against English activity among coastal Indians. Ibarbo was equally interested in the illicit trade and had been accused of complicity in smuggling. When Oconor learned, too late to prevent it, that the settlement had been established, he knowingly observed that the exiles had been located by Ripperdá in "the place, which better than any other, enables them to engage in illicit trade and to encourage the northern Indians in stealing droves of horses from the Presidios of San Antonio de Béjar, La Bahía del Espíritu Santo, and even as far as Laredo, as lately has been done. Moreover, the Trinity River facilitates navigation to the Opelousas and the neighborhood of New Orleans itself. Hence it is concluded that the citizens established on the Trinity have better facilities than formerly for their contraband trade."<sup>27</sup> But in spite of evidence to the contrary, Ripperdá maintained his innocence to the end and Ibarbo actually attempted to put a stop to French trade during the short stay on the Trinity.<sup>28</sup>

*Early progress of Bucareli.* The energy displayed by the tireless Ibarbo is remarkable. As soon as the families arrived at Paso Tomás, he immediately went to Los Adaes, from where he brought three cart-loads of gun-carriage, iron and nails, using for the purpose his own mules. It is significant that on the way back he stopped at Lobanillo, his ranch, where he left eight cart-loads of iron and a considerable supply of cannon balls, which he buried there for later transportation. He also transported four brass and two iron cannon, besides powder and lead, for the defense of the new settlement. It was not long before the temporary huts began to be replaced by substantial houses built of timber. This material was the only kind available and it seems that no *adobe* was used. By January, 1776, there were twenty wooden structures, which by the summer of the following year had been increased to fifty. While the settlers were busily engaged in the construction of their homes and the cultivation of the fields, the indefatigable Ibarbo lost no time in erecting a guardhouse, a stockade, a chapel, and stocks for delinquent culprits. With amazing

<sup>27</sup>Oconor to the Viceroy, December 31, 1775, *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 323-332.

<sup>28</sup>Bolton, *Texas*, 408-412.

rapidity the village began to take form with the houses lined around a public square, the chapel on one side and the guardhouse on the other, as provided by the *Laws of the Indies*.

The first chapel was a modest building of hewn timber built with the coöperation of all the settlers. But this was soon replaced by a more pretentious church erected by the munificence of a French trader named Nicholas de la Mathe, a former friend of Ibarbo. It seems hardly credible but we have the truth as revealed in the report of the governor, that De la Mathe had visited the new settlement shortly after its establishment to collect some debts. Moved by his devotion to Our Lady of Pilár, the patron saint of the colony, he decided to build her a new temple twenty-five *varas* long and proportionately wide, for which purpose he soon sent two carpenters. The settlers obtained permission for the construction of the new chapel from the Bishop of Guadalajara and were in hopes that the king in his piety would soon provide them with a resident parish priest.

From the beginning the settlers had gathered every evening in the chapel to recite the rosary, led by the *Justicia Mayor*, who also conducted the people in prayer in the morning on feast days. In 1775, early in February, two missionaries visited Bucareli, strongly urged by the parish priest of San Antonio, who obtained permission for their visit from the Father President of the missions. The ornaments of the former chapel of Nuestra Señora del Pilár de Los Adaes, left in charge of Governor Ripperdá, when that post was vacated, were in part taken back to Bucareli in 1775. Early the following year, the citizens of the new settlement requested through Ibarbo, that all the ornaments be turned over to them for the new chapel which eventually was done.<sup>29</sup>

The exiles in San Antonio had continued to go to the new settlement as circumstances permitted. Some had complained that San Antonio was being depopulated. To this charge the Governor replied that he had given permission only to those who had formerly lived in Los Adaes and that even now (1776) there were many who because of their poverty had been unable to join their companions. Ibarbo brought to the new settlement some of those who had been left in the ranch at Lobanillo and in Nacogdoches. The growth in population was temporarily checked in the winter of 1776-1777, when the struggling settlement was visited by an epidemic. Seventeen persons died, Lieutenant Gil Flores among them. The neigh-

<sup>29</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, January 25, 1776; Ibarbo to Ripperdá, November 25, 1775; Ibarbo to Ripperdá, June 30, 1777. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 337-349, 351-354, 459-461.

boring tribe of the Bidais lost almost half of its people. The malady was attributed to excessive dampness caused by heavy floods and appears to have taken the form of malignant dysentery. By 1777, when a census was taken, the population of Bucareli consisted of one hundred and twenty-five men, eighty-seven women, one hundred twenty-eight children, and five slaves, making a total of three hundred and forty-seven persons.<sup>30</sup>

*Material progress and plans for the future.* The first year the settlers planted their corn on the east bank of the Trinity near some permanent lakes. But the heavy floods of the year destroyed the fruits of their labors. The Bidais, who knew the country better, showed them a place on the west side of the river where crops could be raised safely without irrigation. Here an abundant crop was gathered the following year. Sample ears of corn were sent to San Antonio which the governor described as being over twelve inches long with grains of good quality.

At the same time they planted some cotton as an experiment. It grew with such vigor that it surprised the settlers. The same was true of the truck gardens that had been attempted. A bushel of wheat had been planted which yielded an abundant crop. The land was suitable also for cultivation of rice.

Early in 1776, Governor Ripperdá permitted Ibarbo to take to Bucareli a mulatto weaver, who was then residing in San Antonio in order that he might teach his trade to the settlers and "to see if cloth similar to that of Puebla can be made." For this purpose a supply of wool had been taken as well as a number of sheep and some cotton seed to produce the necessary fiber and wool in the new settlement.

Much was expected also from the advantages offered for raising horses, cattle, sheep, and goats. The abundance of buffalo and wild cattle that roamed one day's journey west of Bucareli led the governor and settlers to hope for the production of fat in sufficient quantity to make possible the manufacture of soap "to supply [the soldiers of] our presidios who are now dependent on Saltillo."

Communication with the new establishment was claimed not to be so difficult as the distance might imply. Although it was more than one hundred leagues to San Antonio there were only three large streams in the intervening area: the Brazos, the Colorado, and the Guadalupe, which were fordable most of the year. There was no other danger than attack from the Comanches between the Guadalupe and San Antonio by

<sup>30</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, January 25, 1776; De Mézières to Croix, March 18, 1778; Ripperdá to Croix, January 11, 1778. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51.

the lower road, or from the Colorado by the upper road. When De Mézières visited the town in 1778, he noted the possibilities for the settlement becoming the basis of a lucrative trade with New Orleans which might be carried on through the Trinity River and Opelousas if the government permitted trade between the two provinces.<sup>31</sup>

As proof of the determination to put an end to the trade with the French and to establish new connections with San Antonio as a source of supply, Ibarbo arranged in 1776 to secure all supplies from this town. He entered into a contract with a merchant in San Antonio named Juan de Ysurrieta, who was to furnish all the goods needed by the settlers and to receive in exchange their products. Ibarbo took a supply of the most essential things needed by the colonists when he returned in January, 1776, "in order to put a stop to the use of all imports from Louisiana."<sup>32</sup>

*Prospects for missions.* The relations between the new settlers and the surrounding Indians were very friendly. There is a strong suspicion that the source of the amicable relations was the mutually profitable, but illicit trade under the existing regulations. Be that as it may, the new colony did not suffer during the early years from the destructive raids of hostile natives.

The northeastern tribes had welcomed the return of the Spaniards to this area and their friendship, particularly that of the Tawakonis and Tonkawas, had saved the settlers from the fury of the Comanches. The Bidais and the Tejas frequently visited the new settlement and in the absence of a priest or missionary were wont to ask the settlers to baptize the dying. Great hope was held out to the officials for the conversion of these Indian nations. The Cocos and the apostates from the San Antonio missions, who lived in this area, had begun to frequent Bucareli. If a missionary or parish priest were sent there, it was thought that a mission for these Indians could be easily established.<sup>33</sup>

*Securing a priest for Bucareli.* It has been noted that Ibarbo and his companions requested from the beginning only one favor from viceregal authorities, namely that a priest be provided for the new settlement at Paso Tomás on the Trinity at royal expense for a period of ten years. But as late as November, 1775, this modest request had not been granted.

<sup>31</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, January 25, 1776; De Mézières to Croix, March 18, 1778. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51.

<sup>32</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, January 25, 1776, in *Ibid.*, vol. 51, 344.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, 35.

Ibarbo now made a moving appeal to the viceroy, declaring that the wretched settlers, who had obeyed without question the dictates of the king, abandoning their homes and property in Los Adaes, and then founding a new settlement on the Trinity without royal aid, missed the consolations of religion in their numerous afflictions. The sick and the dying clamored in vain for spiritual ministrations. In February, 1775, the curate and vicar of San Antonio had sent a priest, who had solemnly placed the image of Our Lady of Pilár in the new chapel and tended to the religious needs of the settlers for a few days. But he had returned to San Antonio and left the flock without a shepherd. The most urgent need of the struggling settlement was a resident priest. He begged that one be provided for ten years at royal expense.<sup>34</sup>

Upon receipt of the new petition at Béjar, Governor Ripperdá immediately forwarded it to the viceroy with his strong endorsement, suggesting that the ornaments and sacred vessels of the abandoned church of Los Adaes now being held by him in custody should be given to the settlers at Bucareli.<sup>35</sup> On April 29, 1776, the viceroy referred the petition to the *Fiscal*, who on May 7, rendered an opinion. The request was just and fair and should be granted, but the priest should be secured at the least expense possible, the settlers contributing what they could for his support "in order that they may hear Mass and have some one to administer the holy sacraments to them."<sup>36</sup> The matter was immediately referred to the *Comandante Inspector*, Hugo Oconor.

The opposition of this official to the new settlement has been pointed out already. Nevertheless in this instance he agreed to the request, but he pointed out that under the circumstances it was not necessary to burden the royal treasury with added expenses. In San Antonio there were five missions located along the river within a radius of three leagues with two missionaries each. The governor should be instructed to request the Father President of these missions to send a missionary to the new settlement to minister to the settlers until its permanence was determined.<sup>37</sup>

The recommendation was once more submitted to the *Fiscal*, who in his

<sup>34</sup>Ibarbo to the Viceroy, November 25, 1776, in Expediente Sobre que el vecindario del Pueblo de Ntra. Señora del Pilár de Bucareli se le destine Parroco, por cuenta de la Real Hacienda. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 350-353.

<sup>35</sup>Ripperdá to the Viceroy, January 15, 1776. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 354-355.

<sup>36</sup>Areché to the Viceroy, May 7, 1776. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 356-357.

<sup>37</sup>Oconor to the Viceroy, June 15, 1775. *Ibid.*, Vol. 51, pp. 358-359.

final report inadvertently stated that, given the proximity of the five missions to the new settlement—meaning to each other—the Father President should be asked by the governor to send a missionary to Bucareli.<sup>38</sup>

*The missionaries at Bucareli.* Satisfied with a plan that saved all additional expense to the royal treasury, the viceroy instructed the governor to carry out the recommendation. Ripperdá formally requested Father Pedro Ramírez de Arellano, President of the missions in San Antonio, to send a missionary to Bucareli on September 27, 1776. Fray Pedro promptly complied with the request, sending Father Fray José Francisco Mariano de la Garza to take charge. But in January of this year two missionaries had gone to Bucareli to investigate the possibility of establishing a mission, one of them being, it seems, Father Garza.<sup>39</sup> Early in the following year he seems to have been joined by a second missionary, Fray Juan García Botello, who remained in Bucareli until the end of October, 1778, when he returned to San Antonio.<sup>40</sup>

*Objections of Fray Ramírez de Arellano.* Although he complied with the order transmitted through the governor, the president of the missions registered a strong protest and pounced upon the inadvertent error of the *Fiscal*, which he attributed to the viceroy, regarding the distance of Bucareli from San Antonio, as an excuse to have the arrangement annulled. Bucareli, he pointed out, was almost one hundred and forty leagues from San Antonio. The missionary sent was, in fact, sorely needed in Béjar, where each mission required two men in order that, when one went out to secure new converts or retrieve runaways, those in the mission might have some one to minister to them and to keep them to their regular duties. In his opinion, a secular priest was what was needed, and the

<sup>38</sup>Areche to the Viceroy, August 8, 1776. *Ibid.*, Vol. 51, p. 359.

<sup>39</sup>Fray Pedro Ramirez de Arellano to the *Commandante General*, April 27, 1777; Fray José Francisco Mariano de la Garza to Governor Domingo Cabello, January 8, 1779, *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 359-365; 484-490; 334, 346. There is no doubt that Father Garza went to Bucareli at this time, since in his letter of January 8, 1779, he clearly states he had been in Bucareli since sent there by order of the viceroy, meaning September 27, 1776. Cf. Bolton, "Spanish Abandonment and Re-Occupation of East Texas," *The Quarterly*, Texas Historical Association, Vol. 9, pp. 112-114.

<sup>40</sup>There has been some doubt as to the time and how long Father Botello was in Bucareli. In his own statement he says he was present at both attacks of the Comanches in 1778 and Governor Cabello says in August, 1777, that two missionaries were then in Bucareli. Fray Juan García Botello to Governor Cabello, December 23, 1778; Governor Cabello to Caballero de Croix, August 30, 1777. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 478-482; 376-382. Cf. Bolton, *op cit.*, pp. 114-115.

settlers were able to maintain one. In 1775, the parish priest of San Antonio had gone to administer the sacraments in Bucareli and had received the corresponding perquisites. The Bishop of Guadalajara had approved the practice on August 3, 1775, and had suggested it should be administered as part of the San Antonio parish by employing an assistant. Not to appear selfish Father Ramírez de Arellano made an alternative proposal. If the curate agreed to minister to Bucareli by going once a year to that settlement, a missionary could substitute in Béjar during his absence. He also suggested that the chaplain of the presidio might undertake to look after the spiritual needs of Bucareli.<sup>41</sup>

In view of the objections raised by Fray Ramírez de Arellano, Croix instructed Governor Cabello to send either the Chaplain of San Antonio or La Bahía to relieve the missionary at Bucareli.<sup>42</sup> But Governor Cabello was no more willing to spare the chaplain than Father Ramírez de Arellano was to furnish one of his missionaries. He explained to Caballero de Croix, in August, 1777, that the chaplain of the troops was also the curate of San Antonio. Under the regulations adopted by the Council of Trent, a curate could not absent himself from his parish for more than two months each year, the permission of the bishop being required even for such an absence. Under the circumstances the chaplain and curate would spend most of his time commuting between San Antonio and Bucareli, attending to neither properly, and require an escort constantly in his goings and comings. Such a plan was ill-advised and impractical. Furthermore, missionaries were more appropriate for Bucareli, because they could advantageously exercise their sacred calling there, baptizing and converting the numerous natives that frequented the settlement. The Tawakonis and Xaranames came in large numbers, and some of the latter had agreed to return to their former mission of La Bahía. The Mayeyes had been on the point of being congregated, but the accidental death of three of their number caused them to give up the idea temporarily. The Orcoquisacs were very anxious to be placed in a mission at the new settlement and had lately sent significant gifts to Father Garza, who was there now, accompanied by another missionary. In the opinion of the governor it would be best to continue the plan.<sup>43</sup> Croix evidently accepted the reasons

<sup>41</sup>Fray Pedro Ramírez de Arellano to *Commandante General* Croix, April 27, 1777. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 359-365.

<sup>42</sup>Teodoro de Croix to Governor Cabello, June 24, 1777. In *Ibid.*, pp. 365-367.

<sup>43</sup>Governor Cabello to Caballero de Croix, August 30, 1777. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 367-372.

presented by the zealous and efficient governor, who had seen service in Nicaragua and far-away Florida before coming to Texas, for no change was made.

*Exemption from payment of tithes.* The settlers had finally obtained the assignment of a parish priest. Great was their consternation when on July 22, 1777, it was announced at the parish church that tithes would be collected and that these were payable to Sebastián Mojaras. The little parish had fought so hard to obtain a priest and now learned it was in arrears for two years in its payments of the tax. Like faithful subjects and good Christians they promptly paid the wretched amount due on their insignificant holdings, but immediately drew a long petition to the governor to intercede with the corresponding authority, that the unfortunate settlers who had made so many sacrifices in the service of their king might be exempted from future payment of tithes for a period of ten years. In support of their petition the settlers reviewed their numerous hardships, recounted their poverty, and retold the indescribable misery they had endured to safeguard the best interests of the king.<sup>44</sup>

Governor Ripperdá, who was in full sympathy with the settlers of Bucareli, forwarded the petition to the new *Commandante General* Croix with his strong endorsement. While it was true, he explained, that the church had been built at the expense of Nicholas de la Mathe, nevertheless, the settlers had rendered valuable service to the king in maintaining at their own expense and without any cost to the royal treasury an important outpost that served to cultivate the good will of the friendly tribes of the north and to keep an effective watch on the attempts of the English to penetrate through the lands to the coast to establish trade with the natives. He suggested that the Bishop of Guadalajara and the *Cabildo* of the cathedral should be requested to grant this modest petition.<sup>45</sup>

Croix referred the matter to Assessor General Galindo Navarro, who after due deliberation made an extended report on July 23, 1778. This able and legal-minded adviser recommended that the petition be granted. He argued in its support that Bucareli was exempt from all civil dues and should be similarly exempted from the payment of tithes. Furthermore, the purpose of the collection of tithes was to help maintain the secular priest, but since no ecclesiastic of this class was serving there,

<sup>44</sup>Ibarbo to Governor Ripperdá, June (July) 30, 1777. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 459-461.

<sup>45</sup>Ripperdá to Croix, October 1, and 28, 1777. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 461-464.



the tithes could not legally be collected.<sup>46</sup> Agreeable to the advice of the Assessor General, Croix requested the Bishop of Guadalajara and the *Cabildo* of the cathedral to grant an exemption from tithes to the settlers of Bucareli. The request was granted on September 4, 1778.<sup>47</sup>

*Ibarbo's exploration of the coast.* The founder of the determined settlement of Bucareli found time not only to look after the several duties of its establishment and progress, but to make frequent expeditions to the neighboring tribes and to explore the coast to discover the activities of foreign traders. During the four years at Paso Tomás on the Trinity, he made several expeditions to the coast, but the most noteworthy of these was the one undertaken in the summer of 1777.

Early in June a trader stationed among the Orcoquisac Indians reported that he had learned that there was an English vessel stranded at the mouth of the Neches River with a cargo of brick. The English had given the bricks to the Opelousas and Attacapas with whom they traded and who lived nearby. There was another vessel similarly wrecked at the mouth of the Trinity. Disturbed by the news, Ibarbo immediately called thirty volunteers and set out to investigate. He first went to the Pueblo of the Orcoquisacs. From these Indians he learned the details of the stranded vessel at the mouth of the Neches. It seems the pilot missed the channel and ran the ship against a bank. The accident occurred in May. The crew had departed shortly after, telling the Indians that they would come back. Upon being questioned, the Orcoquisacs explained that the English came frequently to the coast and entered the rivers to trade with the natives. As a matter of fact, they had stayed long enough to sow and reap a crop during the summer of 1777. Ibarbo scolded the Indians for not having reported the recently wrecked boat more promptly and for not acquainting him with the activities of the English along the coast.

Taking two paid guides and ten men he proceeded to the coast. Going east, he came upon the remains of the stranded vessel in the vicinity of present Sabine Lake. The ship had been completely dismantled and nothing was left in it except the bricks. But there were numerous evidences of the rest of its cargo among the Attacapas who lived nearby. From them Ibarbo learned that a party of three men had been left on board until the

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<sup>46</sup>Galindo Navarro to Croix, July 24, 1778. In *Ibid.*, pp. 464-470.

<sup>47</sup>*A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 472-476.

rest of the crew returned, but search as they would the Spaniards could find no trace of them.

Ibarbo now turned back in order to investigate the rumor concerning the ship on the Trinity. This proved to be false. Determined to examine the entire coast to the mouth of the Colorado, he continued west towards the Brazos along the shore. Slightly more than half way he came upon an Englishman dressed in skins like the natives, who told him his name was Bautista Miller, that he came from Jamaica and was on the way to the Mississippi with a cargo of coffee, firewater, and five negro slaves. Miller said he had boarded a ship in Jamaica belonging to Captain José David, who, on reaching the vicinity of the coast, had set him adrift in a canoe to rob him of his goods. He said that he was fifty-four years of age, married, and had eight children. He had been living on the coast for seven months and was on the point of starvation. The statement made by Miller and the declarations of the Orcoquisacs, although indefinite as to the identity and purpose of the English incursions, clearly reveal the frequency of the visits.

Ibarbo turned back before reaching the Brazos and after his arrival in Bucareli, immediately reported the result of his exploration and asked what disposition should be made of the brick and the Englishman he had brought back. Miller would have been sent to San Antonio had he not fallen seriously ill with malaria. Ibarbo had spent twenty-two days on the expedition. He accompanied his report with a rudely drawn map showing the coastline from Sabine Pass to a point some distance west of the Trinity.<sup>48</sup>

Governor Ripperdá, alarmed by the report, ordered a new expedition to reconnoiter the entire coastline from the Brazos to the San Jacinto and the Colorado. A sergeant and nineteen men set out immediately for Bucareli, where they were to be joined by thirty militiamen. The party left Bucareli on July 11, but by August 30, 1777, it had not returned. Unfortunately the repeated requests of Croix for a report on the result of this second expedition were unheeded.<sup>49</sup>

Croix consulted Galindo Navarra, the Assessor General, concerning the disposition of the brick. Galindo Navarra pointed out the value of frequent

<sup>48</sup>A tracing of this map is in the Archives Division of the University of Texas. It was partly reproduced by Bolton in *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, opposite page 422.

<sup>49</sup>The account of the expedition to the coast is based on the report of Ripperdá to Croix, August 30, 1777, and the *Dictamen* of Galindo Navarro, Assessor General, June 8, 1779. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 372-376; 377-384.

expeditions to the coast and praised the services rendered by Ibarbo and the settlers of Bucareli. He recommended that the brick be given to the settlers to help them build their homes; that the vessel be examined and if not completely destroyed, an effort should be made to float it again, to repair it, and to use it in the exploration of the bays and inlets along the coast. Croix approved the suggestions, but it does not seem that any effort was made to carry them out.<sup>50</sup>

*Bucareli's legal status.* The establishment of the settlement at Paso Tomás on the Trinity had not received official sanction in 1778. Oconor had objected to it from the beginning, as a violation of the king's *New Regulations of Presidios* of 1772. He had broadly hinted, furthermore, that the real motive of Ibarbo and his companions in choosing the site, had been to engage in prohibited trade and smuggling. Officials in Mexico had conceived a deep-rooted distrust as the result of the report of Captain Luís Cazorla of La Bahía, made on May 14, 1775, concerning the introduction of French tobacco and other goods through Bucareli.<sup>51</sup> On the advice of Areche, Ripperdá had been requested to make an investigation and he was given authority to remove the settlers without further notice, if he deemed it advisable. During the next three years, however, up to the time of his withdrawal from Texas, Governor Ripperdá staunchly defended and supported the unauthorized settlement. In one of his last letters from San Antonio he urged and suggested that the remaining *Adaesanos* in San Antonio should be sent to reënforce Bucareli instead of trying to settle them in Béjar, the Cíbolo, the Guadalupe or the San Marcos as was being discussed at that time.<sup>52</sup>

In spite of Ripperdá's support Bucareli would have been suppressed before this, had it not been that the obdurate Oconor was too much occupied elsewhere to attend to the matter personally, so that before he took definite action he was replaced early in 1777 by the Caballero de Croix, who was appointed *Commandante General* of the Interior Provinces. The new officer was a man of great administrative ability, who in January, 1778, visited Texas in company with Father Fray Juan Agustín Morfi. In his new position he was practically independent of the viceroy, and not being in sympathy with the order for the withdrawal from East Texas, looked

<sup>50</sup>Pedro Galindo Navarro to Teodoro de Croix, June 8, 1779. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 377-384.

<sup>51</sup>Luís Cazorla to the Viceroy, May 14, 1775. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 317-320.

<sup>52</sup>Ripperdá to Croix, January 11, 1778. *Béjar Archives*.

more kindly upon the undecided fate of Bucareli. Before he had time to approve its establishment on the Trinity, however, it will be shown that circumstances developed which forced the settlers to seek refuge in the country of the Tejas Indians.

*Comanche hostilities at Bucareli.* From 1774 to the spring of 1778, the settlers of Bucareli had enjoyed freedom from attack by the dreaded Comanches. This long respite suddenly came to an end in May of that year. The circumstances surrounding the causes of hostility and the attack itself are somewhat clouded in mystery. It seems that on May 5, 1778, a band of Comanche warriors, led by the son of the most redoubtable chieftain of this fierce nation named Evea, appeared in the vicinity of Bucareli late in the afternoon and apparently made their camp for the night. Some settlers, who were returning home from their fields, discovered the unwelcome visitors and alarmed by their sight, made haste to warn the unsuspecting inhabitants of Bucareli. The whole settlement was aroused by the danger that threatened the pioneer outpost. Drums and bugles called and warned the people, who rushed to their houses, procured their arms, and manned the stockade. Others rushed out to round the horses and cattle and drove them into the safety of the corrals. Amidst great commotion and no little confusion the settlement prepared for resistance. Even if due allowance is made for exaggeration and unnecessary excitement, the fact remains that the presence of Comanches in a neighborhood, where they had never been seen before, and the knowledge of their bitter enmity against the Spaniards must have deeply affected the settlers of Bucareli.

As darkness fell and no attack was made, a reconnoitering party set out and soon returned to report that the enemy had fled, terrorized perhaps by the preparations for defense. Their haste had not been so great, however, that they did not find time to take a few stolen horses with them.<sup>53</sup> Ibarbo immediately organized a pursuit party of thirty men and early next morning he took up the fresh trail of the raiders. In true Comanche fashion, however, the enemy had traveled fast all night and put considerable distance between themselves and their pursuers. Ibarbo knew Indian character and did not give up the chase. A day later he

<sup>53</sup>Athanase de Mézières to Teodoro de Croix, November 15, 1778; Ibarbo to Governor Cabello, January 7, 1779; Fray José Francisco Mariano de la Garza to Governor Cabello. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 588-592, 484-490, 482-484. Mézières staunchly maintained the Comanches came to Bucareli looking for him to make peace, but the weight of the evidence is against this contention.

came upon their camp just beyond the Brazos. Feeling secure, the Comanches had relaxed their vigilance, the settlers completely surprised them, killed several and wounded others, routed the remainder, and captured not only the few stolen horses but most of the Indians' own drove.<sup>54</sup>

Ibarbo and his men had acted with resolution and scored a victory over the dreaded enemy. They returned to Bucareli well pleased and not a little elated. But their triumph was to be short-lived. The Comanches were vindictive. The shame of the surprise on the Brazos and the loss of their own horses induced them to plan their vindication. Whatever their purpose may have been in May, there can be no doubt of their evil intent on their second appearance late in October, 1778. Sweeping down upon the unsuspecting settlers, they gave them no time to round up their horses and place them in safety within the corrals. Quickly they drove off between two hundred and two hundred sixty horses and as many if not more head of cattle.<sup>55</sup> Having obtained their purpose, they left as suddenly as they had come, following the same route as before.

Ibarbo and the settlers soon organized a pursuit party and set out to recover their property. It may be said in passing that most of the horses belonged to Nicholas de la Mathe, the former Louisiana Indian trader, who so generously undertook to rebuild the church of Bucareli and who seems to have enjoyed the full confidence of both the Governor and the new *Comandante General*. Before they reached the Brazos, however, they were informed by the scouts sent ahead that about sixty braves lay in ambush at the crossing of the Brazos, where the Spaniards had surprised them before. Ibarbo had only a handful of men. He wisely decided to give up the pursuit and the little band returned empty-handed and discouraged, filled with fear and apprehension for the future. The vindictive Comanches had discovered Bucareli and had avenged their initial failure.

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<sup>54</sup>De Mézières condemns the Spaniards for not having talked to the Comanches before attacking them. "Without asking a question or trying to ascertain their purpose or intent they fired upon them," he says. The criticism seems a bit unjust, knowing the character of the Comanches. It seems, furthermore, there were thirty warriors and thirty Spaniards. The forces were too equally matched and equally well armed to risk being so generous. At any rate, the Comanches certainly would have denied any hostile intention. De Mézières to Croix, November 15, 1778; Governor Cabello to Croix, August 8, 1779. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 588-92, 551-553.

<sup>55</sup>Fray García Botello, an eye-witness, says over two hundred; Father de la Garza says about two hundred sixty. De Mézières put the number at two hundred forty. See letters previously cited. Bolton gives two hundred seventy-five. Bolton, "Spanish Abandonment and Re-occupation of East Texas," *The Quarterly*, Vol. 9, p. 125.

They would continue to return and to raid the place until it was completely destroyed.

In the meantime the Comanches had gone to one of the villages of the Taovayas in the vicinity of present Wichita Falls and there left most of the stolen stock in charge of seven warriors. A band of Tejas and Quitseys, numbering about thirty, undertook to rescue the stolen stock of their friends of Bucareli and attacked the Comanche guard of seven, killed three and drove off the herd. Before the Tejas and Quitseys could reach the safety of their own country and the vicinity of Bucareli, they were overtaken by the infuriated Comanches, who on being told by the survivors what had happened, had gathered their forces, and with a group of friends rushed to recapture the stock. The struggle was short. The Tejas and Quitseys, seeing themselves greatly outnumbered, fled, leaving three of their warriors and the whole herd behind. They brought the news to Bucareli and warned Ibarbo of new reprisals.

*Effect of Comanche hostilities.* It is difficult to tell with certainty that the attacks by the Comanches were wholly responsible for the decision to abandon the site on the Trinity and refound the settlement at Nacogdoches, on the lands of the former Mission of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe. But it must be admitted that the Comanches were the most feared and dreaded foes of the Spaniards, that Bucareli had fortunately escaped their fury until May, 1778, that they had no regular garrison or presidio, and that in case of more determined efforts on the part of the enemy they would have to depend entirely upon their own resources and strength to repel the Comanches. Given these considerations they had reason to be apprehensive. Ibarbo, in reporting the last raid, declared there were ominous signs of a widespread renewal of Indian hostilities and even San Antonio should be on its guard. Friendly Indians had just told him (in December, 1778) that a large party of Tonkawas was congregating at Monte Grande, near the former site of San Xavier (present Rockdale) where a parley with the Comanches was to take place. He also pointed out that early in March De Mézières and himself had visited the Tawakonis and promised to send them a trader. But up to the present the promise had not been kept and these Indians, who were inclined to be friendly and would prove of great value in repelling a general Comanche attack were dissatisfied. To appease them temporarily, Ibarbo told the governor that he, at his own expense, had given the chief a present.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>56</sup>Ibarbo to Governor Cabello, December 7, 1778. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 482-484.

The fears of Ibarbo and the settlers of Bucareli were not entirely unfounded. On January 20, 1779, a party of four hundred friendly Indians had visited San Antonio. But Indians could not be trusted, the governor observed. They came fully armed, there being more than two hundred warriors among them. Chiefs Toyayo, Casusa, José Chiquito (Little Joe), Manteca Mucha (Too Much Fat), and Pato Blanco (White Duck) had insisted on leading their hordes fully armed into the frightened village.

The governor confesses he had only one gunsmith and two sick soldiers in the presidio. The rest of the garrison was out on different duties. Ten had been sent to reconnoiter, twenty had been detailed to escort Governor Ripperdá upon his departure on January 14, twenty were stationed at the new post of Santa Cruz on the Cibolo, and twenty-four had been assigned to look after the horse herd, which numbered one thousand two hundred thirty-two animals and was being pastured some distance south of San Antonio. Governor Cabello was in a real predicament. But his experience in Florida and Nicaragua stood him in good stead. He knew the first requisite in dealing with natives was to keep a bold front. He told the chiefs they could not enter San Antonio with their men armed. They must order them to leave their arms outside of the city. He would then welcome and regale them as befitted friends. The ruse worked. The chiefs brought their men into San Antonio, to the very square, without a bow or arrow, a gun or rifle, a tomahawk or scalping knife. Governor Cabello received them graciously, ordered cigarettes and candy distributed to them, and held a grand feast in honor of his unwelcome guests, who could have destroyed the settlement on the least provocation. Fortunately they left the next day, while the relieved citizens cheered with genuine joy.

Governor Cabello was a practical man, a realist. He proposed at this time that the exemptions from payment of various royal revenues enjoyed by the settlers of the province be abolished, that the revenues be collected with energy and every penny used to enlarge and maintain adequate garrisons in San Antonio and other places until all the Indians were brought under subjection or exterminated. He emphatically declared that Indians could not be trusted. There was no such thing as a friendly Indian, he assured Croix. Even those reared in the missions would revert from time to time to original type. The northern Indians were little better than the Apaches or any other Indians. They were all Indians, moved primarily by selfish interests. Those who received presents and were befriended by

the Spaniards would be friendly in proportion to the gifts and other advantages enjoyed by the recipients.<sup>57</sup>

*Removal to Nacogdoches.* There are indications that shortly after the second Comanche attack in October, the settlers of Bucareli conceived the idea of moving from what they considered an exposed position to the country of the Tejas, where they would have the protection which the total strength of that nation and their allies would afford them. Father Fray Juan García Botello, who had been in Bucareli since 1776, must have left the settlement shortly after the Comanche attack in October, for he was in San Antonio by December. In a written report made to Governor Cabello at this time, we have the first suggestion, sustained by argument, in favor of allowing the settlers now at Paso Tomás on the Trinity to move to the country of the Tejas. He described vividly the miserable condition of the settlers and their just fear of total annihilation by the Comanches. He then explained that the location of the settlement was too exposed to enemy attacks and unhealthy. Basing the suggestion on these premises, he proposed that the settlers be allowed to move some twenty-five or thirty leagues inland, towards the Neches or Angelina in the country of the Tejas. He went further and declared that on the Atoyaque River, where Mission Guadalupe of the Nacogdoches had been once located, was the ideal site for the permanent establishment of the settlers now at Bucareli. Botello specifically advised against suppression of the settlement and the recall of the settlers to San Antonio as was being contemplated by officials in Mexico. He declared that their presence among the tribes in northeast Texas was essential to the maintenance of the friendship of these Indians.<sup>58</sup> It should be kept in mind that neither the site chosen nor the settlement itself had been officially approved and its existence was entirely unauthorized. Here we find the first mention of the intention to move to Nacogdoches rather than closer to San Antonio, paradoxical as the proposal may seem.

Early in January, 1779, Father Fray José Francisco Mariano de la Garza felt impelled by his moral responsibility for the welfare of his parishioners to make a frank report on the almost unbearable conditions that prevailed in Bucareli. The settlers, he declared, were in a serious predicament, torn between feelings of loyalty to the government and

<sup>57</sup>Governor Cabello to Teodore de Croix, April 24, 1778. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 525-536.

<sup>58</sup>Fray Juan García Botello to Governor Cabello, December 23, 1778. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 478-482.



to their starving families, threatened with complete destruction by the infuriated Comanches. Only God and his Holy Mother the Virgin Mary could save them in their present condition. "These miserable inhabitants," he said, "are left in such a deplorable state that they have no way even to hunt for food . . . for they cannot go out to hunt except in large numbers and well armed, nor can they go out together and with their weapons, lest they should leave the settlement helpless. . . . They can follow no other occupation than to be continuously on guard of the horses and the settlement, relieving each other morning and night. The time left free from this fatiguing work they spend in witnessing the need and the misery of their families, unable to furnish daily food by the ordinary work of hunting, fishing, or other similar means, and moreover, without hope of remedy in the future, since the best time for planting wheat has passed and not a grain has been sown up to the present." Rumors of plans for the total destruction of the suffering settlement were brought daily by friendly Indians, who said the Comanches were making alliances and would soon raze Bucareli to the ground and sell the survivors into slavery.

There were only twenty-three guns and rifles in the whole settlement in serviceable condition, and the amount of ammunition for even these arms was insufficient for a prolonged engagement. True, there were four or five cannon, but there was no one who knew how to serve them. The stockade had long since rotted and was worse than useless. Hostile prowlers had repeatedly entered the settlement and left signs interpreted by friendly Indians as threats of total annihilation. Panic reigned and desperation was driving the settlers to extremes. He closed his moving appeal by an urgent request for immediate relief and troops to defend the settlement. If no soldiers could be sent, permission should be granted to the settlers to seek safety and security among the friendly Tejas Indians, the nearest neighbors.<sup>59</sup>

Conditions were rapidly approaching a crisis. Four days after Father Garza wrote to the governor, on January 8, 1779, Ibarbo informed Cabello that the settlers were desperate and had insistently asked to be allowed to retire to the country of the Tejas, there to await the decision of the *Comandante General* concerning the permanent establishment of a settlement. Being without authority in the matter, he had consistently refused to permit them to abandon Bucareli. Ibarbo took the opportunity to praise

<sup>59</sup>Father Garza to Governor Cabello, January 8, 1779. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 484-490.

the advantages of the old site of the abandoned Mission of the Nacogdoches and concluded by stating he was transmitting the request for permission to move and urging that it be either granted or else that adequate protection be given to Bucareli.

The fears of the settlers had been greatly increased by the alarming news that an Indian messenger had just brought. He had declared that a suspicious rendezvous had been called by the Comanches on the Brazos and that these Indians had been prowling on the Navasoto. If panic seized the settlers, they would very likely abandon Bucareli.<sup>60</sup>

*The flight to Nacogdoches.* On January 25, Ibarbo, unable to refuse the settlers' repeated petition to be allowed to abandon Bucareli and to find refuge among the Tejas on the Neches and the Angelina, told them they might do as they pleased. He explained to the viceroy that he could refuse them no longer, because they had been reduced to practical starvation, unable as they were to go either hunting or fishing, or to work their fields, or to tend their herds for fear of attack by the enemy. He had been forced by circumstances to grant the request. "I am giving you notice," he declared, "of the decision taken as well as of the fact that all of the men have left with their families. My people, too, have gone. Only twenty men and myself, with a few families have remained here until the others can return to gather their property which, through fear of the enemy, they have left scattered in the fields. Today the Reverend Father Garza set out on foot, accompanying the sick. With him I have sent the ornaments and sacred vessels belonging to the church. I beg your lordship to give his approval to this measure, which I have also communicated to the *Commandante General*."<sup>61</sup> This letter definitely fixes the date of departure for Nacogdoches, which is further corroborated by a letter of Father Garza, written from Nacogdoches on April 30, showing that by this time, the settlers were already established there.<sup>62</sup>

Having, as he says, the good fortune of accompanying the fleeing settlers, Father Garza gives a vivid picture of their suffering. "I was an eye-witness," he declares, "of the universal anguish of their souls, of the imponderable miseries they suffered, and the hardships they endured on

<sup>60</sup>Ibarbo to Governor Cabello, January 12, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 490-494.

<sup>61</sup>Ibarbo to Governor Cabello, January 27, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 494-496.

<sup>62</sup>Father Garza to Governor Cabello, April 30, 1779. In *Ibid.*, pp. 521-524. pp. 496-499.

the road; of the painful abandonment of their homes and worldly goods, and the loss of all they had worked so hard for in the new settlement."<sup>63</sup> In the haste of leaving to search for safety among the friendly Tejas, one of the fleeing families forgot to put out the fire that burned brightly in the hearth. Shortly afterwards the wind whipped the flames into a roaring conflagration which soon devoured over half of the abandoned log cabins.<sup>64</sup>

Only Ibarbo and his twenty men, with two or three families remained in the deserted and smouldering ruins of the once prosperous but short-lived settlement at Paso Tomás on the Trinity to await the pleasure of Spanish officials. But fate drove them away. On February 14, a devastating flood forced the water beyond the banks of the river for miles. Such cattle and horses as had remained scattered in the woods and fields were all drowned except thirty-eight. The water rose half-way to the top in the houses that had escaped the fire, and the few remaining women and children and Ibarbo and his men barely escaped with their lives on boards and doors which floated them to safety. It took several days to gather the survivors.

But their troubles were not over. Just as they were beginning to recover from the flood and were making preparations to join the others at Nacogdoches, a band of Comanches swooped down upon them early one morning at about six o'clock and like hungry vultures carried away the remaining thirty-eight head of cattle, killing six friendly Indians. Ibarbo and his men obtained canoes and crossed the families to the east bank, preparatory to leaving the now flooded and burnt settlement. Late that evening, as the last boat had started across, a volley was fired from ambush by the lurking Comanches, which fortunately did no harm. Truly does Ibarbo observe that had not the majority of the families departed on January 25, many women and children would have been drowned.<sup>65</sup>

From the sequence of events narrated it is evident that it was the fear of the Comanches that in reality drove the settlers from Bucareli to seek refuge among the Tejas on the Neches and the Angelina. But as an eminent historian has pointed out the withdrawal has been attributed by Spanish officials to the flood of 1779, which did not take place until almost a month after the bulk of the settlers had departed.<sup>66</sup> It was Governor

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 521-522.

<sup>64</sup>Governor Cabello to Croix, February 11, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51,

<sup>65</sup>Ibarbo to Croix, May 13, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 517-521.

<sup>66</sup>Bolton, "Spanish Abandonment and Re-occupation of East Texas," *The Quarterly*, Vol. 9, p. 131.

Cabello who made this error first in reporting the abandonment to Croix.<sup>67</sup>

*Reoccupation of Nacogdoches.* The permanent occupation of present Nacogdoches dates from the arrival on its site of the former settlers of Bucareli. Unfortunately, the exact date cannot be determined. But it certainly was much earlier than May 13 or even May 9, the dates suggested and generally accepted up to this time.<sup>68</sup> It will be necessary to recapitulate the general sequence of events in order to approximate the date, since the removal was not done with the regularity of official incidents. There is no doubt that the bulk of the settlers and their families left Bucareli on January 25, 1779, as attested by Ibarbo on two different occasions and by Father Garza. It is equally well established that on January 27, two days later, Father Garza set out with the sick and ailing. Their destination was the country of the Tejas, with strong evidence, from what Father Botello said more than a month before the departure, that the former site of the abandoned Mission of Guadalupe de los Nacogdoches was their goal. The distance from Bucareli at Paso Tomás on the Trinity to Nacogdoches, according to Ibarbo himself, was a two days' journey. Allowing all the time desired, the families and men, who left between January 25 and 27, must have arrived in Nacogdoches before the end of the first week in February. The high water and floods which had slowed their march and caused them to stay over three months on the road did not occur until February 14. It is unreasonable and illogical to conclude that families fleeing from hostile Indians would have leisurely tarried on the road regardless of floods and high water, instead of making their way to the desired goal. That the bulk went on January 25, Ibarbo again reassures us on May 13, saying, "and it should be added that had not most of the families departed on January 25, there is no doubt, sir, the flood would have caused greater damage, drowning many children and persons made helpless by sickness."

Keeping all these facts in mind, we find that the first document dated at Nacogdoches available up to now is the letter of Father Garza to Croix, written on April 30. He certainly was at Nacogdoches at this time. If he, who according to his own statement, went on foot, accompanying the sick, was in Nacogdoches at this time, those who departed two days before must have been there also. Furthermore, they had been there for a few

<sup>67</sup>Governor Cabello to Croix, February 11, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 496-499.

<sup>68</sup>Bolton, *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*, p. 439.

days, because they had had time to hear of the flood of February 14 and its devastation. Father Garza had taken with him, at Ibarbo's request, the church ornaments and sacred vessels very likely intended to be used in the old mission. It is unlikely to assume that Ibarbo did not know that the mission was standing until he stumbled upon it.

Now Ibarbo and the twenty men who remained in Bucareli with a few families did not leave until after the flood, perhaps eight or ten days later. It is to them that Ibarbo refers in his letter of May 13, when he says: "And going on with all of them in the direction of the Pueblo of the Tejas, distant two days' march, more than one hundred days were spent on the road to get the people together on account of the floods which were general throughout the country." We cannot take the "one hundred days" literally, for we know that Ibarbo himself was in Nacogdoches and wrote from there on May 9, and again on May 13. From February 14 to either of these dates it is much less than one hundred days. It is logical to assume, therefore, that present Nacogdoches was reoccupied by the majority of the settlers of Bucareli before the middle of February, that those who stayed in Bucareli, and some of those who went back before February 14 to bring their belongings continued to stray in until May 13, by which time they were all in Nacogdoches. But if an exact date must be fixed for the formal beginnings, it is safe to agree on April 30, when Father Garza made his formal report.<sup>69</sup> From this time the permanent occupation of present Nacogdoches may be said to date.

*Efforts to secure recognition of Nacogdoches.* The precipitate course of events that forced the settlers of Bucareli to seek refuge among the Tejas and which resulted in the unofficial reoccupation of Nacogdoches had prevented Governor Cabello from replying to the request of the *Comandante General* for an opinion on the advantages and disadvantages of the original location of the unauthorized settlement at Paso Tomás and the advisability of permitting it to remain there. Ibarbo and his companions were aware that the confirmation of the settlement at Bucareli had never received the stamp of official approval. They knew also that officers in Mexico were inclined to recall the settlers to San Antonio in accord with the *New Regulations of 1772*. When they boldly decided to move further still from San Antonio and closer to the abandoned

<sup>69</sup>The conclusion reached is based on a careful examination of the following documents. Father Botello to Governor Cabello, December 23, 1778; Father Garzo to Croix, April 30, 1779; Ibarbo to Cabello, May 9, 1779; Ibarbo to Croix, May 13, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 478-482, 521-524, 539-541, 517-521.

eastern frontier, their first preoccupation was to try to convince the Governor first and then the new *Commandante General* of the advantages of the new site and of the impracticability of returning either to the former site on the Trinity or to San Antonio. When Father García Botello returned to San Antonio shortly after the second Comanche attack, he very definitely advanced arguments in his report to Governor Cabello in favor of moving to Nacogdoches and against the recall of the settlers to San Antonio.<sup>70</sup>

It was Father Garza who made the first formal defence of the new site on the abandoned Mission of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe of the Nacogdoches. In reporting the circumstances that forced the settlers to leave their homes at Paso Tomás, he emphatically stated that a return to Bucareli was impossible. The former site was not only exposed to attack by the Comanches, but the unhealthy climate and the excessive dampness caused by the destructive floods to which it was susceptible made it undesirable for permanent settlement. Furthermore, the entire course of the Trinity was ill-suited for settlement. There was, in fact, no site that offered greater advantages than the one where the settlers had temporarily sought refuge.

The good Father Garza went on to state that some had suggested the possibility of establishing a settlement for the unfortunate *Adaesanos* either on the Brazos or the San Marcos or the Guadalupe. While the intention of those who made the suggestion was praiseworthy, the fact remained that these streams were frequently visited by the Comanches and that the sites proposed were nearer to the country of these relentless enemies than Nacogdoches. It was in these facts, he assured the new *Commandante General*, that the reason for the flight of the settlers of Bucareli in the direction of the country of the Tejas rather than towards San Antonio was to be found. The country around Nacogdoches was firm and free from floods. The site selected for the settlement was between two streams, both with abundant water for all purposes. The climate was more healthy and there were good fields partly cleared within reasonable distance, some of which had formerly been cultivated by the Indians of the mission. The country was particularly suited for the raising of cattle, there being excellent pastures and numerous springs. But the greatest advantage of Nacogdoches was its excellent location in the heart of the

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<sup>70</sup>Father Juan García Botello to Governor Cabello, December 23, 1778. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 478-482.

country of the Tejas, the oldest and best friends of the Spaniards in the province.<sup>71</sup>

Ibarbo repeated most of the arguments advanced by Father Garza. He declared, however, that the reason for his decision to establish the settlers at Nacogdoches had been primarily the existence of the old chapel which would allow the *Padre* to exercise his sacred ministry. The character of the land, the bundance of water and good pastures, and the easy access to materials for the construction of houses, coupled with the safety and security afforded to the settlement by the friendly Indians, made Nacogdoches an ideal haven for the unfortunate settlers of Bucareli.<sup>72</sup>

*Croix's inclination to favor a new site.* Even before he received the reports of Father Garza and Ibarbo, the *Commadante General* had expressed his open-mindedness on the question in a letter to Governor Cabello. The hardships and sufferings of the wretched settlers had enlisted his sympathy. He authorized Governor Cabello, on May 21st, to decide whether they should return to Bucareli or settle permanently in any one of the places suggested by Father Botello, such as the Neches, the Angelina, the Atoyaque, or the former site of the Nacogdoches Mission. Croix reminded the governor that he had requested a detailed report on the whole question of the return of the settlers to East Texas on July 30, 1778.<sup>73</sup>

*Governor Cabello defends Nacogdoches.* In a long report in reply to the request of July 30, 1778, Governor Cabello narrated the antecedents of Bucareli. The opposition of Oconor to the project from the very beginning had resulted in the hasty selection of the site at Paso Tomás, notwithstanding that others better suited to the purpose might have been found. Although subsequent events had conclusively proved that the choice had been ill-advised, nevertheless, the settlement of Bucareli by the wandering exiles from Los Adaes had been beneficial to the interests of the King and to the propagation of the faith. As a result, Father José de la Garza had been able to induce forty Xaraname families to return to the Mission of Espíritu Santo after seventeen years of apostacy. Ibarbo and his companions had successfully kept a watch on the coast and pre-

<sup>71</sup>Father José Francisco Mariano de la Garza to Caballero de Croix, April 30, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 521-524.

<sup>72</sup>Ibarbo to Croix, May 13, 1779. In *Ibid.*, pp. 517-521.

<sup>73</sup>Teodoro de Croix to Governor Domingo Cabello, July 30, 1778; same to same, May 21, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 478, 499-501.

vented serious incursions by foreigners. Furthermore, Bucareli on its original location had served as an outpost to register the state of mind of the numerous natives that lived in that region. The return of this brave little band of settlers had appeased the northern tribes, who had become embittered by the withdrawal of the Spaniards from Los Adaes.

But the site of Paso Tomás on the Trinity, where the settlement had subsisted for four years waiting authorization for its permanence, had now been abandoned for the reasons already stated. The settlers had chosen a new location at the site of the former Mission of the Nacogdoches. The settlement would continue to render the same services at Nacogdoches, the Governor declared, that it had at Paso Tomás. But on its new location it had some added advantages, such as the protection afforded to the settlers by the friendly northern tribes, the possibility of irrigation, and the healthier climate. The chief objection was the greater distance to San Antonio and to the coast. But the former was offset by the proximity to the friendly Indians of East Texas, while the latter was not so much greater than before, so that a watch on the coast could be maintained.

The governor concluded his report by stating that the number of settlers now at Nacogdoches was small and inadequate for self-defense. According to the last census available, made at the close of 1777, there were one hundred and twenty-five men, including fifty-three militiamen; eighty-nine women, sixty-four boys and sixty-four girls; and five slaves, making a total of three hundred and forty-seven persons in all. The number could not insure the effective defence of the new settlement. While it was clear that troops should be assigned for their protection, the governor deplored his inability to spare a single man from the Presidio of San Antonio or the new Fort of Santa Cruz on the Cíbolo.<sup>74</sup>

*A garrison for Nacogdoches suggested.* No sooner did Ibarbo and his settlers arrive in Nacogdoches than they began to emphasize the need of a garrison to protect the settlers and to inspire greater respect for Spanish authority, promoting thereby better trade relations. On May 9, Ibarbo wrote Croix that there was much dissatisfaction among the friendly Indians in East Texas. This was attributable to the failure of the Spaniards to send trading agents as promised. The Indian chiefs had grown accustomed to receive gifts for trading privileges and now expected them. To restrict trade with the Indians, as Oconor had attempted to do,

<sup>74</sup>Governor Cabello to Teodoro de Croix, May 31, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 501-507.



would only encourage smuggling and bring foreigners into the land. How far the resentment of friendly Indians to the curtailment of trade would go was shown during Oconor's time by attacks and raids made on San Antonio by former friendly tribes.<sup>75</sup> It is to be noted that this suggestion was eventually carried into effect and that it was Ibarbo who was charged with the supervision of Indian trade.

Not long after the settlers were established at Nacogdoches, they were visited by Nicholas de la Mathe, the French trader, now under Spanish employ. When in June, La Mathe left Nacogdoches for San Antonio with a train of mules, horses, and cattle, part of which belonged to Ibarbo and the settlers, he was unexpectedly attacked by the Tawakoni Indians not far from Nacogdoches. In the engagement that followed, the *Alferes* Juan de Mora was killed, and a soldier, Pedro González, suffered a broken leg. The enemy succeeded in driving away a good number of mules and horses, and the party, led by La Mathe was forced to return to Nacogdoches. Ibarbo immediately went out with twenty-six men to recover the remains of Mora, to escort eight messengers as far as Ojo de Agua, and to give aid, if necessary, to a party of hunters from the settlement who had gone to the Colorado in search of food.

While at San Pedro, one of the villages of the Tejas, he had learned how a large number of Comanches had recently brought many Spanish captives from New Mexico to one of the villages of the Taovayas. Here a French trader bought a woman and a child and took them to Natchitoches, going ten leagues north of Nacogdoches in order to avoid the Spanish settlement.

Ibarbo assured the governor that the discontent prevalent among the Indians in northeast Texas was growing and that even those who had formerly been friendly were now becoming hostile, because of the failure of the Spaniards to keep their word with regard to trade. Just recently, the Orcoquisacs, Bidais, and other coastal tribes had planned to raid La Bahía and to steal horses from the missions there. Fortunately, he had been able to dissuade them from their purpose. Ibarbo concluded by urging the need of a trading post and a garrison at Nacogdoches. The Indian pueblos in the vicinity, in his opinion, should be visited more frequently in order to maintain their friendship and allegiance. The Indians, he said, were more inclined to evil than to good and the booty from raids on Spanish settlements was always a strong and irresistible temptation.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>75</sup>Ibarbo to Croix, May 9, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 539-541.

<sup>76</sup>Ibarbo to Governor Cabello, June 13, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 541-544.

Governor Cabello became worried over the threatening attitude of the so-called friendly Indians. He was surprised at the insolence of the natives who, while claiming to be friendly, committed depredations and openly insulted the Spaniards. "The Indians," he said, "within our own borders are as covetous as those outside; in a word, they are all Indians." He urged Croix to take immediate steps to appease the nations of north-east Texas by sending trading agents.<sup>77</sup>

By the end of August, Governor Cabello had become convinced that the solution to the problem of growing Indian discontent and Comanche hostilities was the establishment of a garrison at Nacogdoches. He informed Croix, on August 31, that the most important consideration to aid the settlers now at Nacogdoches and to appease the Indians was to authorize the establishment of a military garrison. This could be made up in its entirety from enlisted volunteers recruited among the settlers. If there were not enough men at Nacogdoches, half of them could be enlisted in San Antonio. The force should consist of an officer, a sergeant, two corporals, and twenty soldiers. The officer in charge could be assigned twenty-two *pesos* a month, the sergeant eighteen, the corporals fifteen, and the soldiers twelve. This would imply a monthly expense of three hundred and ten *pesos*, or an annual expenditure of three thousand seven hundred twenty *pesos*. In the opinion of the governor, men could be secured for the salaries indicated if these were paid in cash. Under the arrangement proposed, there would be a competent detachment of troops always on duty, who could meet any emergency without the need of calling upon San Antonio for aid. Furthermore, the payment of the men in cash would prove a great incentive to the settlers, who had no other source for cash sale of their products.<sup>78</sup> The concrete plan proposed by Governor Cabello received careful consideration and eventually resulted in the establishment of a garrison at Nacogdoches.<sup>79</sup>

*Recognition of Nacogdoches.* The *Comandante General* referred the matter of the approval to Pedro Galindo Navarro, an able and judicious-minded adviser. In a remarkable report this officer reviewed the whole case and made the recommendations that resulted in the approval of the settlement on the former site of Mission Nacogdoches. He pointed out that the original question of authorizing the settlers to remain at Bucareli

<sup>77</sup>Governor Cabello to Teodoro de Croix, June 20, 1779. In *Ibid.*, pp. 537-538.

<sup>78</sup>Governor Cabello to Croix, August 31, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 551-553.

<sup>79</sup>The development of Nacogdoches will be the subject of a chapter in Volume V.

had been changed before a decision was reached as to whether they should be allowed to establish themselves at Nacogdoches. Was that as good a location and was it advisable to establish a permanent post there?

Governor Cabello agreed with the settlers in the choice, but De Mézières, who had personally inspected Paso Tomás and the site of the old mission was not of the same opinion. During the first visit of De Mézières to Bucareli, in March, 1778, this poignant observer had praised in unstinted terms its beauty, its natural resources, and its strategic location. When a little over a year later he visited Nacogdoches, he had reported that the new site, while not lacking in beauty, offered less advantages for a permanent settlement than Bucareli. The stream near Nacogdoches had high banks, which precluded the possibility of irrigation; the soil was not so rich, being better suited to cattle raising than agriculture; and the settlers had already lost the first crop. As a matter of fact, De Mézières painted a dismal picture of conditions at Nacogdoches in contrast with the encouraging reports of Ibarbo and his friends. He went as far as to say that the condemnation of the site of Bucareli on the Trinity on the grounds of its susceptibility to floods was unfounded, there being many places nearby where the houses could have been built, that were not subject to overflow.<sup>80</sup> The well-known character of this trusted officer made his objections worthy of consideration.

In view of the circumstances Galindo Navarro concluded by recommending that since the return of the settlers to San Antonio, as provided by the *New Regulations of 1772*, was out of the question, a special inspection of Bucareli and Nacogdoches should be made by the Governor of Texas. Upon his report concerning the relative merits of the two and of the attitude of the northern tribes, final approval could be given to the site thought best suited for the permanent settlement of the former inhabitants of Los Adaes.<sup>81</sup>

Croix lost no time in acting upon the recommendations of Galindo Navarro. On January 29, he sent Governor Cabello a copy of the report and requested him to make the corresponding inspection and report. He expressed his highest confidence in the integrity and zeal of the governor and assured him he could think of no other person to whom he could entrust so delicate a mission. If his state of health or his time did not

<sup>80</sup>De Mézières to Croix, March 18, 1778; same to same, August 23, 1779. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 592-595.

<sup>81</sup>Dictamen del Asesor General Pedro Galinda Navarro, January 18, 1780. In *Ibid.*, pp. 555-573.

permit his undertaking the exploration and investigation personally, Croix gave Governor Cabello full power to appoint anyone in whom he could place full trust.

When the governor received the letter of the *Comandante General*, he was at La Bahía, suffering from a dislocated left arm as the result of a fall from a horse. He replied that he was flattered by the confidence placed in him, but that the investigation requested would require much time and would involve considerable expense. The condition of his arm and the depleted state of his personal finances made it impossible for him to undertake the investigation immediately, but if necessary, he was willing to sacrifice his comfort and well-being. There was, however, a greater obstacle, the need of a person well versed in geography and the art of map-making to accompany him to draw accurate and reliable maps and plans of the two sites. If Croix could supply him with such a person, in whose judgment and ability full confidence could be placed, the governor was willing to set out immediately upon his arrival. Cabello made it clear to Croix that he was fully aware of the intrigues that had played so powerful a part in obstructing the approval of the original settlement at Bucareli and of the criticism already advanced against the obvious reasons that had forced the removal to Nacogdoches. He was anxious to avoid being drawn into a controversy that could only bring undeserved censure upon his long and loyal career.<sup>82</sup>

The frank and earnest appeal of the scrupulous Cabello met with an equally frank refusal. Croix wrote him in June, 1780, that he sympathized with his sickness and deplored the inability to aid him financially, there being no available fund for the investigation at this time. While it was true that he had two engineers in his office, it was impossible to spare the services of either to accompany him in his expedition. Croix reiterated his high opinion of the governor and his ability to undertake the investigation alone.<sup>83</sup> Governor Cabello apparently did not deem it necessary to carry out a new investigation, when in his mind he was convinced that Nacogdoches was a better site than Bucareli. The untimely death of De Mézières in January, had removed the only serious objector to the new settlement, and Croix had intimated his satisfaction with Nacogdoches and practically left the decision to him. Consequently, without formal action, by tacit consent, the permanent settlement of Nacogdoches was

<sup>82</sup>Governor Cabello to Teodoro de Croix, April 1, 1770. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 574-579.

<sup>83</sup>Croix to Cabello, June 19, 1780. In *Ibid.*, pp. 579-582.

finally recognized. The assignment of a salary of five hundred *pesos* a year to Ibarbo in October, 1779, and the conferring of the title of Captain of the militia and Lieutenant Governor of the Pueblo of Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Nacogdoches upon him confirmed the official recognition of the new settlement,<sup>44</sup> destined to become the most important outpost on the eastern frontier and the center of Spanish-Indian trade to the time of the appearance of the first Anglo-American settlers.

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<sup>44</sup>Croix to Cabello, October 15, 1779; Cabello to Croix, December 17, 1779; Cabello to Ibarbo, March 11, 1780. *Bexar Archives*, University of Texas.

## CHAPTER IX

### BEGINNING OF SECULARIZATION IN SAN ANTONIO

When in 1778 the newly appointed *Comandante General* Teodoro de Croix visited San Antonio in company with Fray Juan Agustín Morfi, future historian of Texas, the little settlement founded with so much suffering and so many sacrifices had grown into a sturdy, self-sufficient, and energetic frontier outpost. The Canary Islanders and those who joined them, despite untold hardships, had become definitely established. The missions, likewise, had been replaced by substantial stone and mortar buildings, with chapels that would grace regular parishes, comfortable living quarters for the missionaries and the neophytes, and granaries well stocked with the bounty of abundant crops. But with material and physical progress they had reached the stage where the missionaries must move on to new frontiers or return to their College of Zacatecas. The number of Indians under instruction had been reduced greatly; the older neophytes had intermarried with mestizos and others; the process of Christianization and civilization had been accomplished so well, that the continued existence of the original missions could hardly be justified now. They had done their work and had accomplished their purpose. They were ready to pass on.

It is interesting to note at this point the influence which remote Los Adaes in east Texas had upon the founding, development, and ultimate fate of San Antonio and its missions. The need of a halfway station caused a settlement to be founded on the San Antonio River in 1718. A few years later the abolishment of the Presidio de los Tejas caused the Querétaran missionaries to retire from east Texas and to found three additional missions in San Antonio. When in 1773, the former settlers of Los Adaes were ordered to abandon the eastern frontier made useless in view of the Louisiana cession, it could not have been foreseen that the ultimate effect of the recall was to set in motion the process of secularization that was to mark the passing of the missions into history. The removal of the former inhabitants of Los Adaes to San Antonio was not the cause of secularization of the missions, but the activity of the *Adaesanos* called to the attention of Spanish officials the fact that the missions in this community had served their purpose and were ready to be converted into regular parishes and to have their property distributed on an equitable basis.

*Former settlers of Los Adaes ask for relief.* While in 1774 a group of the more determined and energetic settlers of east Texas set out with Gil Ibarbo to found Nuestra Señora de Bucareli, many others remained in San Antonio, where they had been promised lands and the means of starting life anew. Some of these settlers eventually joined the others in Bucareli, but others continued to wait in San Antonio for the promised relief. The visit of the *Comandante General* in December 1777 and January 1778 was the occasion for the last remaining refugees from East Texas to make a concerted effort for relief. Agustín Rodríguez headed the group of sixty-three former citizens of Los Adaes who presented a formal request for aid. Alleging that they had abandoned their lands, property, and all worldly possessions in compliance with the orders issued by the king and the promise that they would be resettled in San Antonio, they requested the fulfillment of the promise. Rodríguez described their sufferings and privations which had reduced them to beggars during the four long years of waiting. He asked that a place where they could be settled should be decided upon and that they be given the necessary aid to start life anew.<sup>1</sup>

*Recommendations for aid to settlers.* At the time the request was made Croix and his advisers were in San Antonio, where a meeting was being held by frontier commanders from Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Texas. The matter was referred to Pedro Galindo Navarro, Assessor General, who made an interesting report four days later. He declared that the former citizens of Los Adaes were not needed to reënforce San Antonio, because this outpost was now able to withstand successfully any attack, and even to take the offensive if necessary. If the *Adaesanos*, therefore, did not want to stay in San Antonio, there was no reason for insisting on it. Furthermore, it had been repeatedly said that there were not sufficient lands with irrigation in the vicinity.

Under the circumstances the citizens of Los Adaes could be used to found a settlement on a site more advantageous to the general defence of the frontier and their future welfare. The government was morally bound to assist them in the selection of the locality where they were to establish their new homes, providing them with the indispensable supplies, tools and seed to enable them to live and plant their first crop. The governor, the Captain of La Bahía, and the city council of San

<sup>1</sup>Agustín Rodríguez to the Governor and the *Comandante General*, January 4, 1778. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 393-394. The petition is signed by the sixty-three heads of families.

Antonio should be requested to make recommendations as to possible sites, keeping in mind the advantages offered both for future development and for the general defence of the province; to estimate the expense of the new settlement; and to suggest means for defraying it.<sup>2</sup>

Croix, who sympathized with the settlers, followed the recommendations of the Assessor General and requested Governor Ripperdá, Captain Cazorla of La Bahía, and the *Cabildo* of San Antonio to report on the subject in order that the remaining citizens of Los Adaes might be permanently and advantageously settled and that these actions be in accord with the best interest of the king.

Although Governor Cabello was already in San Antonio, Governor Ripperdá had not turned over the government to him. On January 11, 1778, he replied to Croix that the majority of the former settlers of Los Adaes had already left San Antonio and had founded the new settlement of Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Bucareli, where they had been since 1774. Those who were still in San Antonio were not sufficient to found another settlement as suggested. A wiser course would be to send them to Bucareli to reinforce that post, which had been seriously weakened by an epidemic in which seventeen persons had died. Governor Ripperdá was unaware of the fact that at this very time Gil Ibarbo and his colony were about to move to the former site of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de los Nacogdoches. Ignorant of what was transpiring, he emphasized the importance of the new settlement on the Trinity as a trading center and point of contact with the northern tribes, whose friendship was so important, and as a point of observation to check foreign incursions.

Having expressed his opinion, he declared that if in spite of the facts indicated, the government desired to found another settlement for the small number of *Adaesanos* now in San Antonio, there were several suitable sites for that purpose. The best, however, was at the headwaters of the San Marcos, about eighteen leagues northeast of San Antonio. Irrigation was possible, and there were good lands for cultivation and for pastures, extending from the San Marcos to the Guadalupe. In this area there were also abundant buffalo and wild cattle that would contribute a good food supply for the new settlement.

But the site was on the main route of the Comanches, who generally came through this region to raid the San Antonio and La Bahía missions.

<sup>2</sup>Pedro Galindo to Teodoro de Croix, January 8, 1778. In *Ibid.*, Vol. 51, pp. 394-396.



Consequently the establishment of a settlement there would require an adequate garrison for its protection of forty-five or fifty men. The fortification of the proposed site on the San Marcos, however, would make the maintenance of the garrison at La Bahía in its present strength unnecessary. A much smaller number of men there would suffice, if a strong garrison was placed on the San Marcos to check the raids of the Comanches before they penetrated to the coast.

As to the aid required by the settlers, the governor thought they would have to be supplied with oxen, agricultural implements, tools, domestic animals such as hens, goats, and sheep, and should be allowed subsistence rations or their equivalent until the first crop was raised.<sup>3</sup>

The second to reply was the *Cabildo* of the Villa de San Fernando, whose sympathy was with the *Adaesanos*. Aware of the strong recommendation for a settlement on the San Marcos by the governor and of the advantages that such a settlement would bring to them indirectly, they agreed with the proposal, adding a few more reasons for its establishment. They were more concrete in the needs of the settlers, however, and stated that in addition to implements, tools, and working animals, they should be allowed about fifty cents a day for maintenance. Furthermore, they should be accorded the right to employ mission Indians from San Antonio to help them cultivate the fields at first, paying them the corresponding wages. While it was true that the new settlement and the establishment of a garrison for its protection would involve considerable expense, this would eventually be justified by the development of ranches and the settlement of the rich pasture lands between the San Marcos and the Guadalupe.<sup>4</sup>

But the *Cabildo* went into the subject more fully. If the site on the San Marcos was not thought advisable, they suggested as second choice the springs of the Guadalupe, located seven leagues south of the San Marcos River (present New Braunfels). These were only thirteen leagues (thirty-two miles) from San Antonio. While land available for cultivation was not as extensive, it could be irrigated. There were also abundant timber, good pastures, convenient quarries, and extensive pasture lands. But the Guadalupe Springs were as much exposed to Comanche raids as

<sup>3</sup>Governor Ripperdá to Croix, January 11, 1778. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 399-401.

<sup>4</sup>*Cabildo y Regimiento* to Croix, January 13, 1778. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 402-406.

the headwaters of the San Marcos and the settlement would still need a strong garrison for protection.

There was another location at a group of springs on the west bank of the Guadalupe River, downstream, known as El Capote (present Seguin). This was about twenty-five leagues east of San Antonio. The water was not as abundant as at either of the two preceding sites mentioned, but there were good timber, excellent grazing land, wild horses and cattle, and traces of rich mineral deposits. But it was as exposed to Comanche raids as either the San Marcos or the Guadalupe.

The members of the *Cabildo* said further that the new location on the Cíbolo, where the Post of Santa Cruz had been established, might be suited for the purpose. But speaking frankly, there were not sufficient lands suitable for cultivation to insure the future development of the settlement and irrigation was impossible.

*First proposal for secularization.* Lastly, there was the possibility of settling the remaining *Adaesanos* on the lands assigned to Mission Valero (present Alamo). This was unquestionably the best location and the solution to the problem. This old mission, the *Cabildo* declared, had the best lands and its irrigation ditches were better than those of all the other missions and the Villa de San Fernando itself. In recent years the number of Indians had greatly decreased. In a census made in 1777, only forty-two persons had been listed. Of these sixteen were married, five were widowers, eight were bachelors, and thirteen were children. The total was less than in any other mission and such as were now in Valero were fully civilized. By secularizing this mission and giving its lands to the few remaining Indians and the unfortunate *Adaesanos* now in San Antonio, the royal treasury would be saved the expense of maintaining two missionaries and the greater drain of a new garrison, that of San Antonio being sufficient to protect the settlers in their new lands, with only the river between the old mission and the presidio.<sup>5</sup> Here is to be found the germ of the idea of secularization.

While the *Cabildo* strongly urged the settlement of the *Adaesanos* on the mission lands of Valero, Captain Luís Cazorla of La Bahía favored a site on the Cíbolo. He suggested that the *Adaesanos* be settled on the site occupied by the Post of Santa Cruz and that the garrison be moved to some other locality close to the same creek where the soldiers could protect more efficiently the ranches between the San Marcos and the

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 402-406; Census of inhabitants of Bucareli. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, p. 430.

Guadalupe. He opposed the establishment on either of these streams because of the need of a new garrison.<sup>6</sup>

The recommendations reached Croix in due time, but more pressing matters occupied his attention and no immediate action was taken to relieve the suffering remnants of the former settlers of Los Adaes. In the meantime their situation grew worse and they became more insistent. In March, 1778, Croix, unwilling to adopt hasty measures but conscious of the extremes to which the *Adaesanos* had been reduced, instructed Governor Cabello to request the Father President of the missions in San Antonio to coöperate by giving them temporary relief in some form. The governor wrote Father Ramírez de Arellano and asked him to give the former citizens of Los Adaes temporary employment in the mission farms, paying them wages that would enable them to live, or to allow them to cultivate some of the fields that now lay fallow for lack of neophytes to plant them. He made it clear that in either case he was anxious that the mission Indians should suffer no injury or damage in their interests.<sup>7</sup> Here we have a case of unemployment put up to the president of the missions for solution by the institution of a program of public works for the relief of the victims.

*Liberal response of Father Ramírez de Arellano.* With characteristic Christian charity, Father Ramírez de Arellano replied the following day that he was ready and willing to help the unfortunate settlers by ceding to them for a period of two, four, or more years the use of the two large farms formerly cultivated by Indians of Mission Valero, which had irrigation and could be easily planted, waiving the payment of any rent to the mission in the form of shares in the crops raised in order that the *Adaesanos* might enjoy to the fullest the fruit of their labor. He went further and assured Governor Cabello he was anxious to coöperate and to comply with the praiseworthy request of the *Comandante General*. If the cultivation of the two farms ceded was unacceptable to the settlers under the terms proposed because of the lack of means to put it into effect and the long wait before a crop was raised, Father Ramírez de Arellano agreed to give them employment in the mission farms, paying them monthly wages and giving them weekly rations. He assured the governor that the rate of pay would be in accord with the highest schedule of wages in vogue in the vicinity, and he would furnish them oxen, the necessary

<sup>6</sup>Luis Cazorla to Croix, in *Ibid.*, Vol. 51, pp. 407-408.

<sup>7</sup>Governor Cabello to Fray Pedro Ramírez de Arellano, March 21, 1778. *A. G. M. - Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 308-409.

farm implements, and tools for the construction of houses. If they agreed to come to live in Mission Valero either to cultivate the two of its farms independently or work for wages and rations until the government decided their ultimate destination, the Father President offered to build a special chapel to enable them to attend services independently of the Indians; he agreed to administer to them all the sacraments without stipend, and to do anything within reason to alleviate their suffering.<sup>8</sup>

But although Father Ramírez de Arellano was willing to help the suffering *Adaesanos* generously, he was fully aware that human nature is weak and that the present plight of the remaining settlers in San Antonio was not due entirely to fate and an unfair deal. Willing as he was to aid and comfort the worthy, he asked Governor Cabello that in either case proposed, the government should appoint an overseer or agent to compel the settlers to work regularly in order that the land assigned to them should be utilized to the fullest extent and as much grain as possible should be raised in accord with the desire of Croix. He concluded by frankly stating that he would regret the waste of land and the consumption of supplies by individuals, who in the name of distress and misfortune desired at heart to live and dress without sufficiently exerting themselves.<sup>9</sup>

*Reaction to Father Ramírez de Arellano's proposal.* Governor Cabello called together the *Adaesanos* on April 5, 1778, and read to them the offer made by the Father President of the missions for their temporary relief. They listened in silence and showed little or no enthusiasm. There were forty-four men present, varying in age from fourteen to over sixty years. Asked what they thought of the alternate proposals just read, they replied they could give no answer because all were not present. They suggested that a committee of three be appointed to interview those absent, and that three days be allowed them for a formal reply. Agustín Rodríguez, Bernardo Cerventes, and Miguel de la Cerda were appointed and charged with the duty of questioning each and every one not present.

Three days later, on April 8, Rodríguez and his companions solemnly declared that all the former settlers of Los Adaes, of whom there were now sixty-three heads of families left, fully appreciated the generous offer to help them made by Father Ramírez de Arellano. They were reluctant to accept, however, because since the lands belonged to the mission Indians in the final analysis and titles were vested in them,

<sup>8</sup>Fray Pedro Ramírez de Arellano to Governor Cabello, January (March) 22, 1778. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, p. 510.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, p. 411.

they feared they would be constantly involved in complaints made by the Indians and accusations of ungratefulness by officials for favors bestowed. Under the circumstances they preferred to continue to earn a scanty livelihood and live on public charity as they had done up to the present, rather than to undertake to cultivate and plant the farms, build houses, and make permanent improvements in the missions, while waiting for the decision of the *Comandante General* as to their ultimate destination. They specifically referred to the concluding sentence of Father Ramírez de Arellano's communication and resented the slur cast upon their character by the insinuation.<sup>10</sup> But in all justice, it should be kept in mind that the majority of the settlers had sought out a solution by returning to Bucareli and that only those who lacked initiative and willingness to earn a living by personal exertion had remained in San Antonio, content to eke out a meager existence at the expense of the citizens.

At this time Father Ramírez de Arellano was residing at San José Mission. In San Juan Capistrano was Fray José Luís Mariano de Cárdenas, while at Mission Espada Fray Pedro Moreno was located. Mission Concepción was being tended by Fray José Francisco López, and the old Mission of Valero was being administered by Fray José María Salas.<sup>11</sup>

Governor Cabello was disappointed with the stand taken by the *Adaesanos* and seems to have tried to convince them of the advisability of accepting the temporary relief offered. Convinced of the futility of his efforts, he finally transmitted copies of the proceedings to Croix on June 1, 1778.<sup>12</sup>

*Proposal for secularization of Mission Valero.* Almost a year elapsed before the meticulous Assessor General, on whose fair judgment Croix depended, made a report on the problem of settling the remnants of the former citizens of Los Adaes. He reviewed the whole question. It seemed that the Villa of San Fernando and the five missions on the San Antonio had claims on all the available lands suited for cultivation. Consequently, the remaining settlers from Los Adaes had to find homes elsewhere.

Several sites had been suggested for this purpose, mainly on the San Marcos, the Guadalupe, and the Cíbolo, but in each case the establishment of the remaining families in the localities suggested involved the need

<sup>10</sup>Auto del Gobernador Cabello, April 5, 1778; Comunicación de Agustín Rodríguez, Bernardo Cervante, y Miguel de la Cerda. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 412-415; 416-417; 428-429.

<sup>11</sup>*A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 420-421.

<sup>12</sup>Governor Cabello to Croix. June 10, 1778. *Ibid.*, p. 422.

of a new garrison in addition to the inevitable expense of settling the families. Both expenditures required the expressed approval of the king, a procedure that would consume considerable time, an element that was precious in view of the dire distress of the petitioners, who were in need of immediate relief. The Assessor General expressed fear lest the remaining families from Los Adaes driven by desperation should seek refuge in the interior. There was urgent need, in his opinion, to do something to keep them together until the question of founding a new settlement with and for them was decided.

Under these circumstances there was but one solution: to establish them on the site of old Mission Valero. This mission, with its extensive farms, excellent system of irrigation, and rich grazing lands, was just across the river from the Presidio of San Antonio de Béjar. The Indians living in the mission were so few that even now the farms were being cultivated with the aid of Spanish labor, employed by the missionaries at relatively low wages. The maintenance of the mission cost the royal treasury nine hundred *pesos* a year paid to two missionaries. This expense was unnecessary because the few remaining Indians could attend services in the church of the Villa de San Fernando, which was less than three hundred paces away, just across the river. The lands of the mission could be distributed among the former citizens of Los Adaes, keeping the best for the neophytes, but placing them all within the jurisdiction of the Villa de San Fernando. These plans would obviate the expense of transportation, maintenance, and establishment of a new garrison required if any other site was chosen. Furthermore, it would strengthen San Antonio by extending its limits to include the new settlers on the mission lands.<sup>13</sup>

*Plan for secularization of Mission Valero.* Having expressed the strong reasons for the suppression of the old mission, the *Asesor General* proceeded to outline a plan for carrying it into effect. He recommended that instructions be issued to Governor Cabello to make a formal inventory of all the property of the mission, its lands, cattle, farming implements, domestic animals, and farm products stored in its granary. He should then order the withdrawal of the two missionaries and join the remaining Indians to the parish of the Villa de San Fernando, where they were to go for all spiritual ministrations.

When the lands of the mission were duly surveyed and defined, these

<sup>13</sup>Dictamen del Asesor General Pedro Galindo Navarro. June 2, 1779. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 431-447.

should be declared to form part of the jurisdiction of the Villa by formal proclamation. They should then be divided into convenient plats and their respective limits marked with stone and mortar mounds. The former neophytes should be given first choice in the selection of their plats, each one drawing his portion by lot. The remaining lands were to be distributed in the same manner to the settlers of Los Adaes, giving to each one of them possession of their respective farm lands. The extensive pastures were to be disposed of in the same manner, reserving a portion for the communal lands of the Villa.

The implements and the tools as well as the grain and other products stored in the granary, and all the domestic animals and the cattle were to be equitably distributed among the mission Indians to whom they rightly belonged. The same was to be observed with regard to the mission houses, but those left over might be given to the new settlers.

The streets of the Villa were to be extended to the mission and its pueblo, and the lands enclosed within the mission walls were to be divided into building lots. These were to be distributed to the settlers at a public drawing and assigned to them for the construction of their houses. The Indians were to be allowed to draw their lots first.

Within four years after the new settlers were formally put in possession of the apportioned building lots, farm lands, and pastures, they were to fence them, build their houses, and cultivate the land. Failure to build permanent houses and make improvements on their lands forfeited the right of the holders to the property, which was then to be declared vacant and given to more worthy settlers. Furthermore, no settler could sell or transfer any part of the land assigned to him, nor his building lot during the first four years. After this period the consent of the governor was required and a certified statement that the party disposing of his property had fulfilled the terms of the grant by making the prescribed improvements. But under no circumstances could any of the lands distributed pass into *mortmain*. Such a transfer was to be null and void and the property involved was to revert to the public domain of the king.

The settlers receiving land under the conditions outlined were to incur other obligations. They were to be required to provide themselves with arms and horses and to be subject to call for inspection by the governor as often as that official deemed it proper. While not expected to render regular military duty, they were to be ready at all times to aid in repelling attack and to pursue the enemy whenever ordered to do so by the governor.

The *Asesor General* further recommended that the governor of the

province be given discretion in carrying out the secularization under the plan outlined, and that he be authorized to make such regulation as he might deem necessary.<sup>14</sup>

*Approval of plan by Croix.* The recommendation of Galindo Navarro met with the hearty approval of the *Commandante General*. On June 8, 1779, he ordered a copy of the report sent to Governor Cabello with instructions for putting the plan into operation and a request to report the action taken. The parish priest of the Villa de San Fernando was to be informed of his duties to the mission Indians, who were to become his parishioners under the new plan. The Father President was to be likewise notified of the resolution taken, and asked to withdraw the two missionaries from Mission Valero. The Bishop of Nuevo León, in whose jurisdiction the mission was located, was to be sent a copy of the recommendations and of all the measures taken pursuant thereto for his information. Lastly, the king was to be informed of the plan adopted and put into execution for his final approval.<sup>15</sup>

*Postponement of secularization.* The exact reasons for the failure to carry into effect the plans so carefully outlined are not clear, but some of the influences at work may be deduced from the touching appeal made by Bernardo Cervantes two years later. It seems that on October 20, 1780, this aged pioneer set out from San Antonio on foot, and after many hardships arrived in Chihuahua City sick and half-starved. He appeared before Croix on January 21, 1781, and explained that in spite of his age and poverty, he had taken the desperate resolution of making the long pilgrimage on foot and without permission from the governor, because repeated appeals made by him and his companions had apparently never been forwarded. The remaining settlers from Los Adaes had by now been reduced to fifty families besides some widows and orphan children, who if not given aid would soon die of starvation and suffering. He declared that nothing had been done concerning the secularization of Mission Valero and that it seemed it would never be put into effect. Shortly before setting out, he had gone to Governor Cabello and asked permission to repair his miserable hut (*jacal*). His request had been refused on the

<sup>14</sup>Dictamen del Asesor General al Commandante General Croix, June 2, 1779. In *Ibid.*, pp. 431-447.

<sup>15</sup>Decreto de Teodoro de Croix, June 8, 1779. *A. G. M. Historia*, Vol. 51, p. 447. Copies of this and all other documents cited relative to the proposed secularization of Mission Valero at this time are found also in *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-4-9 (Dunn Transcripts, 1777-1780), pp. 85-131.



grounds that he should build a decent house. To this he had replied that he had neither the land on which to build it, nor the means with which to do it. He had then asked permission to go to Chihuahua, but this, also, was refused, whereupon he had come anyway.

He described the deplorable conditions to which the settlers had been reduced by their prolonged suffering. But it seems they were being allowed twenty-five cents a day for food, the first dole in Texas. This amount, Cervantes declared, was inadequate, providing only the means for two meals a day, if the recipient was willing to live on *tortillas* (corn pancakes) and chili. Such a diet, he assured Croix, would undermine the health of any individual and end by ruining him.

Recently their afflictions had been increased by the demands of Governor Cabello, who decided to rebuild the Casas Reales (Royal Headquarters) and put new iron bars in the windows, tile floors in his residence, and construct new stables for the horses of the garrison. In order to carry out this program of improvements he had called upon the citizens living in San Antonio for contributions in accord with their means, assigning to each the minimum sum of fifty cents and a maximum of six *pesos*. The wretched inhabitants of Los Adaes had been unable to contribute more than fifty cents each, whereupon they had been required to work four days without pay. During this time they had not even been provided with food, and many of them too poor to furnish their own board had worked the required four days without food.

Up to this time they had not been assigned the lands promised them three years before and ordered for their use in June, 1779. "We have kept alive until the present," he declared, "by the hope that the promise made by your lordship would be fulfilled. But imperative necessity has compelled us to appeal again to your lordship's generous liberality, fearful that the inevitable hardships attendant upon misfortune may end our own lives beforehand." He complained that all appeals to the governor were answered by curses, threats, and ill-treatment. Father Salas of Mission Valero spent most of his time with the governor, and had worn a deep path from the mission to his residence. He had offered to give them the lands between Mission Valero and Concepción, but they had refused, mindful of the old Spanish proverb that a jar placed between two stones is soon crushed.<sup>16</sup>

The bold insinuations of Cervantes have to be taken with some reserve.

<sup>16</sup>Representations of Bernardo Cervantes to Croix, January 22, 1781. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 103-4-9 (Dunn Transcripts, 1777-1780), pp. 125-129.

Governor Cabello had too fine a record of service<sup>17</sup> to warrant giving serious consideration to the accusations of partisan treatment to the unfortunate settlers of Los Adaes. His hesitation in carrying out the order for secularization is to be found in his conviction that so radical and sweeping an innovation should come from the king. He was not sympathetic with the *Adaesanos* because he suspected their indolence and insistence on being taken care of by the government.

Croix was a bit disappointed to learn that his orders of June 8, 1779, had not been carried out. After consulting Galindo Navarro, he wrote a sharp note to Governor Cabello on March 21, 1781, ordering him to put into effect the former instructions given him for the secularization of Mission Valero.<sup>18</sup>

But apparently the second order met with no better observance than the first, and Mission Valero was not secularized at this time. Nevertheless, Croix reported the matter to the king on August 27, 1781, as an accomplished fact, asking for his approval. On May 6, of the following year, he was informed by José de Galvez that the settlement of the former inhabitants of Los Adaes on the lands of Mission Valero had been approved by the king. It was to be understood, however, that upon the conclusion of the war with the English now in progress (American Revolution) the *Adaesanos* were to be established in a new settlement on the San Marcos, a locality thought to be more advantageous for the purpose of defence of the province.<sup>19</sup> Thus the secularization of Mission Valero received royal approval, but in fact it was not carried out at this time. The approval in principle was an ominous portent that foretold the approaching end of the missions in Texas. They were soon to pass away and to become milestones in the history of the State.

<sup>17</sup>Governor Cabello was a native of old Castilla. He had risen from sub-lieutenant to the rank of Colonel from 1741 to 1777. He had seen service in Portugal, Toledo, and Havana, where he had fought bravely against the English in 1762, and was rewarded for his bravery by the appointment as governor of Nicaragua. From here he came to Texas. *A. G. I., Audiencia de Guadalajara*, 104-6-20 (Dunn Transcripts, 1777 to 1780), pp. 235-239.

<sup>18</sup>Croix to Governor Cabello, March 21, 1781. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, pp. 454-455.

<sup>19</sup>José de Galvez to Croix, May 6, 1782. *A. G. M., Historia*, Vol. 51, p. 457.

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